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<blockquote data-quote="Saif" data-source="post: 82254" data-attributes="member: 7"><p>[URL unfurl="true"]https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/315441/primacy-of-intellectual-foundation-ii[/URL]</p><p></p><p style="text-align: justify"><strong><span style="font-size: 18px">Primacy of intellectual foundation – II</span></strong></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Mohammad Abdur Razzak 27 September, 2026, 00:00</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">[ATTACH=full]29438[/ATTACH]</p> <p style="text-align: justify">A file photo shows an army contingent leaving on a UN peacekeeping mission in 2022. | Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">BANGLADESH lacks the think tanks, strategic studies institutes and civilian defence intellectuals that in other nations provide for the continuity of strategic thought and serve as a bridge between political leadership and military expertise. Consequently, defence planning has been episodic and personality-driven rather than systematic and enduring, with each administration’s approach reflecting the preferences of the military leadership of the moment rather than accumulated strategic wisdom.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify"><strong>Modernisation</strong></p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">BANGLADESH’S Forces Goal 2030, initiated in 2009 and revised in 2017, represents a fundamentally different approach to defence development. The programme was designed to enhance the capabilities of the Bangladesh Armed Forces through restructuring, expansion and acquisition of advanced equipment. Its principal purposes were to set development priorities, ensure consistency in development undertakings, yield the best value for investment in defence and promote indigenous manufacturing.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">A closer examination reveals a troubling absence. As Global Security notes, details of Forces Goal 2030 are ‘extremely sparse and fragmentary.’ The programme has been described as fundamentally the ‘preferred choices’ rather than the product of a coherent national strategic vision.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">The defence policy framework has been weak and discontinuous. Only in 2018, Bangladesh approved its first defence policy document since independence: the National Defence Policy 2018. This means, for more than four decades, Bangladesh’s armed forces operated without a formal strategic policy framework.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">The National Defence Policy 2018, a significant advancement, came nearly a decade after Forces Goal 2030 had been initiated. The modernisation programme was, thus, launched without the policy foundation that should have guided it. Capabilities were pursued before the intellectual framework that should have given them purpose and coherence.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify"><strong>Consequences</strong></p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">THE absence of a robust intellectual foundation has had predictable consequences. First, force modernisation has been heavily import-dependent, with a review of acquisitions revealing that ‘activities linking transformation and indigenisation are missing.’ The modernisation is characterised by procurement from a range of countries without a coherent industrial strategy to build domestic capacity.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Second, the programme has been viewed as reflecting ‘preferences’ rather than a unified strategic vision. This is the natural consequence of modernisation in the absence of an intellectual architecture that would subordinate service-specific interests to national strategic requirements.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Third, while individual platforms, including new infantry divisions, warships, and aircraft, have been acquired, Bangladesh remains a nation with modest military capabilities relative to its regional neighbours and strategic challenges.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Fourth, and most significant, Bangladesh has not developed the strategic culture and societal consensus that sustains effective defence in the long term. The relationship between military institutions and civilian society remains contested, with periodic interventions in politics.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Fifth, inextricably linked to the preceding points, the absence of a robust intellectual foundation has coincided with, and arguably enabled the dramatic involvement in commercial enterprises, a development that fundamentally compromises the institution’s martial character. What began as welfare trusts for retired personnel is evolving into a sprawling corporate empire. The army has been running many profit-making businesses under its welfare trust, Sena Kalyan Sangstha. Experiences of Pakistan, Myanmar and Indonesia, where militaries run vast corporate empires, demonstrate that self-generated resources often ‘prod the armed forces to take an abiding interest in the politics of the country, often undermining the institutions that support and sustain public participation in the process of nation-building.’</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify"><strong>Recent developments</strong></p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">THE 2024 political changeover and the subsequent change in government have created an opportunity for reassessment. The new administration has signalled its intention to reshape the forces and formulate a modern national security strategy, reflecting Bangladesh’s realities, national interests and future threat.