Saif
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It was not done before because of your aunti Hasina. By the by, Bangladeshis are not in the habit of lying like the Indians.
[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh
Bangladesh Defense
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Lying is allowed in Islam. It is called Al-Taqiya.
Saif
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You are a religious bigot. I said Bangladeshis are not in the habit of lying like the Indians. Why did you bring Islam in it?
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BD originally Pakistan was made on the basis of religion. Everything in these nations are driven by Islam. As we discuss some topics here for quite some time, it is not difficult for me to point out who are Islamists.
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That is why this guy is very popular in Pakistan.
Rasool is protecting Pakistani missile.
Rasool is protecting Pakistani missile.
Saif
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If everything in Bangladesh is driven by Islam then how did your aunti Hasina rule the country for 16 years?
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She was More powerful than Islamist in that time but ultimately Islamist Prevailed.
Saif
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It was the student revolution not the Islamist's revolution that ousted Sheikh Hasina.
Saif
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Renewing inland water trade & transit protocol
Even before the independence of Bangladesh, the waterway was one of the key modes for the movement of freights with India like it was historically the case through the railway. Most of the railway network of Bangladesh was also built and developed in the British period, starting with a
Renewing inland water trade & transit protocol
Asjadul Kibria
Published :
May 18, 2025 00:27
Updated :
May 18, 2025 00:27
Even before the independence of Bangladesh, the waterway was one of the key modes for the movement of freights with India like it was historically the case through the railway. Most of the railway network of Bangladesh was also built and developed in the British period, starting with a 53-km long broad-gauge track between Darsana and Jagati, in 1862. The record also shows that steam navigation in inland waterways began in the mid-nineteenth century with passenger services between Kolkata and key river ports of erstwhile East Bengal. The river routes were relatively cheap compared to road transport. Nevertheless, since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the importance of waterways started declining, as the country became focused more on developing roads and highways. The emphasis on roadways has also put the developmental issues of railway to the backburner. Bilateral trade with India also largely depends on roadways, although waterways are still used to carry freight.
In 1972, two countries signed the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWT&T) in accordance with Article VIII of the Indo-Bangla bilateral trade agreement. The protocol was signed to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways for commerce between the two countries. The protocol also allowed the passage of goods between two places in one country and to third countries through the territory of the other. So far, it is one of the few Indo-Bangla bilateral deals that is still working.
The protocol was initially renewable every two years. Later, in 2015, with a few amendments, the deal became renewable every five years. The relevant section of the protocol said: "It shall automatically be extended for successive five years unless either Government terminates the protocol by giving a written notice of its intention to terminate to the other Government at least six months before end of term. In case of termination, it shall cease to operate on the expiry of the respective term. But termination shall not affect the actions taken or agreements reached pursuant to this protocol."
Consequently, the protocol was formally renewed on May 20, 2020, extending the scope. Two new routes and five new ports of calls were included in the protocol, making the total number of routes and ports of calls ten and eight, respectively. As the renewed period of five years will end on Tuesday next, it is to see what the governments on both sides of the border do. Suppose the governments maintain silence and neither side gives any notice for termination. In that case, the protocol will get another five years of extension, with the current terms and conditions unchanged. The automatic renewal will be effective from May 21, 2025. So far, there has been no indication from any of the governments to terminate the deal, especially when the two countries' bilateral ties have come under serious strain.
In the face of a mass uprising, Sheikh Hasina, the autocratic prime minister of Bangladesh, resigned and fled to India for shelter. Since then, the two neighbouring countries' bilateral relations have deteriorated. New Delhi's unconditional support to Hasian and persistent intervention in the domestic affairs of Bangladesh during one and half decades of the Hasina regime made the people of Bangladesh angry and disappointed. Hasina unleashed a reign of terror and oppression in Bangladesh with the backing of India. Her regime brutally killed around 1,400 people during the student-led mass uprising when more than 20,000 were also injured. As Hasina took shelter in Delhi on August 5 last year, a new era of Indo-Bangla ties has also emerged where Bangladesh signalled for a balanced and mutually respectful relationship. As Hasina had turned the country almost into a 'vassal state' of India, her ouster irritated the Indian establishment. Even after nine months of the fall of Hasina, India is yet to accept the reality in Bangladesh, making it difficult to restore normalcy in bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, bilateral trade is going on as both countries are interdependent regarding many products and services, and it is not easy to shift the sources of imports within a short period. The trade and transit cargo movements under the inland waterway protocol routes have also continued, though the volume has declined. The Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority (BIWTA) statistics showed that the total volume of cargo carried under the protocol declined by 13 per cent to 4.13 million tonnes (MT) in FY23 from 4.74 MT in FY22. In FY24, the volume declined further by 2.50 per cent in FY24 to 4.02 MT. The official statistics also showed that during the first half (July-December) of FY25, the water vessels carried some 1.97 MT of cargo in various protocol routes. Despite adding new routes under the protocol five years ago, most of the routes remained unused.
The protocol's main objective is to reduce the cost of bilateral trade and allow India to transfer goods using Bangladesh's inland waterways. It is also known as a river transit facility.
Around 99 per cent of the cargo was carried under the inter-country trade arrangements, which means a negligible amount of cargo was transited through Bangladesh waterways from one part of India to another part. Another interesting feature of the cargo movement under the protocol is the dominance of Bangladeshi vessels, as around 99 per cent of the trip is conducted by Bangladeshi ships. It indicates that Bangladeshi water vessel owners have gained significantly in carrying bilateral trade cargo.
Against the backdrop, it is clear that the importance of the protocol is there, and both countries need to continue the arrangement for bilateral trade. The protocol also provides necessary transit routes for India to connect the northeastern region, known as the seven-sisters, with mainland India. Though the usage of transit routes is small, keeping them open is helpful for India in reducing the cost of transferring products from one part to another. Bangladesh also needs to continue the facility for the neighbouring country as the movement of transit cargo is still limited and does not bring additional pressure on the movement of local cargo vessels. It is to see whether both governments will go for auto-renewal of the protocol or amend the agreement.
Asjadul Kibria
Published :
May 18, 2025 00:27
Updated :
May 18, 2025 00:27
Even before the independence of Bangladesh, the waterway was one of the key modes for the movement of freights with India like it was historically the case through the railway. Most of the railway network of Bangladesh was also built and developed in the British period, starting with a 53-km long broad-gauge track between Darsana and Jagati, in 1862. The record also shows that steam navigation in inland waterways began in the mid-nineteenth century with passenger services between Kolkata and key river ports of erstwhile East Bengal. The river routes were relatively cheap compared to road transport. Nevertheless, since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the importance of waterways started declining, as the country became focused more on developing roads and highways. The emphasis on roadways has also put the developmental issues of railway to the backburner. Bilateral trade with India also largely depends on roadways, although waterways are still used to carry freight.
In 1972, two countries signed the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWT&T) in accordance with Article VIII of the Indo-Bangla bilateral trade agreement. The protocol was signed to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways for commerce between the two countries. The protocol also allowed the passage of goods between two places in one country and to third countries through the territory of the other. So far, it is one of the few Indo-Bangla bilateral deals that is still working.
The protocol was initially renewable every two years. Later, in 2015, with a few amendments, the deal became renewable every five years. The relevant section of the protocol said: "It shall automatically be extended for successive five years unless either Government terminates the protocol by giving a written notice of its intention to terminate to the other Government at least six months before end of term. In case of termination, it shall cease to operate on the expiry of the respective term. But termination shall not affect the actions taken or agreements reached pursuant to this protocol."
Consequently, the protocol was formally renewed on May 20, 2020, extending the scope. Two new routes and five new ports of calls were included in the protocol, making the total number of routes and ports of calls ten and eight, respectively. As the renewed period of five years will end on Tuesday next, it is to see what the governments on both sides of the border do. Suppose the governments maintain silence and neither side gives any notice for termination. In that case, the protocol will get another five years of extension, with the current terms and conditions unchanged. The automatic renewal will be effective from May 21, 2025. So far, there has been no indication from any of the governments to terminate the deal, especially when the two countries' bilateral ties have come under serious strain.
In the face of a mass uprising, Sheikh Hasina, the autocratic prime minister of Bangladesh, resigned and fled to India for shelter. Since then, the two neighbouring countries' bilateral relations have deteriorated. New Delhi's unconditional support to Hasian and persistent intervention in the domestic affairs of Bangladesh during one and half decades of the Hasina regime made the people of Bangladesh angry and disappointed. Hasina unleashed a reign of terror and oppression in Bangladesh with the backing of India. Her regime brutally killed around 1,400 people during the student-led mass uprising when more than 20,000 were also injured. As Hasina took shelter in Delhi on August 5 last year, a new era of Indo-Bangla ties has also emerged where Bangladesh signalled for a balanced and mutually respectful relationship. As Hasina had turned the country almost into a 'vassal state' of India, her ouster irritated the Indian establishment. Even after nine months of the fall of Hasina, India is yet to accept the reality in Bangladesh, making it difficult to restore normalcy in bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, bilateral trade is going on as both countries are interdependent regarding many products and services, and it is not easy to shift the sources of imports within a short period. The trade and transit cargo movements under the inland waterway protocol routes have also continued, though the volume has declined. The Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority (BIWTA) statistics showed that the total volume of cargo carried under the protocol declined by 13 per cent to 4.13 million tonnes (MT) in FY23 from 4.74 MT in FY22. In FY24, the volume declined further by 2.50 per cent in FY24 to 4.02 MT. The official statistics also showed that during the first half (July-December) of FY25, the water vessels carried some 1.97 MT of cargo in various protocol routes. Despite adding new routes under the protocol five years ago, most of the routes remained unused.
