[🇧🇩] Bangladesh Polls & Referendum 2026

[🇧🇩] Bangladesh Polls & Referendum 2026
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G Bangladesh Defense

Army’s role during the polls and interim period merits a nod

23 February 2026, 00:30 AM
Tanim Ahmed

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‘The army’s final act in the interim period came during the election, which was most likely their finest.’ PHOTO: RASHED SHUMON

Now that the dust has settled and we have begun another hopeful journey under a new government, we can look back at the interim government’s 18-month tenure and say with confidence that the defence forces, especially the army, played a highly creditable role. Their final act came during the election, which was most likely their finest.

Zero tolerance for mischief—that was the tone firmly set by the army on the eve of the February 12, 2026 election. It was a relief to see aspiring troublemakers scampering through crop fields and alleyways as men in fatigues gave chase. The army was in no mood for disorder, and the sight of soldiers patrolling the streets was reassuring.

Considering the uncertainties surrounding this election, the army’s role was always going to be crucial. Law enforcement in the run-up to polls and on polling days is critical even in normal times, since it is customary for the losing side to reject the results outright. It was therefore, bound to be a serious challenge for the Election Commission to make the February 12 polls so fair and peaceful that even the losing side would find them broadly acceptable. The army was always going to be the commission’s linchpin in this exercise.

Although seldom stated openly, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the army would be a decisive factor in ensuring law and order, more so because it was perhaps the one institution that still commanded authority among the people. And as far as the public was concerned, the army acquitted itself commendably. Together with the Election Commission, it delivered an election that will remain exemplary.

To be fair, despite the shifting timelines and narratives—“early election if fewer reforms are wanted,” “election between December 2025 and June 2026,” and so on—the army was unwavering in its stance on the necessity of elections at the earliest possible time. For much of the interim government’s tenure, the timetable remained conditional, but the army was resolute both in its support for the government and in its insistence on a return to polls.

In fact, it was the army chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, who first articulated the 18-month timeline for the national election. As early as September 2024, just over a month after Muhammad Yunus and his cabinet had been sworn in, when they were still coy or uncertain about the duration of their tenure, General Waker stated in a rare interview with Reuters that an election could be held within a year and a half. It was the first time that a key figure had publicly advanced such a timeframe. In the same interview, he also asserted his force’s wholehearted support for the chief adviser and his mission, thus allaying concerns about the military establishment’s position.

Later that month, however, the interim government indicated that the election timing would depend on progress in reforms. It also pointed out, most likely for the consumption of the army chief, that only the government could determine the length of its stay in office. There were several more occasions when General Waker’s patience was also tested.

Perhaps the most visible episode occurred in March 2025, when a July uprising leader posted allegations against the army chief on Facebook. A wave of social media commentary followed, openly taunting the army chief, something unprecedented in Bangladesh. Other frontline July leaders also joined in. There were even rumours of certain quarters trying to replace the four-star general with someone more pliant. Throughout those tense days, the army remained silent.

Once things subsided, however, the general appeared to harden his stance. In May 2025, he told an officers’ meeting that the election should be held by December 2025. One source quoted him as saying, “Bangladesh needs political stability. This is only possible through an elected government, not by unelected decision-makers.”

In hindsight, it was a strange scenario. Some within the interim government and certain political actors did not seem especially keen on transitioning to elected rule but rather content with the interim arrangement, whereas the army chief was making pointed public statements in favour of a democratic transition.

A few months later, the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), led by a section of the July leaders, faced a setback in Gopalganj. The army did not dither in rescuing those very leaders who had earlier mocked and criticised General Waker. Had it not been for the deployment of APCs, the outcome could have been quite grave. Significant bloodshed in Gopalganj at that juncture would have been detrimental to Bangladesh’s stability.

