[🇧🇩] The U.S.A.---A Strategic Partner of Bangladesh

[🇧🇩] The U.S.A.---A Strategic Partner of Bangladesh
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G Bangladesh Defense

It’s not the immigrants, stupid

Helal Mohiuddin

IT’S October 2026. In Limoges, a 19th-century city hall is burning. In Milan, masked teens dodge riot police near the Duomo. In Madrid, tents cover the Puerta del Sol. In Tirana, students throw stones at what they call a corrupt government.

Meanwhile, in Washington, an 80-year-old in a red tie thinks he knows the answer. ‘What’s happening in France has to do with immigration,’ Donald Trump tells reporters. ‘Not schools, not anything.’ He says he warned Macron ‘a long time ago’ to ‘close up your borders.’

Not schools? After thirty years of grading exams, I’d mark that answer in red: ‘Did you read the question?’ The French uprising actually started in a school. And the people setting bins on fire didn’t just arrive last Tuesday by boat. They are the continent’s own children.

IN MAY, India’s chief justice called some unemployed young activists ‘cockroaches.’ The next day, those activists started the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a parody of the ruling BJP, with the tagline ‘Voice of the Lazy & Unemployed.’ Exam leaks, jobless graduates and questionable voter rolls brought thousands to Delhi’s Jantar Mantar. By July, the education minister had resigned. Are these cockroaches immigrants? No. They’re Indian kids with Indian degrees but no Indian jobs.

In 2022, Sri Lanka’s government fell. In 2024, Bangladesh’s prime minister fled by helicopter after fifteen years in power. That same year, Kenya scrapped a finance bill. In 2025, Nepal’s government collapsed in just a week. Then unrest spread to Madagascar, Morocco, Peru and Bulgaria. Now, in one autumn, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Albania and Poland are all facing turmoil. Some call it the Euro Spring, arriving in October, which seems fitting for a generation known for being late.

So who exactly moved to Kathmandu? Did a wave of Norwegians suddenly show up in Dhaka?

The protests in France began on September 21 at a high school in Créteil, sparked by teacher shortages, overcrowded classes, run-down buildings and classrooms hitting 40°C. Universities, unions, and the Yellow Vests joined in. On October 17, 550,000 people marched, mostly peacefully. Then came a violent weekend: about 2,500 people were detained and 3,000 shops were damaged. Court reports mention ultra-left ‘black bloc’ activists known to police, along with opportunists who had no record or politics. Macron blamed the far left. The French officials with the arrest files did not blame immigrants.

In Milan, 271 people were arrested after cost-of-living protests turned violent, and most were minors. Giorgia Meloni, known for her tough stance on migration, called them ‘thugs,’ not migrants. In Spain, the minimum wage is about €1,221 a month, while the average rent for a modest flat is about €1,130. It’s easy to see why people are living in tents. In Portugal, house prices have more than doubled since 2017. Belgian students are protesting tuition hikes. In Albania, students want Edi Rama out because of corruption and a resort linked to Kushner. There’s irony everywhere this year.

The spark is local. The fuel is local. The young people starting the fires are local.

After the 2023 riots over Nahel Merzouk’s killing, a French Senate inquiry found that about 71 per cent of those arrested were French nationals, with an average age of about 23, and nearly 60 per cent were first-time offenders. Even interior minister Gérald Darmanin noted ‘lots of Kevins and Matteos.’ Yes, many are immigrants’ grandchildren. But a girl born in Marseille isn’t an immigrant. She’s angry about French schools, French rents and French jobs, and calling her a foreigner is part of what makes her angry. As Karl Mannheim once argued, generations are shaped by shared formative experiences. For this generation, those are a pandemic, a locked housing market and a phone flaunting the 1 per cent.

RAPID immigration can strain housing, schools and clinics, especially when governments don’t keep up. Integration hasn’t worked in some suburbs, and foreign nationals appear more in some crime statistics, though the difference shrinks when you factor in age and poverty. Wanting secure borders isn’t racist. But none of this explains why a French-born student in Créteil blocked her own school because of 36-pupil classes.

