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[🇧🇩] Israel and Hamas war in Gaza-----Can Bangladesh be a peace broker?

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[🇧🇩] Israel and Hamas war in Gaza-----Can Bangladesh be a peace broker?
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Source : https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/diplomacy/news/foreign-minister-calls-greater-oic-role-end-gaza-atrocities-3559996

Foreign minister calls for greater OIC role to end Gaza atrocities​


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Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud. File photo

Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud called on the OIC member states to take alternate measures to end the conflict in Gaza and to ensure rights for the Palestinian people.

The foreign minister reiterated Bangladesh's firm support for the Palestinian cause and called for an immediate ceasefire and opening of humanitarian corridors in the besieged territory.

While addressing the 19th Extraordinary CFM of the OIC on Israel's' aggression on the Palestinian People in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, he also stressed on the importance of the Islamic Financial Safety Net to ensure basic necessities for the Palestinians.

Foreign minister, mentioning the strong statement delivered by Bangladesh at the ICJ in February for the Palestinians, hoped that peace will be established soon in the region.

Noting the current stalemate at the United Nations Security Council, Foreign Minister highlighted the need for its reform so that decision on globally effecting issues could be reached.

He stressed the importance of Muslim Ummah's unity to stop atrocities against Palestinians, ensuring their safe and peaceful living in their homeland.

Earlier yesterday, Dr Hasan Mahmud paid a courtesy call on Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at the OIC Secretariat in Jeddah.

Expressing satisfaction at bilateral ties, Dr Mahmud hoped for deeper cooperation between Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia, anticipating a visit from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Al Saud affirmed Saudi Arabia's commitment to sophisticated economic cooperation.

They discussed increasing sectoral cooperation, trade, and investment opportunities, with Dr. Mahmud seeking cooperation in crude oil purchase, which Al Saud promised to consider, including investments in refinery and petrochemical industries.

Al Saud congratulated Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on her re-election and praised her leadership in hosting Rohingya refugees, pledging Saudi Arabia's full support.

Hasan Mahmud also met with OIC Secretary General Hissein Brahim Taha.

Taha praised Sheikh Hasina's leadership and reaffirmed OIC's support for Rohingya people.

The foreign minister advocated for greater trade and investment among OIC member states to mitigate economic challenges stemming from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, proposing a dedicated cell at the OIC Secretariat for trade-related information dissemination.​
 
www.thedailystar.net

Why China won’t fight the Houthis

The current turmoil in the Middle East is not bad news for China.
www.thedailystar.net www.thedailystar.net

Why China won’t fight the Houthis​


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Chinese policy in the Middle East is shaped by two factors: China's threat perceptions and its strategic calculus regarding its great power competition with the United States. And when it comes to dealing with the US, China's approach comes down to three "nos": no cooperation, no support, and no confrontation. This credo underlies China's decision not to push back against the Iran-backed Houthis as they carry out drone and missile attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes.

The Red Sea attacks—a response to Israel's war against Hamas in Gaza—have not directly threatened Chinese ships, and the Houthis insist this will not change: neither Chinese or Russian vessels will be targeted, a senior Houthi official declared last month, as long as they are not connected with Israel. But the attacks will still affect China's economic interests, and not only because of the need to avoid links with Israel. (COSCO, China's largest shipping conglomerate, has already been forced to suspend all shipping to Israel, owing to security concerns.)

The identification of ships (or their flag countries) is not always straightforward, and shipping that affects China's interests can still be targeted. But avoiding the area is costly. The Red Sea is one of the most sensitive chokepoints for world trade. If Chinese ships heading to Europe must circle around the Cape of Good Hope, rather than following the traditional route through the Suez Canal, a 26-day journey grows to 36 days and adds significantly to costs.

Longer shipping routes could also raise import prices, potentially fuelling inflation in China; if oil prices are affected, China's economy—already in the doldrums—will come under even more pressure. More broadly, continued shipping disruptions will hamper China's efforts to boost its economy by strengthening external trade.

So, whether they target Chinese vessels directly or not, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping could undermine China's economic recovery. And things could get much worse: if Iran deepens its involvement in the conflict between the Houthis and the US-led coalition that is launching strikes against them, the Strait of Hormuz could be affected, threatening China's energy supplies.