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Critics have noted that the Forces Goal 2030 plan needs re-evaluation under current strategic realities. The geopolitical landscape has shifted, with India’s assertive posturing, China’s growing regional influence and the shifting Indo-Pacific strategic architecture; and, importantly, the social security burden of 1.3 million Rohingyas all demand a more sophisticated strategic response.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Several interlocking factors have persistently impeded the development of a robust intellectual foundation for defence in Bangladesh. The legacy of military interventions in civilian governance has fundamentally distorted the relationship between military institutions and the state. This history has fostered a culture where the armed forces have operated with considerable institutional autonomy, often shaping defence priorities from within rather than being guided by a coherent political strategic vision.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">The absence of a strong, institutionalised civilian defence policy establishment has compounded this problem. The dominance of service-specific rather than joint perspectives has further fragmented the intellectual foundation. The three services — the army, the navy and the air force — have historically pursued their own modernisation trajectories with very limited integration under a unified strategic concept. This is evident in the character of Forces Goal 2030, which critics have described as reflecting the preferred choices of individual service than a coherent, joint vision for national defence. The absence of a robust joint doctrine, a framework that would subordinate closed-minded service interests to overarching national strategic requirements, has meant that procurement decisions, force structuring, and training have proceeded along parallel rather than convergent lines. The result is a military that has acquired individual platforms and capabilities without developing the operational concepts and integrated command structures necessary to employ them effectively as a unified force.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">THE geopolitical position has also contributed to this intellectual deficit in ways distinct from smaller states facing existential threats. Situated between India and Myanmar, with the Bay of Bengal to the south and China’s influence extending westward, Bangladesh confronts a complex but diffuse security environment where no single, clear-cut threat has compelled the kind of strategic clarity that existential vulnerability demands. The perception of manageable rather than imminent peril has allowed successive governments as well military leaderships to defer the difficult intellectual work of articulating a comprehensive defence doctrine, prioritising immediate political concerns over long-term strategic thinking. This has been further reinforced by the politicisation of the security discourse, where defence issues have often been framed through the lens of domestic political contestation rather than national strategic interest.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Even the landmark National Defence Policy 2018, while representing a significant step forward, came more than four decades after independence and nearly a decade after the initiation of Forces Goal 2030, underscoring the extent to which capability development outpaced and proceeded in the absence of the policy foundation that should have guided it. The cumulative effect of these impediments has been a defence establishment that possesses growing material capabilities but lacks the intellectual architecture — the coherent doctrine, the unifying policy framework, the institutionalised strategic culture, necessary to transform those capabilities into genuine national power.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify"><strong>Conclusion</strong></p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">THE Singapore case studies demonstrate that the intellectual foundation of defence is not an optional extra but a requisite for effective force development. Doctrine, policy, industrial strategy and strategic culture provide for the conceptual architecture that gives military capabilities purpose, direction, and sustainability.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Singapore’s experience shows that even a small state with limited resources can build a credible military if it first develops a clear intellectual framework. Lee Kuan Yew understood the work of thinking. Defining threats, articulating principles and designing institutions must precede the work of building. The Singapore Armed Forces is the product not just of budget and procurement but of decades of intellectual labour that has kept the force aligned with strategic realities.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Bangladesh’s experience offers a cautionary tale. Forces Goal 2030, conceived without a robust policy or doctrinal foundation, has yielded material expansion rather than transformational change. The programme’s import dependence, service-specific orientation and limited strategic coherence reflect the absence of the intellectual architecture that should have guided it.