Going back to the beginning, it was also General Waker-Uz-Zaman who assumed responsibility during the brief but critical power vacuum in August 2024—between the fifth, when Sheikh Hasina fled, and the eighth, when Muhammad Yunus took the oath of office. During those days, it was the army that maintained what semblance of order existed across the country. Having lost moral authority after siding with the Awami League regime and opening fire on protesters, the police were initially afraid and later reluctant to confront crowds or mobs for much of the interim period. Hence, policing effectively became the army’s job. Deployed with magistracy powers, it was instrumental in maintaining order throughout these 18 months. Barring some unfortunate excesses, its role in standing beside the people and giving them a sense of security must be noted.

Since the early days of August 2024, Bangladesh has teetered dangerously close to the brink on several occasions. One of the reasons that it was able to weather these storms was because the army stood resolutely behind the interim government while strongly insisting on a democratic transition. In doing so, General Waker set himself apart as an army chief who did not reach for power even when it lay within grasp.

The past year and a half has been a testament to Bangladesh’s unique brand of resilience and resourcefulness. Now that an orderly transition has taken place, it is time to recognise the army’s role as a pillar of stability during a turbulent period, and General Waker as a patriot.

Tanim Ahmed is digital editor at The Daily Star.​
 

Khalilur, Rizwana involved in manipulating polls, alleges Jamaat

bdnews24.com
Published :
Mar 05, 2026 20:23
Updated :
Mar 05, 2026 20:23

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Jamaat-e-Islami’s deputy chief Syed Abdullah Mohammad Taher has accused Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman and former advisor Syeda Rizwana Hasan of playing direct roles in “manipulating polls”.

On Thursday, Taher alleged that Khalilur Rahman, then security chief of the interim administration, planned a special meeting in London to bring the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to power.

“As part of that plan, he is believed to have orchestrated election engineering from within the interim government,” the opposition leader said at a press conference at the party office.

“His reward was a cabinet position in the BNP government. Bringing him to justice and questioning him will reveal the truth.”

Taher highlighted Jamaat’s formal complaints linked to voting in 53 constituencies during the Feb 12 elections, which resulted in the BNP securing an outright majority.

On Rizwana’s recent television remarks, Taher said: “She acknowledged that those unable to secure women’s rights were not allowed to rise as mainstream powers, even within opposition ranks. This indicates her tacit admission of election engineering.”

Taher demanded accountability from the former advisors and the BNP government, asking who else was involved in the alleged manipulation.

He added: “It is clear from their statements that both were complicit. We demand they be swiftly questioned and brought to justice.”

Addressing other concerns, Taher noted declining law and order, including child murders and politically motivated attacks, with police often delaying action or refusing to file cases.​
 

How the 1971 Liberation War shaped Bangladesh’s 2026 election

Md. Al-Amin
Updated: 12 Apr 2026, 16: 07

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Long queue of female voters in the 2026 parliamentary election File photo

Historical legacies continue to shape contemporary political behaviour and social dynamics, as many aspects of present-day society are rooted in pivotal moments from the past. Therefore, understanding current political developments requires attention to their historical foundations. However, historical events are not interpreted uniformly; different groups often remember and understand the past in ways shaped by their political identities, social movements, and experiences. As a result, historical narratives can influence voting behavior and political preferences.

In an era of rising global populism, political leaders frequently draw on selective interpretations of history to shape public opinion and mobilise electoral support. Examples such as references to the Viking Age in Nordic political discourse, the enduring legacy of slavery in the US South, and the long-term effects of colonialism in regions such as the Middle East and Africa illustrate how historical experiences continue to influence contemporary political attitudes, conflicts, and patterns of political stability.

South Asia also follows this pattern, in which historical legacies such as anticolonial movements shape the ideological patterns of political parties, which in turn shape their supporters’ voting behavior. Along with this pattern, the colonial creation of a divide-and-rule policy is still alive.

