[🇧🇩] Bangladesh's Look East Foreign Policy and ASEAN.

[🇧🇩] Bangladesh's Look East Foreign Policy and ASEAN.
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Should Bangladesh join RCEP?

Md Julfikar Islam

Published :
Apr 22, 2026 23:41
Updated :
Apr 22, 2026 23:41

1776902945789.webp


Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have emerged as multilateral or bilateral arrangement in the global trade landscape and have been shaping economic relationships and influencing global trade dynamics since 1960s. Starting from European Economic Community in 1957, the world experienced RTAs like MERCOSUR, NAFTA which is later transformed to USMCA, ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), SAFTA and the latest CPTPP and RCEP. Till date, 381 RTAs were notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in force. These Agreements have reduced or eliminated trade barriers such as import quotas and tariffs, export restraints, and enhanced economic integration among member states.

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in 2020, as a mega trade alliance, accounts for about 30 per cent of the world's population (2.2 billion people) and 30 per cent of global GDP ($26.2 trillion), making it the largest trade bloc in history followed by CPTPP which covers 6.6 percent of world population and 12.2 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP).

Born from ASEAN's push for deeper integration to simplify overlapping trade deals, the RCEP is a landmark agreement negotiated over eight years among 15 Asia-Pacific nations. 10 ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam) with five of their FTA partners including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand signed the agreement. Despite India's withdrawal due to domestic concerns, the pact entered into force in 2022, serving as a stabilising force for regional trade and supply chains.

While considering the different stages of development of its members, the pact aims to create a modern, comprehensive economic partnership by progressively eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers on goods, services, and investment. It further extends to intellectual property, e-commerce, and inclusive development areas like SMEs and technical cooperation, aiming to create a stable, transparent, and integrated regional economy. RCEP establishes WTO plus trade facilitation measures, including expedited customs clearance timelines, an Authorised Economic Operator system, and binding advance rulings, to create faster, more predictable, and efficient cross-border trade for member states. To join RCEP, an applicant must demonstrate its capacity to comply with all agreement rules and offer commercially meaningful market access to existing members. The accession process requires rigorous consultation and unanimous consensus at every stage before final ratification.

BANGLADESH & RCEAP: RCEP countries account for 7.92 per cent of total exports and 53.90 per cent of total imports of Bangladesh. On the other hand, Bangladesh accounts for 0.08 per cent of total imports and 0.57 per cent of total exports of RCEP Countries. Bangladesh's service exports to RCEP nations nearly doubled from 2014 to 2023, reaching US$ 1.5 billion with China being the dominant market, followed by Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. In 2023, Bangladesh's service exports to RCEP countries were dominated by Other Business Services (36 per cent), Construction (23 per cent), and Transport (13 per cent), with ICT services emerging as a notable growth sector. Bangladesh's service imports from RCEP countries grew steadily from 2014 to 2023, reaching USD 3.6 billion, with China as the dominant source. The imports were primarily driven by Transport (38.3 per cent), Construction (24.1 per cent), and Other Business Services (15.7 per cent). In FY 2023-24, RCEP countries contribute 51 per cent of net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows of Bangladesh amounting USD741.8 million and 39 per cent of total FDI stock amounting USD 6.9 billion. Textiles and Wearing received highest FDI stock overall - mainly from Korea (1,061.32 million USD), followed by China (172.89 million USD). Power sector is the second-largest sector, dominated by China (975.78 million USD) and significant investment from Singapore (799 million USD).

A study conducted by the author employing CGE Modelling with four types of simulation found that, RCEP accession may enhance GDP of Bangladesh which ranges from just above -.74 per cent to approximately 2.83 per cent. Export gains are significantly higher, reaching around 14.63 per cent to 16.18 per cent. Import increases are also notable, ranging from 14 per cent to about 17 per cent, reflecting deeper integration into global and regional value chains. Full RCEP liberalisation would trigger a surge in manufactured goods imports from member countries, posing more competition to domestic industries like textiles, agro-food products and electronics and machinery equipment, while a limited, asymmetric agreement would carefully manage this import risk. The simulations underscore that successful accession requires strategic sectoral protection and robust labour policies to mitigate job losses and harness benefits for key export sectors like RMG. Under all simulated scenarios, Bangladesh's exports see the most significant gains in the Ready-Made Garment (RMG) sector, with the European Union (EU), United States of America (USA), and RCEP bloc emerging as the primary drivers of this growth. While other sectors show moderate to insignificant increases, the findings highlight the strategic importance of regional integration through RCEP for fuelling Bangladesh's future export expansion. Bangladesh exhibits modest but positive total welfare effects in simulations is around US$.4 billion to US$.6 billion. Key drivers include improvements in allocative efficiency and, to a lesser extent, endowment effects, though Terms of Trade (ToT) effects and IS effects appear less significant or slightly negative. Another study employing SMART simulation suggests that trade creation effects are quite a few times larger than the trade diversion effect caused by the accession to RCEP agreement. The change in total trade is $7.3 billion of which $6.4 billion will be produced by trade creation and $872.07 million will be engendered by trade diversion.

Bangladesh accounts for just 0.1 per cent of RCEP's total services import demand underscoring a massive untapped opportunity. WTO and RCEP data show that ICT, business, and professional services dominate demand. Bangladesh's service exports to RCEP have grown at 7 per cent CAGR over the past decade. Countries such as Japan, Australia, and Vietnam are emerging as new high-growth markets. Strategic Opportunity is that with 10-12 per cent CAGR Bangladesh may export US$3 billion-US$3.3 billion within 2030. The agreement may further boost ICT, transport, construction, financial services, and manufacturing-related services by attracting RCEP investment and facilitating deeper integration into regional supply chains, particularly for its dominant apparel industry. However, Bangladesh needs to take strategic stance while liberalizing service sectors.