Why do politicians keep blaming immigrants? Because it’s easy. Fixing schools costs billions, but blaming foreigners only takes a tweet. Many migrants can’t vote, so there’s no risk in insulting them. It distracts from real issues like education budgets and housing policy. And it’s simple enough to fit on a baseball cap: ‘They came, and now things are bad.’

Gordon Allport showed that frustrated people often take out their anger on weaker, visible groups. Stanley Cohen explained how ‘folk devils’ are created through moral panic and now algorithms make these panics spread even faster. Norris and Inglehart’s Cultural Backlash shows that older voters who feel left behind are the main supporters of anti-immigrant populism and they vote more than young people. JD Vance blamed liberals for ‘importing the Third World.’ The old explanation is easier to accept than the hard truth: we failed our own children.

In the 1850s, the ‘Know-Nothing’ party called Irish Catholics drunken criminals loyal to the Pope. Their great-grandson became President Kennedy. In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act banned an entire nationality for ‘stealing jobs’; it was repealed in 1943 as an embarrassment. In 1924, Italians, Jews and Poles were declared ‘unassimilable.’ Their children caught up with native-born Americans within a generation.

In 1938, at the Évian Conference, 32 nations almost unanimously refused more Jewish refugees, and we know where that road led. In 1968, Enoch Powell predicted ‘rivers of blood.’ No race war came; migrants staffed the NHS, the buses and eventually the cabinet. In 1972, Idi Amin expelled Uganda’s South Asians. The economy collapsed, the 27,000 who settled in Britain prospered, and by the 1990s Uganda was inviting them back.

FRANCE’S 2005 riots were blamed on immigration and even ‘polygamy.’ Most of those arrested were French-born teenagers angry about joblessness and policing. After the 2011 London riots, historian David Starkey said ‘the whites have become black,’ yet research pointed to poverty and policing. Brexit blamed EU migrants, then led to lorry-driver shortages, unpicked crops and longer NHS queues. Covid became the ‘China virus’ and anti-Asian attacks followed. In 2024, a fake name, ‘Ali Al-Shakati,’ turned a Cardiff-born attacker in Southport into a Muslim asylum seeker, and a mosque was attacked. Haitians in Springfield, Ohio, were accused of ‘eating the dogs,’ and the town got bomb threats.

But what do the data really say? Research by Abramitzky and others in 2024 found that, across more than 150 years of US census data, immigrants are about 60 per cent less likely to be incarcerated than US-born people. The OECD’s 2021 Report found that immigrants’ taxes exceed what governments spend on their health, education and social protection. And David Card’s Nobel-recognised study of the Mariel boatlift, when 125,000 Cubans arrived in Miami, found no harm to local wages.

WHY does blaming others turn deadly? Because words can become bullets. The Christchurch killer, who murdered 51 people in 2019, called his manifesto ‘The Great Replacement.’ The El Paso shooter wrote about a ‘Hispanic invasion.’ Hanau happened in 2020. Blame isn’t just talk. Sometimes it leads to violence.

I have to say, a wrong diagnosis leads to the wrong cure. Even if you closed every border tomorrow, the classroom in Créteil would still have 36 pupils. If you tell a 19-year-old that her anger about rent is ‘really about immigration,’ she’ll realise adults aren’t listening. If you treat French-born grandchildren as foreigners for long enough, as Robert Merton’s self-fulfilling prophecy suggests, some will stop feeling French.

Europe’s fertility rate is about 1.4 children per woman. Hospitals, farms and care homes rely on migrant workers, and pensions depend on migrant taxes. Demanding to ‘close the borders’ is like biting the hand that pays for your retirement. Skilled people will go to places like Toronto or Dubai. Emergency powers, like Italy’s 500 deployed soldiers, are rarely temporary. And you can say goodbye to your kebab, your curry and half the French team that won the 2018 World Cup.

