[🇧🇩] Bangladesh as a peace broker to establish peace in South Asia.

[Saif]

Date of Event: May 23, 2025

Source: https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/what-role-can-bangladesh-play-securing-peace-south-asia-3900046

What role can Bangladesh play in securing peace in South Asia?

VISUAL: SIFAT AFRIN SHAMS

The South Asian region has long been a theatre of enduring geopolitical tensions. Central to this is the perpetual rivalry between two nuclear-armed states: India and Pakistan. Their antagonism is cyclical, manifesting in military skirmishes, diplomatic stand-offs, and proxy conflicts. Amid this volatility, Bangladesh, though smaller in size, holds a strategically pivotal position that offers both opportunities and responsibilities in shaping regional peace.

The legacy of Bangladesh's late President Ziaur Rahman remains significant when discussing the regional peace architecture. It was under his leadership that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was conceived—a bold attempt to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among South Asian nations. At a time when India and Pakistan remained at odds, Zia's vision provided smaller countries with a platform to assert their identities and strategic interests independently.

Over time, this initiative lost its momentum, largely due to growing Indian influence in regional diplomacy. This shift diluted the very balance that once allowed Bangladesh to act as a neutral and independent voice. Recent democratic movements, especially the mass uprising of July, have sparked renewed interest in reviving SAARC and Bangladesh's mediating role—this time led by interim leadership under Professor Muhammad Yunus.

However, Bangladesh's role in regional peace must go beyond ceremonial diplomacy. The country has the potential to become a nucleus of new geopolitical equations, as war today is not confined to just borders; rather, it extends to economic systems, democratic institutions, and national identities. In this context, small states like Bangladesh face four key challenges: preserving political neutrality, ensuring national security, maintaining diplomatic balance, and sustaining economic resilience. These challenges must be tackled holistically, grounded in theory and practical statecraft.

From an international relations perspective, the theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism offer distinct frameworks for understanding how Bangladesh can chart its foreign policy. Realism emphasises power dynamics and survival, seeing the international system as anarchic and inherently prone to conflict, where states prioritise their security and interests. Liberalism, in contrast, advocates cooperation, institutions, and interdependence, suggesting that peace can be achieved through dialogue and mutual understanding, where shared interests guide international relations. Meanwhile, constructivism prioritises national identity, values, and historical memory, emphasising how collective ideas and self-perception influence foreign policy decisions.

In Bangladesh's case, shaped by its Liberation War, democratic aspirations, and the recent student uprising of July 2024, the constructivist approach resonates most strongly. By embracing its identity as a peace-seeking, democratic nation, Bangladesh has the potential to offer both a moral and strategic counterbalance to the power struggles in its region.

If Bangladesh can act as a catalyst in reviving SAARC, mediating between India and Pakistan, and promoting peaceful coexistence, it would set a precedent for the role of smaller states in conflict resolution. The present leadership—emerging from a popular uprising—has the historic opportunity to steer the region away from conflict and towards reconciliation. The aim must be to ensure that peace, not war, defines the subcontinental narrative.

Redefining strategic posture

Realism teaches that in times of regional conflict, smaller nation-states typically choose one of three paths: neutrality, balancing, or bandwagoning. Neutrality, as demonstrated by Switzerland and Sweden during World War II, allows smaller countries to preserve their internal stability by avoiding alignment with warring parties. Balancing, adopted by countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, involves seeking security through strategic alliances with more powerful nations. On the other hand, bandwagoning entails aligning with the stronger power for protection, though this strategy risks eroding diplomatic autonomy and independence.

Bangladesh, to maintain its sovereignty and strategic flexibility, must judiciously blend neutrality and balanced alliances without succumbing to dependency. From a liberal standpoint, Bangladesh can use regional institutions and multilateral platforms to mediate, reduce tension, and maintain diplomatic channels with both India and Pakistan. ASEAN-style diplomacy, as practised by Malaysia and Singapore, offers an effective model. Such a middle-ground strategy enables smaller states to act as peace brokers while expanding their global legitimacy.

