Saif
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A legal weapon against NPL menace
There is something profoundly unsettling about the fact that Bangladesh now needs a new legal arsenal to deal with non-performing loans (NPLs) that should have been contained by normal banking discipline. The proposed Distressed Asset Management Act (DAMA) 2026 and amendments to the Money Loan Cour
A legal weapon against NPL menace
There is something profoundly unsettling about the fact that Bangladesh now needs a new legal arsenal to deal with non-performing loans (NPLs) that should have been contained by normal banking discipline. The proposed Distressed Asset Management Act (DAMA) 2026 and amendments to the Money Loan Court Act are, therefore, welcome, but they also represent an uncomfortable reality: the banking system has allowed the problem of bad loans to grow far beyond the management capacity of its existing institutions. The scale of bad loans is staggering. Classified loans stood at Tk 6.06 trillion at the end of the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2026, equivalent to 32.78 per cent of total outstanding bank credit. In other words, roughly one in every three taka lent by the banking system had entered a troubled territory. Even more revealing is the broader definition of distressed assets --- including defaulted, written-off, rescheduled and court-stayed loans --- which reached nearly Tk 11 trillion, or about 60 per cent of outstanding loans, at the end of 2025.
Under the circumstances, the government's move to equip itself with stronger legal instruments is thus both necessary and overdue. The proposed Distressed Asset Management Act, together with amendments to the Money Loan Court Act, seeks to turn loan recovery from a slow, cumbersome process into a more dynamic mechanism. More importantly, DAMA envisages a formal market in which distressed loans can be bought and sold, allowing private firms to acquire bad loans, take possession of mortgaged assets and, where necessary, assume control of indebted companies.
There is indeed logic behind such an approach. Once bad loans remain trapped on banks' balance sheets, their ability to extend fresh credit is diminished, capital is impaired and the entire financial system becomes less efficient. A functioning distressed-asset market could, in principle, give banks an avenue to clean, at least partially, their balance sheets while allowing specialised investors to recover value from assets that banks themselves may be unable to manage effectively. The proposed Distressed Asset Management Unit (DAMU) under the Bangladesh Bank, and a specialised enforcement taskforce, could further strengthen this process. The proposal to settle Money Loan Court cases within six months and introduce mechanisms for appeals, auctions and recovery officers also points to an effort to address one of the most persistent weaknesses of the system involving the extraordinary delay between default, litigation and recovery.
In view of the wrongs facing the banking industry, one may find it easy to be convinced that legislation alone will correct the system. Bangladesh's NPL problem did not emerge simply because recovery laws were inadequate. It also grew out of politically connected lending, absence of due diligence, regulatory lapses and wilful default. The proposed law should be seen not only as an instrument for recovering old loans but also as a larger effort to prevent creation of new bad loans. Ultimately, success of the DAMA will be measured not by how efficiently it recovers yesterday's bad loans, but how successfully it prepares ground for sound borrowing practices for tomorrow.
There is something profoundly unsettling about the fact that Bangladesh now needs a new legal arsenal to deal with non-performing loans (NPLs) that should have been contained by normal banking discipline. The proposed Distressed Asset Management Act (DAMA) 2026 and amendments to the Money Loan Court Act are, therefore, welcome, but they also represent an uncomfortable reality: the banking system has allowed the problem of bad loans to grow far beyond the management capacity of its existing institutions. The scale of bad loans is staggering. Classified loans stood at Tk 6.06 trillion at the end of the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2026, equivalent to 32.78 per cent of total outstanding bank credit. In other words, roughly one in every three taka lent by the banking system had entered a troubled territory. Even more revealing is the broader definition of distressed assets --- including defaulted, written-off, rescheduled and court-stayed loans --- which reached nearly Tk 11 trillion, or about 60 per cent of outstanding loans, at the end of 2025.
Under the circumstances, the government's move to equip itself with stronger legal instruments is thus both necessary and overdue. The proposed Distressed Asset Management Act, together with amendments to the Money Loan Court Act, seeks to turn loan recovery from a slow, cumbersome process into a more dynamic mechanism. More importantly, DAMA envisages a formal market in which distressed loans can be bought and sold, allowing private firms to acquire bad loans, take possession of mortgaged assets and, where necessary, assume control of indebted companies.
There is indeed logic behind such an approach. Once bad loans remain trapped on banks' balance sheets, their ability to extend fresh credit is diminished, capital is impaired and the entire financial system becomes less efficient. A functioning distressed-asset market could, in principle, give banks an avenue to clean, at least partially, their balance sheets while allowing specialised investors to recover value from assets that banks themselves may be unable to manage effectively. The proposed Distressed Asset Management Unit (DAMU) under the Bangladesh Bank, and a specialised enforcement taskforce, could further strengthen this process. The proposal to settle Money Loan Court cases within six months and introduce mechanisms for appeals, auctions and recovery officers also points to an effort to address one of the most persistent weaknesses of the system involving the extraordinary delay between default, litigation and recovery.
In view of the wrongs facing the banking industry, one may find it easy to be convinced that legislation alone will correct the system. Bangladesh's NPL problem did not emerge simply because recovery laws were inadequate. It also grew out of politically connected lending, absence of due diligence, regulatory lapses and wilful default. The proposed law should be seen not only as an instrument for recovering old loans but also as a larger effort to prevent creation of new bad loans. Ultimately, success of the DAMA will be measured not by how efficiently it recovers yesterday's bad loans, but how successfully it prepares ground for sound borrowing practices for tomorrow.