[🇧🇩] Bangladesh as a peace broker to establish peace in South Asia.

[Saif]

Date of Event: May 23, 2025

Source: https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/what-role-can-bangladesh-play-securing-peace-south-asia-3900046

What role can Bangladesh play in securing peace in South Asia?

VISUAL: SIFAT AFRIN SHAMS

The South Asian region has long been a theatre of enduring geopolitical tensions. Central to this is the perpetual rivalry between two nuclear-armed states: India and Pakistan. Their antagonism is cyclical, manifesting in military skirmishes, diplomatic stand-offs, and proxy conflicts. Amid this volatility, Bangladesh, though smaller in size, holds a strategically pivotal position that offers both opportunities and responsibilities in shaping regional peace.

The legacy of Bangladesh's late President Ziaur Rahman remains significant when discussing the regional peace architecture. It was under his leadership that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was conceived—a bold attempt to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among South Asian nations. At a time when India and Pakistan remained at odds, Zia's vision provided smaller countries with a platform to assert their identities and strategic interests independently.

Over time, this initiative lost its momentum, largely due to growing Indian influence in regional diplomacy. This shift diluted the very balance that once allowed Bangladesh to act as a neutral and independent voice. Recent democratic movements, especially the mass uprising of July, have sparked renewed interest in reviving SAARC and Bangladesh's mediating role—this time led by interim leadership under Professor Muhammad Yunus.

However, Bangladesh's role in regional peace must go beyond ceremonial diplomacy. The country has the potential to become a nucleus of new geopolitical equations, as war today is not confined to just borders; rather, it extends to economic systems, democratic institutions, and national identities. In this context, small states like Bangladesh face four key challenges: preserving political neutrality, ensuring national security, maintaining diplomatic balance, and sustaining economic resilience. These challenges must be tackled holistically, grounded in theory and practical statecraft.

From an international relations perspective, the theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism offer distinct frameworks for understanding how Bangladesh can chart its foreign policy. Realism emphasises power dynamics and survival, seeing the international system as anarchic and inherently prone to conflict, where states prioritise their security and interests. Liberalism, in contrast, advocates cooperation, institutions, and interdependence, suggesting that peace can be achieved through dialogue and mutual understanding, where shared interests guide international relations. Meanwhile, constructivism prioritises national identity, values, and historical memory, emphasising how collective ideas and self-perception influence foreign policy decisions.

In Bangladesh's case, shaped by its Liberation War, democratic aspirations, and the recent student uprising of July 2024, the constructivist approach resonates most strongly. By embracing its identity as a peace-seeking, democratic nation, Bangladesh has the potential to offer both a moral and strategic counterbalance to the power struggles in its region.

If Bangladesh can act as a catalyst in reviving SAARC, mediating between India and Pakistan, and promoting peaceful coexistence, it would set a precedent for the role of smaller states in conflict resolution. The present leadership—emerging from a popular uprising—has the historic opportunity to steer the region away from conflict and towards reconciliation. The aim must be to ensure that peace, not war, defines the subcontinental narrative.

Redefining strategic posture

Realism teaches that in times of regional conflict, smaller nation-states typically choose one of three paths: neutrality, balancing, or bandwagoning. Neutrality, as demonstrated by Switzerland and Sweden during World War II, allows smaller countries to preserve their internal stability by avoiding alignment with warring parties. Balancing, adopted by countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, involves seeking security through strategic alliances with more powerful nations. On the other hand, bandwagoning entails aligning with the stronger power for protection, though this strategy risks eroding diplomatic autonomy and independence.

Bangladesh, to maintain its sovereignty and strategic flexibility, must judiciously blend neutrality and balanced alliances without succumbing to dependency. From a liberal standpoint, Bangladesh can use regional institutions and multilateral platforms to mediate, reduce tension, and maintain diplomatic channels with both India and Pakistan. ASEAN-style diplomacy, as practised by Malaysia and Singapore, offers an effective model. Such a middle-ground strategy enables smaller states to act as peace brokers while expanding their global legitimacy.

Constructivism emphasises moral positioning and national identity. Bhutan, for instance, has maintained neutrality in Sino-Indian conflicts based on its cultural philosophy and non-aligned foreign policy. Similarly, Bangladesh's stance—rooted in the Liberation War, popular uprisings, and its resistance to autocracy—provides a solid foundation for a principled foreign policy that supports peace and justice over partisanship.

Besides, history provides numerous examples of small states effectively navigating conflicts around them. After Yugoslavia's disintegration, countries like Croatia and Slovenia emerged as sovereign states with significant international support. In Lebanon, neutrality during prolonged regional tensions was paired with reliance on UN peacekeeping missions. Latin American nations have also responded to neighbouring conflicts with economic diplomacy rather than militarisation.

