[🇧🇩] Indus Water Treaty---Is there anything to learn for Bangladesh?

[Saif]

Source : https://www.PKDefense.com

নদীর পানির ভাগ নিয়ে মুখোমুখি ভারত-পাকিস্তান! যু'দ্ধে জড়াবে?

 

[Saif]

What will it take for Bangladesh and India to sign transboundary river agreements?

Bangladesh and India need to talk about sharing water on two major rivers, the Teesta and Ganges. But experts on both sides say much depends on political consensus and the right atmosphere for negotiations

dialogue.earth

What will it take for Bangladesh and India to sign transboundary river agreements?
Bangladesh and India need to talk about sharing water on two major rivers, the Teesta and Ganges. But experts on both sides say much depends on political consensus and the right atmosphere for negotiations

Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has said her government will continue to cooperate with neighbouring countries, including on issues of cross-border communication, transit, energy partnerships and equitable water sharing. (Image: SK Hasan Ali / Alamy)

Bangladesh’s ruling party, the Awami League, started its fourth consecutive term in government this year with a promise to cooperate with India, Nepal and Bhutan and ensure equitable water sharing. In an election manifesto released at the end of 2023, party president and current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said her government will continue to cooperate with neighbouring countries, including on issues of cross-border communication, transit, energy partnerships and equitable water sharing.

But experts fear that many issues around transboundary rivers will remain unresolved between both Bangladesh and India. Among those, the much-talked about agreement on water sharing for the Teesta river will be at the forefront. Another major challenge for both governments is going to be the renewal of the Ganges water-sharing treaty which expires in 2026.

The Awami League-led government has been in power since 2009, but has not made any significant progress on transboundary water cooperation with India.

Sheikh Rokon, a river activist and general secretary of the Dhaka-based think tank Riverine People said, “In the past decade, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have met at least six times and issued joint statements. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has visited Delhi three times and Narendra Modi has visited Dhaka twice. During the Covid-19 pandemic, a virtual meeting was held between the two premiers. But the issue of the Ganges water-sharing agreement was never on the main agenda.”

The birth of the JRC and its 50-year ‘successes’

The formal mechanism for managing the joint rivers was established by the two countries in 1972 through the formation of the Joint River Commission (JRC). The JRC was formed as part of the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace in March 1972 to work for common interests such as irrigation, floods and cyclone control as well as sharing of water resources.

According to the rules of procedure of the JRC, at least four meetings should be held in a year, which would have meant that 208 should have been held over 52 years, but in reality, only 38 meetings have taken place. The 38th JRC ministerial-level meeting in August 2022 was the most recent, and was held after a gap of 12 years.

Despite being more than half a century old, the success of the commission has been limited. In the decades of negotiations, the two countries have been able to ink one successful treaty, the one on sharing Ganges river water in December 1996, a milestone that eased tensions between the neighbours and paved the way for greater collaboration on transboundary issues. That treaty is set to expire in two years.

The negotiation on the sharing of the Teesta river water started in 1983 with a short-term agreement. In 2011, an interim agreement for 15 years was ready to be signed by both the countries on the Teesta. But the deal was shelved as the West Bengal Chief Minister Mamta Banerjee opposed it.

JRC member Mohammad Abul Hossen said that though the committee fulfilled its role as a technical committee and drafted working agreements for water secretaries of both countries to review, a lack of consensus between both sides on the Teesta meant that attempts at formalising a treaty failed in 1997, 1999 and 2003.

Eminent water expert Ainun Nishat, who was a JRC member during signing the Ganges water-sharing agreement, explained that the JRC’s initiatives and decisions cannot be implemented unless there is political consensus. Nishat cited the series of meetings and attempts that led to the failed Teesta agreement when Banerjee opposed signing in 2011, adding “Since then, the JRC Bangladesh chapter has been following up with Indian counterparts for the signing of the agreement. But nothing has happened so far.”