In 1992, Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist James Carville put up a sign that said, ‘The economy, stupid.’ Europe needs a new version: ‘It’s the broken promise, stupid.’ Punish those who throw bricks, but don’t mix them up with the people you want to blame.

A society that blames newcomers for its own children’s anger is like a man blaming his neighbour’s dog for the hole in his roof. He can yell at the dog all through the rainy season, but he’ll still get wet.

Dr Helal Mohiuddin is director of research and communication at the Conflict and Resilience Research Institute, Canada and a sociology professor at Mayville State University, North Dakota, USA.​
 

US midterms: Why Bangladesh has a stake in the result

Ayesha Tariq

Bangladesh has spent nearly two years paying for decisions made in Washington without having any say in them. US tariffs on its garments have been revised five times since April 2025, the war against Iran has sent the cost of its imported fuel soaring, and a strong dollar has made every foreign debt repayment more expensive. On 3 November,

Americans will elect a new House of Representatives and about a third of the Senate. A Democratic Congress would not restore the America that Bangladesh dealt with for half a century, but it could restore some restraint on the administration it faces today, and Dhaka has every reason to welcome that restraint.

Nowhere has the absence of such restraint been clearer than in trade policy. Washington announced a 37 per cent tariff on Bangladeshi goods in April 2025, imposed 20 per cent in August and settled on 19 per cent under a trade agreement signed on 9 February this year. Eleven days later, the US Supreme Court ruled that the emergency law underpinning those duties gave the president no authority to impose them. A temporary 10 per cent tariff followed, replaced in July by a new measure under Section 301 of the Trade Act, and Dhaka is still seeking clarity on what its February agreement is worth.

American voters appear ready to deliver their verdict. Polls and forecasters suggest that Democrats could win the House comfortably and gain a narrower advantage in the Senate, consistent with a long historical pattern in which the president's party has lost House seats in 20 of the 22 midterm elections since 1938. This time, discontent is driven primarily by the cost of living. The vote will also reflect whether Americans support an administration that treats alliances as transactions and shows little interest in the democratic partnerships that once defined American leadership. That is the broader question the rest of the world will be watching.

A Democratic victory would not, however, give Congress the power to reverse the administration's policies. Democrats are unlikely to secure two-thirds of either chamber, meaning a presidential veto would remain a significant obstacle. A war powers resolution aimed at ending the Iran conflict would struggle to overcome such a veto. Tariffs demonstrate how readily the White House can circumvent congressional constraints. The temporary 10 per cent levy required congressional approval to remain in force beyond 150 days; rather than seek it, the administration shifted to Section 301, which requires no such approval. What a Democratic majority could do is provide a check on executive power, challenging both the tariffs and the war while forcing officials to defend publicly decisions they currently make with limited scrutiny.

The US buys roughly a fifth of the country's garment exports, and the damage over the past 18 months has resulted less from any single tariff rate than from the uncertainty surrounding successive changes. An American buyer placing an order for spring delivery needs to know the final landed cost. The risk has not disappeared, as the administration has demonstrated its ability to impose new duties under Section 301 without seeking congressional approval.

For Bangladesh, that counterweight matters first in trade. The US buys roughly a fifth of the country's garment exports, and the damage over the past 18 months has resulted less from any single tariff rate than from the uncertainty surrounding successive changes. An American buyer placing an order for spring delivery needs to know the final landed cost.

The risk has not disappeared, as the administration has demonstrated its ability to impose new duties under Section 301 without seeking congressional approval. A Congress empowered to investigate cannot prevent such measures on its own, but it can raise the political cost of each escalation. For Bangladeshi exporters, predictability may be worth more than a percentage point or two in tariff reductions.

That predictability would, however, come with demands of its own. Democrats have traditionally pressed harder on labour standards, and it was the Obama administration that suspended Bangladesh's trade preferences in 2013 following the Rana Plaza collapse. A Democratic-controlled House would therefore be expected to scrutinise factory conditions and supply chains as closely as it scrutinises the president's trade policies.