Bangladesh stands at a pivotal juncture to capitalise on growing FDI outflows from major RCEP economies such as Japan ($204 billion), China ($163 billion), Singapore ($55 billion), and South Korea ($49 billion), which together represent vast pools of investable capital. Historically, foreign investments in Bangladesh have been concentrated in traditional sectors like power, textiles, telecommunications, and gas & petroleum, while high-potential areas such as food processing, and new technology remain underexplored. Leveraging its competitive labour costs, expanding domestic market, and strategic geographic location connecting South and Southeast Asia, Bangladesh can attract greater FDI by moving beyond low-cost manufacturing. The next phase of opportunity lies in energy diversification, digital infrastructure development, agribusiness, and technology-driven industries-sectors that align with both RCEP countries' strategic priorities and Bangladesh's evolving economic strengths. This shift would enable the country to transition from a resource and labour-based investment model toward a more diversified, innovation-led growth trajectory. In an earlier study, it was also found that due to RCEP accession investment in Bangladesh might be increased by 3.36 per cent.

Bangladesh has a significant opportunity to deepen its regional integration within RCEP by expanding beyond its traditional textiles sector into higher-value areas like transport equipment, electronics, and energy-related inputs, where it already plays a crucial role in regional supply chains. This broad-based integration across diverse industrial and service sectors positions Bangladesh to leverage RCEP for more sophisticated economic upgrading and greater value-added exports.

RISK FACTORS: There are some disadvantages and risks also of acceding to RCEP. Though RCEP integration may significantly boost Bangladesh's key export sectors like Ready-Made Garments (20-22 percent output growth) and leather products, reinforcing its comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries it would also create severe challenges for capital-intensive sectors like electronics, machinery, and chemicals, which face sharp output declines of up to 35 per cent due to import competition, necessitating strategic policy support for diversification and mitigation.

RCEP member countries exhibit a wide range of MFN tariff rates, from Singapore's zero tariffs to South Korea's highly protective 13.4 per cent, highlighting the diverse economic policies and the significant adjustment challenge high-tariff countries like Bangladesh would face in reducing barriers under the agreement. An earlier study suggests that the projected revenue loss is likely to be higher for Bangladesh, US$2.5 billion in contrast to around US$541 million for RCEP. Another study refers that full tariff liberalization to RCEP countries may cause Bangladesh a tariff revenue loss of USD $3.3 billion.

In addition, Bangladesh may face significant challenges in meeting RCEP obligations due to its heavy reliance on import tariffs for revenue, which discourages tariff liberalisation, and its limited capacity to comply with complex Rules of Origin (ROO) due to dependence on imported materials. The country also struggles with inadequate infrastructure for trade facilitation, such as lengthy customs clearance times, out-dated standards, and a lack of testing laboratories and mutual recognition agreements. Furthermore, Bangladesh's regulatory frameworks for services, investment, intellectual property, and e-commerce are underdeveloped and not yet aligned with RCEP's modern, comprehensive requirements. Bangladesh lacks comprehensive data and understanding about the regulatory framework and offensive and defensive interest of each service sector to go for negative list. Foreign Investment Guidelines of Bangladesh has provision of requiring specific ratio of local citizen's representation in Senior Management and Board of Directors. In case of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), the legal framework of Bangladesh is characterised by a significant gap between strong law and weak enforcement. Piracy remains rampant online and offline, and government software use, while improving, still has high rates of unlicensed software. Bangladesh's prospective accession to RCEP is hindered by deep institutional weaknesses-limited accountability, weak regulatory and revenue capacity, fragile IPR enforcement, and poor inter-agency coordination-which undermine its ability to implement complex, legally binding commitments.

Moreover, acceding to RCEP also poses socioeconomic risks for Bangladesh, including premature de-industrialisation, significant government revenue loss from tariff reductions, and heightened vulnerability for its agriculture and domestic industries. All of these are critically magnified by the nation's impending graduation from the Least Developed Country (LDC) status and loss of vital trade preferences.

However, RCEP Agreement provides significant flexibilities for LDCs to ensure their gradual and sustainable integration into the regional economy. Key provisions include extended timelines for tariff liberalization, allowing LDCs up to 10 years to eliminate tariffs for 30 per cent tariff lines and 15 years to liberalise 80 per cent of tariffs, and 20 years to fully implement rules of origin certification systems. LDCs also benefit from longer periods to comply with trade facilitation measures, IPR enforcement, enhanced safeguard mechanisms that protect against import surges without retaliation, and delayed services liberalisation commitments. The dispute settlement process mandates special consideration for LDCs, requiring panels to exercise restraint and address their unique circumstances. Additionally, the agreement emphasises technical assistance and capacity building to support LDCs in implementation, reflecting a structured effort to balance regional integration with equitable development. It would be very tough for Bangladesh to negotiate the flexibilities after its graduation.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: Policy recommendations can be made in four areas including negotiation strategies, sector specific policy adjustments, strengthening institutions and inclusive stakeholders' participation in decision making. Bangladesh must approach RCEP negotiations strategically by demanding extended transition periods, and exclusions for sensitive sectors to protect vulnerable industries and revenue streams. Concurrently, it should undertake urgent domestic reforms to boost competitiveness, modernize infrastructure, and broaden its tax base to mitigate the impact of tariff reductions. Finally, the country should proactively leverage technical assistance and cooperation provisions to build capacity for compliance while positioning itself to attract FDI and integrate into regional supply chains.

To protect its sensitive agriculture sector, Bangladesh must create a carefully curated Sensitive List for staple foods, drastically upgrade its SPS measures, and shift subsidies toward RCEP-compliant support for research and infrastructure. For its competitive manufacturing base, the country needs rules of origin strategy to integrate into regional value chains, develop backward linkage industries, and diversify exports beyond RMG into sectors like footwear and electronics. The government may review RCEP product-specific rules of origin and, through extensive sectoral consultations, classify industries into compliant and non-compliant groups, with targeted policy support to gradually bring the latter into compliance. The government may standardise policy support across sectors using indicators such as value addition and employment creation, noting that industries with higher value addition tend to be more diversified. Furthermore, Bangladesh must undertake foundational reforms, including shifting to a negative list for investment, harmonising national standards, modernising its intellectual property regime, and enacting and implementing comprehensive digital trade laws to harness the opportunities of RCEP while building domestic resilience.

