| Global Defense, OSINT & Geopolitics Wire

[🇧🇩] Judiciary of Bangladesh.

[🇧🇩] Judiciary of Bangladesh.
81
5K
More threads by Saif

G Bangladesh Defense

Judiciary still under dual administration

M Moneruzzaman . Dhaka


1793492954601.webp



The lower judiciary continues to face a dual administration, with the law, justice division and the Supreme Court sharing the control over judicial officers even 19 years after its formal separation from the executive organ of the state.

Although the separation, which took effect on November 1, 2007 during the military-backed interim government, replaced executive magistrates with judicial officers to run the judicial magistracy, the controlling authority over the lower court judges has yet to be fully transferred to the Supreme Court.

Legal experts said successive governments failed to take effective initiatives to end the dual administration despite making commitments to ensure judicial independence in their electoral manifestos.

Senior lawyer Manzill Murshid said that the continuation of dual administration, with the law ministry retaining control over subordinate court judges’ postings, transfers and other service matters, kept preventing them from exercising judicial functions independently.


- BNP election manifesto pledges judicial independence

- JS repeals SC secretariat, SC judge appointment ords on April 10

- SC secretariat abolished on May 19

Successive governments have failed to implement their commitments to ensure judicial independence, he said, pointing to the cancellation of the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance by the current government.

The issue gained renewed attention following the repeal of the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance by the parliament on April 10 and the abolition of the Supreme Court Secretariat on May 19.

The ordinance was issued on November 30, 2025 and the secretariat began functioning on December 11, 2025, placing the administration of the lower judiciary under the Supreme Court, during the interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus.

The repeal of the ordinance placed the lower judiciary under the dual administration.

The July National Charter 2025 also proposed constitutional reforms to ensure judicial independence, including amendment to Article 116 of the constitution to place the control and discipline of subordinate court judges entirely under the Supreme Court.

Senior Supreme Court lawyer ZI Khan Panna said that the separation of the judiciary from the executive remained incomplete, as no government was willing to relinquish its control over the subordinate courts.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party in its election manifesto 2025 pledged to ensure judicial independence through several measures, including constitutional amendments vesting the control over the service terms and conditions of subordinate court judges entirely in the Supreme Court.

Senior lawyer Shahdeen Malik told New Age on Saturday that there was no visible progress in implementing the BNP’s electoral pledge to ensure judicial independence.

He acknowledged that implementing the pledge was a complicated and time-consuming process.

The government, however, can transfer control and supervision of subordinate courts entirely to the Supreme Court by amending Article 116 of the constitution, he said.

‘We need foreign investment and investors, for which judicial independence and impartial justice system are essential,’ Shahdeen said.

‘Unless judicial independence and fair justice are ensured, investors will not come. Ensuring judicial independence, therefore, also has an economic dimension,’ he added.

Legislation is also needed to regulate the appointment of Supreme Court judges, he said, expressing hope that the necessary reforms would be completed within three to four months.

The Supreme Court Judge Appointment Ordinance, issued on January 21, 2025, introduced a Supreme Judicial Appointment Council chaired by the chief justice to ensure transparent and merit-based appointments. Under the system, 26 additional High Court judges and two Appellate Division judges were appointed.

The Jatiya Sangsad, however, repealed this ordinance as well on April 10, 2026.

The Parliamentary Special Committee, formed on March 12 to scrutinise 133 ordinances issued by the interim government, opposed both the ordinances on SC secretariat and the SC judges’ appointment.

The committee argued that the sharing of control over the lower judiciary ensured a balance of powers and the appointment council would curtail the government’s representation and the president’s authority in the appointment of Supreme Court judges.

The reforms were initiated following recommendations of the Judicial Reform Commission and a roadmap announced by then chief justice Syed Refaat Ahmed in September 2024.

Former Judicial Service Association secretary general and former senior district and sessions judge Shahjahan Saju urged the government to enact a new law and establish a separate Supreme Court Secretariat to end executive control over the lower judiciary.

