[🇧🇩] Bangladesh's Blue Economy

[Saif]

Date of Event: Jun 18, 2026

Source: https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/views/opinions/blue-economy-bds-fisheries-promise-or-paradox

Blue economy & BD's fisheries: promise or paradox?

Nuzhat Fatima Purnota and Md Shanawez Hossain

Published :
Jun 15, 2026 23:24
Updated :
Jun 15, 2026 23:24

The pride of Bengal, the Bay of Bengal, is not just a matter of global recognition for the people of Bangladesh, but also a gold mine of opportunities and regional cooperation. But how little do we do to utilise the opportunities it offers us? How well are we treating the resources that have the potential to drive economic growth on the next level if utilized sustainably? Such questions remain very pertinent to proper utilisation of fisheries and related marine resources on which life and livelihoods of millions of people depend.

BLUE ECONOMY OF BANGLADESH: POTENTIALS AND GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS: The Blue Economy is widely renowned for sustainable economic development based on marine and coastal resources. The Bay of Bengal is both a curse and a blessing for Bangladesh due to its extreme climate vulnerability and the immense resources it provides. It is an opportunity for growth for us, especially with regional cooperation at play in the Indo-Pacific region. Bangladesh has been promoting the utilisation of the ocean economy since 2014, establishing a memorandum of understanding with India in 2015 in order to develop the blue economy in the Bay of Bengal. The country also launched its seventh five year plan where the inclusion of blue economy development was ensured and identified the prospects as a potential driver of growth. The total value of ocean resources is estimated to be at US$24 trillion, where the government of Bangladesh has identified approximately US$16 Billion investment opportunities across its 26 blue economy sectors. The expected GDP return is estimated to be approximately 4-4.5 per cent by 2030 which includes fisheries sector, eco-tourism, renewable energy, maritime trade etc. Investment efforts include projects like the Matarbari deep sea port construction which aim to open up further trading opportunities for Bangladesh. However, threats to ocean habitats and estuarine ecosystems will remain if external factors are not considered.

Bangladesh has been focusing on its blue economy initiatives since 2017, first launching its "Blue Economy Initiatives". The government bodies working on Blue Economy are the Planning Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has identified 26 sectors for the country's blue economy development. The government also launched a Bangladesh Blue Economy Cell in 2016 under the Energy and Mineral Resources Division, which failed miserably due to lack of adequate resources, lack of strategic plans, implementation, and policies. Its role has been heavily criticised over the years. Several multilateral partners work in the development of the blue economy in Bangladesh, for example UNDP has assisted in developing the National Blue Economy Action Plan, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, the UNDP has also organised a national dialogue on Blue Bonds, in partnership with UNEP-PEA4SDGs and the General Economics Division, aiming to promote innovative financing mechanisms for marine-based sustainable development while addressing the estimated USD 928 billion SDG financing gap by exploring tools such as bonds in order to enhance sustainable fisheries, offshore energy and waste management. Several policies, like the Hilsa Ban which refrains fishermen from catching and selling wild Hilsa during breeding seasons, particularly during October, and protection of smaller (Jhatka) at peak seasons, also promotes sustainability. Other initiatives include the establishment of the Swatch of No Ground Marine Protected Area in 2014 that aims to protect marine biodiversity in the Bay of Bengal.

Thus, on the internal front, the government has taken short-term and long term measures for sustainable development of the fisheries sector. However, on the external front, there remains many disputed issues that still threaten the long term sustainability of this sector.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL MECHANISMS IN MARINE RESOURCES GOVERNANCE: Bangladesh's maritime dispute with India and Myanmar had also been an issue for quite a long time, obstructing economic growth in the country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). But despite the conflict resolution, the country faces immense exploitation of marine resources from neighbouring countries and ranks 85th among the 152 most vulnerable countries to Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing according to the IUU Fishing Index 2021. Bangladesh has also amended the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act in 2021. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) members adopted the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies during their 12th Ministerial Conference in June 2022 which entered into force on September 15, 2025 with two thirds of its members formally accepting the Protocol of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies by depositing an "instrument of acceptance". As a Least Developed Country, Bangladesh has been exempted from dispute settlement for continuing subsidies within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles. It also has access to benefits like a voluntary WTO funding mechanism for technical and capacity building assistance, extended reporting timelines and support for implementing the agreement's disciplines.

CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD: Native fishermen are at the heart of Bangladesh's coastal community whose lives depend heavily on native fishing techniques and practices. Despite their lives being so intricately tied to the sea, they are often marginalised and treated like passive beneficiaries in development efforts rather than considering or including them as key stakeholders. They often lack access to sustainable fishing practices due to inadequate training, modern equipment and market connections, making them more vulnerable to exploitation and climate shocks, especially with the presence of foreign pirates in our EEZ. Despite their equitable inclusion, Bangladesh won't be able to succeed in their blue economy efforts if institutional incapacities persist. Bangladesh has strengthened its maritime security and the presence of Navy and Bangladesh Coast Guard to ensure safety and security within its EEZ. The incapacities in question include lack of coordination between government agencies, governance challenges, lack of participatory actions, technical capacities, etc. Prioritisation of ecological conservation over economic acceleration is also a challenge for a developing country like Bangladesh that has a poverty rate of 27.93 per cent as of mid-2025, according to a study by the Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC).

As a potential solution and way forward to the development of the fisheries sector various measures are required at national, regional and global levels. First, more research and development with extensive data is required in order to plan the utilisation of the marine and coastal resources sustainably. Funding oceanographic and marine research should be prioritised to fill in data gaps and surveillance of piracy activities. Bangladesh should invest heavily in capacity building of stakeholders-- from grassroot to government levels.

Second, inclusivity of local coastal communities and their empowerment should be the core focus, building resilience and knowledge while promoting community-led conservation and co-management of resources. In addition to that, infrastructure projects should undergo rigorous Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) in order to ensure environmental sustainability and protection of marine resources. Coastal tourism facilities and ports should be environmentally friendly and not cause destruction. Significant monitoring, evaluation and reporting are thus required for actionable solutions.

Furthermore, a comprehensive national blue economy framework should be established where all government institutions overseeing marine and coastal affairs should ensure cross-sectoral coordination in management of the associated resources. Public-Private Partnerships should also be considered for better economic development and resource management.

Finally, Bangladesh can strengthen its regional cooperation through the Indo-Pacific that has the potential to connect the South Asian countries to the Southeast Asian countries, and enhance economic development through regional bodies like Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Engagement with these organisations and exchange of knowledge & learning outcomes from best practices for marine and community conservation can further develop Bangladesh's capacity, facilitate joint research, promote peace & prosperity and build economic relations that benefits all the entities involved.

Bangladesh's blue economy is not just an untapped sector but a vision for inclusive, resilient, and sustainable development. It is a bridge for the Indo-Pacific that offers a future of prosperity, resilience, and ecological harmony within neighbouring countries. But realising this vision demands a shift from extractive practices to regenerative ones, from exclusion to empowerment, and from fragmented governance to integrated actions at the national, regional and global levels.

Nuzhat Fatima Purnota is a development professional working in the field of Climate Change & Disaster Management. Dr. Md Shanawez Hossain is an Associate Professor of the Department of Global Studies and Governance (GSG) at Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB).​

 

[Saif]

The budget has revived focus on blue economy, but there's a lot of catching up to do

On July 7, 2014, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague handed Bangladesh the second half of its maritime triumph.

www.thedailystar.net

The budget has revived focus on blue economy, but there's a lot of catching up to do

FILE VISUAL: Salman Sakib Shahryar

On July 7, 2014, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague handed Bangladesh the second half of its maritime triumph. Two years earlier, judges at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg had done much the same against Myanmar. Between them, the two awards left Bangladesh with sovereign rights over roughly 1,18,813 square kilometres of the Bay of Bengal, an aquatic territory close in size to the land we already had. Since then, there has been much discussion framing the collective victory as the start of a “blue economy revolution.” Twelve years on, however, that promise remains largely untapped.

The Blue Economy Cell, established in 2017 to map opportunities in the new maritime estate, identified more than two dozen potential sectors: fisheries, deep-sea hydrocarbons, shipbuilding, salt, marine biotechnology, ocean renewables, tourism. Yet, marine fish catches in FY 2023-24 fell to their lowest level in nine years, at just over 6,28,000 tonnes, and the figure reportedly dropped even further in FY 2024-25. Multiple bidding rounds for deep-sea hydrocarbons have yet to produce a single commercial discovery run by a domestic firm. The marine spatial plan the World Bank flagged years ago as the prerequisite for everything else still sits in draft. Inter-ministerial coordination, divided uneasily among the navy and four civilian ministries, works much as it did before the verdict: indifferently.

Amid these, the proposed budget for the next fiscal year has set aside Tk 200 crore for the blue economy. This includes Tk 100 crore for a new “Blue Economy Research Fund” and Tk 100 crore for development, alongside plans to run commercial vessels for deep-sea tuna, scale up seaweed cultivation, declare new marine protected areas at Kuakata and Salimpur, build a fishing port at Matarbari and upgrade the landing centre in Cox’s Bazar. It is a welcome line in the ledger, and an instructive one. For the first time in years, the blue economy has been given not only some significance but also dedicated allocations. But this is only a start. A research fund is not the same as research capacity. The real test will be to see whether this allocation builds the standing human and institutional architecture needed to decide what to do with the sea portions that Bangladesh won.