The protocol's main objective is to reduce the cost of bilateral trade and allow India to transfer goods using Bangladesh's inland waterways. It is also known as a river transit facility.
Around 99 per cent of the cargo was carried under the inter-country trade arrangements, which means a negligible amount of cargo was transited through Bangladesh waterways from one part of India to another part. Another interesting feature of the cargo movement under the protocol is the dominance of Bangladeshi vessels, as around 99 per cent of the trip is conducted by Bangladeshi ships. It indicates that Bangladeshi water vessel owners have gained significantly in carrying bilateral trade cargo.
Against the backdrop, it is clear that the importance of the protocol is there, and both countries need to continue the arrangement for bilateral trade. The protocol also provides necessary transit routes for India to connect the northeastern region, known as the seven-sisters, with mainland India. Though the usage of transit routes is small, keeping them open is helpful for India in reducing the cost of transferring products from one part to another. Bangladesh also needs to continue the facility for the neighbouring country as the movement of transit cargo is still limited and does not bring additional pressure on the movement of local cargo vessels. It is to see whether both governments will go for auto-renewal of the protocol or amend the agreement.
Saif
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Chief adviser voices concern over Indian hegemony: Manna
Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna has said the Chief Adviser told them that the country is facing a major crisis due to Indian hegemony.
en.prothomalo.com
Chief adviser voices concern over Indian hegemony: Manna
Staff Correspondent Dhaka
Published: 25 May 2025, 23: 02
Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna briefs journalists after meeting Chief Adviser on 25 May Prothom Alo
Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna has said the Chief Adviser told them that the country is facing a major crisis due to Indian hegemony.
Manna said this during a briefing tonight after a meeting with chief adviser professor Muhammad Yunus at his official residence, Jamuna, today, Sunday.
“The chief adviser stated that the country is in a major crisis due to Indian hegemony. He believes that the entire nation needs to remain united in response,” said Manna.
The chief adviser held a meeting at the state guest house Jamuna with leaders of several political parties, including Mahmudur Rahman Manna, today.
Manna spoke to journalists outside Jamuna later in the evening.
“He started the discussion by saying that we are in a deep crisis. By crisis, he meant the conspiracy of Indian hegemony. Indian hegemony does not want to accept this change in our country at all. If they could, they would destroy us in a single day, and they are doing everything necessary to that end. That’s what he said,” Manna quoted the chief adviser as saying.
Manna added that during the meeting, they urged the chief adviser to become more ‘politically engaged’. They also told him that he should clearly announce the date of the election, framework, and how he intends to conduct it.
“The chief adviser clearly informed them that if there are minimal reforms, the election will be held in December; if there are major reforms, it will be in June. He even offered to write in his resignation letter that the election will not be held after June under any circumstances.” Manna added.
Noting that unity among the people and political parties is weakening day by day, Manna said that the chief adviser is worried and frustrated because of it.
He added that they assured the chief adviser that they would remain united on national issues.
Mahmudur Rahman Manna said the chief adviser also told them that he became disheartened even during a recent meeting of advisory council, which is why he had decided on his resignation.
“A lot of things happened over the issue among them (advisers). He shared a detailed account of how the others stopped him, didn’t allow him to submit the resignation letter, and kept him from stepping down.”
Staff Correspondent Dhaka
Published: 25 May 2025, 23: 02
Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna briefs journalists after meeting Chief Adviser on 25 May Prothom Alo
Nagorik Oikya President Mahmudur Rahman Manna has said the Chief Adviser told them that the country is facing a major crisis due to Indian hegemony.
Manna said this during a briefing tonight after a meeting with chief adviser professor Muhammad Yunus at his official residence, Jamuna, today, Sunday.
“The chief adviser stated that the country is in a major crisis due to Indian hegemony. He believes that the entire nation needs to remain united in response,” said Manna.
The chief adviser held a meeting at the state guest house Jamuna with leaders of several political parties, including Mahmudur Rahman Manna, today.
Manna spoke to journalists outside Jamuna later in the evening.
“He started the discussion by saying that we are in a deep crisis. By crisis, he meant the conspiracy of Indian hegemony. Indian hegemony does not want to accept this change in our country at all. If they could, they would destroy us in a single day, and they are doing everything necessary to that end. That’s what he said,” Manna quoted the chief adviser as saying.
Manna added that during the meeting, they urged the chief adviser to become more ‘politically engaged’. They also told him that he should clearly announce the date of the election, framework, and how he intends to conduct it.
“The chief adviser clearly informed them that if there are minimal reforms, the election will be held in December; if there are major reforms, it will be in June. He even offered to write in his resignation letter that the election will not be held after June under any circumstances.” Manna added.
Noting that unity among the people and political parties is weakening day by day, Manna said that the chief adviser is worried and frustrated because of it.
He added that they assured the chief adviser that they would remain united on national issues.
Mahmudur Rahman Manna said the chief adviser also told them that he became disheartened even during a recent meeting of advisory council, which is why he had decided on his resignation.
“A lot of things happened over the issue among them (advisers). He shared a detailed account of how the others stopped him, didn’t allow him to submit the resignation letter, and kept him from stepping down.”
Saif
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Indian president hopes for ‘democratic, inclusive’ Bangladesh as Dhaka’s envoy presents credentials
Extending a warm welcome to newly appointed Bangladesh High Commissioner, President of India Droupadi Murmu on Thursday said they envision a "democratic, stable, prosperous, and inclusive" Bangladesh. She emphasised that the foundation of bilateral ties between the two nations lies in the shared s
Indian president hopes for ‘democratic, inclusive’ Bangladesh as Dhaka’s envoy presents credentials
UNB
Published :
May 29, 2025 21:34
Updated :
May 29, 2025 21:34
Extending a warm welcome to newly appointed Bangladesh High Commissioner, President of India Droupadi Murmu on Thursday said they envision a "democratic, stable, prosperous, and inclusive" Bangladesh.
She emphasised that the foundation of bilateral ties between the two nations lies in the shared sacrifices made during the Liberation War of 1971.
Earlier, Bangladesh High Commissioner to India M Riaz Hamidullah presented his credentials to the Indian President.
The President of India accepted credentials from the Ambassadors/High Commissioners of Thailand, Costa Rica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Türkiye, Bangladesh and Kazakhstan at a ceremony held at Rashtrapati Bhavan.
The Indian president also spoke of the importance of a joint vision for shared prosperity and enhanced connectivity.
She congratulated Bangladesh on assuming the chairmanship of BIMSTEC for a two-year term.
High Commissioner Hamidullah, a senior career diplomat, assumed his duties in New Delhi on April 14, 2025, coinciding with the Bangla New Year, succeeding Mustafizur Rahman.
During the ceremony, the High Commissioner conveyed warm greetings from the President and the people of Bangladesh, according to Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi.
He reiterated his commitment to strengthening the multifaceted partnership between the two countries.
High Commissioner Hamidullah also emphasised the importance of fostering connections between the youth of both nations, recognising that they represent the largest demographic segments.
Before his current posting, Ambassador Hamidullah served as Secretary (West & Multilateral) at Bangladesh's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Dhaka.
Hamidullah served as the High Commissioner of Bangladesh to Sri Lanka and Ambassador to the Netherlands, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
He is a career diplomat who belongs to the 15th batch (1995) of Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs).
Hamidullah served in various capacities in the Bangladesh Mission in New Delhi and Bangladesh Permanent Mission in New York in the past.
He also served as Director at SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu.
At the headquarters, he worked in various capacities, inter alia, on multilateral economic issues, South Asian and European affairs and regional cooperation.
UNB
Published :
May 29, 2025 21:34
Updated :
May 29, 2025 21:34
Extending a warm welcome to newly appointed Bangladesh High Commissioner, President of India Droupadi Murmu on Thursday said they envision a "democratic, stable, prosperous, and inclusive" Bangladesh.
She emphasised that the foundation of bilateral ties between the two nations lies in the shared sacrifices made during the Liberation War of 1971.
Earlier, Bangladesh High Commissioner to India M Riaz Hamidullah presented his credentials to the Indian President.
The President of India accepted credentials from the Ambassadors/High Commissioners of Thailand, Costa Rica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Türkiye, Bangladesh and Kazakhstan at a ceremony held at Rashtrapati Bhavan.
The Indian president also spoke of the importance of a joint vision for shared prosperity and enhanced connectivity.
She congratulated Bangladesh on assuming the chairmanship of BIMSTEC for a two-year term.
High Commissioner Hamidullah, a senior career diplomat, assumed his duties in New Delhi on April 14, 2025, coinciding with the Bangla New Year, succeeding Mustafizur Rahman.
During the ceremony, the High Commissioner conveyed warm greetings from the President and the people of Bangladesh, according to Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi.
He reiterated his commitment to strengthening the multifaceted partnership between the two countries.
High Commissioner Hamidullah also emphasised the importance of fostering connections between the youth of both nations, recognising that they represent the largest demographic segments.
Before his current posting, Ambassador Hamidullah served as Secretary (West & Multilateral) at Bangladesh's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Dhaka.
Hamidullah served as the High Commissioner of Bangladesh to Sri Lanka and Ambassador to the Netherlands, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
He is a career diplomat who belongs to the 15th batch (1995) of Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs).
Hamidullah served in various capacities in the Bangladesh Mission in New Delhi and Bangladesh Permanent Mission in New York in the past.
He also served as Director at SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu.
At the headquarters, he worked in various capacities, inter alia, on multilateral economic issues, South Asian and European affairs and regional cooperation.
Saif
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54 years of Bangladesh-India relations: Who gained what?