Previous communal riots are often referenced and politically framed by party leaders to mobilise electoral support. Critics argue that some leaders in the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) have invoked past communal violence and emphasized anti-Muslim narratives to consolidate Hindu voter support. For example, political debates surrounding the 2002 Gujarat riots have frequently appeared in electoral rhetoric and media discourse, where references to communal tensions were used to mobilise identity-based political support. Similarly, disputes linked to the Babri Masjid demolition have been repeatedly invoked in political campaigns to reinforce religious polarisation and influence voting behavior.

In Bangladesh, the 1971 Liberation War remains the most significant event shaping political party ideologies. Some parties even adopt anti-liberation rhetoric to appeal to certain voter bases. The war’s legacy continued to influence the 2026 elections, serving as a central element of national identity and a symbol of legitimacy and patriotism. Analysts noted that parties perceived as linked to anti-liberation forces faced political setbacks, as voters rejected candidates seen as undermining the independence narrative. This dynamic helped the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secure victory by positioning itself as aligned with liberation ideals while opposing extremist alternatives.

In the 12 February election, voters with ideological ties to the Liberation War cast their ballots for BNP not only because of the party’s election manifesto, but also out of concern that if JI were in power, the values and legacy established in 1971 could be undermined
Debates over historical memory, including how the war is commemorated or politicised, further shaped party strategies and public sentiment, with parties either emphasising their commitment to the values of 1971 or facing criticism for failing to do so.

In the lead-up to the 2026 parliamentary elections, the BNP increasingly highlighted the Liberation War of 1971 in its campaigns, focusing on the controversial role of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) during that period. Historically, BNP had allied with JI in multiple elections, forming coalition governments despite JI’s opposition to Bangladesh’s independence. However, the absence of the Awami League in this election transformed JI into BNP’s main rival, prompting BNP to reframe historical narratives for electoral advantage.

On 22 January 2026, BNP chairman Tarique Rahman addressed a rally in Sylhet, emphasising JI’s opposition to the Liberation War: “During the fight to free our motherland, many roles were evident. History cannot be erased; people saw how some stood against the country.”

Similar statements were echoed by other top BNP leaders. On 28 January, BNP secretary general Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir further criticised JI, saying, “This party opposed our war of independence and did not believe in Bangladesh’s freedom. Could such people be trusted with running the country?”

BNP leaders framed their critique as a principled defence of the Liberation War and freedom fighters, while also acknowledging that the party’s previous alliances with JI had been strategic and electoral, not endorsements of Jamaat’s controversial history. BNP leaders explained that the earlier coalition had been purely a “strategic election partnership” and did not absolve JI of its historical transgressions.

Analysts noted that this approach had been largely tactical, aimed at capturing the Liberation War-sensitive voter base that might otherwise have leaned toward Awami League supporters. By emphasising JI’s historical opposition to independence, BNP sought to portray itself as a defender of the Liberation War, positioning JI as the ideological and moral antagonist in the absence of the Awami League.

On the other hand, the 1971 period remained a dark chapter in JI’s history, one that continued to haunt the party. Despite repeated attempts, they were never able to erase this legacy. Following the 5 August uprising, JI has attempted to present various narratives, such as 2024 vs. 1971, July Warriors vs. Freedom Fighters, the Spirit of July vs. the Spirit of the Liberation War, and Second Independence vs. Independence. The party chief’s statement claiming that Colonel Oli’s revolt during the Liberation War was the “first revolt” drew widespread criticism on social media. However, these narratives failed to gain popular acceptance among the people of Bangladesh.

Subsequently, the results showed that those who identified strongly with the 1971 Liberation War tended to support the BNP, ultimately contributing to its electoral victory. Commentators observed that in the 12 February election, voters with ideological ties to the Liberation War cast their ballots for BNP not only because of the party’s election manifesto, but also out of concern that if JI were in power, the values and legacy established in 1971 could be undermined.

The election ultimately demonstrated that when political actors actively engage with historical memory, they can shape public perception and influence voting behavior. Voters with a strong attachment to the Liberation War supported parties perceived as defending its legacy, while rejecting those associated with anti-liberation forces.

* Md. Al-Amin is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Barishal, Bangladesh​
 

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