Building political consensus on water-sharing

The Bangladesh government appears serious about resolving outstanding river issues with India. Post-elections, Indian High Commissioner Prannoy Verma was the first foreign envoy to meet the new foreign minister Hasan Mahmud. After the meeting, the foreign minister said the meeting touched on the Ganga water-sharing agreement as well as the Teesta, but suggested that any progress on the latter had to await the outcome of India’s ongoing general elections.

Speaking to The Third Pole, Himanshu Thakkar from the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People explained that there are several factors that make this negotiation complex. “In any water agreement, there’s an upstream and downstream dynamic. The upstream country often sees no direct reason to enter into an agreement, as it doesn’t immediately face consequences unless compelled by other factors. For example, if two countries are closely tied economically through trade and other ventures, it’s easier to negotiate agreements,” he said.

He gave the example of Bhutan, which is upstream of India, and yet – because of their close relations – managing water has been easier.

“Considering the cultural proximity and historical context [between India and Bangladesh as well], an agreement should have been established by now,” Thakkar added, while noting that this had not speeded up negotiations. “Even the Ganga treaty took 25 years to materialise after the birth of Bangladesh in 1971.”

Ultimately, Thakkar said India’s position as an upstream country concerning most of the 54 rivers it shares with Bangladesh means it lacks domestic pressure to enter such agreements.

One way that cooperation could be increased, Thakkar felt, was through a wider river basin perspective. “For example,” he said, “When China’s infrastructure projects like dams on the Brahmaputra, affect the region… India protests such developments, Bangladesh – though also a downstream country [on the Brahmaputra in relation to China] often doesn’t voice concerns, perhaps due to geopolitical factors.”

In the case of Banerjee, he added, “If West Bengal were to engage in such a treaty, it would be at some cost, which can lead to political backlash. Therefore, Bangladesh must work to foster the right atmosphere for West Bengal to agree to the Teesta agreement.”

“Despite the strong ties between West Bengal and Bangladesh, navigating the political landscape remains challenging for both parties. Timing and circumstances are crucial for progress in such agreements.”

Nishat draws attention to the success of drafting agreements for the Ganga and the Indus (The Indus Waters Treaty). “We have two successful water-sharing agreements, but in both cases, the scenario is different. For the Indus treaty, the World Bank played a vital role and there was an arbitration process which led the two countries to sign the treaty. But in the case of the JRC, there is nothing in the middle like the World Bank. It is completely dependent on political consensus. Therefore, the JRC will not be able to meet its mandate unless our political consensus is there.”​

 

[Saif]

WATER SHARING SCENARIO BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND INDIA: A STUDY TOWARDS FUTURE PROSPECTS

 

[Saif]

https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-ganges-waters-treaty-what-will-happen-after-2026/

The Ganges Waters Treaty:
What will Happen after 2026?
Amit Ranjan
12 September 2022

Summary

During Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s recent visit to India, Dhaka and New Delhi agreed on some crucial matters related to the transboundary river water issues. However, the real challenge is the Ganges Water Treaty of 1996, which will expire in 2026.

Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited India from 5 to 8 September 2022. During the visit, Dhaka and New Delhi signed seven memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and agreed on certain issues of bilateral importance. One of the MoUs is on the water withdrawal by India and Bangladesh from the common border river, Kushiyara, a distributary of the Barak River. The pact will benefit Sylhet in Bangladesh and facilitate water projects in South Assam in India. The Kushiyara river is equally important as Karimganj in Assam and Zakiganj in Sylhet, located on its banks, are the entry and exit points of water trade cargo through the Kolkata-Karimganj route.

During the visit, India requested for an early signing of the interim water-sharing agreement on the Feni River. About 116 kilometres long, the Feni River rise in India’s Tripura state and flows southwest to the Chittagong Hill tracts in Bangladesh. In 2019, Bangladesh agreed to let India withdraw 1.82 cubic foot per second of water from the Feni River for drinking by the people from the Sabroom town in Tripura. In New Delhi, Hasina reiterated Dhaka’s long-pending request to conclude the interim agreement on the Teesta River waters sharing. The draft interim agreement, finalised in 2011, states that India would get 42.5 per cent and Bangladesh 37.5 per cent during the lean season from December to March. The deal could not be concluded due to opposition from West Bengal’s Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee.