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">The contemporary strategic environment, characterised by geopolitical competition, technological disruption and hybrid threats make the intellectual foundation of defence more important than ever. The nations that fail to invest in strategic thinking, doctrinal development and policy coherence will find themselves acquiring capabilities that do not serve their purposes while those that prioritise the intellectual work will be better positioned to build forces that are fit for purpose.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Concluded.</p> <p style="text-align: justify"></p> <p style="text-align: justify">Mohammad Abdur Razzak (<a href="mailto:safera690@gmail.com">safera690@gmail.com</a>), a retired commodore of Bangladesh Navy, is a strategic affairs analyst.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Saif, post: 82254, member: 7"] [URL unfurl="true"]https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/315441/primacy-of-intellectual-foundation-ii[/URL] [JUSTIFY][B][SIZE=5]Primacy of intellectual foundation – II[/SIZE][/B] Mohammad Abdur Razzak 27 September, 2026, 00:00 [ATTACH type="full" width="544px" size="1024x580"]29438[/ATTACH] A file photo shows an army contingent leaving on a UN peacekeeping mission in 2022. | Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha BANGLADESH lacks the think tanks, strategic studies institutes and civilian defence intellectuals that in other nations provide for the continuity of strategic thought and serve as a bridge between political leadership and military expertise. Consequently, defence planning has been episodic and personality-driven rather than systematic and enduring, with each administration’s approach reflecting the preferences of the military leadership of the moment rather than accumulated strategic wisdom. [B]Modernisation[/B] BANGLADESH’S Forces Goal 2030, initiated in 2009 and revised in 2017, represents a fundamentally different approach to defence development. The programme was designed to enhance the capabilities of the Bangladesh Armed Forces through restructuring, expansion and acquisition of advanced equipment. Its principal purposes were to set development priorities, ensure consistency in development undertakings, yield the best value for investment in defence and promote indigenous manufacturing. A closer examination reveals a troubling absence. As Global Security notes, details of Forces Goal 2030 are ‘extremely sparse and fragmentary.’ The programme has been described as fundamentally the ‘preferred choices’ rather than the product of a coherent national strategic vision. The defence policy framework has been weak and discontinuous. Only in 2018, Bangladesh approved its first defence policy document since independence: the National Defence Policy 2018. This means, for more than four decades, Bangladesh’s armed forces operated without a formal strategic policy framework. The National Defence Policy 2018, a significant advancement, came nearly a decade after Forces Goal 2030 had been initiated. The modernisation programme was, thus, launched without the policy foundation that should have guided it. Capabilities were pursued before the intellectual framework that should have given them purpose and coherence. [B]Consequences[/B] THE absence of a robust intellectual foundation has had predictable consequences. First, force modernisation has been heavily import-dependent, with a review of acquisitions revealing that ‘activities linking transformation and indigenisation are missing.’ The modernisation is characterised by procurement from a range of countries without a coherent industrial strategy to build domestic capacity. Second, the programme has been viewed as reflecting ‘preferences’ rather than a unified strategic vision. This is the natural consequence of modernisation in the absence of an intellectual architecture that would subordinate service-specific interests to national strategic requirements. Third, while individual platforms, including new infantry divisions, warships, and aircraft, have been acquired, Bangladesh remains a nation with modest military capabilities relative to its regional neighbours and strategic challenges. Fourth, and most significant, Bangladesh has not developed the strategic culture and societal consensus that sustains effective defence in the long term. The relationship between military institutions and civilian society remains contested, with periodic interventions in politics. Fifth, inextricably linked to the preceding points, the absence of a robust intellectual foundation has coincided with, and arguably enabled the dramatic involvement in commercial enterprises, a development that fundamentally compromises the institution’s martial character. What began as welfare trusts for retired personnel is evolving into a sprawling corporate empire. The army has been running many profit-making businesses under its welfare trust, Sena Kalyan Sangstha. Experiences of Pakistan, Myanmar and Indonesia, where militaries run vast corporate empires, demonstrate that self-generated resources often ‘prod the armed forces to take an abiding interest in the politics of the country, often undermining the institutions that support and sustain public participation in the process of nation-building.’ [B]Recent developments[/B] THE 2024 political changeover and the subsequent change in government have created an opportunity for reassessment. The new administration has signalled its intention to reshape the forces and formulate a modern national security strategy, reflecting Bangladesh’s realities, national interests and future threat. Critics have noted that the Forces Goal 2030 plan needs re-evaluation under current strategic realities. The geopolitical landscape has shifted, with India’s assertive posturing, China’s growing regional influence and the shifting Indo-Pacific strategic architecture; and, importantly, the social security burden of 1.3 million Rohingyas all demand a more sophisticated strategic response. Several interlocking factors have persistently impeded the development of a robust intellectual foundation for defence in Bangladesh. The legacy of military interventions in civilian governance has fundamentally distorted the relationship between military institutions and the state. This history has fostered a culture where the armed forces have operated with considerable institutional autonomy, often shaping defence priorities from within rather than being guided by a coherent political strategic vision. The absence of a strong, institutionalised civilian defence policy establishment has compounded this problem. The dominance of service-specific rather than joint perspectives has further fragmented the intellectual foundation. The three services — the army, the navy and the air force — have historically pursued their own modernisation trajectories with very limited integration under a unified strategic concept. This is evident in the character of Forces Goal 2030, which critics have described as reflecting the preferred choices of individual service than a coherent, joint vision for national defence. The absence of a robust joint doctrine, a framework that would subordinate closed-minded service interests to overarching national strategic requirements, has meant that procurement decisions, force structuring, and training have proceeded along parallel rather than convergent lines. The result is a military that has acquired individual platforms and capabilities without developing the operational concepts and integrated command structures necessary to employ them effectively as a unified force. THE geopolitical position has also contributed to this intellectual deficit in ways distinct from smaller states facing existential threats. Situated between India and Myanmar, with the Bay of Bengal to the south and China’s influence extending westward, Bangladesh confronts a complex but diffuse security environment where no single, clear-cut threat has compelled the kind of strategic clarity that existential vulnerability demands. The perception of manageable rather than imminent peril has allowed successive governments as well military leaderships to defer the difficult intellectual work of articulating a comprehensive defence doctrine, prioritising immediate political concerns over long-term strategic thinking. This has been further reinforced by the politicisation of the security discourse, where defence issues have often been framed through the lens of domestic political contestation rather than national strategic interest. Even the landmark National Defence Policy 2018, while representing a significant step forward, came more than four decades after independence and nearly a decade after the initiation of Forces Goal 2030, underscoring the extent to which capability development outpaced and proceeded in the absence of the policy foundation that should have guided it. The cumulative effect of these impediments has been a defence establishment that possesses growing material capabilities but lacks the intellectual architecture — the coherent doctrine, the unifying policy framework, the institutionalised strategic culture, necessary to transform those capabilities into genuine national power. [B]Conclusion[/B] THE Singapore case studies demonstrate that the intellectual foundation of defence is not an optional extra but a requisite for effective force development. Doctrine, policy, industrial strategy and strategic culture provide for the conceptual architecture that gives military capabilities purpose, direction, and sustainability. Singapore’s experience shows that even a small state with limited resources can build a credible military if it first develops a clear intellectual framework. Lee Kuan Yew understood the work of thinking. Defining threats, articulating principles and designing institutions must precede the work of building. The Singapore Armed Forces is the product not just of budget and procurement but of decades of intellectual labour that has kept the force aligned with strategic realities. Bangladesh’s experience offers a cautionary tale. Forces Goal 2030, conceived without a robust policy or doctrinal foundation, has yielded material expansion rather than transformational change. The programme’s import dependence, service-specific orientation and limited strategic coherence reflect the absence of the intellectual architecture that should have guided it. The contemporary strategic environment, characterised by geopolitical competition, technological disruption and hybrid threats make the intellectual foundation of defence more important than ever. The nations that fail to invest in strategic thinking, doctrinal development and policy coherence will find themselves acquiring capabilities that do not serve their purposes while those that prioritise the intellectual work will be better positioned to build forces that are fit for purpose. Concluded. Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([EMAIL]safera690@gmail.com[/EMAIL]), a retired commodore of Bangladesh Navy, is a strategic affairs analyst.[/JUSTIFY] [/QUOTE]
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