Constructivism emphasises moral positioning and national identity. Bhutan, for instance, has maintained neutrality in Sino-Indian conflicts based on its cultural philosophy and non-aligned foreign policy. Similarly, Bangladesh's stance—rooted in the Liberation War, popular uprisings, and its resistance to autocracy—provides a solid foundation for a principled foreign policy that supports peace and justice over partisanship.

Besides, history provides numerous examples of small states effectively navigating conflicts around them. After Yugoslavia's disintegration, countries like Croatia and Slovenia emerged as sovereign states with significant international support. In Lebanon, neutrality during prolonged regional tensions was paired with reliance on UN peacekeeping missions. Latin American nations have also responded to neighbouring conflicts with economic diplomacy rather than militarisation.

Given the volatile nature of South Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh must adopt a multi-layered approach that begins with maintaining diplomatic neutrality by advocating international cooperation in addressing potential refugee crises, economic shocks, and regional insecurity. Alongside this, a recalibration of security is essential. Bangladesh needs to reassess its existing defence agreements and strategic partnerships to strengthen national defence capabilities without compromising its sovereignty or falling under external hegemony. Economic diversification is also crucial; by building resilient trade routes and sustaining balanced bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan, Bangladesh can better insulate itself from regional instability. Lastly, a firm moral commitment is indispensable. Upholding human rights, advancing peace advocacy, and adhering to international law will not only reinforce the country's international credibility but also contribute to durable and principled diplomacy.

As the second-largest economy in South Asia, Bangladesh's influence and global acceptance are growing—and with that comes responsibility. As India and Pakistan continue their zero-sum rivalry, Bangladesh must maintain a careful, prudent stance that reflects wisdom rather than warlike sentiment. Historical experiences show that Bangladesh's most potent political transformations have emerged from democratic mass movements. The July Uprising reinforced the strength of people's unity and resistance to external domination. But such victories must now be translated into stability, not further confrontation.

A worrying trend in recent years has been the rise of digitally manipulated hostility. Social media posts, misinformation campaigns, caricatures, and doctored content—often traced back to obscure or foreign-funded sources—seek to provoke anti-India sentiment or misrepresent Bangladesh on international platforms. Ironically, many of these campaigns serve interests within India itself, aiming to legitimise aggression through manufactured consent. In such an environment, Bangladesh must resist the temptation to react emotionally. Strategic patience, defence without aggression, and cool-headed diplomacy are the most effective tools against provocation.

As regional tensions rise, Bangladesh needs to institutionalise a proactive approach to crisis management. Establishing a strategic crisis management cell to anticipate and respond to potential geopolitical shocks can be vital. This cell would monitor emerging threats, such as border conflicts, refugee crises, or economic disruptions, and ensure a swift and coordinated national response. By streamlining decision-making processes and improving inter-agency cooperation, this entity can strengthen Bangladesh's ability to manage crises effectively. In addition to safeguarding national security, such a cell can bolster international trust by demonstrating Bangladesh's commitment to stability and preparedness in a volatile region. Through strategic planning and crisis foresight, Bangladesh can better navigate complex regional dynamics and assert itself as a reliable partner in international affairs.

Being a small state does not mean being a passive observer. Bangladesh has the potential to become a regional leader in peace-building by drawing on its history, values, and strategic location. With the right policies, moral compass, and institutional frameworks, it can transform its geopolitical vulnerability into a position of influence. As India and Pakistan continue their chess game of conflict, Bangladesh can and must choose the path of construction, dialogue, and peace. That will not only preserve its own sovereignty but serve as a guiding light for a troubled region.