Bangladesh formally separated the judiciary from the executive on November 1, 2007, following the Appellate Division’s 12-point directive in the Masder Hossain case.​
 

Institutional autonomy must for judiciary: Justice Refaat

Shahiduzzaman

Justice Syed Refaat Ahmed, the immediate past chief justice, speaks about the institutional autonomy and financial independence of the judiciary with Shahiduzzaman in an interview with New Age

New Age: In your Dhaka University lecture, you have described the constitution as a reflection of the nation’s historical memory, struggles and aspirations. How should that constitutional identity shape the process of judicial reform, especially after the 2024?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
I think the message that came out from the July-August 2024 monsoon revolution was that the people had overwhelmingly called for a break from the shortcomings of our constitutional past. But, that did not necessarily mean an outright rejection of the constitution or of the constitutional ideals that have shaped us as a nation. It, rather, called for a critical re-evaluation of those ideals and, where necessary, their restructuring so that they could respond to aspirations for a new state structure.

It was in that spirit that during the 17 months when I served as chief justice, the Supreme Court became a nerve centre and a hub of reformist activity, even predating the creation and the functioning of the reform commissions in late 2024.

By September and October 2024, the Supreme Court had prepared proposals for two significant pieces of reform legislation. This was not, strictly speaking, part of its conventional constitutional mandate, but the circumstances were exceptional and called for an institutional response. Those initiatives ultimately bore fruit in the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance in November 2025 and, even earlier, in the Supreme Judicial Appointment Council Ordinance, which came into effect in January 2025, the first institutional mechanism of its kind in Bangladesh’s history.

The proposals were sent to the law ministry and were subjected to extensive consideration and exchange over the months that followed. This was not a unilateral exercise. There was a continuing exchange of ideas involving the Supreme Court, the law ministry and other stakeholders. The views of the more than 2,000 judges serving in the judicial service were sought, as were those of the judges of both the divisions of the Supreme Court.

The resulting reforms concerning an independent Supreme Court Secretariat and a structured mechanism for judicial appointments were, therefore, not merely administrative innovations. They represented, in a very practical sense, an attempt to respond to the constitutional moment of 2024, not by abandoning our constitutional identity but by re-engaging with it, correcting its institutional shortcomings and seeking to translate its enduring ideals into more credible and resilient institutions.

New Age: The Supreme Court Secretariat was established, but was subsequently scrapped and the ordinances were also repealed. What does that episode tell you about the difficulty of achieving durable judicial reform?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
We were dealing with a new constitutional reality. As I said, the July uprising had created a constitutional moment and, with it, an opportunity to address some of the institutional shortcomings of the past. From the perspective of the judiciary, the imperative was to look forward and to translate that opportunity into meaningful institutional reform.

I think, with the benefit of hindsight, it was not for want of effort on the part of either the Supreme Court or the executive of the time. It was, rather, also a matter of time. My own tenure as chief justice was limited and reforms of this nature needed time to take root institutionally.

This was one of those rare occasions in our constitutional history when there were both an expectation and an opportunity to do something new. We sought to respond to that opportunity through the reforms we initiated. But, institutional change does not become entrenched merely through the adoption of laws or the creation of new structures. It needs time to become part of institutional practice and, ultimately, to become embedded in our constitutional and political psyche. In that sense, I think we simply did not have enough time.

New Age: You have argued that the judiciary needs institutional autonomy in appointment, administration, financing and organisational management. Which of these areas remain the weakest and what to do?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
What remains after March 2026 is, arguably, decisional independence. Judges are, by and large, independent in arriving at reasoned judgements, exercising their judicial discretion and applying established precedent and, of course, the law. That essential element of judicial independence is there.

What remains weak, however, are the other components of institutional autonomy that are necessary to give decisional independence a firm and sustainable foundation. These include, particularly, institutional arrangements concerning judicial appointment and the administration and organisational management of the judiciary.

The Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance and the Supreme Judicial Appointment Council Ordinance sought to provide for that institutional framework. Those arrangements are no longer in place. So, in my view, the task ahead is to revisit these areas and develop durable institutional mechanisms that can place decisional independence on a firmer foundation.

New Age: The judicial reform commission recommended amending Article 116. Can a genuine judicial independence be achieved without fundamentally changing Article 116?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
I will guarded my response in this regard because it is and necessarily so, because this is a matter still to be decided on finally by the Appellate Division. My views on the current functioning of Article 116 are fairly well-recorded. I will direct you to what I said in my address of September 21, 2024.

More significantly, there was a discussion on the life and the legacy of Barrister Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed on his death anniversary in the Supreme Court Bar Association auditorium on July 17, 2025. In the course of the discussions, we had to sort of delve deep into the legacy of the Masdar Hossain case.

And whenever you talk about the Masdar Hossain case, unavoidably Articles 109 and 116 come up for discussion. My view was that I wholly subscribe to the views and reasoning of Justice Mustafa Kamal in that judgement. Article 116 breeds and perpetuates a dual system of control of the judiciary. There is a dyarchy, as Justice Mustafa Kamal described it, and that observation remains an important part of our judicial discourse. But, the larger and continuing aspiration is to secure a meaningful institutional autonomy for the judiciary. That is why I say that institutional autonomy is a must for the judiciary.

New Age: The commission proposed an independent mechanism for appointing Supreme Court judges. How should such a mechanism be structured to ensure merit and transparency while preventing political influence from simply shifting from one institution to another?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
This issue was thoroughly considered through a collaborative effort between the Supreme Court and the law ministry from as early as 2024. We were guided by established norms and standards that have increasingly gained recognition globally.

Very early on, we decided to create an appointment procedure that would insulate judicial selection from undue political or other external influence. That took shape in the Supreme Judicial Appointment Council Ordinance, which came into effect in January 2025 and had functioned for nearly 15 months.

Under that ordinance, around mid-2025, there was a substantial intake of judges to the High Court Division. By all accounts, that round of appointment was very positively received. Merit, professional experience and suitability were at the centre of the selection process, with due regard also given to the political neutrality expected of judicial office.

Equally important was the process. It was designed to be transparent rather than conducted behind closed doors. The law provided for a public notice inviting applications from qualified individuals, followed by careful scrutiny through a collegial process.

The council was headed by the incumbent chief justice and included the second most senior judge of the Appellate Division, one retired Appellate Division judge, two senior judges of the High Court Division, the attorney general and a leading academic in the field of law. Its composition was, therefore, predominantly judicial while also incorporating perspectives from outside the judiciary.

The strength of the mechanism, in my view, lay in that combination: judicial leadership with institutional inclusivity, alongside public notice, transparent scrutiny and merit-based assessment. These features provided safeguards against undue influence from any quarters and prevented the appointment process from becoming concentrated in any single institution.

The appointments made through that process were widely appreciated and welcomed.

New Age: What accountability mechanism would you consider appropriate for judges without allowing complaints of disciplinary proceedings to become a means of political pressure?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
Well, at the level of the Supreme Court, along with our final decision arrived at by the Appellate Division on the 16th amendment review case, we cleared the way for the revival of the Supreme Judicial Council, which is the in-house disciplinary body of the Supreme Court.

And, that, I think, on revival around late 2024, immediately went into action. I think that if you go back to our records of that period up until January 2026, the Supreme Judicial Council was operating with fair regularity.

Several cases were decided on leading to the removal of judges. Certain pending cases pertaining to various judges led not to removal, but they submitted their resignation during the pendency of the cases. So, that was resolved without any interference from the executive.

As far as judicial officers are concerned, the issue of discipline was covered in the secretariat ordinance, but it came with a caveat. That was Section 7, which is effectively based on Article 116.

