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[🇧🇩] Recovering Laundered Money and Assets of Awami League's Ministers and Oligarchs

[🇧🇩] Recovering Laundered Money and Assets of Awami League's Ministers and Oligarchs
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G Bangladesh Defense

Playing the victim while sitting on loot
SYED MUHAMMED SHOWAIB
Published :
Jan 30, 2026 23:54
Updated :
Jan 30, 2026 23:54

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Bangladesh's push to recover stolen assets has entered a much trickier and consequential stage with business tycoon Mohammad Saiful Alam dragging the country to international arbitration under the Bangladesh-Singapore bilateral investment treaty. Having acquired Singaporean citizenship only in recent years after renouncing their Bangladeshi nationality, Alam, his wife Farzana Parveen, and sons Ashraful Alam and Asadul Alam Mahir are now casting themselves as foreign investors wronged by their former homeland. Represented by the elite firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, they seek not merely to shield vast assets but to hit Bangladesh with a massive claim for damages and costs by taking advantage of the treaty meant to encourage legitimate investment.

This legal offensive follows what is widely considered the most devastating act of financial crime in the nation's history. During the latter years of the fallen Awami League government, companies linked to the S Alam Group, with support from within the administration, seized control of nearly all Shariah-based banks by circumventing the Banking Companies Act of 1991. After consolidating power, they forced out senior management and existing boards, replaced them with loyalists and extracted trillions of taka through fraudulent loans that were later funnelled abroad. Subjecting private banks to such a methodical and carefully orchestrated loan fraud on a scale possibly unseen anywhere else, let alone in a developing nation like Bangladesh, has only magnified the damage many times over.

Arguably, this ruination of financial sector through the activities of S Alam and similar groups was a primary source of public loathing towards the previous government, a sentiment that helped lay the groundwork for the July uprising. Upon assuming office, the interim government declared the recovery of laundered assets a top priority. Eleven inter agency taskforces were formed to track down the trillions believed to have been laundered abroad by politically connected business groups. Expectations were understandably high. Yet, as the government's term comes to the end, the performance of these task forces has been largely underwhelming. This shortfall is attributed to a confluence of factors, ranging from the absence of a central reporting authority and poor inter-agency coordination to unclear mandates, budgetary constraints and limited specialised expertise. Parallel efforts to engage foreign legal firms have likewise yielded little visible progress, also hampered by budgetary constraints and the absence of a standard methodology.

While domestic agencies struggled to act in concert, Saiful Alam, the man who benefited most from the banking plunder, moved decisively on the international stage. In a move that resembles a thief sounding the alarm, he along with his wife and two sons Ashraful Alam and Asadul Alam Mahir, initiated arbitration proceedings against Bangladesh at the World Bank-affiliated ICSID invoking the Bangladesh-Singapore Bilateral Investment Treaty. Their apparent objective is to entangle the state in protracted arbitration to shield their overseas assets and potentially claim hundreds of millions in damages. Bilateral investment treaties are agreements between states designed to protect foreign investors and encourage capital inflows. In 2004, Bangladesh signed one with Singapore in the hopes of attracting investment.

The family's claim of Singaporean nationality is central to the case, as the arbitration body only hears disputes between a state and nationals of another state. As purported Singaporean investors, they allege that Bangladesh breached its obligations under the treaty with respect to their investments. However, by their own admission, Saiful Alam, Farzana Parveen and Asadul Alam Mahir became Singaporean citizens on 12 September 2023 while Ashraful Alam acquired citizenship on 29 July 2021. All four had renounced their Bangladeshi nationality on August 3, 2020.

While the claimants may have held Singaporean passports at the time they filed for arbitration, the investments in question were neither made when they were Singaporean nationals nor financed with income lawfully earned in Singapore. An investigative report published in The Daily Star on 4 August 2023, prior to their change in nationality, titled S Alam's Aladdin's lamp, detailed how Saiful Alam built a business empire in Singapore worth at least one billion dollars, including hotels and real estate without approval from Bangladesh Bank to transfer funds or invest abroad. The central question for arbitration, therefore, must be whether treaty protections extend to assets acquired with funds illicitly expatriated before the claimants became foreign citizens. To hold otherwise would be to allow a party to seek international arbitration for the protection of assets stolen from the very country they are now suing.

Saiful Alam and his cronies drained several Shariah-based banks to such an extent that many devout Muslims now fear using them. Companies linked to him also misappropriated loans from conventional banks including the state-owned Janata Bank. Loans were taken both in the names of his own companies and through others including many unwitting individuals in whose names accounts had been opened. Portions of these funds fuelled domestic operations, while the bulk flowed overseas, laundered through layered ownership structures involving proxies and shell companies to obscure the family's trail. One investigator likened the trail to footprints that suddenly vanish, leaving trackers guessing where they lead. Even attempts by the National Board of Revenue (NBR) to recover some of the remaining liquid assets through tax demands reportedly faced resistance from Islami Bank, demonstrating the significant institutional and political hurdles in the recovery process.