Alauddin Mohammad is joint member secretary at the National Citizen Party (NCP), and executive director at the Institute of Policy, Governance and Development (IPGAD).​

 

[Saif]

How Bangladesh can balance ties with India and Pakistan

Bangladesh’s new government must carefully balance India and Pakistan ties to safeguard economic interests and strategic autonomy.

www.thedailystar.net

How Bangladesh can balance ties with India and Pakistan

Michael Kugelman

One of the biggest geopolitical questions for the new Tarique Rahman administration is how it will approach relations with Bangladesh’s two most important neighbours, India and Pakistan. The interim government period saw some major forward movement on improving what has always been a fragile relationship with Islamabad. By contrast, relations with New Delhi, which were rock-solid during the Sheikh Hasina era, took a major tumble.

Prime Minister Rahman has a strong incentive to patch up ties with New Delhi: Bangladesh’s sputtering economy would be well served by resetting relations with what has become the world’s fourth-largest economy. Additionally, Bangladesh’s restive border with India will be easier to manage if ties with New Delhi are smoother. Similarly, there are important existing collaborations to pursue, like the new Bangladesh-India-Nepal electricity-sharing agreement, and critical future negotiations to carry out, such as talks over shared rivers. These are likely to achieve more positive outcomes if bilateral ties are in a better place.

At the same time, Dhaka has much to gain from maintaining momentum in Bangladesh-Pakistan ties — even amid continued sensitivities rooted in Pakistan’s abhorrent actions during Bangladesh’s independence war. For example, recent progress with visa liberalisation and travel connectivity can bring commercial benefits to Bangladesh. Additionally, the two see eye to eye on important foreign policy issues, from supporting the revitalisation of SAARC and embracing middle powers like Turkey to strengthening ties with the Global South. There’s also some domestic political gains to be achieved from maintaining friendly ties with Islamabad: a large share of Bangladesh’s public harbours anti-India sentiment, and would likely welcome efforts meant to ensure Dhaka’s continued engagement with India’s bitter rival.

Fortunately, Dhaka can have it both ways. It can pursue a strategy of selective cooperation with both Islamabad and New Delhi: one that allows for robust engagement with each capital, while also avoiding taking steps with either relationship that could be imprudent or cause problems for the other.

With India, trade and economic cooperation is of the essence, as is close coordination on border security. But Dhaka can also draw the line. It can take care not to let India dictate or influence important Bangladesh foreign policy postures, such as pursuing warm ties with Beijing — and having a cordial relationship with Islamabad.

Cooperation on this front, combined with broader collaborations on knowledge sharing, constitute a relatively low hanging fruit that can potentially produce multiple positive outcomes for Dhaka. It can help advance partnership with Pakistan without causing consternation in New Delhi, especially as Dhaka will likely want to learn from India’s own DPI successes. It can serve as a confidence-building measure that could pave the way for future important but difficult discussions on government-to-government levels.

With Pakistan, it’s easy to identify what isn’t practical. If there’s a genuine desire to patch up ties with India, deepening defence cooperation with Islamabad would be prohibitively risky. And while establishing trade ties with Islamabad — a key achievement of the interim government — may make sense in principle, there are considerable constraints. One is geography, where there are no direct land routes, making direct overland trade infeasible. Another is a lack of comparative advantage: At least for now, each country prioritises similar exports, making them natural commercial competitors rather than partners.

A sweet spot for Pakistan-Bangladesh cooperation lies in what can best be described as knowledge exchanges — on government, but also non-government, levels. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s landmark visit to Dhaka last August set some of these exchanges in motion: The two sides launched a knowledge corridor meant to promote education and academic exchanges through the provision of scholarships and training for civil servants. Additionally, an MOU was signed between two prominent think tanks: the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, and Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.

There’s plenty of scope for expanding such collaborations. This important opportunity was highlighted, albeit indirectly, at two separate events hosted last month in Washington DC by the Atlantic Council. One featured Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Muhammad Aurangzeb, and the other featured his Bangladeshi counterpart, Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury.