Given the volatile nature of South Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh must adopt a multi-layered approach that begins with maintaining diplomatic neutrality by advocating international cooperation in addressing potential refugee crises, economic shocks, and regional insecurity. Alongside this, a recalibration of security is essential. Bangladesh needs to reassess its existing defence agreements and strategic partnerships to strengthen national defence capabilities without compromising its sovereignty or falling under external hegemony. Economic diversification is also crucial; by building resilient trade routes and sustaining balanced bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan, Bangladesh can better insulate itself from regional instability. Lastly, a firm moral commitment is indispensable. Upholding human rights, advancing peace advocacy, and adhering to international law will not only reinforce the country's international credibility but also contribute to durable and principled diplomacy.

As the second-largest economy in South Asia, Bangladesh's influence and global acceptance are growing—and with that comes responsibility. As India and Pakistan continue their zero-sum rivalry, Bangladesh must maintain a careful, prudent stance that reflects wisdom rather than warlike sentiment. Historical experiences show that Bangladesh's most potent political transformations have emerged from democratic mass movements. The July Uprising reinforced the strength of people's unity and resistance to external domination. But such victories must now be translated into stability, not further confrontation.

A worrying trend in recent years has been the rise of digitally manipulated hostility. Social media posts, misinformation campaigns, caricatures, and doctored content—often traced back to obscure or foreign-funded sources—seek to provoke anti-India sentiment or misrepresent Bangladesh on international platforms. Ironically, many of these campaigns serve interests within India itself, aiming to legitimise aggression through manufactured consent. In such an environment, Bangladesh must resist the temptation to react emotionally. Strategic patience, defence without aggression, and cool-headed diplomacy are the most effective tools against provocation.

As regional tensions rise, Bangladesh needs to institutionalise a proactive approach to crisis management. Establishing a strategic crisis management cell to anticipate and respond to potential geopolitical shocks can be vital. This cell would monitor emerging threats, such as border conflicts, refugee crises, or economic disruptions, and ensure a swift and coordinated national response. By streamlining decision-making processes and improving inter-agency cooperation, this entity can strengthen Bangladesh's ability to manage crises effectively. In addition to safeguarding national security, such a cell can bolster international trust by demonstrating Bangladesh's commitment to stability and preparedness in a volatile region. Through strategic planning and crisis foresight, Bangladesh can better navigate complex regional dynamics and assert itself as a reliable partner in international affairs.

Being a small state does not mean being a passive observer. Bangladesh has the potential to become a regional leader in peace-building by drawing on its history, values, and strategic location. With the right policies, moral compass, and institutional frameworks, it can transform its geopolitical vulnerability into a position of influence. As India and Pakistan continue their chess game of conflict, Bangladesh can and must choose the path of construction, dialogue, and peace. That will not only preserve its own sovereignty but serve as a guiding light for a troubled region.

Alauddin Mohammad is joint member secretary at the National Citizen Party (NCP), and executive director at the Institute of Policy, Governance and Development (IPGAD).​

 

[Saif]

How Bangladesh can balance ties with India and Pakistan

Bangladesh’s new government must carefully balance India and Pakistan ties to safeguard economic interests and strategic autonomy.

www.thedailystar.net

How Bangladesh can balance ties with India and Pakistan

Michael Kugelman

One of the biggest geopolitical questions for the new Tarique Rahman administration is how it will approach relations with Bangladesh’s two most important neighbours, India and Pakistan. The interim government period saw some major forward movement on improving what has always been a fragile relationship with Islamabad. By contrast, relations with New Delhi, which were rock-solid during the Sheikh Hasina era, took a major tumble.

Prime Minister Rahman has a strong incentive to patch up ties with New Delhi: Bangladesh’s sputtering economy would be well served by resetting relations with what has become the world’s fourth-largest economy. Additionally, Bangladesh’s restive border with India will be easier to manage if ties with New Delhi are smoother. Similarly, there are important existing collaborations to pursue, like the new Bangladesh-India-Nepal electricity-sharing agreement, and critical future negotiations to carry out, such as talks over shared rivers. These are likely to achieve more positive outcomes if bilateral ties are in a better place.

At the same time, Dhaka has much to gain from maintaining momentum in Bangladesh-Pakistan ties — even amid continued sensitivities rooted in Pakistan’s abhorrent actions during Bangladesh’s independence war. For example, recent progress with visa liberalisation and travel connectivity can bring commercial benefits to Bangladesh. Additionally, the two see eye to eye on important foreign policy issues, from supporting the revitalisation of SAARC and embracing middle powers like Turkey to strengthening ties with the Global South. There’s also some domestic political gains to be achieved from maintaining friendly ties with Islamabad: a large share of Bangladesh’s public harbours anti-India sentiment, and would likely welcome efforts meant to ensure Dhaka’s continued engagement with India’s bitter rival.

Fortunately, Dhaka can have it both ways. It can pursue a strategy of selective cooperation with both Islamabad and New Delhi: one that allows for robust engagement with each capital, while also avoiding taking steps with either relationship that could be imprudent or cause problems for the other.