Since 2011, Hasina has been raising the Teesta waters issue during all her past visits to India or in meeting with the Indian leadership. Pointing at the Indian government’s failure to conclude the Teesta waters deal, at a reception hosted by Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi, Hasina quipped, “You [India] aren’t giving us enough water, so I can’t give you Hilsa fish right now. But I promise I will be able to supply Hilsa by the upcoming Puja season [in October]”. Later, after meeting Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, Hasina said, “I recall that the two countries have resolved many outstanding issues in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and we hope that all outstanding issues, including Teesta water-sharing treaty, would be concluded at an early date”.

India and Bangladesh also appreciated the Joint Rivers Commission’s decision to add a number of rivers “for prioritising the exchange of data and formulating the framework of the interim water sharing agreements”. They welcomed the formation of a Joint Technical Committee “to conduct a study for optimum utilisation of water received by Bangladesh under the provisions of Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, 1996”.

At the time of Sonali Adhyay (Golden Chapter) of the India-Bangladesh diplomacy , it is pertinent to start discussing the future of the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty. According to Article XII, the treaty remains in force for 30 years until 2026 and may be renewed by mutual consent. In the past, differences have cropped up between India and Bangladesh over it. For instance, many in Bangladesh believe that the country does not receive the amount of waters as assured under the treaty during dry season. In their paper, Kazi Saidur Rahman, Zahidul Islam, Umme Kulsum Navera and Fulco Ludwig find that between 1997 and 2016, Bangladesh received less water at the Hardinge bridge (opened in March 1915 and named after the then Indian Viceroy, Lord Hardinge) in 94 out of 300 occasions than what “presumably” was released from the Farakka barrage in India. If we take into consideration the critical dry periods, the authors observe that Bangladesh, during the same period, did not receive its guaranteed flow 39 out of 60 times. Such failures frequently occurred during the dry periods between 2008 and 2011. There is also an issue regarding inaccurate data about water availability at the Farakka barrage and Hardinge bridge.

While looking at the 1996 treaty, India and Bangladesh are likely to confront big challenges. First, the water demand-supply gap is widening in the Ganges Basin region. Several studies and assessments show that climate change, agricultural activities, industrialisation, urbanisation and increasing population have added to water woes in the already water-stressed Ganges Basin. Moreover, the groundwater, which contributes about 30 per cent to the Ganges River’s volume of water in the summer season, is declining. Second, the Farakka barrage – an important component of the treaty – causes concerns in both countries. The barrage is upstream of the Ganges River and is located 10 kilometres from the India-Bangladesh border. Bangladesh blames Farakka for denying the required waters and causing silt, thereby threatening the Sundarban delta. In 2017, even the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Bihar, Nitish Kumar, asked for the decommissioning of the Farakka barrage. He said that the barrage has no use and causes floods in Bihar every year. Third, most importantly, the political fate of the treaty highly depends on the position of the Indian states through which the Ganges River flows. Legally, under Article 253 of the Indian Constitution, the “Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body.”

However, in recent years, the West Bengal government’s attitude on the Teesta waters sharing issue clearly showed how helpless the Union government could be if a riparian state did not cooperate on the transboundary water pact. The Union government has agreed that it would not move on the Teesta waters issue without consulting the state government and bringing Mamata on board. Having said that, the ‘Golden Chapter’ in India-Bangladesh relations will certainly be put to the test when the two countries begin discussions on the renewal of the treaty.

Dr Amit Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at isasar@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.​

 

[Saif]

Interview: What now for the Ganges Treaty?

