[🇧🇩] BRICS---Can Developing Countries Including Bangladesh Benefit From It?

[🇧🇩] BRICS---Can Developing Countries Including Bangladesh Benefit From It?
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RBI proposes linking BRICS digital currencies

FE ONLINE DESK
Published :
Jan 19, 2026 13:00
Updated :
Jan 19, 2026 13:00

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India's central bank has proposed that BRICS countries link their official digital currencies to make cross-border trade and tourism payments easier, two sources said, which could reduce reliance on the US dollar as geopolitical tensions rise.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has recommended to the government that a proposal connecting the central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) be included on the agenda for the 2026 BRICS summit, the sources said. They requested anonymity because they were not authorised to speak publicly.

India will host the summit, which will be held later this year. If the recommendation is accepted, a proposal to link the digital currencies of BRICS members would be put forward for the first time. The BRICS organisation includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, among others.

The initiative could irritate the US, which has warned against any moves to bypass the dollar, reports Reuters.

US President Donald Trump has previously said the BRICS alliance is "anti-American" and he threatened to impose tariffs on its members.

The RBI, India's central government and the central banks of China, Brazil, and Russia did not respond to emails seeking comment. The South African central bank declined to comment.

The RBI's proposal to link BRICS' CBDCs for cross-border trade finance and tourism has not been previously reported.

BUILDING BRIDGES

The RBI's proposal builds on a 2025 declaration at a BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, which pushed for interoperability between members' payment systems to make cross-border transactions more efficient.

The RBI has publicly expressed interest in linking India's digital rupee with other nations' CBDCs to expedite cross-border transactions and bolster its currency's global usage. It has, however, said its efforts to promote the rupee's global use are not aimed at promoting de-dollarisation.

While none of the BRICS members have fully launched their digital currencies, all five main members have been running pilot projects.

India's digital currency - called the e-rupee - has attracted a total of 7 million retail users since its launch in December 2022, while China has pledged to boost the international use of the digital yuan.

The RBI has encouraged the adoption of the e-rupee by enabling offline payments, providing programmability for government subsidy transfers and by allowing fintech firms to offer digital currency wallets.

For the BRICS digital currency linkages to be successful, elements like interoperable technology, governance rules and ways to settle imbalanced trade volumes would be among the discussion topics, one of the sources said.

The source cautioned that hesitation among members to adopt technological platforms from other countries could delay work on the proposal and concrete progress would require consensus on tech and regulation.

One idea that is being explored to manage potential trade imbalances is the use of bilateral foreign exchange swap arrangements between central banks, both the sources said.

Previous attempts by Russia and India to conduct more trade in their local currencies hit roadblocks. Russia accumulated large balances of the Indian rupee for which it found limited use, prompting India's central bank to permit the investment of such balances in local bonds.

Weekly or monthly settlements for transactions are being proposed to be made via the swaps, the second source said.

LONG ROAD

Founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, BRICS later expanded to include South Africa and has since broadened further, adding newer members like the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Indonesia.

The bloc has returned to the limelight thanks to Trump’s revived trade-war rhetoric and tariff threats, including warnings aimed at countries aligning with BRICS. At the same time, India has edged closer to Russia and China as it faced trade friction with the US

Past efforts to turn BRICS into a major economic counterweight have run into hurdles, including an ambition to create a common BRICS currency, an idea that was floated by Brazil but was subsequently nixed.

While interest in CBDCs has been dampened globally by rising stablecoin adoption, India continues to position its e-rupee as a safer, more regulated alternative.

CBDCs "do not pose many of the risks associated with stablecoins," RBI Deputy Governor T Rabi Sankar said last month.

"Beyond the facilitation of illicit payments and circumvention of control measures, stablecoins raise significant concerns for monetary stability, fiscal policy, banking intermediation and systemic resilience," Sankar said.

India fears widespread stablecoin use could fragment national payments and weaken its digital payments ecosystem, Reuters reported in September.​
 

Is BRICS losing glamour?

Mir Mostafizur Rahaman

Published :
May 19, 2026 02:13
Updated :
May 19, 2026 02:13

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The rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) was once portrayed as the beginning of a post-western age. For much of the past two decades, the bloc symbolised the ambitions of emerging powers determined to reshape a global order long dominated by the United States and its allies. Economists predicted its collective rise with excitement.

Diplomats from the global south viewed it as an alternative centre of influence. Politicians spoke grandly about a multipolar world.

Today, however, the mood surrounding BRICS is markedly different.

The recent foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi, which ended without a joint statement because of disagreements over the Iran-Israel conflict, has reinforced perceptions that the bloc is losing coherence and strategic direction. A grouping that once promised to challenge western dominance now appears divided even on issues directly affecting one of its own members.

To understand why BRICS now appears to be losing weight, it is necessary to revisit how the platform emerged -- and why so many once believed it could transform global politics.

The story of BRICS began not in diplomacy but in finance.

In 2001, economist Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs coined the term "BRIC" to describe four rapidly growing economies -- Brazil, Russia, India and China. His argument was straightforward: these countries possessed the demographic scale, economic potential and geopolitical importance to reshape the world economy during the 21st century.

The concept soon evolved from an economic label into a political platform.

