[🇧🇩] Reforms carried out by the interim/future Govts.

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G Bangladesh Defense

Bangladesh needs broader reforms beyond Politics

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In the months following the political turbulence of July 2024, the word reform has once again entered Bangladesh’s national vocabulary. Yet, despite its frequent use, the discussion remains narrow. Almost all attention has been devoted to political reform such as the design of the electoral system, the neutrality of institutions, the distribution of power within government and so on.

These are significant issues, but they represent only one dimension of the country’s challenges. If reform is to have meaning beyond rhetoric, it must extend into the social and economic foundations that determine how Bangladesh functions everyday i.e.reform in institutional levels founded on constitutional and legal ground to make it sustainable irrespective of political regimes. However, almost two years later still the question remains valid: how far are weeyeing in that direction or even the question remains very validwhether we intend to go in this direction?

THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL REFORM: It is easy to assume that a fair election and transparent administration can automatically fix the nation’s problems. However, political reform alone cannot rebuild public confidence or create prosperity or even give any guarantee that committed reforms will be continued in future irrespective of changes in political regimes. Particularly, this doubt remains valid as Bangladesh has seen similar reforms and broken promises before. So, it is high time or probably the most opportunistic moment of the history of this nation as the youth were in the center of the July movement and reform agenda. So, all possible causes of limits in the political reform as well as windows of opportunities should be explored properly if some sustainable changes could be expected in the long run.

A reformed political structure that fails to address corruption in service delivery, or that overlooks the stagnation of education and employment, risks reproducing old frustrations under new faces will not be sustainable in the long run. Political stability cannot endure when economic anxiety and social alienation persist. Reform, therefore, must be understood as something far wider: a coordinated renewal of the state and society as a whole; to make functional institutions that will be able to withstand any socio-politico-economic turbulence impartially. Thus, such reform must have to be based on the principles of good governance i.e., consensus oriented, transparency, accountability, following the rule of law, effectiveness and efficiency etc.

THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM: Economic stability based on the principle of equity and inclusion should be on top of any reform agenda in current Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s economic resilience over the past decade has been admirable, but recent years have exposed deep structural weaknesses. Export growth has slowed, the foreign exchange reserve has come under pressure, and inflation continues to erode the real income of ordinary households. The economy’s dependence on a single export sector has created vulnerability, while the tax system remains narrow and regressive, leaving the government perpetually constrained in financing essential services. And in the last one-year reform reports and discussions highlighted the weakness of many institutions such as banks, NBR, other public and private economic entities as the main cause of failure to sustain the claimed economic growth.

Economic reform should aim to diversify the base of production and trade, ensuring that sectors such as information technology, pharmaceuticals, and light engineering can emerge alongside garments and agriculture. At the same time, fiscal policy must evolve. The National Board of Revenue needs to widen the tax net and reduce dependence on indirect levies that disproportionately burden the poor. Public spending should priorities development of human capital such as education, healthcare, and research rather than politically motivated infrastructure projects. Most importantly, Bangladesh must cultivate a domestic environment that rewards innovation, linking universities and industries so that new ideas translate into tangible productivity gains. Without these shifts, growth will remain fragile, and prosperity will be distributed unevenly within the elite class of society. However, within the discussion of reform in various sectors institutional reform in the education sector almost remained untouched rather than agendas related politics such as election of student bodies got priorities.

THE NEED FOR SOCIAL REFORM: Bangladesh faces a widening urban–rural divide, persistent gender disparity, and limited social mobility for disadvantaged communities. These are not simply outcomes of market failure but of institutional neglect. Schools continue to priorities rote memorisation over critical thinking, leaving graduates unprepared for a rapidly changing economy. Social policies, while well intentioned, often fail to reach those most in need because local administrations lack authority and accountability. Most surprisingly top policy agenda and principles changes with the change of regime, thus creating a confused nation who is still in search of root and identity even after almost 55 years of independence.

Social reform must therefore begin with education. A modernised curriculum that encourages civic responsibility and analytical skills is essential for nurturing citizens capable of contributing to both democracy and development. Empowering local governments, particularly upazila and municipal bodies, is equally important, allowing communities to identify and solve their own problems. Bangladesh must also move towards more inclusive policies that recognise and protect gender equality, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and marginalized groups. Reform, in this sense, is about cultivating values as much as it is about correcting systems. However, these much-expected sectors remain out of focus of reform even at a time when we just got the ‘normal’ state of political governance by a national election recently in February 2026. The country and political parties prioritised ‘selected nomination’ of women in parliament thus again squeezing opportunities of real gender empowerment.