The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, signed by India and Bangladesh in 1996, is due to expire in 2026. Malik Fida A Khan spoke with The Third Pole on its significance and future

dialogue.earth

Interview: What now for the Ganges Treaty?
The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, signed by India and Bangladesh in 1996, is due to expire in 2026. Malik Fida A Khan spoke with The Third Pole on its significance and future

Malik Fida A Khan, executive director of the Center for Environmental and Geographic Information Services (Image: CEGIS)

Z Rahman
March 14, 2022

The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was signed by India and Bangladesh in 1996. The 30-year treaty was the culmination of decades of negotiation, and specifies the minimum level of water flow to be shared by India with its downstream neighbour Bangladesh during the dry season, from January to May. The Ganges Treaty had been a principal demand of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) ever since India started work on the Farakka barrage in 1962 – which was commissioned in 1975 – to divert water from the Ganga to the port of Kolkata.

Malik Fida A Khan is the executive director of the Center for Environmental and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS), a research institution created by the Bangladesh government. He is also a member of the National River Conservation Commission (NRCC), a state institution under the Ministry of Shipping, and has been a member of the Joint River Commission (JRC), a body established as an outcome of the 1972 Indo-Bangla Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace by the two countries.

He spoke with The Third Pole about Bangladesh’s experience with the treaty and prospects for future water cooperation. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

The 30-year Ganges Treaty is set to expire in 2026. How would you assess its effectiveness?

I must say that the treaty is a success because this is the first time Bangladesh was able to establish our right to the river [waters]. Once the right is recognised, we can find other avenues for cooperation and management.

The Ganges Treaty was signed in 1996 on the basis of 30-year data. Both the countries agreed to ensure minimum water flow downstream during the dry season (January-May). But the basis of the treaty was the ‘quantum’ of water. Now is the time to consider other aspects of water regimes like environmental flow, climate change, navigation, economy and social aspects. Twenty-six years ago, these were not part of our negotiation because establishing the right on the water was the goal for Bangladesh.


There is criticism that Bangladesh does not receive the amount of water agreed during the dry season

To the best of my knowledge, we have received water from Farakka point according to the Ganges Treaty. You can find the specific data if you visit the Joint River Commission website. If we look at the data of the last 24 years, we will see that according to clause 2, the amount of water we are supposed to get, we mostly received that.

Fishing boats on the Padma River, as the Ganga is known in Bangladesh. The river has fallen in volume since India operationalised the Farakka barrage in 1975. (Image: Majority World CIC / Alamy Stock Photo)

The Ganges Treaty expires in 2026. What’s next?

There are two things we must understand. On both sides of the border, water demand has increased but the water availability in the river system has gone down. There might be many reasons for that like withdrawal, or diversion, of water upstream. As a lower riparian country, what we need to do is to study the relevant international laws and treaties first. It is urgent for both Bangladesh and India to do a lot of homework around these issues and share details with each other at expert level. For example, both the countries could work on the future demand. We all know that the demand is much higher than the availability of water in the river. That’s why we may not always have a win-win situation.

The treaty should not be based only on ‘a quantum of water’ and agricultural productivity. We need to also consider how both countries could help push back salinity.

The second thing is that both the countries should consider the environmental flow of the river while planning for another treaty. We have to remember that the impacts of climate change will not only affect Bangladesh river systems. Unless we consider the environmental flows of the Hooghly, Gorai and Meghna river systems, both India and Bangladesh will face challenges in the days to come.

From Bangladesh, we told our Indian counterparts that if we get more water than we need, maybe in the future we can divert that to India to save the Sundarbans in their part. The treaty should not be based only on ‘a quantum of water’ and agricultural productivity. We need to also consider how both countries could help push back salinity through the joint management of the Ganges.

Do you mean the countries should do more joint studies and more discussion at a technical level?

We are in continuous discussion with India at the technical level. In Article 2 of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the heads of state of both countries in 2011, both countries agreed to work for basin-wide management of the joint rivers. But we are yet to start working together for the basin-wide management as there are few initial things that are still underway.

As a follow-up to the MoU, both countries have formed a technical committee to evaluate how Bangladesh can ensure the optimum use of the water, of which I am a member. We have already prepared terms of reference to do a joint study on that. We are thinking to initiate joint dredging of the rivers at our borders. If we can do that, I think we will be able to increase the water flow downstream. Both countries are planning joint studies, but the Covid situation has led to some delays. I think the situation has improved; we can now plan.