Bangladesh and Pakistan face many shared development challenges — especially public health scourges like dengue, malnutrition, and tuberculosis, but also broader ones from poor agricultural productivity to climate change effects and persistent poverty. In his comments at the Atlantic Council, Aurangzeb spoke about how Pakistan has used tech innovations, especially digital public infrastructure (DPI), to tackle some of these challenges. Meanwhile, Khasru acknowledged in his remarks the massive economic challenges faced by his government, which Bangladesh’s onerous health and development challenges certainly don’t make any easier to tackle.

Fortunately, Dhaka can have it both ways. It can pursue a strategy of selective cooperation with both Islamabad and New Delhi: one that allows for robust engagement with each capital, while also avoiding taking steps with either relationship that could be imprudent or cause problems for the other.

Bangladesh’s new government is closely studying DPI success stories in other countries. Pakistan is a logical case to focus on — in part because this would continue the spirit of the knowledge exchanges prioritised in the bilateral relationship over the last year.

As my Atlantic Council colleague Imran Shauket recently wrote for Pakistan’s Daily Times, a logical next step would be for a delegation of Bangladeshi digital policy experts to visit Pakistan to learn more about Pakistan’s DPI journey and see what lessons can help inform the development of Bangladesh’s own DPI architecture. Such a delegation could perhaps be preceded and succeeded by an informal virtual dialogue between non-government experts from both countries.

Cooperation on this front, combined with broader collaborations on knowledge sharing, constitute a relatively low hanging fruit that can potentially produce multiple positive outcomes for Dhaka. It can help advance partnership with Pakistan without causing consternation in New Delhi, especially as Dhaka will likely want to learn from India’s own DPI successes. It can serve as a confidence-building measure that could pave the way for future important but difficult discussions on government-to-government levels, such those about Pakistani apologies and reparations tied to 1971. Most importantly, information-sharing and lessons-learned exercises on DPI can help move the needle forward on tackling serious, entrenched health and development challenges that hamper Bangladesh’s long-term growth. Furthermore, they can help advance Bangladesh’s reform agenda. DPI, if properly applied, can help in areas ranging from boosting tax revenue collection to increasing online financial transactions and thereby reducing corruption risks. Getting reforms right is an immediate priority to fulfill current obligations to the IMF, but it’s also a critical prerequisite for long-term growth.

Three years after Bangladesh’s independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman famously said that his country’s foreign policy principle is “friendship to all, malice toward none.” In the five decades that have followed, Bangladesh has achieved success in pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy. It has important relationships in both the developed world and the Global South, and it has balanced its friendly relations with rival pairings, including the US and Russia. However, it has frequently betrayed this policy when applied to the India-Pakistan rivalry, instead siding with one — including India in the Hasina era and Pakistan during the recent interim government period — over the other.

Bangladesh’s new government has an opportunity to correct this imbalance, through carefully calibrated diplomacy that maximises possibilities for cooperation — in spheres where it is both prudent and relatively low-risk—with both neighbors.

Michael Kugelman is resident senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.​

 

[Saif]

Who is ahead in the India–Pakistan ‘cold war’ over Bangladesh?

Given the realities of current geopolitics and domestic politics, it is also true that India probably no longer has the ability to maintain an exclusive relationship with Bangladesh. In some sectors, Pakistan or other countries may receive priority. Moreover, the two major geopolitical powers...

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Who is ahead in the India–Pakistan ‘cold war’ over Bangladesh?

Given the realities of current geopolitics and domestic politics, it is also true that India probably no longer has the ability to maintain an exclusive relationship with Bangladesh. In some sectors, Pakistan or other countries may receive priority. Moreover, the two major geopolitical powers, the United States and China, are also actively trying to secure influence across various sectors.

Saleh Uddin Ahmed

A small but significant piece of news published recently revealed that Pakistan has provided training to several senior Bangladeshi bureaucrats at Pakistan’s Civil Services Academy. Pakistan is bearing the full cost of the program. Although it has been described as training aimed at improving the “leadership and skills” of Bangladeshi officials, Pakistan’s objectives and potential benefits from it are much broader.