It said that the entire secretariat ordinance would come into effect immediately, which it did on November 30, 2024 and with the exception of the control and discipline of subordinate court judges, that provision would only come into effect later on through another official notification after there was satisfaction in all quarters, including the government, that the secretariat was operating to its full potential and with satisfaction. That was the only condition that was written into the secretariat ordinance. However, the secretariat was not given enough time to prove itself whether it would function to its full potential as envisaged in the law and which would, thereby, lead to the removal of this caveat in due course. We will never know. But, the possibility was there.

New Age: The commission proposed financial independence for the judiciary. You also emphasised financial and organisational autonomy. Can the judiciary be genuinely independent without financial independence?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
It is a fundamental question that goes to the heart of why the judiciary should be the master of its own destiny. When I came into office, and following my September 2024 address, what we devised at the Supreme Court, together with our stakeholders, was a series of reform roadshows across the country. We went to all the divisional cities, in some cases more than once, and covered several districts as well.

Our purpose was twofold. First, we wanted to see the situation on the ground. This was not only an issue of judicial independence. It was also about logistics and infrastructure. Second, we wanted to engage with all our constituents — litigants, judges and citizens generally.

We looked not only at constitutional or legal access to the justice delivery system, but also at physical and financial access: legal aid, accessibility and how we could better assist people who, because of disability or marginalisation, face difficulties in obtaining proper legal advice or accessing the courts.

What struck me was that a great deal of good work had been done over the years, nearly 54 years into our independence, but there was no consistency of approach. Certain divisions and districts had excellent facilities, in some instances world-class facilities, while those facilities were absent elsewhere. There was no uniform approach to assessing needs on the ground.

That, I think, was one of the strengths of the secretariat ordinance. The judiciary must be able to identify, assess and evaluate its own institutional needs. That necessarily includes a financial assessment of the resources required to implement its programmes, priorities and proposals.

Beyond that, there was the larger issue of developing, for the first time, an effective institutional policy: what should be the philosophical and structural basis of the judiciary over the next five to 10 years? We believed that such planning could only be undertaken effectively if the necessary institutional decision-making capacity was located within the judiciary.

We received a positive response from the government and once the secretariat was formed, a separate lump-sum allocation was made on the basis of the judiciary’s own assessment of its needs. That was an important beginning.

Of course, the secretariat was operational for only about three months. That was too short a period to meaningfully assess how the model of greater financial and organisational autonomy would have worked in practice. My belief is that it had considerable potential. And as with any new institutional arrangement, there would always have been scope for engagement with the government and the ministry to address practical issues as they arose.

New Age: An enormous case backlog has remained unresolved despite repeated procedural reforms. Do you think the problem is primarily a shortage of judges and infrastructure or does it reflect weakness in the court management, investigation, prosecution and legal procedure?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
All of the above. In my reform roadshows, in my discussions with the members of the judiciary in each case, I would take a sort of stock of the rate of disposal of cases and the rate at which court cases were coming into the system. It was such a revelation for me. The data showed that disposal far exceeded the number of cases that were coming into the system daily, monthly or yearly.

But, the problem was the backlog of cases that every court was inheriting. On a daily basis, on a weekly basis, on a monthly basis, we were far exceeding the rate of cases coming in, but at the same time, we were then dealing with the cases that were already there — hundreds and thousands of them.

It struck me that those cases, being piled up for years and decades, were part of a system, or a systemic failure that we needed to address now.

So, judges were qualified, efficient, motivated; but, they needed a systemic change. I think this is one of the success stories of every government — pre-2024, or the interim government and this government as well that we made certain procedural innovations.

The procedural innovations have to do with diversion of cases from the mainstream adjudication, adversarial system. So, alternative dispute resolution and mediation have become a huge component of mandatory procedural necessities to address the backlog. But these can only operate prospectively. This will help us to curtail the number of cases that will come into the system.

How do we deal with the inheritance of hundreds and thousands of cases? This will have to do with innovation and management and dedication, by identifying judges and courts that would specifically deal, for weeks and months ahead, with the inherited backlog cases.

Unfortunately, that will be a matter of time. But, I think that the innovations that have come forth now and which has been in the offing for even more than five years, we will see the results in the next five to 10 years that there will be no massive accumulation of cases as we go forward. It is the old cases that we have to deal with now and it has to do with innovation and management.