After independence, the first agreement Bangladesh signed with India was a 25-year Treaty of Friendship. Shortly thereafter, a bilateral trade agreement was signed. For war-torn Bangladesh, this trade deal was essential. It can be said that cooperation between the two countries advanced rapidly...
en.prothomalo.com
54 years of Bangladesh-India relations: Who gained what?
After independence, the first agreement Bangladesh signed with India was a 25-year Treaty of Friendship. Shortly thereafter, a bilateral trade agreement was signed. For war-torn Bangladesh, this trade deal was essential. It can be said that cooperation between the two countries advanced rapidly up to 1975. However, that same period also became one of the most active for smuggling, from which Bangladesh suffered the most.
Following the ousting of the Awami League government in 1975, relations with India deteriorated over several issues, including the Farakka Barrage. During the Ershad regime, the relationship saw fewer ups and downs. Bilateral relations came into renewed focus after the Awami League returned to power in 2009. During that time, there were visible improvements in many areas of cooperation between the two countries. The Awami League government also benefited from political support in its efforts to consolidate power. However, after the fall of the Awami League government in the wake of the student-people's uprising, tensions in Bangladesh-India relations have reemerged. Trade-related retaliatory measures have been taken by both sides, and their effects are beginning to be visible in the economy. The extent of the long-term impact remains to be seen.
Now, let us examine the range of agreements and decisions made over the past 54 years between the two countries in the areas of economy and trade—that is, the Bangladesh–India Trade Timeline (1972–2025).
Shawkat Hossain Dhaka
Updated: 29 May 2025, 19: 06
19 March 1972 – Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship
The Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship was signed in New Delhi, the capital of India, by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The treaty was signed as a gesture of recognition and gratitude for India's role in Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War. It was a 25-year strategic and diplomatic cooperation agreement between the two nations. Although initially set for 25 years, the treaty was not officially renewed when it expired in 1997.
For newly independent Bangladesh, the treaty marked its first strategic alliance. However, it has also faced criticism from some quarters as an attempt to establish Indian dominance.
28 March 1972 – First bilateral trade agreement
The first bilateral trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was signed on 28 March 1972. According to reports published in the Daily Ittefaq on 29 and 30 March, the agreement allowed both countries to exchange goods within 16 kilometers of the international border and permitted transit facilities.
The agreement was initially valid for one year, with provisions for review after six months. It was signed on behalf of Bangladesh by the then Minister of Commerce, MR Siddiqui, and on behalf of India by the Minister of Foreign Trade, LN Mishra.
Under the agreement, trade worth Tk 1 billion was expected to take place over the next year. Bangladesh would export to India items such as fish, raw jute, furnace oil, naphtha, jute batching oil, semi-processed cowhide, silk thread, handloom cotton products, molasses, Ayurvedic medicines, and books and periodicals.
India would export to Bangladesh items including cement, asphalt, stone, gypsum, limestone, cotton yarn, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, spices, tobacco, machinery spare parts, and also books and periodicals.
1 November 1972 – First inland water transport agreement
Through the Inland Water Transit and Trade Protocol, Bangladesh and India established a framework for mutual trade and cargo transportation using their internal waterways.
This framework significantly facilitated connectivity between India’s northeastern region and the rest of the country.
According to a Daily Ittefaq report published on 2 November 1972, this new river transport agreement was signed under the provisions of the first Bangladesh-India trade deal.
Initially, the agreement was set to last five years. It granted India access to navigate and transport goods through Bangladesh’s river routes, which had been suspended during the 1965 India–Pakistan war.
The agreement was signed by Pimpunker, Secretary of India’s Department of Transport and Shipping, and Sultanuzzaman, Secretary of Navigation for Bangladesh. As a result of this agreement, direct waterway connectivity between West Bengal and Assam through Bangladesh was established, allowing for cargo transport via river routes.
Notably, this protocol has since been renewed and expanded. For example, it was renewed for five years in 2015, and a second addendum was signed on 20 May 2020, introducing new routes and ports of call.
5 July 1973 – Three-year trade agreement
A three-year trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was signed in Dhaka. Bangladesh’s Minister of Commerce AHM Qamaruzzaman and India’s Minister of Commerce Professor DP Chattopadhyay signed the bilateral agreement.
According to a report published in the Daily Ittefaq on 6 July, the agreement stipulated that goods worth a total of Tk 610 million would be exchanged between the two countries during the first year— Tk 305 million worth on each side. At a press conference following the signing, it was announced that the agreement would come into effect on 28 September and that officials from both countries would meet every six months to review its implementation.
Under the new agreement, Bangladesh would export to India: Raw jute worth Tk 200 million, newsprint worth Tk 45 million, dried and fresh fish worth Tk 35 million, leather worth Tk 10 million, newspapers and magazines worth Tk 2.2 million, ayurvedic and unani medicines worth Tk 500,000, films worth Tk 1 million, silk cotton, medicines, spices, and various other products totaling another Tk 10 million.
In return, Bangladesh would import from India: Coal worth Tk 60 million, raw tobacco worth Tk 52 million, cotton worth Tk 75 million, yarn worth Tk 20 million, textile yarn worth Tk 10 million, newspapers and magazines worth Tk 2.2 million and films worth Tk 1 million.
In addition to spare parts, chemicals, toothbrushes, machinery, bicycles, spices, and more will be imported.
30 September 1974 – Trade and Payments Arrangement Agreement
On 30 September 1974, Bangladesh and India signed the Trade and Payments Arrangement (TPA). This agreement established the foundation for a balanced system of trade and financial settlements between the two countries.Through this arrangement, a clearing account was established between the central banks of the two countries, enabling periodic settlement of commercial transactions.
Later, on 17 December 1974, a protocol was signed to end rupee-based trade and transition to trade using freely convertible currencies.
17 December 1974 – End of rupee-based trade and currency conversion
Although signed on 17 December 1974, the protocol came into effect on 1 January of the following year. Through this protocol, Bangladesh and India agreed to end trade in rupees and conduct transactions in freely convertible currencies. The agreement was signed in Delhi by Bangladesh’s Commerce Minister Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmed and India’s Commerce Minister Debi Prasad Chattopadhyay.
A report published in the Daily Sangbad on 18 December 1974, stated:
“From 1 January, Bangladesh and India will switch from rupee-based trade to trade in freely exchangeable currencies. The original rupee trade agreement was to remain valid until July 1976 under the 5 July 1973, India-Bangladesh trade treaty.”
The Indian commerce minister at a press conference said that both public and private sectors in the two countries had shown reluctance in rupee-based transactions, leading to underwhelming progress in trade. This made a change in the exchange mechanism necessary.
12 January 1976 – Subsequent trade protocol
By then, the Awami League government was no longer in power, and bilateral relations had become strained, leading to a decline in trade. In an effort to improve ties—particularly in trade—a Bangladeshi government delegation led by then-Commerce Secretary Nurul Islam visited India. After six days of discussions with a team led by India’s Secretary of Foreign Trade, PC Alexander, a memorandum of understanding was signed. The protocol established specific trade arrangements for products like coal and newsprint.
4 October 1980 – Renewal of bilateral trade agreement
This was essentially a renewed and expanded version of the original 1972 trade agreement between Bangladesh and India. A Daily Ittefaq headline on 5 October 1980, read: “New Bangladesh-India Trade Agreement Signed Under Conditions of Mutual Benefit.”
The agreement was signed during a visit by Indian Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee. On behalf of Bangladesh, State Minister for Commerce Chowdhury Tanveer Ahmed Siddiqui signed the deal. The agreement was valid for three years, with a provision for extension by mutual consent.
8 November 1983 – Renewal of Inland Water Transit Protocol
During the renewal of this protocol, new routes and ports of call were added. After three days of talks in Dhaka, representatives from both countries signed the renewed Inland Water Transit Protocol. A headline in Daily Ittefaq on 9 November read: “Protocol on Indian Ship Movement Renewed.”
11 April 1993 – SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)
At the 7th SAARC Summit held in Dhaka, all member states signed the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) agreement.
1 January 2006 – SAFTA Comes into Effect
The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) replaced SAPTA and became effective on 1 January 2006. The SAFTA agreement was signed on 6 January 2004, during a SAARC summit held in Islamabad. Under SAFTA, member countries began gradually reducing tariffs in mutual trade.
13 August 2008 – Bangladesh included in India’s LDC scheme
At the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, it was agreed that 98.2pc of products from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would receive duty- and quota-free access. In line with that, India launched the Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme for LDCs on 13 August 2008, which included Bangladesh.
12 January 2010 – Sheikh Hasina's visit to India
During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India in 2010, a number of agreements were signed. At the time, India’s Prime Minister was Manmohan Singh.
Key decisions made during the visit included:
Bangladesh and India agreed to allow each other the use of their sea, rail, and road transport routes.
India decided to allow Bangladesh to use its territory for transit access to Nepal and Bhutan.
In return, Bangladesh would permit India to use the Chattogram and Mongla seaports. These ports would also be accessible to Nepal and Bhutan.
Both countries agreed on the use of Ashuganj (in Bangladesh) and Silghat (in India) as ports of call.
India pledged $1 billion in loan assistance for the reform of Bangladesh’s railway system, improvement of transport infrastructure, and dredging of rivers.
India assured that it would not undertake any activity under the Tipaimukh Dam project that could harm Bangladesh.
The two countries agreed to expedite the signing of a Teesta River water-sharing agreement by arranging a meeting between their respective water resource ministers.
India agreed to supply 250 megawatts of electricity to help Bangladesh address its power shortage.