Now that Saiful Alam has sought redress through international arbitration, Bangladesh has little choice but to contest the case. The matter must be treated with utmost seriousness, particularly given precedents where countries such as Argentina have lost arbitration cases and been ordered to pay substantial sums. Bangladesh's strategy must rest on clearly and factually showing that the assets in question belonged to the country were acquired through illicit means before the claimants assumed Singaporean citizenships, and that their later change of nationality does not legitimise the theft or entitle them to the protections of a treaty meant for genuine foreign investors.​
 
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Focus on trade-based money laundering

Shah Md Ahsan Habib
Published :
Feb 01, 2026 23:53
Updated :
Feb 01, 2026 23:53

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Illicit fund flows pose a significant risk to the integrity of the banking system and present persistent challenges for regulators operating under risk-based supervisory frameworks. In recent years, Bangladesh has formally moved towards implementing risk-based supervision, reflecting a broader shift away from purely compliance-driven oversight. One of the most complex manifestations of these risks is Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML), which takes place through legitimate international trade transactions. Despite the growing effectiveness of risk-based approaches for detection, control, and oversight, TBML frameworks in many developing countries, including Bangladesh, still rely largely on compliance-based systems. Traditional compliance-driven approaches are often insufficient to identify and address TBML vulnerabilities. Risk-sensitive supervision itself is complex to implement, as it requires strong data, skilled analysis, and consistent supervisory judgment.

A recurring conceptual issue is whether TBML should be treated merely as a compliance risk for banks. The answer is yes, but only partially, and stopping there often leads to supervisory criticism. For a bank, TBML is fundamentally a financial crime, arising from the nature of its trade-related business. This risk becomes a compliance risk because banks are legally required to identify, assess, and mitigate it under applicable laws and regulations. When banks fail to do so, the consequences materialise as regulatory breaches, financial penalties, and reputational damage. In risk taxonomy terms, the root risk is money laundering. The primary risk category is compliance risk due to failure to meet regulatory obligations. Secondary spillovers may include legal risk, reputational risk, and in some cases credit or operational risk. Treating TBML as "just compliance" may help simplify internal classification for banks; however, it is hardly acceptable to regulators operating under a risk-based supervisory approach.

Risk-based supervision changes how TBML is evaluated and managed. Under this approach, supervisors are less interested in whether a bank has policies on paper and more interested in whether the bank understands its own business and risks. The central supervisory question becomes how exposed a particular bank is to TBML and whether its controls are proportionate to that exposure. This assessment begins with an evaluation of inherent TBML risk, independent of mitigating controls. Supervisors consider the size and complexity of the bank's trade finance activities, the jurisdictions involved, the nature of customers such as traders or intermediaries, the types of products offered including letters of credit, guarantees, open-account trade, and supply-chain finance, and the nature of goods traded. A bank with little or no trade activity is likely to attract limited supervisory attention, while a bank heavily engaged in cross-border trade in higher-risk corridors is examined far more closely.

After assessing inherent risk, supervisors review how effective a bank's controls are, which is often the most challenging stage for banks. Under risk-based supervision, how well controls are applied matters more than whether policies exist on paper. Supervisors look for meaningful review of trade documents, the ability to identify unusual pricing or trade patterns, proper use of trade data in AML systems, staff understanding of TBML risks, and careful investigation of alerts. Even without proven violations, weak controls raise concern because they indicate exposure to risk. Under this approach, potential weaknesses are taken seriously, not just actual failures. The supervisory response is then adjusted proportionately based on the combination of inherent risk and control effectiveness. Where TBML risk is high and controls are weak, supervisors may increase the frequency and depth of inspections. They may expand the focus on trade finance, require targeted remediation programs, or impose qualitative measures such as restrictions on certain products or trade corridors. In serious situations, supervisors may require additional capital or apply enforcement measures. These actions are typically progressive, with pressure increasing until weaknesses are addressed.

Banks often overlook that TBML is not treated the same way as general AML under risk-based supervision. Trade finance has unique features that cannot be managed through retail AML controls alone. Supervisors expect TBML risk to be assessed at the product level and supported by trade-specific controls. They also expect data-driven monitoring and clear ownership by senior management. When TBML is only briefly addressed within a general AML framework, supervisors often interpret this as a lack of genuine understanding of the bank's risk profile.

Global standard-setting bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force have repeatedly identified TBML as a major vulnerability in the financial system and have called for risk-focused supervisory responses. Supervisors increasingly emphasise the use of trade data analytics and stronger information sharing between banks and authorities as part of risk-based oversight. There is also closer cooperation among financial supervisors, customs, and tax agencies, along with thematic examinations of trade finance. These developments reinforce the principle that TBML controls must be proportionate to the nature, size, and complexity of a bank's trade activities.