Sector specific position papers may be prepared including regulatory frameworks, scope of liberalization across four modes of services, SWOT analysis, preparedness and offensive and defensive interests of each of the service sectors. While considering Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA), areas of improvement should be assessed through consultation with RCEP member countries' quality and qualification standards and sector experts of Bangladesh. Comprehensive assessment of sector specific impact of RCEP IP obligations should be conducted. In addition, capacity of the IP registration and enforcement agencies should be assessed and strengthened accordingly. The government should review and phase out local content, technology transfer, or performance requirements violating RCEP rules, including amending BIDA's 2023 foreign worker and commercial office guidelines.

To successfully accede to RCEP, Bangladesh must prioritise a comprehensive overhaul of its institutional capacities, beginning with a massive modernisation of its intellectual property administration and enforcement agencies to handle complex registrations and border measures. It is equally critical to strengthen the National Board of Revenue (NBR) for rules of origin verification, upgrade the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution and quarantine wing for international SPS and TBT compliance, and empower the BIDA to facilitate investment under new rules. Furthermore, establishing robust inter-ministerial coordination is essential to break down institutional silos and ensure a unified national strategy for negotiating, implementing, and leveraging the agreement.

For Bangladesh, inclusive stakeholder engagement for RCEP cannot be a mere box-ticking exercise. It must be a continuous process of consultation, negotiation, and co-creation that continues long after accession, into the implementation phase. By building a structured, transparent, and responsive engagement mechanism, the government can improve negotiating outcomes and get real-time ground-level intelligence to shape better deals. Government can build a coalition of support by creating stakeholders who understand and have a vested interest in the agreement's success. It will also enhance legitimacy through ensuring the process is seen as democratic and accountable. It will also facilitate smooth implementation as the government may identify potential problems early and develop mitigation strategies, making the eventual adjustment less disruptive. Ultimately, an inclusive approach transforms RCEP from a government-to-government treaty into a national strategy for economic transformation, with shared ownership of both its opportunities and its responsibilities.

Md. Julfikar Islam, Research Fellow, Bangladesh Foreign Trade Institute.​
 

Bangladesh seeks more ASEAN engagement for Rohingya repatriation

UNB

Published :
Jun 10, 2026 11:30
Updated :
Jun 10, 2026 11:30

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Bangladesh has sought more engagement from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the successful repatriation of Rohingyas to their homeland Rakhine of Myanmar.

"The ASEAN should be more engaged for successful repatriation of the Rohingyas to Rakhine, Myanmar," Foreign Secretary Asad Alam Siam said while sppeaking at the ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials’ Meeting held in Manila on Tuesday.

He underscored the importance of sustained multilateral engagement to address common regional and global challenges.

The foreign secretary also highlited climate change, cybersecurity, and supply chain sustainability as the growing threats for the region, among others.

Earlier, Foreign Secretary Siam held bilateral meetings with Under Secretary of the Philippines and the Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN on bilateral cooperation and Bangladesh’s bid for ASEAN’s Sectoral Dialogue Partner.​
 

PM Tarique’s Malaysia visit signals revival of BNP’s ‘Look East’ policy

Analysts see a push to deepen trade, energy, technology and strategic ties with Southeast Asia

Porimol Palma

1782345846808.webp

Photo: PMO

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s first overseas visit since taking office -- to Malaysia -- signals the BNP government’s broader foreign policy shift towards East and Southeast Asia.

Foreign policy analysts say the trip reflects an effort to revive BNP’s earlier “Look East” policy in response to changing geopolitical and economic realities in the Indo-Pacific.

The June 22 talks between Tarique and his Malaysian counterpart Anwar Ibrahim in Putrajaya focused on expanding trade, investment, technology, energy, defence and strategic cooperation.

“This visit by Bangladesh seems to be an effort to come out of the box,” said former Bangladesh High Commissioner to Malaysia Shameem Ahsan.

“The talks on LNG supply, cooperation in the semiconductor industry, the halal industry, and academic cooperation all signal an eventual strategic partnership,” he added.

Anwar Ibrahim described the visit as a step towards strengthening Malaysia-Bangladesh friendship and strategic cooperation, while Tarique Rahman said the discussions reaffirmed the two countries’ enduring bonds and shared aspirations for prosperity.

Analysts say the joint statement reflected an effort to redefine bilateral relations.

The two sides discussed cooperation in artificial intelligence, LNG supply, energy, defence training, oil and gas exploration, and technical skill development. They also agreed to revitalise the long-inactive joint commission mechanism to accelerate economic cooperation and negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA).

For decades, Bangladesh-Malaysia ties have largely centred on migrant labour. Around 800,000 Bangladeshis currently work in Malaysia, and labour recruitment has often dominated bilateral engagements. This time, however, discussions extended well beyond that, though labour-sector reforms remained on the agenda.

Former high commissioner Shafi U Ahmed said the visit should be viewed in terms of expanding economic opportunities and strategic regional cooperation rather than labour recruitment alone.

Bangladesh currently runs a significant trade deficit with Malaysia. In 2025, Malaysia exported goods worth $2.35 billion to Bangladesh against imports of just $500 million.

Analysts say an FTA, which Malaysia has agreed to negotiate, could improve market access for Bangladeshi products. Malaysia also pledged support for Bangladesh’s bid to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's largest free trade bloc.

Energy cooperation also featured prominently. Bangladesh invited Malaysian firms to explore oil and gas in the Bay of Bengal, while Shafi U Ahmed said Malaysian state energy giant Petronas appears increasingly interested in such opportunities.

“Malaysia is a net energy exporter and can become a sustained partner in energy cooperation,” he said.

Jalal Uddin Sikder, associate professor at North South University, said the visit should be viewed in a broader strategic context.

“The BNP government adopted a 'look east' policy in 2001-02, and Tarique Rahman appears to be extending that approach through Malaysia, an influential ASEAN member,” he said.

“This visit is more about trade and the economy than labour,” he added.

Analysts say Malaysia’s expertise in halal certification, IT and technical industries could help Bangladesh develop skilled manpower and boost exports.

Sikder noted that the global halal industry is projected to grow from $2.6 trillion in 2025 to nearly $3.9 trillion by 2030.