After independence, the first agreement Bangladesh signed with India was a 25-year Treaty of Friendship. Shortly thereafter, a bilateral trade agreement was signed. For war-torn Bangladesh, this trade deal was essential. It can be said that cooperation between the two countries advanced rapidly up to 1975. However, that same period also became one of the most active for smuggling, from which Bangladesh suffered the most.
Following the ousting of the Awami League government in 1975, relations with India deteriorated over several issues, including the Farakka Barrage. During the Ershad regime, the relationship saw fewer ups and downs. Bilateral relations came into renewed focus after the Awami League returned to power in 2009. During that time, there were visible improvements in many areas of cooperation between the two countries. The Awami League government also benefited from political support in its efforts to consolidate power. However, after the fall of the Awami League government in the wake of the student-people's uprising, tensions in Bangladesh-India relations have reemerged. Trade-related retaliatory measures have been taken by both sides, and their effects are beginning to be visible in the economy. The extent of the long-term impact remains to be seen.
Now, let us examine the range of agreements and decisions made over the past 54 years between the two countries in the areas of economy and trade—that is, the Bangladesh–India Trade Timeline (1972–2025).
Shawkat Hossain Dhaka
Updated: 29 May 2025, 19: 06
19 March 1972 – Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship
The Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship was signed in New Delhi, the capital of India, by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The treaty was signed as a gesture of recognition and gratitude for India's role in Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War. It was a 25-year strategic and diplomatic cooperation agreement between the two nations. Although initially set for 25 years, the treaty was not officially renewed when it expired in 1997.
For newly independent Bangladesh, the treaty marked its first strategic alliance. However, it has also faced criticism from some quarters as an attempt to establish Indian dominance.
28 March 1972 – First bilateral trade agreement
The first bilateral trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was signed on 28 March 1972. According to reports published in the Daily Ittefaq on 29 and 30 March, the agreement allowed both countries to exchange goods within 16 kilometers of the international border and permitted transit facilities.
The agreement was initially valid for one year, with provisions for review after six months. It was signed on behalf of Bangladesh by the then Minister of Commerce, MR Siddiqui, and on behalf of India by the Minister of Foreign Trade, LN Mishra.
Under the agreement, trade worth Tk 1 billion was expected to take place over the next year. Bangladesh would export to India items such as fish, raw jute, furnace oil, naphtha, jute batching oil, semi-processed cowhide, silk thread, handloom cotton products, molasses, Ayurvedic medicines, and books and periodicals.
India would export to Bangladesh items including cement, asphalt, stone, gypsum, limestone, cotton yarn, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, spices, tobacco, machinery spare parts, and also books and periodicals.
1 November 1972 – First inland water transport agreement
Through the Inland Water Transit and Trade Protocol, Bangladesh and India established a framework for mutual trade and cargo transportation using their internal waterways.
This framework significantly facilitated connectivity between India’s northeastern region and the rest of the country.
According to a Daily Ittefaq report published on 2 November 1972, this new river transport agreement was signed under the provisions of the first Bangladesh-India trade deal.
Initially, the agreement was set to last five years. It granted India access to navigate and transport goods through Bangladesh’s river routes, which had been suspended during the 1965 India–Pakistan war.
The agreement was signed by Pimpunker, Secretary of India’s Department of Transport and Shipping, and Sultanuzzaman, Secretary of Navigation for Bangladesh. As a result of this agreement, direct waterway connectivity between West Bengal and Assam through Bangladesh was established, allowing for cargo transport via river routes.
Notably, this protocol has since been renewed and expanded. For example, it was renewed for five years in 2015, and a second addendum was signed on 20 May 2020, introducing new routes and ports of call.
5 July 1973 – Three-year trade agreement
A three-year trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was signed in Dhaka. Bangladesh’s Minister of Commerce AHM Qamaruzzaman and India’s Minister of Commerce Professor DP Chattopadhyay signed the bilateral agreement.
According to a report published in the Daily Ittefaq on 6 July, the agreement stipulated that goods worth a total of Tk 610 million would be exchanged between the two countries during the first year— Tk 305 million worth on each side. At a press conference following the signing, it was announced that the agreement would come into effect on 28 September and that officials from both countries would meet every six months to review its implementation.
Under the new agreement, Bangladesh would export to India: Raw jute worth Tk 200 million, newsprint worth Tk 45 million, dried and fresh fish worth Tk 35 million, leather worth Tk 10 million, newspapers and magazines worth Tk 2.2 million, ayurvedic and unani medicines worth Tk 500,000, films worth Tk 1 million, silk cotton, medicines, spices, and various other products totaling another Tk 10 million.
In return, Bangladesh would import from India: Coal worth Tk 60 million, raw tobacco worth Tk 52 million, cotton worth Tk 75 million, yarn worth Tk 20 million, textile yarn worth Tk 10 million, newspapers and magazines worth Tk 2.2 million and films worth Tk 1 million.
In addition to spare parts, chemicals, toothbrushes, machinery, bicycles, spices, and more will be imported.
30 September 1974 – Trade and Payments Arrangement Agreement
On 30 September 1974, Bangladesh and India signed the Trade and Payments Arrangement (TPA). This agreement established the foundation for a balanced system of trade and financial settlements between the two countries.Through this arrangement, a clearing account was established between the central banks of the two countries, enabling periodic settlement of commercial transactions.
Later, on 17 December 1974, a protocol was signed to end rupee-based trade and transition to trade using freely convertible currencies.
17 December 1974 – End of rupee-based trade and currency conversion
Although signed on 17 December 1974, the protocol came into effect on 1 January of the following year. Through this protocol, Bangladesh and India agreed to end trade in rupees and conduct transactions in freely convertible currencies. The agreement was signed in Delhi by Bangladesh’s Commerce Minister Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmed and India’s Commerce Minister Debi Prasad Chattopadhyay.
A report published in the Daily Sangbad on 18 December 1974, stated:
“From 1 January, Bangladesh and India will switch from rupee-based trade to trade in freely exchangeable currencies. The original rupee trade agreement was to remain valid until July 1976 under the 5 July 1973, India-Bangladesh trade treaty.”
The Indian commerce minister at a press conference said that both public and private sectors in the two countries had shown reluctance in rupee-based transactions, leading to underwhelming progress in trade. This made a change in the exchange mechanism necessary.
12 January 1976 – Subsequent trade protocol
By then, the Awami League government was no longer in power, and bilateral relations had become strained, leading to a decline in trade. In an effort to improve ties—particularly in trade—a Bangladeshi government delegation led by then-Commerce Secretary Nurul Islam visited India. After six days of discussions with a team led by India’s Secretary of Foreign Trade, PC Alexander, a memorandum of understanding was signed. The protocol established specific trade arrangements for products like coal and newsprint.
4 October 1980 – Renewal of bilateral trade agreement
This was essentially a renewed and expanded version of the original 1972 trade agreement between Bangladesh and India. A Daily Ittefaq headline on 5 October 1980, read: “New Bangladesh-India Trade Agreement Signed Under Conditions of Mutual Benefit.”
The agreement was signed during a visit by Indian Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee. On behalf of Bangladesh, State Minister for Commerce Chowdhury Tanveer Ahmed Siddiqui signed the deal. The agreement was valid for three years, with a provision for extension by mutual consent.
8 November 1983 – Renewal of Inland Water Transit Protocol
During the renewal of this protocol, new routes and ports of call were added. After three days of talks in Dhaka, representatives from both countries signed the renewed Inland Water Transit Protocol. A headline in Daily Ittefaq on 9 November read: “Protocol on Indian Ship Movement Renewed.”
11 April 1993 – SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)
At the 7th SAARC Summit held in Dhaka, all member states signed the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) agreement.
1 January 2006 – SAFTA Comes into Effect
The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) replaced SAPTA and became effective on 1 January 2006. The SAFTA agreement was signed on 6 January 2004, during a SAARC summit held in Islamabad. Under SAFTA, member countries began gradually reducing tariffs in mutual trade.
13 August 2008 – Bangladesh included in India’s LDC scheme
At the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, it was agreed that 98.2pc of products from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would receive duty- and quota-free access. In line with that, India launched the Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme for LDCs on 13 August 2008, which included Bangladesh.
12 January 2010 – Sheikh Hasina's visit to India
During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India in 2010, a number of agreements were signed. At the time, India’s Prime Minister was Manmohan Singh.
Key decisions made during the visit included:
Bangladesh and India agreed to allow each other the use of their sea, rail, and road transport routes.
India decided to allow Bangladesh to use its territory for transit access to Nepal and Bhutan.
In return, Bangladesh would permit India to use the Chattogram and Mongla seaports. These ports would also be accessible to Nepal and Bhutan.
Both countries agreed on the use of Ashuganj (in Bangladesh) and Silghat (in India) as ports of call.
India pledged $1 billion in loan assistance for the reform of Bangladesh’s railway system, improvement of transport infrastructure, and dredging of rivers.
India assured that it would not undertake any activity under the Tipaimukh Dam project that could harm Bangladesh.
The two countries agreed to expedite the signing of a Teesta River water-sharing agreement by arranging a meeting between their respective water resource ministers.
India agreed to supply 250 megawatts of electricity to help Bangladesh address its power shortage.
In 2010, Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Delhi.
6 September 2011 – Manmohan Singh's visit to Bangladesh
During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s four-day visit to Bangladesh, several agreements were signed:
India announced duty-free and quota-free access for 46 Bangladeshi products.
Agreements were reached on border management, including joint patrols, and consensus to reduce border intrusions and killings.
Residents of enclaves were allowed to travel within designated areas of both countries without passports.