Country experience shows that TBML risk varies according to economic structure and trade patterns. Countries that rely heavily on international trade often face higher TBML risk, particularly where trade processes remain manual or poorly integrated. Under risk-based supervision, authorities respond by issuing TBML-specific guidance, conducting sector-wide risk assessments, and increasing oversight of higher-risk trade finance products. In some cases, certain products are restricted until banks can demonstrate adequate controls. These approaches highlight the importance of adjusting supervisory intensity based on TBML risk rather than applying uniform rules across all banks.

Bangladesh offers a relevant example due to its heavy reliance on international trade, particularly in sectors such as garments, textiles, and commodities. The volume of imports and exports, combined with complex supply chains, has made TBML a recognised risk. Authorities have identified cases involving trade misinvoicing, over-invoicing of imports, and under-invoicing of exports, often linked not only to money laundering but also to capital flight and tax evasion. Supervisory responses have included strengthening AML/CFT regulations applicable to trade finance, issuing guidance on TBML red flags, enhancing coordination between the central bank, customs, and other agencies, and increasing scrutiny of high-risk customers and trade corridors. These measures illustrate how risk-based supervision can be adapted to national trade realities.

An emerging and increasingly logical view is that TBML should also be treated as a strategic risk rather than only an operational or compliance issue. A bank's exposure to TBML is shaped by strategic decisions such as market entry, customer targeting, product offerings, and investment in systems, data, and skilled personnel. When TBML is recognised as a strategic risk, it becomes part of enterprise-wide risk governance and attracts attention from senior management and boards. This alignment supports risk-based supervision by encouraging forward-looking risk assessments, proportionate investment in controls, clearer accountability, and more credible engagement with supervisors.

International developments and country experiences, including Bangladesh, indicate that supervisors increasingly expect trade-specific, data-driven, and strategically aligned approaches to TBML. Recognising TBML as both a compliance and strategic risk strengthens regulatory compliance and enhances long-term resilience in an increasingly complex global trade environment.


Dr. Shah Md Ahsan Habib is Professor BIBM, and Chairman, DNet.​
 
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Bangladesh engages British law firm to face S Alam arbitration
United News of Bangladesh . Dhaka 03 February, 2026, 22:54

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Saiful Alam. —New Age file photo

The government on has appointed a British law firm to contest an international arbitration case filed by S Alam Group founder Saiful Alam and his family before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

Sources familiar with the decision said that the cabinet committee government procurement on Tuesday approved the appointment of White and Case LLP, a UK-based international law firm, to represent Bangladesh in ICSID arbitration case ARB/25/52. The firm will be paid a fee of $1,250 per hour for its legal services.

The proposal to hire an international law firm was placed before the committee by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, citing the complexity and high financial stakes of the case.

Talking to journalists after the meeting, finance adviser Salehuddin Ahmed said the arbitration was linked to allegations of money laundering.Daily newspaper subscription

‘S Alam has apparently filed a case in London and challenged Bangladesh at the World Bank’s ICSID, he said.

‘We need to engage an international legal firm to fight this case, as it involves a huge amount of money and has been brought before an organisation like the World Bank,’ said Salehuddin.

When asked about the identity of the firm, the adviser said that it was a British firm but did not name it at the time.

Salehuddin also said that legal action was underway against S Alam on money laundering charges.

He said, ‘When a government or a company is accused of obstructing business, ICSID arbitration is invoked. We have received the arbitration notice and must respond. This is a highly complicated legal process.’

In October 2025, lawyers representing S Alam and his family formally filed the arbitration request at ICSID in Washington, alleging that asset freezes, confiscations and punitive measures taken by the Bangladesh government on money laundering charges caused them losses worth hundreds of billions of dollars.

In their filing, the S Alam family claimed that the interim government deliberately targeted them through bank account freezes, asset seizures, ‘baseless investigations’ into their businesses and a ‘provocative media campaign,’ arguing that such actions violate international investment protection obligations.

The arbitration has been filed under the 2004 Bangladesh-Singapore Bilateral Investment Treaty. Documents show that members of the S Alam family renounced Bangladeshi citizenship in 2020 and obtained Singaporean citizenship between 2021 and 2023. They are currently residing in Singapore.

As Singapore nationals, they claim entitlement to international investment protection under the BIT, as well as protection under Bangladesh’s Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act 1980.

Following the August 5, 2024 mass uprising that led to the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government, an interim administration headed by Professor Muhammad Yunus initiated investigations and asset recovery efforts against major business groups and influential individuals accused of large-scale money laundering.

An economic white paper published by the interim government in December 2024 estimated total illicit capital flight at around $234 billion.

Bangladesh Bank governor Ahsan H. Mansur, who heads the asset recovery task force, alleged that the S Alam family alone siphoned off nearly $12 billion abroad.

He accused S Alam and his associates of taking control of multiple banks with the help of military intelligence and transferring funds overseas through loan and import fraud, forcing the government to bail out six banks.

S Alam Group has denied all allegations, saying the government has failed to present any credible evidence to support the claims.​
 
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