With India, trade and economic cooperation is of the essence, as is close coordination on border security. But Dhaka can also draw the line. It can take care not to let India dictate or influence important Bangladesh foreign policy postures, such as pursuing warm ties with Beijing — and having a cordial relationship with Islamabad.

Cooperation on this front, combined with broader collaborations on knowledge sharing, constitute a relatively low hanging fruit that can potentially produce multiple positive outcomes for Dhaka. It can help advance partnership with Pakistan without causing consternation in New Delhi, especially as Dhaka will likely want to learn from India’s own DPI successes. It can serve as a confidence-building measure that could pave the way for future important but difficult discussions on government-to-government levels.

With Pakistan, it’s easy to identify what isn’t practical. If there’s a genuine desire to patch up ties with India, deepening defence cooperation with Islamabad would be prohibitively risky. And while establishing trade ties with Islamabad — a key achievement of the interim government — may make sense in principle, there are considerable constraints. One is geography, where there are no direct land routes, making direct overland trade infeasible. Another is a lack of comparative advantage: At least for now, each country prioritises similar exports, making them natural commercial competitors rather than partners.

A sweet spot for Pakistan-Bangladesh cooperation lies in what can best be described as knowledge exchanges — on government, but also non-government, levels. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s landmark visit to Dhaka last August set some of these exchanges in motion: The two sides launched a knowledge corridor meant to promote education and academic exchanges through the provision of scholarships and training for civil servants. Additionally, an MOU was signed between two prominent think tanks: the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, and Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.

There’s plenty of scope for expanding such collaborations. This important opportunity was highlighted, albeit indirectly, at two separate events hosted last month in Washington DC by the Atlantic Council. One featured Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Muhammad Aurangzeb, and the other featured his Bangladeshi counterpart, Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury.

Bangladesh and Pakistan face many shared development challenges — especially public health scourges like dengue, malnutrition, and tuberculosis, but also broader ones from poor agricultural productivity to climate change effects and persistent poverty. In his comments at the Atlantic Council, Aurangzeb spoke about how Pakistan has used tech innovations, especially digital public infrastructure (DPI), to tackle some of these challenges. Meanwhile, Khasru acknowledged in his remarks the massive economic challenges faced by his government, which Bangladesh’s onerous health and development challenges certainly don’t make any easier to tackle.

Fortunately, Dhaka can have it both ways. It can pursue a strategy of selective cooperation with both Islamabad and New Delhi: one that allows for robust engagement with each capital, while also avoiding taking steps with either relationship that could be imprudent or cause problems for the other.

Bangladesh’s new government is closely studying DPI success stories in other countries. Pakistan is a logical case to focus on — in part because this would continue the spirit of the knowledge exchanges prioritised in the bilateral relationship over the last year.

As my Atlantic Council colleague Imran Shauket recently wrote for Pakistan’s Daily Times, a logical next step would be for a delegation of Bangladeshi digital policy experts to visit Pakistan to learn more about Pakistan’s DPI journey and see what lessons can help inform the development of Bangladesh’s own DPI architecture. Such a delegation could perhaps be preceded and succeeded by an informal virtual dialogue between non-government experts from both countries.

Cooperation on this front, combined with broader collaborations on knowledge sharing, constitute a relatively low hanging fruit that can potentially produce multiple positive outcomes for Dhaka. It can help advance partnership with Pakistan without causing consternation in New Delhi, especially as Dhaka will likely want to learn from India’s own DPI successes. It can serve as a confidence-building measure that could pave the way for future important but difficult discussions on government-to-government levels, such those about Pakistani apologies and reparations tied to 1971. Most importantly, information-sharing and lessons-learned exercises on DPI can help move the needle forward on tackling serious, entrenched health and development challenges that hamper Bangladesh’s long-term growth. Furthermore, they can help advance Bangladesh’s reform agenda. DPI, if properly applied, can help in areas ranging from boosting tax revenue collection to increasing online financial transactions and thereby reducing corruption risks. Getting reforms right is an immediate priority to fulfill current obligations to the IMF, but it’s also a critical prerequisite for long-term growth.

Three years after Bangladesh’s independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman famously said that his country’s foreign policy principle is “friendship to all, malice toward none.” In the five decades that have followed, Bangladesh has achieved success in pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy. It has important relationships in both the developed world and the Global South, and it has balanced its friendly relations with rival pairings, including the US and Russia. However, it has frequently betrayed this policy when applied to the India-Pakistan rivalry, instead siding with one — including India in the Hasina era and Pakistan during the recent interim government period — over the other.

Bangladesh’s new government has an opportunity to correct this imbalance, through carefully calibrated diplomacy that maximises possibilities for cooperation — in spheres where it is both prudent and relatively low-risk—with both neighbors.

Michael Kugelman is resident senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.​