Labour migration nevertheless remains part of the broader restructuring effort. The sector has long been associated with corruption, exploitation and syndicate control, prompting Malaysia to seek greater transparency before further expansion.

Reflecting this concern, the joint statement stressed need-based worker quota approvals and transparent recruitment. Bangladesh also emphasised upskilling workers in technical, IT and halal sectors, signalling a shift away from dependence on low-skilled migration.

The visit also carried wider regional significance. Malaysia remains one of Asean's influential members and has consistently supported Bangladesh on issues such as the Rohingya crisis.

Analysts say closer ties with Malaysia could help Bangladesh deepen its engagement with Asean as Dhaka seeks greater economic integration with Southeast Asia.

The warm diplomatic reception accorded to Tarique, including meetings with Anwar Ibrahim and Malaysia’s King Sultan Ibrahim, was also viewed positively.

“Altogether, the BNP government is trying to diversify cooperation. What is important is to make the efforts functional,” Shafi U Ahmed said.​
 

PM Tarique’s Malaysia visit signals revival of BNP’s ‘Look East’ policy

Analysts see a push to deepen trade, energy, technology and strategic ties with Southeast Asia

Porimol Palma

View attachment 27873
Photo: PMO

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s first overseas visit since taking office -- to Malaysia -- signals the BNP government’s broader foreign policy shift towards East and Southeast Asia.

Foreign policy analysts say the trip reflects an effort to revive BNP’s earlier “Look East” policy in response to changing geopolitical and economic realities in the Indo-Pacific.

The June 22 talks between Tarique and his Malaysian counterpart Anwar Ibrahim in Putrajaya focused on expanding trade, investment, technology, energy, defence and strategic cooperation.

“This visit by Bangladesh seems to be an effort to come out of the box,” said former Bangladesh High Commissioner to Malaysia Shameem Ahsan.

“The talks on LNG supply, cooperation in the semiconductor industry, the halal industry, and academic cooperation all signal an eventual strategic partnership,” he added.

Anwar Ibrahim described the visit as a step towards strengthening Malaysia-Bangladesh friendship and strategic cooperation, while Tarique Rahman said the discussions reaffirmed the two countries’ enduring bonds and shared aspirations for prosperity.

Analysts say the joint statement reflected an effort to redefine bilateral relations.

The two sides discussed cooperation in artificial intelligence, LNG supply, energy, defence training, oil and gas exploration, and technical skill development. They also agreed to revitalise the long-inactive joint commission mechanism to accelerate economic cooperation and negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA).

For decades, Bangladesh-Malaysia ties have largely centred on migrant labour. Around 800,000 Bangladeshis currently work in Malaysia, and labour recruitment has often dominated bilateral engagements. This time, however, discussions extended well beyond that, though labour-sector reforms remained on the agenda.

Former high commissioner Shafi U Ahmed said the visit should be viewed in terms of expanding economic opportunities and strategic regional cooperation rather than labour recruitment alone.

Bangladesh currently runs a significant trade deficit with Malaysia. In 2025, Malaysia exported goods worth $2.35 billion to Bangladesh against imports of just $500 million.

Analysts say an FTA, which Malaysia has agreed to negotiate, could improve market access for Bangladeshi products. Malaysia also pledged support for Bangladesh’s bid to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's largest free trade bloc.

Energy cooperation also featured prominently. Bangladesh invited Malaysian firms to explore oil and gas in the Bay of Bengal, while Shafi U Ahmed said Malaysian state energy giant Petronas appears increasingly interested in such opportunities.

“Malaysia is a net energy exporter and can become a sustained partner in energy cooperation,” he said.

Jalal Uddin Sikder, associate professor at North South University, said the visit should be viewed in a broader strategic context.

“The BNP government adopted a 'look east' policy in 2001-02, and Tarique Rahman appears to be extending that approach through Malaysia, an influential ASEAN member,” he said.

“This visit is more about trade and the economy than labour,” he added.

Analysts say Malaysia’s expertise in halal certification, IT and technical industries could help Bangladesh develop skilled manpower and boost exports.

Sikder noted that the global halal industry is projected to grow from $2.6 trillion in 2025 to nearly $3.9 trillion by 2030.

Labour migration nevertheless remains part of the broader restructuring effort. The sector has long been associated with corruption, exploitation and syndicate control, prompting Malaysia to seek greater transparency before further expansion.

Reflecting this concern, the joint statement stressed need-based worker quota approvals and transparent recruitment. Bangladesh also emphasised upskilling workers in technical, IT and halal sectors, signalling a shift away from dependence on low-skilled migration.

The visit also carried wider regional significance. Malaysia remains one of Asean's influential members and has consistently supported Bangladesh on issues such as the Rohingya crisis.

Analysts say closer ties with Malaysia could help Bangladesh deepen its engagement with Asean as Dhaka seeks greater economic integration with Southeast Asia.

The warm diplomatic reception accorded to Tarique, including meetings with Anwar Ibrahim and Malaysia’s King Sultan Ibrahim, was also viewed positively.

“Altogether, the BNP government is trying to diversify cooperation. What is important is to make the efforts functional,” Shafi U Ahmed said.​

Agreed 100%.

Increasing trade with Malaysia, Indonesia and other larger SE Asian countries (as opposed to India) will only benefit Bangladesh.
 
Agreed 100%.

Increasing trade with Malaysia, Indonesia and other larger SE Asian countries (as opposed to India) will only benefit Bangladesh.
It is high time Bangladesh push South East Asian countries to admit Bangladesh into ASEAN Plus. Our future lies in ASEAN Plus not in SAARC.
 
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Why Bangladesh’s ‘Look East’ policy matters more than ever

Mohammad Aynul Islam

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Begum Khaleda Zia is widely regarded as the pioneer who actively shaped and adopted Bangladesh’s formal ‘Look East’ policy during her tenures as Prime Minister of Bangladesh. On 18 May 2005, calling the ‘Look East’ policy a “cornerstone” of Bangladesh’s foreign policy, Begum Zia asserted that its adoption was “significant” as it would assist Bangladesh in advancing its national interests realistically. However, she clarified that this did not suggest Bangladesh attached lesser significance to the world’s other regions. As Begum Zia put it: “the doors are open to us for West, East, North and South” (2005).