Yet, for now, China does not seem to be treating the threat posed by the Houthis as either immediate or acute. Yes, Chinese officials have reportedly urged their Iranian counterparts to pressure the Houthis to curb their attacks. But, while China has some influence over Iran, it hardly controls Iranian policy. Nor is Iran fully in control of the Houthis, despite being their main backer. Given this—and contrary to what the US apparently thinks—China's ability to rein in the Houthis diplomatically is limited.

And China is unlikely to go much further. Since Chinese strategists tend to view developments in the Middle East through the lens of Sino-American relations, even regional instability might not appear all bad to China.

Among Chinese experts, there is no shortage of schadenfreude watching the US being forced to back Israel, at the cost of its strategic relationships with Muslim countries in the region. And China can only benefit from its great-power rivalry being sucked into a conflict in the Middle East, at a time when it is already heavily invested in the Ukraine war.

To be sure, China does not appear to be plotting to exploit America's distractedness, say, by making a move on Taiwan. But it does relish the decline of US credibility and leadership. The longer the US stands by Israel, the more opportunity China will have to consolidate its ties with other Middle Eastern countries, and the more credible China's alternative approach to regional security will appear.

Under no circumstances will China join the US-led coalition against the Houthis, not only because of the first "no," but also because this would upend its own delicate balancing act between Israel and the Arab world, and between Sunni and Shia Muslims. The fact remains, however, that the Houthis' activities in the Red Sea are costing China. So, what are China's options?

One possible response is to deploy naval escorts for cargo ships, as China has been doing in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. But the Gulf of Aden escorts—part of a counter-piracy effort—are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations: Security Council Resolution 1846. Without such a mandate, the Chinese have been reluctant to pursue similar actions in the Red Sea, though they have recently begun to do so.

But, for China, the easiest and most politically convenient response to the current Middle East crisis lies elsewhere. The key is to blame the turmoil since Hamas's October 7 attack on Israel—the event that triggered the current conflict—on the failure of the US and Israel to achieve a two-state solution with the Palestinians and to treat such a deal as the precondition for any practical resolution to the ongoing crisis. China knows well that reaching a two-state solution is highly unlikely to happen anytime soon, not least because it would fundamentally change Israel's national-security outlook and that of the entire Middle East.​
Yun Sun is a senior fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.​
 
www.thedailystar.net

The Implications of the Israel-Hamas War for Bangladesh: An American perspective

Where does this new war leave Bangladesh?
www.thedailystar.net www.thedailystar.net

Geopolitical Insights​

The Implications of the Israel-Hamas War for Bangladesh: An American perspective​

We dedicate this issue of our new weekly page, Geopolitical Insights, to offer perspectives on the devastating conflict erupting in the Middle East.

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This picture taken on October 11, 2023 shows an aerial view of buildings destroyed by Israeli air strikes in the Jabalia camp for Palestinian refugees in Gaza City. Photo: AFP

The Israel-Hamas war, now in its third week, broke out at a moment when global geopolitics were already in a state of deep churn.

The world had experienced, over a period of just two years, multiple black swans – a term famously coined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb that refers to events that are wholly unforeseen and have massive ripple effects. First came the COVID pandemic, and then Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These two shocks slammed the globe amid intensifying great power competition, toxic nationalism, growing refugee crises, and worsening climate change effects – among other destabilising developments.

And now comes this new war. Because of the legacy of conflict in the Middle East in recent decades, it's not a total shock. But it is still difficult to grapple with Israel's massive intelligence failure, the horrific scale of Hamas's terrorism on October 7, the uncompromisingly brutal Israeli retaliation, and above all the immense human toll.
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With Washington focused intently on the war, and also facing allegations of moral hypocrisy for failing to object to Israel's brutalities – some experts call them war crimes – against Palestinians, Dhaka might have hoped it would get a respite from the Biden administration's relentless pressure campaign on rights and democracy in Bangladesh. But it wasn't meant to be.

— Michael Kugelman​
Click to expand...

Few countries will be unaffected, even if indirectly, by the war. There will be economic implications, especially global oil price spikes and impacts on energy trade. There will be security implications, from new terrorism threats to public unrest sparked by large and angry protests.

The jury is still out on the conflict's geopolitical impacts, but so far this much is true: Washington – and many of its allies and partners – won't be advantaged by a long war. The conflict has upended a new US vision of the Middle East, which revolves around a region that becomes a locus for trade, connectivity and infrastructure development with deeper links to Europe and South Asia. Washington wants to operationalise that vision by stitching together new integrative mechanisms – from the India-Israel-UAE-US quad to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. But these initiatives require stability and cooperation to succeed. The war delivers a tragic reminder that both remain elusive, even with less conflict in the region and new peace deals between Israel and some of its neighbors over the last few years.