REFORM AS A NATIONAL MINDSET: Reform must ultimately be understood as a mindset, not as some changes on paper. Similarly, in an era of AI and sonic social transformation, the question of pragmatic and gradual organic changes will also not be valid. We must remember that broader social change is gradual and needs time. But we must sow the seed of need for reform in the minds of people.

As the nation stands at a crossroads, the question is not only whether the political system will change, but whether the culture of governance itself can evolve. Can Bangladesh truly reform if the conversation remains confined to electoral mechanics? Can the promise of democracy endure without a fair economy and an inclusive society? And can the new government truly serve the people if it ignores the everyday reforms that citizens need most?

The answers to these questions will define whether Bangladesh’s next reform is remembered as another adjustment of power, or as the beginning of genuine transformation.

Dr Shanawez Hossain is Head andAssociate Professor at the Global Studies and Governance (GSG) Department at the Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB). Farhan Musfiqueis a Research Assistant and Student at GSG, IUB.​
 

Democratic dreams fade, rifts over reforms deepen

Nawaz Farhin Antara and Moinul Haque 05 August, 2026, 00:05

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Two years after the ouster of the authoritarian regime of Sheikh Hasina amid a student-led mass uprising, people’s aspirations for a more democratic Bangladesh appears to be slipping away over the issue of state reforms.

Rival political parties are now divided over the pace and direction of the aspired reforms while violence has returned to the streets and campuses after the political changeover through the general elections.

In the 13th Jatiya Sangsad elections and a referendum held on February 12, 2026, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party secured a two-thirds majority in parliament, while voters approved the proposed constitutional reforms through the referendum.

Through the election, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami emerged as the main opposition, securing 68 seats in parliament.

The post-uprising period also witnessed the emergence of a new political force.

In February 2025, leaders of the student-led July Mass Uprising formed the National Citizen Party, with Nahid Islam resigning from the interim government to become its convener.

The unity that defined the July uprising in 2024 has given way to sharp political division with opposition parties and analysts warning that the democratic gains many had hoped for are yet to materialise under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led government, which took office on February 17 after nearly an 18-month rule of the interim government-led by Professor Muhammad Yunus.

The interim government initiated a political dialogue through the National Consensus Commission, leading to the signing of the July National Charter in October 2025.

The interim administration also introduced a wide range of reforms and issued 113 ordinances to improve governance.

During its first session, the BNP-led government in the 13th Jatiya Sangsad passed 91 bills validating the 113 ordinances promulgated by the interim government.

Twenty ordinances issued by the interim government, including key reforms on judicial independence, human rights, referendums, enforced disappearance, and anti-corruption lapsed after the government failed to secure parliamentary approval for them within the constitutionally required timeframe.

Opposition parties argue that six months into its tenure, the BNP-led government has delayed key constitutional reforms, failed to implement the July National Charter, and stalled the promised referendum -- measures they see as central to fulfilling the uprising’s democratic aspirations.

The BNP, for its part, maintains that it inherited a state institutionally weakened by ‘nearly 17 years of authoritarian rule’ and needs time to rebuild before delivering on these commitments.

Political analysts point to this lack of consensus –over constitutional reform, the July Charter, and the referendum –as the central fault line driving the confrontation, with disagreements increasingly spilling from parliament onto the streets and university campuses.

National Citizen Party joint convener Sarwar Tushar said that the optimism generated by the July uprising was fading fast.

‘We have entered an era where democracy is gradually transforming into “dopamine politics”. The major political parties now stand against reforms. What the people of Bangladesh wanted after July is not happening,’ he told New Age.

He accused the government of prioritising electoral politics over long-term democratic reforms.

‘They signed the July Charter before coming to power, but now they have ignored it. The referendum-backed reforms have also been sidelined,’ he said, adding that opposition parties were being obstructed from organising freely.