During her tenures (1991–1996 and 2001–2006), Begum Zia pursued a foreign policy that placed increasing emphasis on expanding Bangladesh’s engagement with the emerging economies of East and Southeast Asia. Her government sought to diversify Bangladesh’s diplomatic and economic partnerships by strengthening ties with countries including China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and other ASEAN members. This engagement was driven by the objectives of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), expanding export markets, enhancing development cooperation, promoting labour migration, and increasing technology transfer. Her administration also recognised the growing economic dynamism of East Asia and the strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal, encouraging Bangladesh’s deeper integration into regional economic and connectivity initiatives. These efforts laid the groundwork for what later came to be described as Bangladesh’s ‘Look East’ orientation—a pragmatic foreign policy approach. The subsequent Asia-Pacific Outlook (APO) can be viewed as a natural evolution of Bangladesh’s earlier ‘Look East’ policy.

The recent visit of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to China and Malaysia represents practical expressions of Bangladesh’s evolving ‘Look East’ policy. These visits can also be interpreted as reflecting Bangladesh’s pursuit of strategic autonomy—a foreign policy approach that seeks to maximise national interests by engaging with multiple partners while avoiding dependence on, or alignment with, any single major power. In the contemporary geopolitical environment, Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy is expressed through balanced diplomacy, economic diversification, and issue-based cooperation with a range of regional and global actors.

However, Bangladesh’s interest in eastward engagement dates back to the reign of Sultan Giasuddin Azam Shah, who ruled Bengal from 1393 to 1409. Royal delegations were exchanged between China and Bengal during that period. Bangladesh’s ‘Look East’ policy can be traced to these historical foundations as well as to the interplay of the country’s domestic and external foreign policy determinants. In essence, it is predicated on Bangladesh’s economic and strategic interests in the region. It encompasses multiple dimensions, including political, economic, and cultural engagement. The ‘East’ includes the countries of Southeast and Northeast Asia, as well as those located geographically to the east of Bangladesh.

A key strategic component of Bangladesh's foreign policy is its economic diplomacy. Its 'Look East' policy has evolved as an extension of its economic diplomacy. The forces of globalisation have both pushed and pulled Bangladesh to diversify the direction of its foreign policy. Bangladesh's policy orientation towards the East is consistent with the changing environment, both domestically and internationally.

The then Foreign Minister in Begum Zia’s Cabinet, Morshed Khan (2003), stated in a lecture at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore that Bangladesh’s ‘Look East’ policy represented an approach towards the “diversification of horizons” and an effort to extend its “neighbourhood”. The policy was not conceived at the expense of Bangladesh’s immediate region or other parts of the world. Rather, it was entirely consistent with the fundamental principles of Bangladesh’s foreign policy.

The main objectives of the ‘Look East’ policy are to strengthen cooperation and coordination with the East on issues of international peace and security; to broaden economic cooperation with the East, particularly in the areas of trade, investment, technology, and employment; and to enhance interaction between the peoples of Bangladesh and the East at various levels through exchanges in education and social and inter-religious activities, thereby fostering greater mutual understanding.

Several ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors appear to have motivated Bangladesh to pursue its ‘Look East’ policy. The ‘pull’ factors relate to the Eastern countries’ rapid economic growth, political stability, and cohesive multilateral cooperation frameworks. The ‘push’ factors, meanwhile, relate to Bangladesh’s economic needs, strategic compulsions, and aspirations. ‘Asian regionalism’ is another ‘pull’ factor. If the prediction of the ‘Asian Century’ holds any real meaning and Asian regionalism becomes a reality in the coming years, then it provides a strong basis for Bangladesh to pursue its ‘Look East’ policy.

Yet another ‘push’ factor that may have motivated Bangladesh to adopt its ‘Look East’ policy is its geographical proximity to Southeast Asia, which connects the entire ASEAN and Pacific regions. Viewed in this way, geographical proximity gives rise to strategic and economic compulsions for the countries concerned, requiring them to sustain close cooperation and collaboration to maximise their foreign policy goals. Bangladesh’s ‘Look East’ policy is likely to serve as a means of strengthening its ties with South Asian and APT countries.

Bangladesh stands to benefit significantly from deeper economic engagement with East Asian and ASEAN countries, as well as regional economic blocs. Bangladesh has expressed interest in exploring membership of RCEP following its graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status. Bangladesh’s evolving ‘Look East’ orientation provides an important strategic framework for expanding trade, investment, connectivity, and economic diplomacy with ASEAN and other East Asian partners. At the same time, intensifying geopolitical competition, supply-chain diversification, and the search for resilient economic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific have further reinforced the importance of East and Southeast Asia in Bangladesh’s foreign and economic policy.

The overall success of Bangladesh’s ‘Look East’ policy can be discerned from the following areas: faster bilateral cooperation, active participation in regional and sub-regional groupings to the East, enhanced political and strategic significance, wider people-to-people contact, and so on. Bangladesh’s trade with the ten major East and Southeast Asian economies is estimated to have reached approximately US$55–58 billion in 2026, representing an increase of around US$3–5 billion (6–10%) compared with 2025.

The main objectives of the 'Look East' policy are to strengthen cooperation and coordination with the East on issues of international peace and security; to broaden economic cooperation with the East, particularly in the areas of trade, investment, technology, and employment; and to enhance interaction between the peoples of Bangladesh and the East at various levels through exchanges in education and social and inter-religious activities, thereby fostering greater mutual understanding.

Currently, China-Bangladesh relations have been described as “eclectic in outlook, nation-building in content, peaceful in purpose”. Japan remains Bangladesh’s largest bilateral development partner and one of its most trusted strategic partners. Japan continues to be Bangladesh’s leading source of Official Development Assistance (ODA), supporting transformative projects such as the Dhaka Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), the Matarbari Deep Sea Port, the Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport Third Terminal, the Bay Terminal at Chattogram Port, and the Dhaka-Chattogram transport corridor.