In 2006, foreign ministers from the four countries held their first meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. By 2009, amid the global financial crisis that badly damaged confidence in western financial institutions, the first formal BRIC summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia.

The timing mattered. While the western financial system was shaken by crisis, many emerging economies appeared comparatively resilient. BRIC's message resonated across the developing world: global governance institutions no longer reflected contemporary realities and emerging powers deserved greater influence.

In 2010, South Africa joined the grouping, transforming BRIC into BRICS and giving the bloc representation from Africa as well. The inclusion carried symbolic importance. BRICS increasingly presented itself as a political voice for the global south.

Its ambitions expanded steadily.

The bloc demanded reforms to institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, arguing that voting structures unfairly favoured western powers. It criticised unilateral sanctions and western military interventions. It promoted the idea of a multipolar international order.

Then came perhaps its most concrete institutional achievement: the creation of the New Development Bank in 2014. Headquartered in Shanghai, the bank was designed as an alternative source of development financing for emerging economies.

At the same time, discussions intensified about reducing dependence on the US dollar. Some BRICS leaders floated proposals ranging from local currency trade settlements to a common reserve currency. Countries such as Bangladesh expressed interest in joining or engaging more closely with the bloc, believing BRICS represented the future centre of economic and political gravity.

For a while, the momentum appeared real.

The combined population of BRICS countries accounted for more than 40 per cent of humanity. China became the world's manufacturing hub. India emerged as a major technological power. Russia remained a formidable military actor. Brazil and South Africa projected regional influence.

Many analysts predicted that BRICS would gradually erode American dominance over global finance and diplomacy.

Yet beneath the rhetoric of unity, contradictions always existed.

BRICS was never a military alliance or an ideologically coherent bloc. Its members possessed vastly different political systems, strategic priorities and regional interests. China and India remained geopolitical rivals despite participating in the same platform. Russia's foreign policy increasingly revolved around confrontation with the west, while India simultaneously deepened security cooperation with Washington through the Quad. Brazil's priorities fluctuated with changes in domestic leadership.

These contradictions were manageable as long as BRICS functioned mainly as a platform for expressing dissatisfaction with western dominance. But global crises gradually exposed the limits of the grouping's unity.

The first major rupture came with the Ukraine war.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Moscow expected diplomatic solidarity from fellow BRICS members. Instead, responses varied considerably. China offered strategic backing but avoided direct military alignment. India maintained close ties with Russia while strengthening relations with the United States and Europe. Brazil and South Africa attempted neutrality.

The bloc survived, but its internal divisions became increasingly visible.

Now the Iran-Israel conflict has deepened those fractures further.

The latest BRICS foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi ended without consensus because of disagreements surrounding the Middle East crisis. Iran, one of the bloc's newer members, urged a united condemnation of the United States and Israel. Yet several members resisted adopting language that could damage their own strategic interests.

This was politically significant. A grouping that claims to represent solidarity among emerging powers could not formulate a collective position regarding military actions involving one of its own members.

The absence of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi from the summit further fuelled perceptions of drift. Officially, he remained in Beijing because of the visit of Donald Trump. Symbolically, however, it reinforced the impression that BRICS no longer commands the same strategic urgency it once did.

Expansion may also have complicated the bloc's cohesion.

The admission of countries such as Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates broadened BRICS geographically and politically. Yet it also imported regional rivalries directly into the organisation. Iran and Gulf states possess sharply different security perspectives. India's priorities differ from China's. Russia's confrontation with the west is not universally shared.

As membership expands, consensus becomes harder.

Unlike the European Union or NATO, BRICS lacks strong institutional mechanisms capable of enforcing collective positions. It has no common security architecture, no binding treaty system and no unified strategic doctrine.

It is ultimately a coalition of convenience.

Yet declaring BRICS irrelevant would also be premature.

The dissatisfaction that fuelled its rise still exists across much of the global south. Many developing countries continue to view western-led institutions as unequal and unrepresentative. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have intensified accusations of double standards regarding international law and humanitarian principles.

BRICS still offers emerging powers diplomatic leverage and symbolic autonomy. It still reflects the broader transition from a unipolar to a more fragmented world order.

But the romantic vision of BRICS as a disciplined anti-western alliance now appears detached from reality.

The bloc's core problem is simple: opposing western dominance is easier than constructing a coherent alternative. Shared grievances do not automatically produce shared strategy.

The New Delhi meeting exposed that truth with unusual clarity. National interests prevailed over bloc solidarity. Strategic calculations trumped rhetoric about southern unity.

BRICS is unlikely to disappear. It will continue holding summits, expanding partnerships and demanding reforms to global governance. But unless it can reconcile the competing ambitions of its members and articulate a coherent collective agenda, its influence may gradually diminish.

The irony is striking. BRICS emerged during a moment of western uncertainty and rising optimism about emerging powers. Two decades later, the world is undeniably more multipolar - but also more fragmented and transactional.

In that harsher geopolitical environment, BRICS is discovering that symbolism alone cannot sustain strategic weight.

For now, the bloc remains influential enough to matter, but too divided to lead. And that is why the question echoing through global diplomacy today is no longer whether BRICS will reshape the world order.

It remains to be seen whether the world's most ambitious non-western coalition can avoid becoming merely another talking shop in an increasingly unstable world.​
 

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