What do you think of the Farakka barrage? Do you think it should be dismantled?

Any intervention on the run of the river is bad for the river and its ecosystem. Nevertheless, we do many engineering interventions in the rivers. The reason for the Farakka barrage was to keep the Kolkata port navigable and try to push back salinity in downstream West Bengal. The barrage was also necessary to divert water to keep the Kolkata port running during the dry seasons of the year (January-May). India constructed the Farakka barrage to divert 40,000 cubic feet of water per second to the Hooghly through a feeder canal.

Any such intervention requires strong management. Sedimentation [may lead to] operational problems while managing the gates of the barrage. If there is an acute shortage of water in the river system, then what would be the method of releasing water for downstream Bangladesh and West Bengal? The value of joint management comes through in this.

The barrage became operational in 1975, but do you think the morphological situation remains the same? The other thing we should think of is evaluating the performance of the barrage – how much it is contributing to the economy and the ecology. Unless we answer all these questions, there will be criticism around such engineering interventions. And the other thing is to make such reports public. If we could do such research and evaluations and let people know all these things, I think many concerns would be dealt with.

Do you think Bangladesh and India will be able to sign a Teesta treaty?

Both Ganges and Teesta issues are related to the Indian state of West Bengal. The former chief minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, supported the Ganges Treaty and that is why we were able to sign the treaty. The central government is always in favour of such treaties or agreements, but they must value the opinion of the state government. The role of the state government, particularly its chief minister, Mamata Banerjee, is very important. We have to include her in our dialogue and technical discussion. It is important that she realises the importance of the treaty, her advisors need to be involved in the discussion around the Teesta.

In 1947, after Partition, management was divided, but the flow remains the same.

For example, it would be really good if we could sit with eminent water experts like Professor Kalyan Rudra. We have to remember that these rivers are shared rivers. In 1947, after Partition, management was divided, but the flow remains the same.

The Indian central government should invite experts from West Bengal to the meetings when we discuss bilateral issues around water management. Otherwise, the state government will not be able to know what is happening around water management at the central level. On the Teesta treaty, both government at the JRC level and leadership level agree on the need of the treaty, but we need to have West Bengal on board to reach a consensus.

Bangladesh shares 54 rivers with India but there is only one treaty. What should Bangladesh’s focus be for the overall management and coordination of shared river systems?

Please do not assume that there is no, or limited, coordination between us on the overall management of the water systems that we share. When we meet at the JRC level, we always highlight the directions of the 2011 MoU, which is basin-wide management. It is not practical to have agreements for each of the 54 rivers, it may take many years. So, we took a decision at the JRC on which rivers we would consider initially for basin-wide management. These include the Teesta, Mahananda, Dudhkumar, Dhorla, Feni, Monu and Khowai.

It is high time we focused on navigation, water quality, climate change, flood management, and resilience.

We should do joint studies which look beyond the quantum of water at other benefits. If we only focus on the quantum of water, we must wait for many years to solve the issues around water management. But if we consider the benefits of sharing, we will then be able to solve a lot of disputed issues.

It is high time we focused on navigation, water quality, climate change, flood management, and resilience. It will not be a realistic solution if we only think of the five months of the dry season and how much water is diverted or withdrawn upstream.

And finally, there are a few new rivers identified as transboundary, but those rivers have not been listed. But if we can start working on the management of strategic rivers considering their importance on the ecosystems, we can then set an example of basin-wide management.

Since we are talking about basin-wide management, are you trying to bring China into the discussion?

Bangladesh is always willing to discuss these issues, particularly multilaterally. But when we proposed to the Chinese that we should discuss the issue of basin-wide river management, they did not want to discuss this multilaterally. Up until now we have not been able to discuss the issue at Track I [inter-governmental] level. But there have been a number of dialogues and discussion at Track II [experts] or Track III [academics and NGOs] level.