The eastern countries are a potential market for Bangladeshi manpower. Many Bangladeshi skilled and semi-skilled workers have been employed in Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, and South Korea, contributing to Bangladesh’s economy. After a long interval, the Malaysian government has reopened its market to Bangladeshi skilled and semi-skilled workers. The Singapore government has also become more receptive to recruiting Bangladeshi skilled workers. Thus, great potential exists for Bangladesh and the countries of these regions to prosper if they remain constructively engaged. For Bangladesh, adjusting to these emerging realities, a ‘Look East’ policy appears to be the need of the hour, and it should therefore continue to pursue it.

A key strategic component of Bangladesh’s foreign policy is its economic diplomacy. Its ‘Look East’ policy has evolved as an extension of its economic diplomacy. The forces of globalisation have both pushed and pulled Bangladesh to diversify the direction of its foreign policy. Bangladesh’s policy orientation towards the East is consistent with the changing environment, both domestically and internationally.

Although some economic and strategic gains are evident following the adoption of the ‘Look East’ policy, several key issues require careful consideration to make the policy more effective and pragmatic. To achieve these goals, the Bangladesh government may make greater efforts in the following areas: (i) bringing about an early and concerted solution to its lopsided external trade; (ii) pursuing its ‘Look East’ policy simultaneously at the governmental and non-governmental levels, thereby creating equal opportunities for both Track I and Track II engagement; and (iii) including more countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, thereby further diversifying the overall direction of the ‘Look East’ foreign policy.

Mohammad Aynul Islam is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Applied Democracy Lab at the University of Dhaka.​
 

What challenges stand in the way of Bangladesh's ASEAN ambitions?

AKM Ahsan Ullah

Published: 30 Jun 2026, 08: 21

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ASEAN is no longer a distant regional organisation in Bangladesh's foreign policy, but rather it is gradually becoming a strategic aspiration. During the interim government's tenure, the question of Bangladesh's inclusion in ASEAN was raised anew in diplomatic discussions. The issue resurfaced in conjunction with the new government's visit to Malaysia. The question is, can Bangladesh truly become a member of ASEAN?

The answer to this question is not simple. This is because ASEAN is not just a commercial alliance; it is a geographical, political, security, and institutional community. Bangladesh is economically significant, demographically strong, geographically located at the junction of South and Southeast Asia, and is becoming increasingly important in the geopolitics of the Bay of Bengal. However, attaining ASEAN membership is not solely dependent on potential; it relies on the language of the charter, consensus among member states, institutional capacity, geographical identity, political confidence, and regional balance.

According to Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter, there are four fundamental conditions for becoming a new member. First, the state's location must be within the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia. Second, it must be recognised by all ASEAN member states. Third, it must abide by the ASEAN Charter. Fourth, it must demonstrate the capability and willingness to fulfill the responsibilities of membership.

Beyond these, there is a practical political condition: decisions in ASEAN are made based on consensus; a single member state’s objection can halt full membership. Geographically, Bangladesh is a South Asian state. But in terms of strategic geography, Bangladesh is at the nexus of South and Southeast Asia.

Bangladesh shares a border with Myanmar, has potential maritime connections with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore through the Bay of Bengal, and historically there were exchanges of trade, labour, religion, and culture among Arakan, Chattogram, the Bay of Bengal, and the Malay world. Therefore, Bangladesh's argument might be: we are not on the edge of the map but rather stand on the bridge between two regions. However, ASEAN does not admit members solely based on strategic imagination. The example of Timor-Leste is pertinent here. Despite undoubtedly being within the geographical region of Southeast Asia, Timor-Leste had to wait more than 14 years to become a full member after applying in 2011.

Where does Bangladesh's potential lie? First, Bangladesh is a large market. The economy of about 180 million people, a young workforce, and Bangladesh’s capabilities in the garments industry, pharmaceuticals, agro-processed products, shipbuilding, information technology, and services may be attractive to ASEAN. Many ASEAN countries are rapidly aging.

Countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand need foreign workers in their labour markets. If Bangladesh's workforce is managed through skills, language, rights, and fair recruitment systems, it can create practical links with the ASEAN economy.

Secondly, Bangladesh is a central state of the Bay of Bengal. In today’s Indo-Pacific politics, the Bay of Bengal is not just a sea; it is a trade route, an area of energy security, naval connectivity, coastal economies, climate risks, and geopolitical rivalries. If ASEAN wants to define itself not just around the Mekong or South China Sea but as a broader maritime Southeast Asia, ignoring Bangladesh would be difficult. Ports like Chittagong, Matarbari, Payra, Mongla are not just assets of Bangladesh; they can be trade corridors for South and Southeast Asia.

Thirdly, Bangladesh can be a bridge connecting ASEAN with South Asia. SAARC is almost dysfunctional, BIMSTEC has not yet gained full political strength, and India-China rivalries have complicated regional cooperation. In this scenario, if Bangladesh builds deep partnerships with ASEAN, it would not only benefit Bangladesh but also ASEAN. Because ASEAN would then gain a new gateway for trade, connectivity, labour markets, climate cooperation, and security discussions with South Asia.

However, alongside potentials, there are tough questions. The first question is geographical. ASEAN countries might argue that Bangladesh does not fall within the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia. This geographical objection could be the largest legal and political hurdle.

The second question is ASEAN’s internal capacity. Including Timor-Leste took ASEAN a long time. Taking a South Asian state with a large population, complex economy, and political sensitivity as a member might be concerning within ASEAN. ASEAN makes decisions slowly, by consensus, avoiding conflicts. Will South Asian tensions, India-Bangladesh relations, the Myanmar crisis, the Rohingya issue, and China-India competition enter ASEAN's fold if Bangladesh joins? Some members will undoubtedly raise these questions.

The third question is the Myanmar and Rohingya crisis. The relationship between Bangladesh and Myanmar is deeply complicated by the Rohingya issue. ASEAN itself is divided and embarrassed over the Myanmar crisis. If Bangladesh were included, would ASEAN become a more direct party to the Rohingya problem? Or, would including Bangladesh open a new diplomatic path to solving the crisis? ASEAN members will not have a unified stance on these two arguments.