In foreign affairs, Congress has less power to restrain the president, but its influence still matters. American presidents have traditionally enjoyed considerable latitude in foreign policy, and a president facing constraints at home may have greater incentives to exercise that authority abroad. This is one of the rare American elections in which foreign policy is a prominent electoral issue, as voters feel the economic consequences of the war against Iran whenever they fill their fuel tanks. The bigger question is how President Donald Trump will behave once the midterms are over and no further national election stands between him and 2028. For Bangladesh, the war has been the costliest American decision of all. When the Strait of Hormuz closed, all three of its long-term LNG suppliers declared force majeure. QatarEnergy later halved its scheduled deliveries for 2026, and Dhaka has had to purchase more than 30 cargoes on the spot market, some at twice their pre-war prices.


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US President Donald Trump leaves the stage after a rally ahead of the midterm elections at the University of South Alabama’s Mitchell Center in Mobile, Alabama, on October 2, 2026. Photo: Reuters

No vote in Congress can reopen the strait, but a Democratic majority could at least seek to bring the war to an end. It could hold hearings on its costs, force repeated votes on war powers and seek to attach conditions to the funding a prolonged conflict requires. Such measures could raise the political cost of continuing the war and strengthen the case for a negotiated settlement. Even if the president vetoes the legislation Congress passes, that pressure would matter to Bangladesh, because a diplomatic resolution could help bring down the price of its imported gas.

The war also affects Bangladesh through the US dollar. The country repaid a record $4.49 billion in foreign debt in the 2025–26 fiscal year, mostly in dollars, and the government expects that bill to approach $7.6 billion annually by 2028–29. Expensive oil has kept American inflation high, and the Federal Reserve, which raised interest rates in September for the first time since 2023, has signalled that further increases may follow. Higher American interest rates attract capital into dollar-denominated assets, and each time the dollar strengthens, Bangladesh needs more taka to service the same debts and pay for the same fuel imports. Washington's own borrowing adds to the pressure, as the government must offer investors increasingly higher returns to sustain its borrowing. A dispute over the federal budget before funding expires on 11 December could intensify that pressure. A Democratic Congress could seek to restrain borrowing by challenging spending proposals it considers fiscally unsustainable. It cannot directly bring down oil prices, however, and the dollar could therefore remain strong for some time, regardless of the outcome on 3 November.

Above all, the war points to a broader loss. For 80 years, the US helped establish and largely uphold the rules on which smaller economies depended, including open markets, a rules-based trading system with an impartial dispute settlement mechanism and development finance through institutions it helped lead. Bangladesh built its garment industry within that system, on the assumption that market access, once negotiated, would remain relatively stable. The US once expected other countries to uphold those standards. It now appears increasingly willing to set them aside when they become inconvenient, imposing tariffs under a law the Supreme Court found did not authorise them, dismantling its aid agency within weeks and signing trade agreements whose legal foundations were subsequently challenged. A Democratic majority in Congress could signal renewed support among American voters for elements of that earlier approach.

No vote in Congress can reopen the strait, but a Democratic majority could at least seek to bring the war to an end. It could hold hearings on its costs, force repeated votes on war powers and seek to attach conditions to the funding a prolonged conflict requires. Such measures could raise the political cost of continuing the war and strengthen the case for a negotiated settlement. Even if the president vetoes the legislation Congress passes, that pressure would matter to Bangladesh, because a diplomatic resolution could help bring down the price of its imported gas.