I think we have opportunities to bring all the parties together to discuss at multilateral platforms, especially at Track I level. A regional conference or dialogue can be organised where policymakers from China, India, Bangladesh and Nepal can be invited to discuss the multilateral management of river basins.

The problem is with China and India. They want to discuss these issues at the bilateral level only. Bangladesh and Nepal are open to take part at any multilateral level. Even Bhutan is also willing to solve any disputed issues at a multilateral forum.​

 

[Saif]

India weighs plan to slash Pakistan water supply with Indus river project

India is considering plans to dramatically increase the water it draws from a major river that feeds Pakistani farms downstream, as part of retaliatory action for a deadly April attack on tourists that New Delhi blames on Islamabad, according to four people familiar with the matter.

en.prothomalo.com

India weighs plan to slash Pakistan water supply with Indus river project
Reuters New Delhi
Published: 17 May 2025, 15: 30

A view of the Uri-II hydroelectric project dam on the Jhelum River which flows from Indian Kashmir into Pakistan-administered Kashmir, near Uri in India-administered Kashmir's Baramulla district, 7 May, 2025. Reuters

India is considering plans to dramatically increase the water it draws from a major river that feeds Pakistani farms downstream, as part of retaliatory action for a deadly April attack on tourists that New Delhi blames on Islamabad, according to four people familiar with the matter.

Delhi "put in abeyance" its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, which governs usage of the Indus river system, shortly after 26 civilians in Indian Kashmir were killed in what India called an act of terror. Pakistan has denied involvement in the incident, but the accord has not been revived despite the two nuclear-armed neighbours agreeing a ceasefire last week following the worst fighting between them in decades.

After suspending India's participation in the treaty, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ordered officials to expedite planning and execution of projects on the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus rivers, three bodies of water in the Indus system that are designated primarily for Pakistan's use, six people told Reuters.

One of the key plans under discussion involves doubling to 120km the length of the Ranbir canal on the Chenab, which runs through India to Pakistan's agricultural powerhouse of Punjab, two of the people said. The canal was built in the 19th century, long before the treaty was signed.

India is permitted to draw a limited amount of water from the Chenab for irrigation, but an expanded canal - which experts said could take years to construct - would allow it to divert 150 cubic meters of water per second, up from about 40 cubic meters currently, the four people said, citing official discussions and documents they had seen.

Details of the Indian government's deliberations on expanding Ranbir have not previously been reported. The discussions started last month and continue even after the ceasefire, one of the people said.

The Indian ministries responsible for water and foreign affairs, as well as Modi's office, did not respond to Reuters' questions. Indian hydropower giant NHPC, which operates many projects in the Indus system, also did not respond to an email seeking comment.

Modi said in a fiery speech this week that "water and blood cannot flow together," though he didn't refer to the treaty. Water minister CR Paatil told a media event Friday that his ministry would "implement what Prime Minister Modi says" and "try to ensure that not a drop of water goes out."

The water and foreign ministries of Pakistan did not respond to requests for comment. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar told lawmakers this week that the government had written to India arguing that suspending the treaty was unlawful and that Islamabad regarded it as remaining in force.

Islamabad said after India suspended the treaty in April that it considered "any attempt to stop or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan" to be an "act of war."

About 80 per cent of Pakistani farms depend on the Indus system, as do nearly all hydropower projects serving the country of some 250 million.

Any efforts by Delhi to build dams, canals or other infrastructure that would withhold or divert significant amount of flow from the Indus system to India "would take years to realize," said water security expert David Michel of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

But Pakistan has had a preview of the kind of pressure it could face from India: Water at a key receiving point in Pakistan briefly fell by as much as 90 per cent in early May after India started maintenance work on some Indus projects.

Success Threatened
The Indus system runs through some of the world's most geopolitically tense areas, originating near Lake Mansarovar in Tibet and snaking through India's north and Pakistan's east and southeast, before emptying into the Arabian Sea.

The treaty is widely seen as one of the world's most successful water-sharing accords, having survived several major wars and longstanding tensions between India and Pakistan.