The fourth question is institutional compatibility. ASEAN membership entails continuous participation in hundreds of meetings, legal documentation, economic standards, customs cooperation, trade facilitation, investment policies, digital connectivity, labour policies, anti-human trafficking mechanisms, disaster management, education, health, and environment. Has Bangladesh prepared administratively for this? Membership does not come through political declarations alone; it comes through preparation based on ministries, expert teams, legal frameworks, policy coordination, and enduring diplomatic patience.

Therefore, the most realistic path for Bangladesh is to proceed step by step. The first step might be attaining the status of a Sectoral Dialogue Partner. Bangladesh has already shown interest in this path. Attaining this status would allow Bangladesh to work with ASEAN in specific areas such as trade, labour, education, health, disaster management, climate, maritime security, and the digital economy. The second step could be a Dialogue Partner or an Enhanced Partnership. The third step might be special observer status or an independent ‘Bangladesh-ASEAN Connectivity Roadmap’. If full membership is a long-term goal, it should be thought of as a ten-year strategy rather than a demand for today.

Bangladesh can then undertake three tasks. First, frame a ‘connectivity-based argument’ rather than attacking the geopolitical debate politically—what matters more than being part of Southeast Asia is how effectively Bangladesh is connected with Southeast Asia. Second, deepen bilateral relations with ASEAN member states, especially with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines. Third, Bangladesh needs to transition from being a labour-exporting country to a partner in skills, investment, technology, education, and marine cooperation.

ASEAN may offer Bangladesh some conditions. For example: working initially as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner; reviewing the ASEAN charter and legal documents; increasing trade and connectivity with Southeast Asia; ensuring fair recruitment in labour migration; taking credible measures to control human trafficking, cybercrime, and irregular migration; modernising ports, customs, and supply chains; building a coordinated diplomacy instead of conflict over Myanmar and the Rohingya issue with ASEAN; and showing internal political stability, rule of law, and policy continuity.

Therefore, Bangladesh's strategy should not be emotional but institutional. Strengthening an ASEAN cell in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducting targeted diplomacy in every ASEAN capital, involving research institutions and business communities, creating experts on ASEAN language and policy, increasing port connectivity and direct shipping, creating a fair recruitment model in Malaysia and Singapore's labour markets—without these, membership claims will remain on paper, not in reality.

#AKM Ahsan Ullah is a Professor, International, Security, and Migration
University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei​
 

Can Bangladesh become 12th ASEAN member?

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Bangladesh and ASEAN. | Wikimedia

THE foreign policy of Bangladesh is entering a moment in which ASEAN is no longer a distant regional organisation but an increasingly important strategic horizon. Professor Muhammad Yunus had earlier raised Bangladesh’s aspiration for closer engagement with ASEAN, including the possibility of membership. The BNP government also appears interested in closer engagement with ASEAN. The question, however, is not merely whether Bangladesh wishes to join ASEAN. The deeper question is whether ASEAN can imagine Bangladesh as part of its regional community, and whether Bangladesh is institutionally, politically and strategically prepared for such a possibility.

The answer is neither simple nor immediate. ASEAN is not simply a trade bloc. It is a regional community built around geography, political consensus, institutional discipline, economic integration, security habits and a shared diplomatic culture. Bangladesh has many assets: a large population, a growing economy, a strategic location on the Bay of Bengal, an expanding manufacturing base and a potentially important role as a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia. Yet ASEAN membership depends not only on strategic relevance. It depends on legal criteria, political consensus, institutional readiness and regional trust.

Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter sets out the basic conditions for admission of new members. A prospective member must be located in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia; it must be recognised by all existing ASEAN member states; it must agree to be bound by the ASEAN Charter; and it must demonstrate the ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of membership. Beyond these written requirements lies an equally important political condition: ASEAN works by consensus. This means that even one member state’s hesitation can delay or block accession.

This is where Bangladesh faces its most fundamental challenge. Is Bangladesh part of Southeast Asia? Conventional geography places Bangladesh in South Asia. Strategic geography, however, tells a more complex story. Bangladesh shares a border with Myanmar, opens onto the Bay of Bengal, and has historical, commercial, religious, maritime and cultural connections with the wider Southeast Asian world. The old routes between Bengal, Arakan, the Malay world and the Bay of Bengal created a long history of mobility and exchange. Bangladesh can therefore argue that it does not stand outside Southeast Asia; it stands at the connective edge between South Asia and Southeast Asia.

But ASEAN does not admit members on the basis of strategic imagination alone. The example of Timor-Leste is instructive. Timor-Leste was clearly located within Southeast Asia, yet its accession took more than a decade. It applied for ASEAN membership in 2011, was granted observer status in 2022, received a roadmap for full membership in 2023, and finally became ASEAN’s eleventh member in 2025. The Timor-Leste case shows that geography is necessary but not sufficient. ASEAN membership requires patience, institutional preparation, political confidence and consensus among existing members.

Where, then, does Bangladesh’s potential lie? First, Bangladesh is a major market. With nearly 180 million people, a large young labour force, a strong garment sector and growing capacities in pharmaceuticals, agriculture, shipbuilding, information technology and services, Bangladesh could become an attractive economic partner for ASEAN. Several ASEAN economies face labour shortages, demographic ageing and demand for foreign workers. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand already have significant experience with migrant labour. If Bangladesh can move from a low-cost labour-export model to a more regulated, skilled, rights-based and mutually beneficial labour partnership, it could become highly relevant to ASEAN’s future economy.

Second, Bangladesh is central to the Bay of Bengal. In contemporary Indo-Pacific politics, the Bay of Bengal is not merely a body of water. It is a field of trade routes, energy movement, maritime security, port development, climate vulnerability, fisheries, blue economy and geopolitical competition. If ASEAN wants to think beyond the Mekong and the South China Sea and imagine a broader maritime Southeast Asia, Bangladesh becomes difficult to ignore. Chattogram, Mongla, Payra and Matarbari are not only national infrastructure projects. Properly developed, they could become part of a wider chain of connectivity between South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Third, Bangladesh can provide ASEAN with an entry point into South Asia. SAARC remains largely inactive. BIMSTEC has potential but has not yet become a strong political or economic architecture. India-China competition continues to complicate regional cooperation. In this context, Bangladesh could serve as a practical bridge between ASEAN and South Asia, especially in trade, logistics, labour mobility, disaster management, food security, climate adaptation and maritime cooperation. For ASEAN, Bangladesh may not be a traditional Southeast Asian state, but it may be a strategic connector that Southeast Asia increasingly needs.