The line of credit was extended, and India agreed to allow parts of the previously announced 1 billion dollar loan to be spent on specific projects.
However, the much-anticipated Teesta water-sharing agreement was not signed.
This was the main focus of the talks, but the agreement fell through after strong opposition from West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, who refused to join the visit. Notably, the agreement has still not been signed to this day.
6 June 2015 – Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh
On 6 June 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his first official visit to Dhaka.
During the visit, 22 memorandums of understanding and agreements were signed. Key highlights included:
Land Boundary Agreement (LBA): Implementation of the 1974 treaty and formal exchange of documents. A total of 162 enclaves were exchanged — 111 Indian enclaves (with 17,160 residents) transferred to Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (with 37,369 residents) to India.
$2 Billion Line of Credit: India announced a new $2 billion loan commitment to Bangladesh.
Coastal Shipping Agreement: This allowed direct cargo shipping between Bangladesh’s Chattogram and Mongla ports and India’s eastern seaports.
Rail Connectivity Agreement: Restoration and expansion of cross-border railway links.
Renewal of Bilateral Trade Agreement.
Expansion of Border Haats (markets).
Power Cooperation Agreement: Promoting electricity trade and interconnection.
Education and Cultural Agreements: Including student and faculty exchanges, joint celebrations of Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam, and collaborative research/publications on Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose.
Launch of Direct Bus Service: Between Agartala (India), Dhaka, and Kolkata.
Renewal of Inland Water Trade and Transit Agreement: Originally signed in 1972, this agreement was renewed for five years with an automatic extension clause.
Later, on 20 May 2020, the agreement was further expanded through the signing of a second addendum, introducing new routes and ports, including Haldia in India and Mongla in Bangladesh.
1 July 2015 – Renewal of trade agreement
The five-year bilateral trade agreement between Bangladesh and India was renewed.
5 November 2017 – Power purchase agreement with Adani
In 2017, the state-owned Power Development Board (PDB) signed a power purchase agreement with Adani Power (Jharkhand) Limited. Under the deal, electricity would be supplied to Bangladesh from a 1,600-megawatt coal-fired power plant located in Godda district, Jharkhand, India. The agreement has faced widespread criticism due to the high cost of electricity.
25 October 2018 – Agreement to use Chattogram and Mongla ports for transit
An agreement was signed allowing India to use Bangladesh’s Chattogram and Mongla ports for transit of goods to its northeastern states. The deal faced significant criticism in Bangladesh, with concerns that the country would not benefit financially from this arrangement.
21 July 2020 – First transit shipment
The first trial shipment under the transit agreement was completed, with Indian goods transported via Chattogram Port to Tripura by Indian trucks.
18 March 2023 – Inauguration of the India-Bangladesh diesel pipeline
As part of enhanced energy cooperation, the prime ministers of both countries jointly inaugurated a 131.57-kilometer cross-border pipeline via video conference. The pipeline delivers diesel from Assam, India, to northern Bangladesh. Of the total length, 126.57 km lies within Bangladesh and 5 km in India. Under a 15-year agreement, Bangladesh can import between 250,000 and 400,000 tonnes of diesel annually. The deal was approved by Bangladesh's cabinet committee on economic affairs on 23 August 2017.
1 April 2023 – Permanent access to Chattogram and Mongla ports for India
Bangladesh officially granted India permanent access to use Chattogram and Mongla ports for transporting goods to India’s northeastern states. The National Board of Revenue (NBR) issued a permanent transit order for this purpose.
Previously, in 2018, Dhaka and Delhi signed a related agreement. In 2019, a trial shipment from India was sent via Chattogram Port through Akhaura to Agartala. In 2022, India conducted further trial transits through two additional routes using Mongla Port.
8 April 2025 – India cancels transshipment facility
Following the fall of the Awami League government, India revoked the transshipment facility that allowed Bangladesh to export goods to third countries via Indian land borders. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) issued the cancellation notice.
15 April 2025 – Bangladesh halts yarn imports via land ports
Bangladesh's National Board of Revenue (NBR) discontinued the import of yarn through land ports such as Benapole, Bhomra, Sonamasjid, Banglabandha, and Burimari. However, yarn can still be imported via sea or other routes.
15 April 2025 – Expiry of rice import allowance
The government had previously allowed duty-free rice imports through Hili and Benapole land ports. As of 15 April, this allowance expired, and no extension was granted.
17 May 2025 – India imposes restrictions on land port imports
India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) announced restrictions on the import of certain goods from Bangladesh via land ports. Affected items include ready-made garments, processed foods, and plastics. These goods can now only be imported through Kolkata and the Haldia seaport.
India's decision includes four key points:
First, Bangladesh will no longer be allowed to export garments using any Indian land ports. Such exports must now go through Kolkata’s Haldia Port or Mumbai’s Nhava Sheva Port.
Second, Bangladesh will not be permitted to export processed foods, beverages, furniture, plastic products, yarn, and yarn-based items to the Indian states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram via land customs stations.
Third, processed foods, beverages, furniture, plastic products, yarn, and related items also cannot be exported through West Bengal’s Changrabandha and Fulbari customs stations. This means such exports will not be allowed via Bangladesh’s Burimari (Lalmonirhat) and Banglabandha (Panchagarh) land ports either.
Fourth, India has not imposed restrictions on imports of fish, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), edible oil, or crushed stone from Bangladesh. Furthermore, there will be no restrictions on the export of Bangladeshi goods to Nepal and Bhutan via Indian ports.
Final word
All things considered, although Bangladesh has maintained close political and economic ties with India since its independence, there has been a persistent imbalance in the give-and-take dynamic. The relationship began with the 1972 Treaty of Friendship, but over the past 54 years, Bangladesh has granted India transit rights, access to the Chattogram and Mongla ports, the opportunity to export electricity, and the use of its waterways, roads, and railways. It has also enabled connectivity to India’s northeastern states. India has gained tangible benefits from coastal shipping, the diesel pipeline, electricity exports, lines of credit, border markets, and trade agreements.
In return, Bangladesh has received some financial assistance, limited duty-free access for certain products, and promises of infrastructure development. However, the long-anticipated Teesta water-sharing agreement remains unsigned. Bangladesh has also gained little financial benefit from transit rights. Though loans were provided, they often came with conditions—such as the mandatory purchase of Indian goods and use of Indian contractors—which raised questions about project quality and relevance.
Recently, trade relations have further weakened due to India’s imposition of restrictions on imports and exports via land ports, the withdrawal of transshipment facilities, and Bangladesh’s decision to suspend yarn imports through land ports.
In summary, over the last 54 years, India has gained more strategically and economically, while Bangladesh is still waiting for the promises and equitable opportunities to be fulfilled.
*This analytical report, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online edition, has been prepared in English by Rabiul Islam.
Saif
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Dependency by design?
Was Bangladesh's reliance on Indian transhipment inevitable - or did it unfold from failures that could, and perhaps should, have been foreseen and averted? More provocatively: was this dependency merely a by-product of internal inelasticity caused by shortcomings, or a consequence of strategic pas
Dependency by design?
A retrospective on Bangladesh's transhipment reliance on India
Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum
Published :
May 30, 2025 23:53
Updated :
May 30, 2025 23:53
Was Bangladesh's reliance on Indian transhipment inevitable - or did it unfold from failures that could, and perhaps should, have been foreseen and averted? More provocatively: was this dependency merely a by-product of internal inelasticity caused by shortcomings, or a consequence of strategic passivity enabled by Bangladesh's then political alignment with India? These questions matter because they lie at the heart of our policy expertise, political will, national sovereignty, and economic competitiveness.
For several years, India facilitated transhipment of Bangladeshi goods - by land, rail, sea, and even air - to destinations like Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and some parts of Europe. This may seem like a win-win to some, but this surface-level convenience conceals deeper vulnerabilities. How did we end up depending on a not-so-neighbourly neighbour, however friendly presented at the time, for something as foundational as trade access and supply chain movement?
There were several signs visible as early as the 1990s, and especially right from the beginning of the following decade that Bangladesh would need upgraded trade logistics, diversified connectivity, and regional transport cooperation. But the successive governments either underestimated the urgency, over-politicised regional cooperation, or failed to invest early enough in required infrastructure and trade facilitation. So, let's be clear: transhipment through India became necessary not because Bangladesh lacked options, but because it failed to develop and diversify those options in time.
Take ports, for example. Chattogram Port was showing signs of congestion since the early 2000s. Exporters complained of costly delays; global buyers worried about reliability, and reports from the World Bank and domestic think tanks issued repeated warnings. But what happened? The long-envisioned deep-sea port at Sonadia was shelved, reportedly due to Indian discomfort with Chinese involvement in the process and instead, Matarbari's plan was cleared with Japanese backing, which remains under construction. Meanwhile, India modernised Haldia and Kolkata and waited.
Again, despite being the second-largest RMG exporter in the world, Bangladesh's air cargo infrastructure lagged far behind. Considering the country's export basket, the airport cold chains were substandard, logistics were inefficient, and the capacity to ship by air is still minimal. And, investment decisions were not fast or sizeable enough to fix that, while neighbouring economies raced ahead in cargo competitiveness. Some will argue: well, maybe Bangladesh just did not have the resources then.
But this is not a story of capacity, it is of prioritisation. Because the government, especially under the Awami League since 2009, though focused overwhelmingly on increasing exports, failed to recognise how those exports move. While the bureaucracy kept hitting numbers, infrastructure fell behind. The Ministry of Commerce sets goals, but the Ministry of Shipping delayed reforms, and logistical modernity remained buried, glossed over by national plans to promote exports. And that lack of attention led to predictable outcomes - congestion, delay, and loss of competitiveness.