The election could also influence the future of the concessional financing on which Bangladesh depends. Congress, rather than the White House alone, approves America's contributions to the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) and the Asian Development Fund, which provide financing to developing countries at low or no interest. Bangladesh is the largest borrower from IDA, with $22.7 billion outstanding in March this year. In July last year, the Republican-led House Appropriations Committee approved a spending bill that excluded contributions to both funds, while the administration's budget proposal for next year asks Congress to reduce the World Bank contribution from approximately $1.07 billion to $867 million. A Democratic-controlled House could be more inclined to protect such funding rather than support further reductions. If these funds shrink, Bangladesh may have to rely more heavily on financing from China, Gulf countries and lenders such as the BRICS New Development Bank, which it joined in 2021. Such financing could involve higher borrowing costs or different political and commercial conditions. Bangladesh would need to engage with these partners on terms consistent with its own interests, recognising that none can necessarily replace the role the US once claimed in supporting the international economic order.

Bangladesh cannot vote on 3 November, but it will live with the consequences of the result. A Democratic Congress would not necessarily make the United States more generous or even more consistent. It could, however, subject the administration to greater scrutiny and accountability. For an economy that can ill afford another two years of unpredictable decisions from Washington, greater institutional restraint could offer some much-needed stability.

Ayesha Tariq, CFA, is the CEO and co-founder of MacroVisor, an independent global macroeconomic research and consulting firm.​
 

US midterm results: What it means for Bangladesh’s trade, economic challenges

Abdur Razzaque

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US President Donald Trump poses for a photo after delivering a speech marking the end of the midterm election campaign in Washington, DC on November 2. Trump’s bilateral trade approach and unilateral measures may face greater congressional resistance, creating room for constructive multilateral engagement. Photo: AFP

The results of the US midterm elections appear to be a major political setback for US President Donald Trump. As Democrats seize control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the administration will face much stronger opposition to its policies, including those related to international trade.

Extensive use of tariffs by President Trump has generated considerable debate in the United States, especially over their impact on consumer prices and business costs. The new political balance would make it more difficult to pursue further tariff increases without facing serious political challenges.

For Bangladesh, this development offers some grounds for cautious optimism. A Democratic-controlled Congress could provide greater opportunities to raise concerns about US trade restrictions and to seek more favourable market access conditions.

Stronger Congressional scrutiny may also constrain some of the administration’s unilateral trade measures, along with some of the bilateral trade deals that the US enforced upon some countries, including Bangladesh.

Nevertheless, expectations of immediate or substantial changes in US trade policy should remain modest.

One important consideration is that President Trump will continue to exercise considerable executive powers, particularly in international trade, where existing legislation provides significant discretion to impose tariffs and undertake other trade-related measures. These powers are subject to legal restrictions, but Congressional opposition cannot automatically prevent their use.

Indeed, disagreements between the White House and Congress could lead to greater political confrontation, with the administration continuing to pursue its trade agenda through executive actions while Congress attempts to challenge or constrain them. Such tensions could generate further policy uncertainty and volatility.

It would therefore be premature to assume that the election outcome will necessarily produce a more stable and predictable international trading environment.

There is also a broader issue concerning the direction of US trade policy.

The resurgence of industrial policies, growing protectionist tendencies and scepticism towards certain aspects of the multilateral trading system have become increasingly prominent features of American economic policymaking across party lines.

It is worth recalling that President Biden retained several major elements of Trump’s first-term trade policies. His administration maintained important tariffs on Chinese products and continued the US opposition to appointments to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body, leaving the WTO’s dispute settlement system without a functioning appeals mechanism.

The Biden administration also pursued ambitious industrial policies, including substantial subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act.

These developments suggest that the changing US approach to international trade reflects deeper shifts in American economic priorities.

Both political parties attach considerable importance to protecting strategic industries, responding to China’s economic influence and preserving domestic policy space. Their approaches to international cooperation certainly differ.

Trump’s strong preference for bilateral bargaining and unilateral trade measures could face greater resistance under the new Congress, potentially creating some room for more constructive multilateral engagement. But a fundamental reversal of the US position on WTO disciplines and dispute settlement seems unlikely simply because the political balance in Washington has changed.

For smaller trading economies such as Bangladesh, which have a strong interest in predictable and enforceable international trade rules, this continuing shift in US policy is an important concern.