Yet the constraints are serious. The first is geographical. ASEAN members may argue that Bangladesh does not fall within the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia, as required by the ASEAN Charter. This is the strongest legal and political obstacle. The comparison with Timor-Leste is therefore limited. Timor-Leste was small and institutionally fragile, but it was geographically Southeast Asian. Bangladesh is large and strategically important, but it is generally classified as South Asian. This distinction matters.

The second concern is ASEAN’s own institutional capacity. Integrating Timor-Leste already required a long and carefully managed process. Admitting a much larger country with a complex political economy, a large population and a distinct regional identity would be a far more demanding decision. ASEAN may worry that Bangladesh’s inclusion could bring South Asian tensions into Southeast Asian forums: India-Bangladesh issues, Myanmar-related problems, the Rohingya crisis, border politics, irregular migration and the wider rivalry between India and China. ASEAN’s diplomatic style is cautious, gradual and consensus-driven. It is unlikely to take a major enlargement decision without calculating these risks carefully.

The third concern is Myanmar and the Rohingya crisis. Bangladesh’s relationship with Myanmar is deeply shaped by the forced displacement of Rohingya refugees. ASEAN itself has struggled to manage Myanmar’s internal crisis since the military coup. Some ASEAN members may fear that including Bangladesh would make ASEAN more directly involved in the Rohingya question. Others may see Bangladesh’s inclusion as a way to create a more realistic regional mechanism for addressing displacement, repatriation, humanitarian protection and cross-border stability. ASEAN members are unlikely to hold a single view on this issue.

The fourth concern is institutional compatibility. ASEAN membership means participation in hundreds of meetings, working groups, legal instruments, economic agreements, security dialogues, social-cultural programmes and technical frameworks. It requires administrative capacity across ministries, regulatory alignment, diplomatic continuity, and the ability to follow ASEAN’s dense institutional calendar. Bangladesh must therefore ask itself whether it has prepared a whole-of-government ASEAN strategy, or whether membership is still mostly a political aspiration expressed through diplomatic speeches.

The fifth concern is ASEAN identity. ASEAN sees itself as a Southeast Asian family. If Bangladesh is admitted, other neighbouring states may also seek similar consideration. Sri Lanka, for instance, could make a maritime argument. Nepal could make a connectivity argument. Even countries beyond the immediate region may frame themselves as strategic partners of Southeast Asia. ASEAN may therefore prefer to keep Bangladesh close through partnership mechanisms rather than extend full membership. This would allow ASEAN to benefit from Bangladesh’s strategic location without changing the geographical identity of the organisation.

For these reasons, Bangladesh’s most realistic path is not immediate full membership but gradual institutional integration. The first step should be sectoral dialogue partnership. Bangladesh has already shown interest in this direction. Such a status would allow cooperation in specific areas such as trade, labour mobility, education, health, disaster management, climate adaptation, maritime security, digital economy and counter-trafficking. The second step could be broader dialogue partnership or a customised ASEAN-Bangladesh connectivity framework. The third step, if political conditions evolve, could involve observer status or a special roadmap for deeper engagement. Full membership should be treated as a long-term strategic objective, not as an instant diplomatic demand.

If Bangladesh receives a polite ‘no’, it should not treat that as a diplomatic defeat. It should treat it as an invitation to prepare better. Three tasks would then become essential. First, Bangladesh should not fight the geography question emotionally. Instead, it should develop a connectivity-based argument: the issue is not only whether Bangladesh is conventionally located within Southeast Asia, but whether Bangladesh is functionally necessary for Southeast Asia’s future connectivity. Second, Bangladesh should deepen bilateral relations with each ASEAN member state, especially Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines. ASEAN consensus is built one capital at a time. Third, Bangladesh must transform its image from a labour-exporting state into a multidimensional partner in skills, trade, technology, investment, education, maritime cooperation, climate resilience and regional security.

ASEAN may also set informal or formal conditions for Bangladesh. These may include: first obtaining sectoral dialogue partner status; reviewing ASEAN legal instruments; increasing trade and connectivity with Southeast Asia; improving fair recruitment and labour migration governance; strengthening measures against human trafficking, irregular migration and cybercrime; modernising ports, customs and supply-chain systems; working constructively with ASEAN on Myanmar and the Rohingya crisis; and demonstrating domestic political stability, rule of law, policy continuity and administrative capacity.

Bangladesh therefore needs a strategy of architecture, not emotion. It is not enough to say that Bangladesh should be admitted because it is important. Bangladesh must show why its inclusion would strengthen ASEAN, not complicate it. This requires a dedicated ASEAN strategy within the ministry of foreign affairs, stronger ASEAN expertise in government and universities, regular policy dialogues with ASEAN capitals, a business-led connectivity agenda, better maritime diplomacy and a labour mobility framework based on skills, rights and mutual benefit. Bangladesh should also invest in language training, area studies, port diplomacy, customs modernisation and direct shipping and air links with ASEAN economies.

In the end, Bangladesh may not become ASEAN’s twelfth member immediately. Indeed, the legal and geographical obstacles are significant. But this does not mean the aspiration is meaningless. It can become a powerful organising idea for Bangladesh’s foreign policy. For too long, Bangladesh has been viewed mainly through the lens of South Asian politics. Yet its geography, economy, demography and maritime location also connect it deeply with Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. The challenge is to turn that geographical potential into institutional credibility.

Timor-Leste’s accession shows that ASEAN’s door is not permanently closed. But it also shows that the door opens slowly, after years of preparation, confidence-building and consensus formation. Bangladesh’s task is therefore not simply to knock on the door. It must build the case, demonstrate readiness, reduce anxieties and prove that keeping Bangladesh outside ASEAN may one day mean leaving out one of the most important bridges between South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Dr AKM Ahsan Ullah is professor of international studies and global migration in the University of Brunei Darussalam.​
 

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