So, when India came offering the transhipment options, ready-built and waiting, it did not need to be coercion - it was packaged convenience. Which leads us to the political question: did Bangladesh's lack of preparation serve Indian interests? On the one hand, it would be naive to blatantly suggest that India orchestrated this outcome, but on the other hand, it would be equally naive to pretend that India did not benefit from Bangladesh's inactivity, or that the Awami League's slippery slope of foreign policy tilts played no role. Having repeated opportunities to establish mechanisms to reach Nepal and Bhutan, deepen ties with China and Myanmar, or at least diversify our transit channels, these did not materialise from the fear of offending India, or the desire to remain in Delhi's good books. Meaning, such moves was either delayed, diluted, or diplomatically downplayed.
In fact, arguably the very absence of urgency in developing sovereign infrastructure was a form of 'strategic myopia'. A silent calculus. Why spend billions and test foreign relations when India is right there, cheering the inertia and opening its gates? But naturally, for sovereigns, dependency once formed, does not stay economic. It becomes political. And, so it became. It narrowed Bangladesh's room to manoeuvre, especially in times of regional tension.
Though the situation is now being addressed, and Bangladesh is investing in Matarbari, exploring multimodal transport, and improving customs systems, these efforts are reactive, not visionary. They come after the costs of dependence have already been absorbed.
Looking back, the signs were clear from the demand side - port warnings, export congestion, air cargo delays, asymmetrical infrastructure etc. And in the market, too, there were signs - growing exports, shifting geopolitics, rising regionalism etc. But the supply side- government - ignored or downplayed until crisis, competition, and congestion forced action. Yet they were not treated with the seriousness they demanded. And this strategic myopia led us to a place where transhipment through India was not a choice, but a necessity, does not matter whether it was negligence or quiet alignment.
So, the lesson here is this: in international trade and/ or geopolitics, failure to prepare often translates into dependence. The true cost of not investing in infrastructure is not just lost time or money, it's lost leverage. Bangladesh must catch up now and do so not just for efficiency, but for autonomy. Because no matter how friendly any partner is, sovereignty should never be routed through someone else's corridor.
Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum is development economist and policy researcher at the crossroads of history, morality and pragmatism.
A retrospective on Bangladesh's transhipment reliance on India
Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum
Published :
May 30, 2025 23:53
Updated :
May 30, 2025 23:53
Was Bangladesh's reliance on Indian transhipment inevitable - or did it unfold from failures that could, and perhaps should, have been foreseen and averted? More provocatively: was this dependency merely a by-product of internal inelasticity caused by shortcomings, or a consequence of strategic passivity enabled by Bangladesh's then political alignment with India? These questions matter because they lie at the heart of our policy expertise, political will, national sovereignty, and economic competitiveness.
For several years, India facilitated transhipment of Bangladeshi goods - by land, rail, sea, and even air - to destinations like Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and some parts of Europe. This may seem like a win-win to some, but this surface-level convenience conceals deeper vulnerabilities. How did we end up depending on a not-so-neighbourly neighbour, however friendly presented at the time, for something as foundational as trade access and supply chain movement?
There were several signs visible as early as the 1990s, and especially right from the beginning of the following decade that Bangladesh would need upgraded trade logistics, diversified connectivity, and regional transport cooperation. But the successive governments either underestimated the urgency, over-politicised regional cooperation, or failed to invest early enough in required infrastructure and trade facilitation. So, let's be clear: transhipment through India became necessary not because Bangladesh lacked options, but because it failed to develop and diversify those options in time.
Take ports, for example. Chattogram Port was showing signs of congestion since the early 2000s. Exporters complained of costly delays; global buyers worried about reliability, and reports from the World Bank and domestic think tanks issued repeated warnings. But what happened? The long-envisioned deep-sea port at Sonadia was shelved, reportedly due to Indian discomfort with Chinese involvement in the process and instead, Matarbari's plan was cleared with Japanese backing, which remains under construction. Meanwhile, India modernised Haldia and Kolkata and waited.
Again, despite being the second-largest RMG exporter in the world, Bangladesh's air cargo infrastructure lagged far behind. Considering the country's export basket, the airport cold chains were substandard, logistics were inefficient, and the capacity to ship by air is still minimal. And, investment decisions were not fast or sizeable enough to fix that, while neighbouring economies raced ahead in cargo competitiveness. Some will argue: well, maybe Bangladesh just did not have the resources then.
But this is not a story of capacity, it is of prioritisation. Because the government, especially under the Awami League since 2009, though focused overwhelmingly on increasing exports, failed to recognise how those exports move. While the bureaucracy kept hitting numbers, infrastructure fell behind. The Ministry of Commerce sets goals, but the Ministry of Shipping delayed reforms, and logistical modernity remained buried, glossed over by national plans to promote exports. And that lack of attention led to predictable outcomes - congestion, delay, and loss of competitiveness.
So, when India came offering the transhipment options, ready-built and waiting, it did not need to be coercion - it was packaged convenience. Which leads us to the political question: did Bangladesh's lack of preparation serve Indian interests? On the one hand, it would be naive to blatantly suggest that India orchestrated this outcome, but on the other hand, it would be equally naive to pretend that India did not benefit from Bangladesh's inactivity, or that the Awami League's slippery slope of foreign policy tilts played no role. Having repeated opportunities to establish mechanisms to reach Nepal and Bhutan, deepen ties with China and Myanmar, or at least diversify our transit channels, these did not materialise from the fear of offending India, or the desire to remain in Delhi's good books. Meaning, such moves was either delayed, diluted, or diplomatically downplayed.
In fact, arguably the very absence of urgency in developing sovereign infrastructure was a form of 'strategic myopia'. A silent calculus. Why spend billions and test foreign relations when India is right there, cheering the inertia and opening its gates? But naturally, for sovereigns, dependency once formed, does not stay economic. It becomes political. And, so it became. It narrowed Bangladesh's room to manoeuvre, especially in times of regional tension.
Though the situation is now being addressed, and Bangladesh is investing in Matarbari, exploring multimodal transport, and improving customs systems, these efforts are reactive, not visionary. They come after the costs of dependence have already been absorbed.
Looking back, the signs were clear from the demand side - port warnings, export congestion, air cargo delays, asymmetrical infrastructure etc. And in the market, too, there were signs - growing exports, shifting geopolitics, rising regionalism etc. But the supply side- government - ignored or downplayed until crisis, competition, and congestion forced action. Yet they were not treated with the seriousness they demanded. And this strategic myopia led us to a place where transhipment through India was not a choice, but a necessity, does not matter whether it was negligence or quiet alignment.
So, the lesson here is this: in international trade and/ or geopolitics, failure to prepare often translates into dependence. The true cost of not investing in infrastructure is not just lost time or money, it's lost leverage. Bangladesh must catch up now and do so not just for efficiency, but for autonomy. Because no matter how friendly any partner is, sovereignty should never be routed through someone else's corridor.
Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum is development economist and policy researcher at the crossroads of history, morality and pragmatism.
Saif
Senior Member
- Jan 24, 2024
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Bangladesh tackling regional issues
Since the overthrow of the despotic Hasina regime in August 2024, Bangladesh has been facing a complex set of regional conflicts along with economic challenges and political instability. The August 2024 uprising offered an opportunity to improve governance and stabilise the econom, but various regi
Bangladesh tackling regional issues
Muhammad Mahmood
Published :
May 31, 2025 23:37
Updated :
May 31, 2025 23:37
Since the overthrow of the despotic Hasina regime in August 2024, Bangladesh has been facing a complex set of regional conflicts along with economic challenges and political instability. The August 2024 uprising offered an opportunity to improve governance and stabilise the econom, but various regional and domestic challenges are slowing the process.
During Sheikh Hasina's 16-year rule under the Awami League, she exercised significant power which led to high levels of white-collar crimes and extensive financial corruption. These financial corruptions resulted in an annual illicit outflow to the tune of US$6 billion notwithstanding massive siphoning of billions of dollars annually through trade mis-invoicing. Her rule also saw an endemic corruption at all levels of the government.
Hasina's own immediate family has also been alleged to be deeply involved in financial corruptions, not to mention the extended family. It has been alleged that her niece (a Labour member of the British Parliament) and her mother (Hasina's sister) who live in London, were involved in various financial corruptions involving graft and influence peddling. Similar allegations have also been made against her son, who is now a US citizen residing in the US. An estimated US$20 billion were allegedly laundered out of the country during the 15-year rule of the despotic and kleptocratic regime of Sheikh Hasina (FE, May 28). According to the Guardian (May 24), UK's National Crime Agency (NCA) froze £90 million of London property linked to the Hasina regime. The Financial Times also reported that Sheikh Rehana, sister of Sheikh Hasina and mother of former UK City minister Tulip Siddiq, had lived at the property.
It has been alleged that Hasina received US $6 billion from a Russian company involved in building the Rooppur nuclear power plant in Bangladesh, facilitated by her niece who was previously a junior minister in the UK government. Hasina's niece and her mother (Hasina's sister) received 30 per cent out of this Russian bribery money and Hasina and her two children pocketing the remaining 70 per cent.
Therefore, the country is now grappling with slow economic growth, limited fiscal buffer due to multiple shocks and the impact of global uncertainty, including political uncertainty. Bangladesh not only faces domestic challenges but must also address repercussions from events in neighbouring countries, which include activities involving India, insurgency in Myanmar, and conflicts between India and Pakistan. Overall, Bangladesh is now navigating both internal instability and external recalibration.