New Age: The commission proposed decentralisation of the judiciary, including establishing permanent High Court benches in divisional headquarters. How can the decentralisation improve access to justice without compromising the quality and consistency of judicial decisions?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
I am a firm believer of the decentralisation of justice delivery on the basis of creating specialised, dedicated courts. A manifestation of that is the creation of commercial courts. The idea was spawned in January 2025 during one of my reform roadshows in Chittagong and, then, from concept to materialisation in 12 months, January 1, 2026, we had the Commercial Courts Ordinance.

After the elected government had assumed office, the ordinance took on the form of the Commercial Courts Act. The act is our first example of creating specialised courts with specialist judges and having these courts in all corners, especially financial and trade hubs.

As for having permanent benches, that is a matter now for the parliament to evaluate and there is still scope within the present constitutional dispensation under Article 100 for the sessions of the High Court Division to be held in various places as the chief justice may decide.

I think this is a provision of the constitution that has not been invoked, or has been hardly invoked. But, we should give this a try now.

New Age: Does the proposed decentralisation of the High Court, especially the permanent benches in divisions, contradict the...

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
That is why this has to be looked into by the parliament and maybe re-evaluated by the Supreme Court if it comes before the Supreme Court. I know you are talking about the eighth amendment judgement.

New Age: The commission recommended an independent criminal investigation service. How important is the reform of police investigation and prosecution systems?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
Let me start with what I was working with. This was the creation of a professional prosecutorial service. We have done considerable work with our stakeholders in this regard. The idea is that you have prosecutors taking this up on the basis of or engaging prosecutors on the basis of merit and experience and that you get a professional service in place to aid the dispensation of justice, but this is an ongoing process.

As far as police investigation is concerned and its role and its capacity to do so, this has to do with police reform. We have a lot of work to be done in this regard because that operates as the weakest link in our criminal justice delivery system.

New Age: You have made a point that a reform that survives only during the tenure of one leader or a particular administration cannot be considered genuine institutional reform. Looking at the reform undertaken since 2024, which ones do you think are sufficiently institutionalised and which remain vulnerable to reversal?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
I believe that the reforms that were undertaken during tenure of the interim government marked the first phase of transition from the old constitutional order to the new one. The elections of February 2026 have ushered in the second phase, the second chapter of that transition period.

I am cautiously optimistic of the prospects of the revival of the Supreme Court Secretariat and, of course, the Supreme Court judges’ appointment collegium in due course. There is still the possibility that the laws will undergo further evaluation and maybe fine-tuned by the parliament in due course.

But our success story of 2024–2025 is that we have created legal benchmarks, solid benchmarks, if not landmark initiatives at creating these institutional safeguards, which I think will aid any government in revisiting and revising the laws as need be. I hope this happens sooner rather than later.

And again, as I always say, if we have done it once, we can do it again. And, we can do it better. So, I am optimistic.

New Age: You have spoken of moving Bangladesh away from personality-driven system towards stronger institutions. What institutional safeguards are necessary to ensure that judicial reform survive changes of government and cannot simply be reversed by a future political leadership?

Syed Refaat Ahmed:
Leadership is critical. And by leadership, I do not mean something only within the government or political parties. As far as the judiciary is concerned, it must extend across the institution and the legal profession, including the bar.

We need to cultivate leaders and visionaries — visionary members of the bar, but also judges with the institutional vision to strengthen the judiciary, all the way up to the office of the chief justice.

But, leadership should ultimately be about building institutions that can endure beyond individuals. That is precisely how we move away from a personality driven system. Reforms need to be embedded in institutional structures, practices and a culture strong enough to survive changes in leadership.

I think that there is still a dearth of that kind of institutional leadership in our system. And part of the constitutional promise of 2024, as I see it, is that we cultivate such visionaries, people capable not merely of initiating reform but of building institutions that can sustain it.

Shahiduzzaman is deputy editor at New Age.​