Bangladeshi bureaucrats play a major role in shaping the country’s trade and foreign policy, so training them is a significant opportunity for Pakistan. After Bangladesh’s independence, the opportunity, or privilege, of training Bangladeshi civil servants had effectively been monopolised by India.

India provided Bangladesh with wholehearted support and assistance during the Liberation War. Many people, however, have interpreted that support in different ways. Right-wing Bangladeshi politicians who opposed the independence struggle believe that India’s sole objective was to weaken Pakistan. Although independence was achieved through the Liberation War of 1971, a large pro-Pakistan political force continued to remain in Bangladesh.

On the other hand, after the Liberation War, a politics of friendship toward India naturally developed in Bangladesh under the leadership of Awami League. During the Pakistan era, India’s doors had been completely closed to the people of Bangladesh, but overnight, new horizons opened up in trade, diplomacy, tourism, and governmental cooperation with India.

At different times, after changes of government in Bangladesh, Pakistan tried to find new opportunities to rebuild ties with the country, while India tried to preserve the advantages it had already gained. Broadly speaking, however, relations with India remained relatively stable until the July movement. July brought a major transformation.

After the July mass uprising, many of the institutional frameworks underpinning India–Bangladesh relations, including agreements related to the training of civil servants, collapsed. It can be said that during the Yunus government, relations with India deteriorated in almost every sector except import trade. Problems emerged regarding visas, tourism, diplomacy, land corridors, and even cricket ties.

Following the July mass uprising, Bangladesh’s Gen-Z generation became sharply anti-India. In this context, Pakistan has, from the very beginning of the Yunus government, tried to build a new framework for relations with Bangladesh.

Professor Yunus was also seen as a willing partner of Pakistan, having met the Pakistani prime minister several times. Pakistan also found supportive attitudes among Bangladesh’s political parties. Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP are strongly pro-Pakistan, and even BNP cannot really be described as anti-Pakistan. In fact, in Bangladesh’s 55-year history, the period of the interim government has been the most favorable environment for Pakistan to improve relations with Bangladesh.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Bangladesh during the Yunus government. He personally met leaders of BNP, Jamaat, and NCP at their homes. Pakistan’s commerce minister also accompanied him. Trade agreements were signed, along with various friendship agreements. However, it cannot be denied that while the ministers’ visit was warm and cordial, the agreements themselves were not equally productive. The reason is that Pakistan’s economic structure is not well suited to sustaining large-scale import-export trade.

At the time, India could do very little. It was waiting for Bangladesh’s election and the formation of a new government. After the death of Begum Khaleda Zia, India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar came to Bangladesh to offer condolences and signaled that India would be willing to normalise relations if BNP came to power.

On one hand, Bangladesh now has a new government; on the other, the geopolitics of the region are changing rapidly. Against this backdrop, both India and Pakistan have shown certain advantages and limitations in improving relations with Bangladesh.

India’s disadvantages

India shares a very long border with Bangladesh. Although there is no territorial dispute over the border itself, issues such as smuggling, illegal crossings, push-ins, and the killing of Bangladeshis at the border periodically create severe bitterness on both sides. The sharing of water from the Ganges and Teesta rivers has also been a long-standing problem between the two countries. There is no easy solution to this issue, and hostility continues to grow.

BJP’s anti-Muslim politics, along with isolated incidents involving the suffering of Hindus in Bangladesh, also periodically generate intense tension and dissatisfaction among the people of both countries. The strong rise of right-wing politics in Bangladesh has become somewhat uncomfortable for India. In the absence of the Awami League, there is currently no major pro-India political party in Bangladesh. BNP can be described as pragmatic, it may lean in whichever direction circumstances require.