Bangladesh experiences domestic challenges and must also manage the impacts of events in neighbouring countries, such as hostile actions involving India, insurgency in Myanmar, and fallouts from conflicts between India and Pakistan.
Amidst an array of domestic challenges, Bangladesh's interim government faces armed conflict at its Myanmar border and an ongoing refugee crisis. The Bangladesh-Myanmar border has been the scene of frequent clashes and tension, particularly between Myanmar's military and the Arakan Army. These conflicts, including those involving the Rohingya, have resulted in cross-border incursions, civilian casualties, and the displacement of people. An estimated 1.2 million Rohingyas are sheltered in Bangladesh now. Ethnic armed groups in Myanmar are fighting the Myanmar army for self-determination.
It is reported that Bangladesh is in contact with the Arakan Army to protect its border and support Rohingya repatriation. In late April, Bangladesh's Foreign Affairs Adviser announced that Bangladesh agreed to the UN's request to set up a humanitarian corridor along its border with Myanmar's Rakhine state for refugees. Dhaka's willingness to support this initiative reflects its humanitarian legacy but also represents a complex decision, one with profound implications for Bangladesh's national security, regional stability and international standing.
While it is a humanitarian initiative, many in India see it as part of a trend of foreign involvement in India's strategic area. India has increased security measures around the Siliguri Corridor, known as the "chicken neck," a crucial connection to its northeastern states, due to Bangladesh's growing relations with China and the UN proposal for a humanitarian-aid corridor into Myanmar's Rakhine State.
South Asia has never been a unified geopolitical entity, but it possesses a unique geographical identity. The British formed a colonial geopolitical entity in the mid-19th century, which included present-day Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and briefly Myanmar. The region extends beyond the British colonial construct of the mid-19th century encompassing not only Bangladesh, India and Pakistan but also Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
The region is currently characterised by various conflicts, both inter-state and intra-state, often driven by a combination of factors such as historical grievances, border disputes, ethnic and linguistic tensions, and frequently the involvement of external actors. The primary conflict is the ongoing dispute over Kashmir, which has resulted in multiple wars between India and Pakistan, including one that occurred last month.
Bangladesh-India relations have seen a significant change since the removal of Sheikh Hasina's Awami League party, now in tatters, has long-standing ties to New Delhi and Hasina herself was considered as a client of India. In fact, bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India have hit a seriously low level over the last 9 months.
The Awami League, Hasina's party was recently banned by the Bangladesh government under the country's anti-terror laws. Her departure signifies the end of an era in the India-Bangladesh relationship, marked by unprecedented subservience to India.
Since Hasina's overthrow, India has been involved in hostile activities along the Bangladesh border, with reports of ties to Hasina and her associates with the aim to help regroup them to destabilise the interim government in Bangladesh. Delhi's silence on Bangladesh's extradition request for Hasina has further worsened bilateral relations. Hasina's hostile comments towards Yunus and members of the interim government, along with Delhi's inaction, are seen as efforts to destabilise the interim government. In fact, anti-Hasina sentiment is intertwined with hostile public sentiment towards India.
Bangladesh is India's biggest trading partner in South Asia. India is the second biggest trading partner of Bangladesh in Asia. In 2023, Bangladesh-India trade saw India exporting $11.3 billion to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh exported $1.89 billion to India, resulting in a significant trade deficit for Bangladesh. Evidently, India enjoys a huge trade surplus with Bangladesh. Though India is having a positive balance of trade with Bangladesh, Bangladesh still struggles to gain access to Indian markets.
In response to bilateral trade-related tensions following Hasina's removal from power, India has been applying economic pressures on Bangladesh by restricting the movement of Bangladeshi products transiting through Indian land ports, especially Ready-Made Garments (RMGs). Targeting Bangladesh's vital RMG sector sent an unmistakable signal that deteriorating political relations have now spilled over into economic ties. As trade-related tensions between India and Bangladesh have been rising, India now also has banned importation of a range of products from Bangladesh.
As anti-India sentiment intensifies, Dhaka may feel compelled to reassert a more independent or even oppositional posture. Economic and strategic pressures, combined with India's ongoing hostile posturing are contributing to political and economic challenges in Bangladesh.
Civil-society actors and nationalist voices are converging around a shared opposition to what they view as the Indian government's involvement in Bangladesh's internal politics-particularly given India's sheltering Hasina and many of her party members and its continued support for the banned Awami League.
Following an attack by insurgents in Indian occupied Kashmir, India launched military strikes against Pakistan, while Pakistan retaliated with its own military strikes. None appears to have gained much from the brief encounter and it was essentially a battle of egos. Despite initial declarations of a ceasefire and talks, both countries continued to accuse each other of violations.
It has been reported that India's recent military encounter with Pakistan, despite Pakistan's fragile economy, was adversely affected by Chinese involvement. India is also a poor and stagnant economy but with Hindu supremacist zeitgeist that has gripped the country under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu supremacist party BJP will only further compound its economic and political crises. A case in point is a number of insurgent groups have emerged following Modi's August 2019 Hindutva inspired revocation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which granted singular Kashmir autonomy.
India under Hindu supremacist Modi is a shining example of a self-indulging and self-adulating leadership. This type of leadership results in government incompetence and suffering. India is now the 4th largest economy in the world in terms of the size of the Economy (GDP), yet its per capita income, according to the IMF reporting, is US$2,880 in 2025. This ranks India around 143rd globally in terms of nominal GDP per capita with about two-thirds of Indians having a living standard like Sub-Saharan Africa.
China recently hosted a trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Afghanistan, announcing plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghan territory - a move India has long opposed due to its passage through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The strengthening cooperation between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan indicates a significant shift in the strategic balance of South Asia, prompting concerns in India.
Bangladesh along with Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives cannot remain bystanders to the India-Pakistan conflict. As a strategic actor in the region, Bangladesh may now look to recalibrate its foreign policy in response to the aftershocks of the conflict in the region.
In a broader context, the intensifying economic and strategic competition between China and the US, as well as between India and China, have contributed to pushing all South Asian countries including Bangladesh towards instability. The economic policy of US President Donald Trump may now further impact India's development prospects and could unwittingly favour China's continued growth and position as a significant global power.
Chiana's first ever white paper on national security published in the middle of May clearly shows that it sees itself an indispensable global power, not just a regional power, ready to play a more assertive role in global affairs, challenging US dominance in the process.
Under such changing circumstances notwithstanding its limited economic power, India's ability to materialise its hegemonic aspirations using bullying tactics against Bangladesh and other neighbours will face further serious limitations. In fact, Indian hegemony is in peril now. India should come to senses that her puppet Hasina is gone forever and she must deal with the evolved reality in Bangladesh. In the long run Indian aggressiveness would be counterproductive to her economic, political and most importantly, national security.
Muhammad Mahmood
Published :
May 31, 2025 23:37
Updated :
May 31, 2025 23:37
Since the overthrow of the despotic Hasina regime in August 2024, Bangladesh has been facing a complex set of regional conflicts along with economic challenges and political instability. The August 2024 uprising offered an opportunity to improve governance and stabilise the econom, but various regional and domestic challenges are slowing the process.
During Sheikh Hasina's 16-year rule under the Awami League, she exercised significant power which led to high levels of white-collar crimes and extensive financial corruption. These financial corruptions resulted in an annual illicit outflow to the tune of US$6 billion notwithstanding massive siphoning of billions of dollars annually through trade mis-invoicing. Her rule also saw an endemic corruption at all levels of the government.
Hasina's own immediate family has also been alleged to be deeply involved in financial corruptions, not to mention the extended family. It has been alleged that her niece (a Labour member of the British Parliament) and her mother (Hasina's sister) who live in London, were involved in various financial corruptions involving graft and influence peddling. Similar allegations have also been made against her son, who is now a US citizen residing in the US. An estimated US$20 billion were allegedly laundered out of the country during the 15-year rule of the despotic and kleptocratic regime of Sheikh Hasina (FE, May 28). According to the Guardian (May 24), UK's National Crime Agency (NCA) froze £90 million of London property linked to the Hasina regime. The Financial Times also reported that Sheikh Rehana, sister of Sheikh Hasina and mother of former UK City minister Tulip Siddiq, had lived at the property.
It has been alleged that Hasina received US $6 billion from a Russian company involved in building the Rooppur nuclear power plant in Bangladesh, facilitated by her niece who was previously a junior minister in the UK government. Hasina's niece and her mother (Hasina's sister) received 30 per cent out of this Russian bribery money and Hasina and her two children pocketing the remaining 70 per cent.
Therefore, the country is now grappling with slow economic growth, limited fiscal buffer due to multiple shocks and the impact of global uncertainty, including political uncertainty. Bangladesh not only faces domestic challenges but must also address repercussions from events in neighbouring countries, which include activities involving India, insurgency in Myanmar, and conflicts between India and Pakistan. Overall, Bangladesh is now navigating both internal instability and external recalibration.
Bangladesh experiences domestic challenges and must also manage the impacts of events in neighbouring countries, such as hostile actions involving India, insurgency in Myanmar, and fallouts from conflicts between India and Pakistan.
Amidst an array of domestic challenges, Bangladesh's interim government faces armed conflict at its Myanmar border and an ongoing refugee crisis. The Bangladesh-Myanmar border has been the scene of frequent clashes and tension, particularly between Myanmar's military and the Arakan Army. These conflicts, including those involving the Rohingya, have resulted in cross-border incursions, civilian casualties, and the displacement of people. An estimated 1.2 million Rohingyas are sheltered in Bangladesh now. Ethnic armed groups in Myanmar are fighting the Myanmar army for self-determination.