For Bangladesh, the immediate question is how any changes in US trade policies might affect its export prospects. This is particularly relevant for the readymade garment sector, where even relatively small differences in tariff treatment between Bangladesh and competing suppliers, including Vietnam, India and Cambodia, can influence international sourcing decisions.

The relative tariff advantage or disadvantage matters as much as the tariff imposed on Bangladesh itself.

Greater certainty about future US trade measures would also help exporters and international buyers plan their sourcing and investment decisions. Bangladesh should therefore closely monitor the emerging policy environment and assess the opportunities for improving its competitive position in the American market.

The implications could extend beyond merchandise trade. Developments in US economic and foreign policies influence global financial conditions, exchange rates, investment sentiment and commodity markets.

Of particular concern is the continuing crisis in the Middle East, where the conflict involving Iran, disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and wider geopolitical tensions have created serious uncertainties for global energy supplies and prices.

Whether the changing political balance in Washington will lead to any substantive shift in the US approach to the Middle East crisis, particularly towards de-escalation and restoring normal energy shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, remains to be seen.

A meaningful easing of these tensions could help stabilise international energy markets and bring down fuel prices. For an energy-importing economy like Bangladesh, lower prices would reduce import costs, ease pressure on foreign exchange resources and help contain domestic inflation and production costs.

Such developments would certainly be welcome. Much, however, will depend on how the geopolitical situation evolves, and there is little reason to assume that the midterm results alone will bring about a resolution of the crisis.

These potential external developments must also be viewed against Bangladesh’s present economic difficulties, many of which have developed primarily from domestic policy weaknesses and prolonged delays in implementing meaningful reforms.

Persistent inflation, the severe banking sector crisis characterised by exceptionally high non-performing loans, weak domestic revenue mobilisation and declining investment have created formidable challenges. Restoring macroeconomic stability, particularly bringing inflation under control, remains an immediate priority.

Strengthening the government’s fiscal position, improving financial sector governance and restoring confidence in the banking system are equally urgent. Improving export competitiveness also requires sustained domestic policy attention, especially given the importance of containing production costs and strengthening productivity.

Bangladesh’s forthcoming LDC graduation adds another dimension to these challenges. The eventual erosion of trade preferences and the loss of certain policy flexibilities will require significant improvements in export competitiveness and greater diversification of the country’s export base.

The additional three years now available before graduation offer an important opportunity to make meaningful progress in these areas. Yet the reform requirements have been known for a long time, and progress in addressing many of the underlying constraints has remained disappointingly limited.

Bangladesh can ill afford to let this additional period pass without substantial improvements in its competitiveness and productive capacity. The immediate challenge is to identify and sequence the most critical reforms, establish an accountable implementation process and ensure that adequate resources and political commitment are available to carry them through.

The next three years must produce tangible progress rather than another round of policy commitments that remain largely unimplemented.

This is where the significance of the US midterm results for Bangladesh’s broader economic prospects needs to be placed in perspective. A less restrictive US trade policy and a more stable international economic environment would certainly be welcome.

Bangladesh should take advantage of any opportunities arising from the changing political balance in Washington, engaging with the incoming Congressional leadership while maintaining constructive negotiations with the Trump administration.

At the same time, the possibility of continuing trade tensions, geopolitical instability and policy uncertainty must be recognised.

Ultimately, the US midterm results may influence certain external conditions facing Bangladesh, particularly its trade opportunities and the wider international economic environment. Their contribution to resolving the country’s most pressing economic challenges is likely to be limited.

The more consequential decisions will have to be taken at home. Progress in restoring macroeconomic stability, addressing financial sector weaknesses, strengthening fiscal capacity and preparing for LDC graduation will depend overwhelmingly on the government’s ability to prioritise and implement long-overdue reforms.

Political developments in Washington may create opportunities, but Bangladesh’s economic recovery and future competitiveness will be shaped primarily by the quality of its own economic policymaking.

The author is an economist who also serves as chairman of Research and Policy Integration for Development, a Dhaka-based think tank.​
 
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