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- Jan 26, 2024
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In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died after his private jet crashed about an hour after taking off in Moscow. He had been Russia's point man in Africa since the Wagner Group began operating in 2017. The group is known for deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns, and propping up influential political leaders. It has had a destabilizing effect. Prigozhin's death – and his aborted mutiny against Russian military commanders two months earlier – has led to a shift in Wagner Group's activities.
What does this mean for Africa? Alessandro Arduino's research includes mapping the evolution of mercenaries and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.
What is the current status of the Wagner Group? Following Yevgeny Prigozhin's death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defense quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be business as usual – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions. Recent reports on the Wagner Group suggest a transformation is underway.
The group's activities in Africa are now under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Wagner commands an estimated 5,000 operatives deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defense ministry has renamed it the Africa Corps. The choice of name could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa serve one master – the Kremlin.
Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia's Ministry of Defense will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin's involvement. The head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to use this defense in Mali.
The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps. Nazi Germany wove myths around his strategic and tactical successes in North Africa. But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the distinctive modus operandi that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin's reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated financing network to enhance combat capabilities.
Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the group's propaganda arm. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin admitted to founding the so-called troll farm:
From a financial perspective, Prigozhin's approach involved establishing a convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the Russian state to support the Wagner Group's direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine and across north and west Africa. Russia is unlikely to yield ground in Libya and Mali due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy, and securing its position as a regional kingmaker. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group's involvement here was primarily linked to Prigozhin's interests in goldmine revenues. The Russian MinistryminiDefencell no doubt seeks to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today's Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility. History has shown that Africa is a lucrative mercenary arena due to various factors. These include the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts that lower the risks to mercenaries' lives compared to full-scale wars like in Ukraine; the continent's abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation, and pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.
As it is, countries in Africa, once considered allies of the West, are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a viable candidate. In January 2024, Chad's junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to "develop bilateral ties." Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.
A month earlier, Russia's deputy defense minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who's been tasked with overseeing Wagner's activities in the Middle East and North Africa, visited Niger. The two countries agreed to strengthen military ties. The military currently leads Niger after a coup in July 2023.
What does this mean for Africa? Alessandro Arduino's research includes mapping the evolution of mercenaries and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.
What is the current status of the Wagner Group? Following Yevgeny Prigozhin's death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defense quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be business as usual – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions. Recent reports on the Wagner Group suggest a transformation is underway.
The group's activities in Africa are now under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Wagner commands an estimated 5,000 operatives deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defense ministry has renamed it the Africa Corps. The choice of name could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa serve one master – the Kremlin.
Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia's Ministry of Defense will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin's involvement. The head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to use this defense in Mali.
The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps. Nazi Germany wove myths around his strategic and tactical successes in North Africa. But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the distinctive modus operandi that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin's reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated financing network to enhance combat capabilities.
Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the group's propaganda arm. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin admitted to founding the so-called troll farm:
From a financial perspective, Prigozhin's approach involved establishing a convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the Russian state to support the Wagner Group's direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine and across north and west Africa. Russia is unlikely to yield ground in Libya and Mali due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy, and securing its position as a regional kingmaker. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group's involvement here was primarily linked to Prigozhin's interests in goldmine revenues. The Russian MinistryminiDefencell no doubt seeks to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today's Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility. History has shown that Africa is a lucrative mercenary arena due to various factors. These include the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts that lower the risks to mercenaries' lives compared to full-scale wars like in Ukraine; the continent's abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation, and pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.
As it is, countries in Africa, once considered allies of the West, are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a viable candidate. In January 2024, Chad's junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to "develop bilateral ties." Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.
A month earlier, Russia's deputy defense minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who's been tasked with overseeing Wagner's activities in the Middle East and North Africa, visited Niger. The two countries agreed to strengthen military ties. The military currently leads Niger after a coup in July 2023.