Fishermen clear a fishing net in the water on the partially dried up riverbed of the Indus River in Hyderabad, Pakistan 25 April, 2025. Reuters

Islamabad has previously opposed many Indian projects in the Indus system, while Delhi said after the Kashmir attack that it had been trying to renegotiate the treaty since 2023 to account for population increases and its rising need for clean hydroenergy.

The treaty restricts India largely to setting up low-impact hydropower projects on the three rivers allocated to Pakistan. Delhi has freedom to utilize the waters of three other rivers - the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi tributaries - as it sees fit.

Alongside the plans to expand Ranbir canal, India is also considering projects that would likely reduce the flow of water into Pakistan from rivers allocated to that country, according to two government documents seen by Reuters and interviews with five people familiar with the matter.

One document, an undated note prepared by a government company for officials considering irrigation plans, suggests that water from the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum "potentially be distributed into rivers" in three northern Indian states.

One of the people said the document, the details of which haven't been previously reported, was created for discussions with power ministry officials after the 22 April attack.

Delhi has also created a list of hydropower projects in its Jammu and Kashmir territory that it hopes will expand capacity to 12,000 megawatts, up from the current 3,360 MW.

The list, which was created by the power ministry and seen by Reuters, was not dated. A person familiar with the document said it was created before the Kashmir incident but is actively being discussed by government officials.

The prospective projects also include dams that can store large volumes of water, in what would be a first for India in the Indus river system, according to two people familiar with the matter.

India has identified at least five possible storage projects, four of which are on tributaries of the Chenab and Jhelum, according to the power ministry document.

Political Wrangling

The Himalayan region of Kashmir is claimed by both India and Pakistan, though each controls only parts of the area.

The region has been ravaged by an anti-India insurgency for decades, which Delhi has accused Islamabad of fuelling and funding. Pakistan denies the charges.

International relations expert Happymon Jacob at Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University said that India's new focus on the Indus Waters Treaty reflected an attempt to pressure Pakistan over Kashmir.

"With the latest conflict, Delhi may refuse to discuss Kashmir with Pakistan in any format," he said. "Delhi has not only progressively narrowed the scope of bilateral talks but has also curtailed the agenda, focusing only on specific issues like the IWT."

Pakistan has said that it is preparing legal action in several international forums, including the World Bank, which facilitated the treaty, as well as the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

"Water should not be weaponised," Pakistan's Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb told Reuters on Monday. "We don't even want to consider any scenario which ... does not take into account the reinstatement of this treaty."

Michel, the US-based expert, said that concern over the treaty's suspension was not limited to Islamabad.

"As geopolitical competition across the region deepens, more than a few Indian observers fear that Delhi’s use of water against Islamabad risks licensing Beijing to adopt the same strategy against India," he said.​

 

[Saif]

Pakistan won’t get water over which India has rights

Pakistan will not get water from rivers over which India has rights, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said yesterday, a month after a deadly attack in Indian Kashmir led New Delhi to suspend a key river water-sharing treaty between the neighbours.

www.thedailystar.net

Pakistan won’t get water over which India has rights
Says India’s Modi

Pakistan will not get water from rivers over which India has rights, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said yesterday, a month after a deadly attack in Indian Kashmir led New Delhi to suspend a key river water-sharing treaty between the neighbours.

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, negotiated by the World Bank in 1960, was among a slew of measures announced by India against Pakistan last month after the April 22 attack that killed 26 men.

New Delhi had said the attack was backed by Pakistan – an accusation Islamabad denied – and the nuclear-armed neighbours were involved in their worst military fighting in nearly three decades before agreeing to a ceasefire on May 10.

"Pakistan will have to pay a heavy price for every terrorist attack ... Pakistan's army will pay it, Pakistan's economy will pay it," Modi said at a public event in the northwestern state of Rajasthan.

The Indus treaty provides water for 80 percent of Pakistan's farms from three rivers that flow from India but Pakistan's finance minister said this month that its suspension was not going to have "any immediate impact".

The ceasefire between the countries has largely held, with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar saying that there is no exchange of fire currently and "there has been some repositioning of forces accordingly".​