It is also relevant to look at how the abovementioned cases had been won. For The Hague and Hamburg, the state had spared no expense on counsel. Foreign barristers had been briefed and international advisers retained; a technical record was assembled with care. Unfortunately, to govern the gains, the government has built no comparable bench at home. We have no national maritime commission of the kinds Singapore or Norway use to drive strategy. We have no steady pipeline of marine geophysicists, fisheries economists, or offshore engineers feeding into policymaking. The country that knew to hire world-class counsel to win 1,18,813 square kilometres of sea never thought to hire a local cadre to govern it.

Meanwhile, the sea around us has filled up. In March 2025, India retired the SAGAR framing it had used for a decade and announced MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) as the new banner for its maritime engagement, now stretched well past the Indian Ocean. China’s Maritime Silk Road has thickened into a steady traffic of port deals, undersea cables and logistics agreements. The US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy now binds together security pacts, technology controls, and supply chain initiatives that converge on the Bay. Bangladesh’s own Indo-Pacific Outlook of April 2023, a careful and non-aligned 15-point document, was a sensible attempt at staying out of trouble.

But hedging is not a posture; it is a workload. Every port concession, security memorandum, dual-use logistics agreement has to be read against a sovereignty checklist that only the country’s own experts can credibly write. When three competing powers arrive at the same time with detailed proposals on deep-water terminals, undersea cable landings, hydrographic surveys, joint exclusive economic zone patrols or rare-earth prospecting, the negotiating table requires not goodwill but specialists who can tell a commercial partnership from a strategic mortgage. We do not have enough of such specialists.

The real problem is the gap between the complexity of what is offered and our ability to interrogate it. Call it epistemic vulnerability if you like, or call it being out-staffed. It rarely makes the front page. It surfaces, instead, in fine print: in clauses we did not push back on, in side-letters we did not read closely, in strategic doors we left a little ajar because we weren’t entirely sure what we were signing.

This gap has only widened, for obvious geopolitical reasons, since August 2024. The political transition effectively cooled the historically close Dhaka-Delhi axis. Across the Naf, and in the waters around Saint Martin’s, the Arakan Army’s effective control of much of Rakhine State has made the eastern flank of Bangladesh’s maritime border one of the most volatile in the region. We are negotiating from a tighter spot than we’ve had to at any point in time since 2014, but with much the same institutional toolkit we had over a decade ago.

There is, however, one asset we have not yet begun to draw on. Across the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Seabed Authority (ISA), major shipping conglomerates, the world’s leading naval academies, and a number of well-funded ocean-science laboratories, several hundred Bangladeshis hold senior-level technical positions. Many of them spent years inside the very institutions whose rules now shape our maritime fate. Almost none of these experts is formally connected to Dhaka’s policymaking architecture.

This is odd, and out of step with what other countries do. India treats its diaspora as a strategic resource: through Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (a day to recognise the contributions made by Non-Resident Indians), overseas advisory councils, and the quiet practice of seconding civil servants to multilateral bodies. China does much the same through Maritime Silk Road technical networks. Even Vietnam, with less to spend, regularly calls back its IMO and ISA personnel to shape national positions on seabed mining or shipping decarbonisation. Bangladesh, alone among countries with a serious maritime stake, has built no such mechanism. The diaspora’s willingness to help is not in doubt; the issue is that institutional response has been silence.

A standing Ocean Affairs Advisory Council, attached to the Prime Minister’s Office or a future Ministry of Maritime Affairs, could pair domestic policy officers with diaspora specialists by sector: hydrocarbons, deep-sea mining, port concessions, fisheries, IMO, ISA, and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) negotiations, and maritime law. Its work would be to carry out technical reviews of inbound proposals, mentoring of junior officials, continuous horizon scanning, and so on. Its annual cost would be a rounding error against the Tk 200 crore the budget has just earmarked. A sliver of that research fund, redirected towards the people who would actually read the contracts, would do more for Bangladesh’s blue economy than acquiring another vessel. The question is no longer whether Bangladesh will spend on the sea, but whether it will spend to build the people and institutions capable of governing it. Think of it as “intellectual remittance.” And unlike the financial kind, this one the state can structure on its own terms.

The lesson of the past 12 years is uncomfortable but plain: winning at a tribunal is not the same as governing the space won. The 1,18,813 square kilometres will go on existing on the map whether or not we do anything about it. Whether this portion of the sea ends up as an economy of our own or becomes a buffer in someone else’s calculations will depend on the decisions Bangladesh makes in the coming days and the institutional capacity we choose to build around these decisions.

Md Syful Islam is a PhD research fellow in the Department of Maritime, Transport Law, and Politics at Ankara University in Türkiye.​