India’s advantages

India’s biggest advantage is its strong economic infrastructure. As a result, India has long maintained a dominant position in supplying consumer goods and electricity to Bangladesh. The shared border also offers major advantages. Transportation costs for imports and exports are lower, and both countries are able to use each other’s land corridors for their own needs. Various destinations in India are also quite popular among Bangladeshis for affordable medical treatment and tourism facilities.

Pakistan’s advantages

The political forces in Bangladesh that are sympathetic to Pakistan and were suppressed during the Awami League era are now closer to the centers of power. In the absence of Awami League, they have emerged as alternative political forces in the country. This has created a major opportunity for Pakistan.

Pakistan has also gained new international recognition as a mediator in the Iran war. This has worked positively for Pakistan’s interests in various bilateral understandings. In addition, Bangladesh has an interest in building up its own defence system, which could create a major opportunity for Pakistan in the future.

Pakistan’s disadvantages

Pakistan has never formally apologised for the genocide of 1971. In addition, there remains the issue of the large amount of assets owed by Pakistan to Bangladesh. These issues have repeatedly become major obstacles to improving relations between the two countries. Pakistan also lacks the production capacity and commercial infrastructure needed to meet Bangladesh’s import demands. This is Pakistan’s biggest limitation.

Although Bangladesh has many points of bitterness with India, India’s geographical position and strong commercial infrastructure help support improved relations with Bangladesh. On the other hand, Pakistan’s biggest obstacle is the weakness of its commercial infrastructure.

Ensuring an uninterrupted supply of essential goods for Bangladesh’s 170 million people is the highest priority for any government. Shortages of rice, lentils, onions, and other staples often destabilize the country’s internal balance. Even during the Yunus government’s intense anti-India stance, imports of goods from India still increased by 7.8 per cent.

Prominent Indian journalist Gautam Lahiri said that Indian government circles believe Bangladesh’s growing closeness with Pakistan and China could affect bilateral relations
However, Pakistan does have one advantage: the possibility of cooperation in Bangladesh’s defence sector. Even that, however, is not certain to be realistic. Given the extent to which the Pakistani military interferes in its own country’s politics, it is also worth considering whether its involvement could increase instability in Bangladeshi politics.

After the election, the BNP government moved quickly to improve relations with India.

As long as Bangladesh does not achieve self-sufficiency in electricity and the production of various essential goods, dependence on India will remain unavoidable. Based on the experience of the Yunus government period, it can be said that repairing the collapsed frameworks with India is far easier than building entirely new frameworks with Pakistan. That said, Pakistan is not giving up, and the rivalry continues.

In a recent interview, prominent Indian journalist Gautam Lahiri said that Indian government circles believe Bangladesh’s growing closeness with Pakistan and China could affect bilateral relations.

A few days ago, a report in the Pakistani newspaper Pakistan Observer claimed that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir may visit Bangladesh on a three-day trip. The main purpose of their visit would reportedly be discussions focused on trade and defence cooperation. However, the Pakistani embassy in Dhaka denied the report. It is believed that no final details regarding the visit will be settled until Prime Minister Tarique Rahman completes his visit to China.

Meanwhile, in the context of the Iran war, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has spoken about the idea of an “Islamic NATO” led by nuclear-armed Pakistan. He said discussions on the matter are taking place among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. Bangladesh will certainly watch such an arrangement carefully. If such an alliance succeeds, Pakistan’s position would become significantly stronger.

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan faces several major obstacles in building deep relations with Bangladesh. In other words, in the tug-of-war over relations with Bangladesh, India currently appears to hold the advantage.

At the same time, given the realities of current geopolitics and domestic politics, it is also true that India probably no longer has the ability to maintain an exclusive relationship with Bangladesh. In some sectors, Pakistan or other countries may receive priority. Moreover, the two major geopolitical powers, the United States and China, are also actively trying to secure influence across various sectors.

* Saleh Uddin Ahmed is teacher, writer, and political analyst.​