‘They are not behaving like exactly a fascist government, but they are governing in a softer tone. If this continues, political confrontation will increase. We do not see a democratic atmosphere in the country,’ said Tushar, a student leader -turned politician.

That confrontation has, in places, turned violent.

According to non-government rights body Ain o Salish Kendra, at least 374 incidents of political violence were recorded nationwide between January and June this year, leaving 2,854 people injured and 66 dead.

Clashes involving the BNP and its affiliated organisations accounted for the largest share of that violence.

Confrontations between the BNP and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami were the single biggest category, with 130 incidents leaving 1,001 people injured and nine dead.

ASK also recorded 16 clashes between the BNP and the Awami League, activities of which are now banned for July atrocities, resulting in 225 injuries and four deaths, while 83 incidents of internal BNP clashes left 786 people injured and 14 dead.

Further violence involved the BNP and the NCP, independent candidates, Islami Andolon Bangladesh, the Jatiya Party, and BNP-affiliated bodies including Chhatra Dal, Juba Dal, Swechhasebak Dal and Sramik Dal.

Recent attacks on NCP programmes in Habiganj and Sylhet — in one of which an NCP activist lost his left eye -- have sharpened the debate over political tolerance.

Jamaat-e-Islami assistant secretary general AHM Hamidur Rahman Azad echoed similar concerns.

‘The democracy that people hoped for after the July uprising is no longer visible,’ he said, adding that five Jamaat leaders and activists had been killed in political violence over the past six months.

The Jamaat leader blamed BNP activists for the killings.

‘Our leaders and activists are being attacked and our political activities are being obstructed. The space for democratic politics is shrinking,’ he said, calling on the government to implement the July Charter, honour the referendum, and strengthen the rule of law, or risk deepening instability.

He also accused the BNP of professing democratic values while acting otherwise.

The Amar Bangladesh Party, while avoiding direct confrontation with the government, struck a similar note.

Its chairman Mojibur Rahman Monju said that the democratic transition envisioned after the uprising remained unfinished.

He called for broader reform and greater political inclusiveness.

The July Charter emerged from the National Consensus Commission’s negotiations and consolidates over 80 reform proposals, nearly half of them constitutional, including a bicameral legislature, term limits for the prime minister, and an amendment to Article 70 to let Members of Parliament vote independently on all matters, except budgetary and confidence votes.

Under the charter, the next parliament was to act as a Constitutional Reform Council with 180 days to implement the changes — but the BNP has objected to some provisions and its lawmakers have so far declined to join that council, with analysts anticipating that the hesitation was due to the fear that such reforms would curb the prime minister’s powers.

The BNP has rejected accusations that democratic space is shrinking, arguing instead that its first six months in office were necessarily spent rebuilding state institutions left weakened by nearly 17 years of authoritarian rule.

BNP standing committee member Selima Rahman said that stabilising the state had been the government’s foremost priority.

‘We inherited a country where institutions had weakened, the economy was in difficulty and moral values had declined over 16 years,’ she said.

She also defended the party’s activists against criticism.

‘For nearly 17 years our leaders and activists faced persecution, torture, enforced disappearances and false cases. Some now think they should also enjoy the benefits of power. But that mentality is wrong and cannot be justified,’ she said.

She, however, said that the party had launched organisational restructuring to restore discipline.

BNP organising secretary Imran Saleh Prince said that the party had hoped to govern through cross-party consensus after the election, but that unity had failed to materialise.

He said that the government remained committed to constitutional reform and the BNP’s 31-point programme, and that disciplinary action was underway against activists implicated in wrongdoing.

Jahangirnagar University governance and politics professor Al Masud Hasanuzzaman said that the deepening confrontation reflected a broader failure by both government and opposition to build consensus after the uprising.

‘The government and the opposition have failed to reach consensus on constitutional amendments, implementation of the July Charter and the referendum. As a result, political disagreements are increasingly moving from parliament to the streets,’ he told New Age.

He said that the widening gap between the government’s reform agenda and opposition demands had deepened mistrust.

‘The lack of consensus has intensified conflict both between political parties and within them. Different opinions are becoming increasingly difficult to accommodate,’ he observed.

Hasanuzzaman said that the forthcoming local government elections would serve as a critical test for the government’s ability to maintain political stability and democratic competition.