Additionally, the war has diverted Washington's attention away from the Indo-Pacific and prompted the Biden administration to strengthen its force posture in the Mideast. This change, while likely temporary, may rekindle longstanding doubts in many Indo-Pacific capitals about Washington's true commitment to a rebalance to the region – and risk undermining very real recent progress toward that goal, including the implementation of a US Indo-Pacific strategy.

Furthermore, America's competitors benefit. With Washington and many of its European and Asian allies focused laser-like on the conflict, Moscow and Beijing will have opportunities to test a distracted Washington in Ukraine, or in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, respectively. South Korea has gone so far as to publicly threaten to suspend a military agreement with North Korea so that it can scale up surveillance of its neighbor, because Seoul fears Pyongyang may be tempted to do to South Korea what Hamas did to Israel. Meanwhile, Iran benefits because the war ends any immediate chances of new normalisation agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors linked to the Abraham Accords, which Tehran has long rejected and Washington seeks to expand.

Not to mention, US competitors can exploit the rage that has erupted against the United States among publics in the Middle East and beyond about Washington's firm backing of Israel during the war despite the latter's brutal tactics against Palestinian civilians. They can point to this as another – and especially egregious – case of the US failing to uphold its oft-stated intention to champion moral causes abroad.

All this said, the war has generated far more solidarity among Western capitals than has been the case with their reactions to the provocations of Russia or China. (Many of them still depend on energy imports from Moscow and broader trade with Beijing).

That India has embraced the West's position also helps Washington and its Western partners. New Delhi will further strengthen a relationship with Israel that has been expanding for years – and especially during Narendra Modi's time in power.

Elsewhere in the Global South (and, to be sure, among large portions of the public in the West), reactions to the war have focused more on the plight of the Palestinians, the need for a cease-fire, and the imperative of a Palestinian state. These reactions are driven by various factors, depending on the country. They include a lack of formal ties with Israel; deep historical links to the Palestinians, especially through the Non-Aligned Movement; a preference to side with the perceived strongest moral position; hostility to the policies of the US, one of Israel's staunchest allies; and, in the Global South's many nonaligned capitals, a desire to avoid taking a position espoused by many within the Western alliance system.

Consequently, the war could deepen policy divides not only between the West and the Muslim world, but also between the West and the Global South. That latter schism is already considerable, due to triggers ranging from climate change mitigation financing to patent rights for pharmaceuticals.

Where does this all leave Bangladesh? Dhaka has emphasised the need for an "urgent cease-fire" and co-sponsored an ultimately unsuccessful UN Security Council resolution calling for an end to hostilities. Like so many countries, Bangladesh gains little from a long war, and especially because of the deleterious economic implications – and these will become even more serious if it expands into a regional conflict. Bangladesh relies heavily on oil from the Gulf, and the Middle East is a key destination for its textile exports. Bangladesh central bank data from earlier this year showed that two thirds of Bangladesh out-migration was to the Middle East, and that the Gulf region accounted by far for the largest source of remittances to Bangladesh.

Another ominous development for Dhaka is that the war is intensifying great power rivalry. Russia and China have thrown their support behind the Palestinians (even though both still have cordial relations with Israel). This will also bring them closer to Iran – another US rival, and a country already moving closer to both Moscow and Beijing well before the war began. Washington and New Delhi are seemingly lining up on one side of the conflict, and Beijing and Moscow on the other. This new fault line means geopolitical competition will grow even fiercer, exacerbating Bangladesh's challenge of balancing its relations with all four countries.

With Washington focused intently on the war, and also facing allegations of moral hypocrisy for failing to object to Israel's brutalities – some experts call them war crimes – against Palestinians, Dhaka might have hoped it would get a respite from the Biden administration's relentless pressure campaign on rights and democracy in Bangladesh. But it wasn't meant to be. Last week, a senior US official, Afreen Akhter, visited Dhaka and reiterated longstanding U.S. messaging about the importance of free and fair elections.

Clearly, even amid the war and so much global churn, some things have remained the same. That includes Washington's ongoing efforts to make Bangladesh a core focus of its values-based foreign policy.​
Michael Kugelman is director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.​
 

Bangladesh's Look East Foreign Policy and ASEAN.

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