It is reported that Bangladesh is in contact with the Arakan Army to protect its border and support Rohingya repatriation. In late April, Bangladesh's Foreign Affairs Adviser announced that Bangladesh agreed to the UN's request to set up a humanitarian corridor along its border with Myanmar's Rakhine state for refugees. Dhaka's willingness to support this initiative reflects its humanitarian legacy but also represents a complex decision, one with profound implications for Bangladesh's national security, regional stability and international standing.
While it is a humanitarian initiative, many in India see it as part of a trend of foreign involvement in India's strategic area. India has increased security measures around the Siliguri Corridor, known as the "chicken neck," a crucial connection to its northeastern states, due to Bangladesh's growing relations with China and the UN proposal for a humanitarian-aid corridor into Myanmar's Rakhine State.
South Asia has never been a unified geopolitical entity, but it possesses a unique geographical identity. The British formed a colonial geopolitical entity in the mid-19th century, which included present-day Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and briefly Myanmar. The region extends beyond the British colonial construct of the mid-19th century encompassing not only Bangladesh, India and Pakistan but also Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
The region is currently characterised by various conflicts, both inter-state and intra-state, often driven by a combination of factors such as historical grievances, border disputes, ethnic and linguistic tensions, and frequently the involvement of external actors. The primary conflict is the ongoing dispute over Kashmir, which has resulted in multiple wars between India and Pakistan, including one that occurred last month.
Bangladesh-India relations have seen a significant change since the removal of Sheikh Hasina's Awami League party, now in tatters, has long-standing ties to New Delhi and Hasina herself was considered as a client of India. In fact, bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India have hit a seriously low level over the last 9 months.
The Awami League, Hasina's party was recently banned by the Bangladesh government under the country's anti-terror laws. Her departure signifies the end of an era in the India-Bangladesh relationship, marked by unprecedented subservience to India.
Since Hasina's overthrow, India has been involved in hostile activities along the Bangladesh border, with reports of ties to Hasina and her associates with the aim to help regroup them to destabilise the interim government in Bangladesh. Delhi's silence on Bangladesh's extradition request for Hasina has further worsened bilateral relations. Hasina's hostile comments towards Yunus and members of the interim government, along with Delhi's inaction, are seen as efforts to destabilise the interim government. In fact, anti-Hasina sentiment is intertwined with hostile public sentiment towards India.
Bangladesh is India's biggest trading partner in South Asia. India is the second biggest trading partner of Bangladesh in Asia. In 2023, Bangladesh-India trade saw India exporting $11.3 billion to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh exported $1.89 billion to India, resulting in a significant trade deficit for Bangladesh. Evidently, India enjoys a huge trade surplus with Bangladesh. Though India is having a positive balance of trade with Bangladesh, Bangladesh still struggles to gain access to Indian markets.
In response to bilateral trade-related tensions following Hasina's removal from power, India has been applying economic pressures on Bangladesh by restricting the movement of Bangladeshi products transiting through Indian land ports, especially Ready-Made Garments (RMGs). Targeting Bangladesh's vital RMG sector sent an unmistakable signal that deteriorating political relations have now spilled over into economic ties. As trade-related tensions between India and Bangladesh have been rising, India now also has banned importation of a range of products from Bangladesh.
As anti-India sentiment intensifies, Dhaka may feel compelled to reassert a more independent or even oppositional posture. Economic and strategic pressures, combined with India's ongoing hostile posturing are contributing to political and economic challenges in Bangladesh.
Civil-society actors and nationalist voices are converging around a shared opposition to what they view as the Indian government's involvement in Bangladesh's internal politics-particularly given India's sheltering Hasina and many of her party members and its continued support for the banned Awami League.
Following an attack by insurgents in Indian occupied Kashmir, India launched military strikes against Pakistan, while Pakistan retaliated with its own military strikes. None appears to have gained much from the brief encounter and it was essentially a battle of egos. Despite initial declarations of a ceasefire and talks, both countries continued to accuse each other of violations.
It has been reported that India's recent military encounter with Pakistan, despite Pakistan's fragile economy, was adversely affected by Chinese involvement. India is also a poor and stagnant economy but with Hindu supremacist zeitgeist that has gripped the country under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu supremacist party BJP will only further compound its economic and political crises. A case in point is a number of insurgent groups have emerged following Modi's August 2019 Hindutva inspired revocation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which granted singular Kashmir autonomy.
India under Hindu supremacist Modi is a shining example of a self-indulging and self-adulating leadership. This type of leadership results in government incompetence and suffering. India is now the 4th largest economy in the world in terms of the size of the Economy (GDP), yet its per capita income, according to the IMF reporting, is US$2,880 in 2025. This ranks India around 143rd globally in terms of nominal GDP per capita with about two-thirds of Indians having a living standard like Sub-Saharan Africa.
China recently hosted a trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Afghanistan, announcing plans to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghan territory - a move India has long opposed due to its passage through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The strengthening cooperation between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan indicates a significant shift in the strategic balance of South Asia, prompting concerns in India.
Bangladesh along with Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives cannot remain bystanders to the India-Pakistan conflict. As a strategic actor in the region, Bangladesh may now look to recalibrate its foreign policy in response to the aftershocks of the conflict in the region.
In a broader context, the intensifying economic and strategic competition between China and the US, as well as between India and China, have contributed to pushing all South Asian countries including Bangladesh towards instability. The economic policy of US President Donald Trump may now further impact India's development prospects and could unwittingly favour China's continued growth and position as a significant global power.
Chiana's first ever white paper on national security published in the middle of May clearly shows that it sees itself an indispensable global power, not just a regional power, ready to play a more assertive role in global affairs, challenging US dominance in the process.
Under such changing circumstances notwithstanding its limited economic power, India's ability to materialise its hegemonic aspirations using bullying tactics against Bangladesh and other neighbours will face further serious limitations. In fact, Indian hegemony is in peril now. India should come to senses that her puppet Hasina is gone forever and she must deal with the evolved reality in Bangladesh. In the long run Indian aggressiveness would be counterproductive to her economic, political and most importantly, national security.
Saif
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Spirit of mutual respect, understanding to guide 2 nations to work together: CA Yunus to PM Modi
Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have exchanged Eid-ul-Azha greetings in the spirit of festivity, sacrifice, generosity and unity. "I am confident that the spirit of mutual respect and understanding will continue to guide our nations to work together f
Spirit of mutual respect, understanding to guide 2 nations to work together: CA Yunus to PM Modi
FE ONLINE DESK
Published :
Jun 08, 2025 22:13
Updated :
Jun 08, 2025 22:13
Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have exchanged Eid-ul-Azha greetings in the spirit of festivity, sacrifice, generosity and unity.
"I am confident that the spirit of mutual respect and understanding will continue to guide our nations to work together for the wellbeing of our peoples," Prof Yunus wrote to PM Modi on June 6.
The interim government on Sunday shared both the letters through its verified social media handle, reports UNB.
He said Eid-ul-Azha is a time of reflection, which brings communities together in the spirit of festivity, sacrifice, generosity and unity and inspires them all to work together for the greater benefits of the peoples across the world.
Prof Yunus said he deeply appreciates PM Modi's thoughtful message, kind greetings and warm wishes on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha, which reflects the shared values between the two countries.
"I also would like to convey my warmest greetings to you, and through you, to the people of India on this auspicious occasion," the message from Prof Yunus reads.
On this blessed occasion, Prof Yunus wished PM Modi good health and happiness and the people of India peace, progress, and prosperity.
Earlier, on behalf of the people and the Government of India, PM Modi on June 4 conveyed warm greetings to Prof Yunus and the people of Bangladesh on the auspicious occasion of Eid al-Adha.
This holy festival is an integral part of the rich and diverse cultural heritage of India and is celebrated with immense joy and fervour by millions of people of Islamic faith across the country, Modi said.
"It reminds us of the timeless values of sacrifice, compassion and brotherhood, which are essential in building a peaceful and inclusive world," PM Modi mentioned.
"I take this opportunity to extend my best wishes for your good health and well-being," the message from Modi reads.
FE ONLINE DESK
Published :
Jun 08, 2025 22:13
Updated :
Jun 08, 2025 22:13
Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have exchanged Eid-ul-Azha greetings in the spirit of festivity, sacrifice, generosity and unity.
"I am confident that the spirit of mutual respect and understanding will continue to guide our nations to work together for the wellbeing of our peoples," Prof Yunus wrote to PM Modi on June 6.
The interim government on Sunday shared both the letters through its verified social media handle, reports UNB.
He said Eid-ul-Azha is a time of reflection, which brings communities together in the spirit of festivity, sacrifice, generosity and unity and inspires them all to work together for the greater benefits of the peoples across the world.
Prof Yunus said he deeply appreciates PM Modi's thoughtful message, kind greetings and warm wishes on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha, which reflects the shared values between the two countries.
"I also would like to convey my warmest greetings to you, and through you, to the people of India on this auspicious occasion," the message from Prof Yunus reads.
On this blessed occasion, Prof Yunus wished PM Modi good health and happiness and the people of India peace, progress, and prosperity.
Earlier, on behalf of the people and the Government of India, PM Modi on June 4 conveyed warm greetings to Prof Yunus and the people of Bangladesh on the auspicious occasion of Eid al-Adha.
This holy festival is an integral part of the rich and diverse cultural heritage of India and is celebrated with immense joy and fervour by millions of people of Islamic faith across the country, Modi said.
"It reminds us of the timeless values of sacrifice, compassion and brotherhood, which are essential in building a peaceful and inclusive world," PM Modi mentioned.
"I take this opportunity to extend my best wishes for your good health and well-being," the message from Modi reads.
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