The interim government banned all activities of the Bangladesh Awami League and its affiliated organisations on May 12, 2025 under the Anti-Terrorism Act, pending the completion of trials before the International Crimes Tribunal for atrocities committed during the July uprising.

The home ministry’s notification cited allegations of killings, crimes against humanity and other grave offences committed during the July 2024 uprising that forced the fall of Awami League regime on August 5, 2024 and on the day Hasina fled to India for shelter.

The Election Commission later suspended the Awami League’s registration, effectively barring the party from contesting elections until further notice.

Following the August 2024 mass uprising, the country experienced deterioration in law and order, marked by widespread mob violence.​
 
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BANGLADESH'S TRADE REGIME

Why deeper reform can no longer wait

Last week the World Bank launched a report, "Bangladesh Trade Policy at a Crossroads". The message coming out of that report could not be more prescient. Tariff and trade policy reforms cannot wait any longer. Furthermore, what was made clear is that reforms would actually pay for themselves. The argument about revenue loss that has thus far stalled reforms for over two decades are no longer valid. Latest modelling techniques are able to project outcomes based on the latest economy-wide applications that can coalesce second and third effects showing that reforms actually can generate growth which yield higher revenues.

With Least Developed Country (LDC) graduation approaching and the need for export diversification becoming increasingly urgent, the country can no longer afford to treat trade policy reform as a marginal or incremental policy issue. The structure of protection has implications not only for import prices and customs revenue, but also for export competitiveness, investment incentives and the prospects for entering into deeper trade agreements.

Rapid implementation of the National Tariff Policy (NTP) has become more urgent than ever because Bangladesh's tariff regime has long needed a coherent policy framework rather than piecemeal adjustments.

The setting for trade policy today remains fundamentally unchanged over the past 25 years. Thanks to the high tariff and protection regime, exporting -- outside the RMG industry -- is not a profitable activity relative to selling in the domestic market. The domestic market has effectively been created behind high tariff walls. And the divergence is not marginal; it is significant. This is the anti-export bias that has become a widely used expression in policy circles.

Trade policy reforms must therefore be formulated within these limiting parameters. If Bangladesh is serious about export diversification and competitiveness, correcting this anti-export bias has to be at the heart of tariff reform.

There is also an important methodological point in assessing protection. Much tariff analysis uses import-weighted tariffs because disaggregated tariff data by countries and products are difficult to obtain. But if existing tariffs are effective in restricting imports, import-weighted tariffs will understate the magnitude of protection. There is a stark difference between ex ante protection (tariff-induced) and ex post tariff protection (outcome of restricted imports).

For Bangladesh, Policy Research Institute of Bangladesh (PRI) has a repository of disaggregated tariff data covering more than three decades, allowing us to undertake ex ante nominal protection analysis. On this basis, the average nominal protection rate in FY2027 is around 28 per cent, with roughly half coming from para-tariffs, while average trade taxes are considerably higher.

Surprisingly, despite pronouncements to the contrary, the proposed measures under the short-term stabilisation programme and the FY2027 Budget fall short of the commitments under the National Tariff Policy 2023. Implementation of the NTP is a critical part of preparation for LDC graduation. The question is: why is it still stuck at the proposal stage?

Among the principal tariff rationalisation measures proposed by the World Bank is a reduction in tariffs on intermediate goods. While this is an absolutely correct posture of tariff reform, and is found to have worked well in Indonesia and Vietnam, the context in Bangladesh is so different that this reform measure has to be reformulated in the Bangladesh context. There exists a deep wedge between output and input tariffs that ensure super-high effective protection. While deep cuts in intermediate goods tariffs can improve competitiveness (if producers were to export), reducing input tariffs without a commensurate reduction in output tariffs could actually raise effective protection and intensify the anti-export bias for non-RMG exports, driving such exporters away from world markets. Therefore, unlike Indonesia, Vietnam, or even India, downward adjustment in intermediate goods tariffs must be associated with a commensurate downward adjustment in output tariffs. Note that this concern is not relevant to RMG exports, which operate under a duty-free import regime.

Exemption rationalisation in the tariff structure is another area where reform is warranted. There is ample justification for eliminating end-user tariff concessions applied to a plethora of industrial sectors and subsectors, except for capital machinery imports. Protective Most Favoured Nation (MFN) output tariffs average around 42 per cent, compared with around 17 per cent for MFN input tariffs. This is already a wide divergence and provides significant protection, which need not be amplified with more input tariff concessions for specified sectors and sub-sectors.

The question of immediate revenue loss will inevitably arise. But tariff reform should not be assessed only through its first-round fiscal impact. Second- and third-round effects can generate more revenue through higher economic activity. Economy-wide models such as TRIST and GTAP can help simulate alternative reform scenarios and assess their wider effects. The World Bank has done that and found clear evidence of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and tariff cuts adding $4 billion to GDP.

Before touching customs duty, regulatory duty (RD) and supplementary duty (SD) have to be addressed. RD is effectively an additional customs duty, meaning the top customs duty is not 25 per cent but 28 per cent when the 3 per cent standard RD is included. RD should be eliminated in a couple of years, while SD needs to cut sharply and become trade-neutral before LDC graduation. This would be an essential part of preparation for LDC graduation.

Protection is concentrated particularly in consumer goods industries. Export producers have to sell at world prices over which they have no control, while high tariffs keep domestic prices of durable and non-durable consumer goods well above international prices. Beyond customs duty and RD, SD has increasingly become a protective instrument. In effect, half the protection comes from para-tariffs-RD and SD.

The industrial policy dimension is equally important. Industrial policy in Bangladesh is essentially trade policy -- or, by and large, import tariff and export subsidy policy, applied to thrust sectors, priority sectors, development sectors, and so on. In recent times distortive and trade restrictive measures have multiplied, according to WTO reports. It is interesting that the New Industrial Policy Observatory (from Global Trade Alert) finds Bangladesh to have adopted as many trade distortive as trade liberalising measures since 2009. However, there is a catch. Such international comparisons based on WTO tariff policy reviews can be misleading because Bangladesh does not always notify all distortive measures, while WTO assessments typically focus on MFN customs duty and give limited attention to para-tariffs.

The bottom line is that economy-wide impacts of tariff reform can offset short-term revenue losses. Bangladesh's deep tariff reforms in the 1990s showed no reduction in customs revenues throughout the decade, during which customs revenue grew by 11 per cent during the decade despite average tariffs were cut by half.

The implications for trade agreements are equally important. With the current tariff structure, an FTA agenda will remain difficult, if not impossible. Note that Bangladesh has not been able to sign one FTA in the past 25 years despite several initiatives that were widely broadcasted. Bangladesh may be limited largely to EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreement) and CEPAs (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement). How about an FTA with EU? If we cannot sign an FTA with Bhutan, can we realistically sign one with the EU? The competitive implications are becoming more urgent as India and Vietnam - our main competitors in garment exports to EU -- have already signed FTAs with EU.

The bottom line is clear: doing nothing will be costly; reform will pay for itself. The challenge is to move from tariff and trade policy reform as a stated policy objective to tariff and trade policy reform as an implemented economic strategy.

Dr Zaidi Sattar, Chairman, Policy Research Institute of Bangladesh (PRI).​
 

Bangladesh needs urgent reforms to reverse slowdown in growth, World Bank says


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Bangladesh needs urgent and comprehensive reforms in the financial, energy and revenue sectors to reverse the slowdown in economic growth, restore investor confidence and create jobs, the World Bank said on Tuesday.

In its latest Bangladesh Development Update, the multilateral lender projected Bangladesh’s economic growth at 3.4 per cent in FY2026 and FY2027, citing persistent structural constraints, weak domestic revenue mobilisation, vulnerabilities in the financial sector and an uncertain global investment environment.

Growth is expected to recover to 3.9 per cent in FY2028, provided there is a gradual easing of energy supply constraints and faster implementation of government reforms, the report said.

“Bangladesh needs to respond with urgency and speed up the reforms essential for protecting the poor and creating more and better jobs,” said Jean Pesme, World Bank Division Director for Bangladesh and Bhutan.

The World Bank said investment activity has softened while exports lost momentum. Elevated inflation has reduced household purchasing power and raised business costs, while weaknesses in financial-sector intermediation have undermined investor confidence.

At the same time, limited fiscal space has constrained public investment. The external sector, however, showed resilience, supported by stronger remittance inflows and improvements in foreign exchange reserves.​
 

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