Saif
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Rate cut vs investment outlook
Bangladesh Bank's recent 50-basis-point reduction in its policy rate, from 10 per cent to 9.5 per cent, was intended to give a weakening economy some breathing room. Yet the signal sent from the central bank has barely changed the calculation being made at the desk of an entrepreneur. The weighted-
Rate cut vs investment outlook
Bangladesh Bank's recent 50-basis-point reduction in its policy rate, from 10 per cent to 9.5 per cent, was intended to give a weakening economy some breathing room. Yet the signal sent from the central bank has barely changed the calculation being made at the desk of an entrepreneur. The weighted-average lending rate remained close to 12 per cent, while private-sector credit growth had slid to roughly 4.5 per cent by mid-2026-a 33-year low. Bangladesh Bank itself acknowledged weak private investment and deteriorating growth prospects when it lowered the policy rate. [Central bank, however, in its quarterly monetary policy statement, issued on Wednesday, kept the policy repo rate unchanged at 9.50 per cent.]
The conventional explanation is that interest rates remain too high. That is true, but incomplete. Investment is not generated by one interest rate moving up or down. It is determined by a matrix of interacting economic, financial, institutional and political variables. The lending rate is only one cell in that matrix. Expected profitability, unused capacity, energy availability, banking-sector health, past loan defaults, money laundering, exchange-rate expectations, political stability, governance and confidence in monetary-policy independence all enter the same investment calculation. Some reinforce one another; others magnify risks originating elsewhere. The weakness of investment therefore cannot be understood by moving one monetary dial while assuming everything else remains unchanged.
THE RATE THAT REALLY MATTERS: A business does not borrow merely because the lending rate has declined. It borrows when the expected risk-adjusted return from an investment exceeds the financing cost by a sufficiently comfortable margin. With commercial borrowing still around 12 per cent, earning 12 or 13 per cent on a long-term project is plainly not enough. The investor must cover interest expenses, depreciation, taxes, operating risks, possible cost overruns, exchange-rate movements, supply disruptions and the opportunity cost of committing capital to an illiquid investment for years.
There is another comparison that matters just as much. Productive investment must compete with what the same capital can earn elsewhere with considerably less risk. Bangladesh Bank's September Treasury-bill auctions produced yields of about 8.3 per cent on 91-day bills and 8.45 per cent on 182-day bills, while its 91-day reference rate was still above 9 per cent later in September. An entrepreneur contemplating a factory, machinery purchase or ten-year expansion therefore asks a simple question: why accept business, regulatory, exchange-rate and political risks unless the expected return is substantially higher than what relatively safe financial assets already offer?
Under such conditions, an expected return of perhaps 20 to 25 per cent can become a plausible hurdle for some long-term private investments-a risk-free floor near 8-9 per cent, plus a premium wide enough to compensate for years of business, currency and policy uncertainty. This is not a universal numerical threshold; industries, leverage ratios, gestation periods and risk profiles differ substantially. The economic point is more important than the particular number: risky productive capital must promise a return comfortably above both the borrowing rate and the return available from safer financial alternatives. A 50-basis-point reduction in the policy rate does relatively little if the entrepreneur's required return remains many percentage points above it.
THE INVESTMENT MATRIX: The problem becomes clearer once the remaining cells of the matrix are brought into the calculation. Firms operating with unused capacity have little reason to borrow for expansion when their existing plants can produce more without additional fixed investment. Weak demand lowers expected sales and profitability. Energy constraints raise production costs. External supply disruptions add uncertainty to imported inputs, transportation and inventory management. Exchange-rate uncertainty can transform a profitable project on paper into an unprofitable one once imported machinery, intermediate goods and foreign obligations are repriced.
Banking history adds another dimension. Bangladesh enters the present slowdown carrying the legacy of large loan defaults, politically connected lending, money laundering and damaged bank balance sheets. These are not merely records of past misconduct-they shape present expectations. Repeated misallocation of credit changes how both lenders and sound borrowers evaluate the financial system. Banks grow more cautious about genuine commercial risk, even as well-connected borrowers have historically faced different incentives. The result can be a paradox: monetary conditions ease, but productive investment does not respond proportionately.
This is what may be described as an investment-confidence trap. The price of money can decline while the willingness to undertake productive investment remains subdued, because the expected return has not risen sufficiently relative to the total risk surrounding the investment. Monetary easing can make credit cheaper, but it cannot by itself manufacture profitable investment opportunities.
MONETARY CREDIBILITY: Confidence in monetary governance belongs in the same matrix. Md Mostaqur Rahman became governor of Bangladesh Bank in February 2026. Bangladesh Bank describes him as a cost and management accountant with decades of professional experience and extensive involvement with business organisations and financial governance; contemporary reporting identified him as the first businessman to head the central bank.
The issue is not whether a businessman is inherently incapable of managing a central bank. The relevant economic question is one of institutional credibility. The appointment represented a departure from the more conventional background of economists, monetary specialists and career regulators. At a time when confidence in banking governance was already fragile, such a departure inevitably places greater weight on demonstrating that monetary-policy decisions remain insulated from the immediate preferences of the political government.
Markets price institutions as well as interest rates. Businesses making investments with ten- or twenty-year horizons must form expectations about inflation, exchange rates, banking regulation and future monetary policy. Central-bank independence therefore matters not simply as an institutional ideal but as an input into the investor's calculation of risk. Advanced economies reinforce this credibility through different mechanisms-long or staggered terms, specialist monetary-policy committees, formal protections against direct government instruction. The arrangements differ, but the underlying logic is the same: monetary policy works more effectively when economic actors believe its formulation will not fluctuate with short-term political convenience.
POLITICAL RISK: The investment matrix cannot stop at the doors of Bangladesh Bank. The continuing disagreement over implementation of the July National Charter and the referendum has added another layer of uncertainty. The Jamaat-led 11-party alliance has rejected the government's preferred parliamentary route for constitutional amendments and has continued to demand implementation of the referendum verdict through the mechanism it considers mandated by the July Charter. The alliance has also warned of broader political mobilisation if the dispute remains unresolved.
The constitutional merits of that dispute are separate from its economic consequences. Investors do not need to take sides politically to price political uncertainty economically. A long-term investment is a wager on future rules as much as on future sales. The entrepreneur must form expectations about taxation, regulation, import policy, energy pricing, exchange-rate management, credit conditions and the broader institutional environment over the life of the project-and political confrontation adds one more governance premium to that calculation.
Each variable in the matrix alters the others, and their combined effect determines whether a proposed project clears the entrepreneur's hurdle rate. A 50-basis-point monetary easing can be overwhelmed if the matrix simultaneously adds several percentage points of perceived economic, institutional and political risk.
BEYOND A 50-BASIS-POINT SOLUTION: Bangladesh Bank's rate cut was not pointless. Lower borrowing costs help existing borrowers and can encourage new investment when other conditions are favourable. But 50 basis points cannot repair bank balance sheets, eliminate bad loans, recover laundered money, generate reliable energy supplies, improve capacity utilisation, settle institutional disputes, or persuade entrepreneurs that the rules governing tomorrow's investment will resemble those governing today's.
Bangladesh's investment problem is consequently deeper than expensive money. It is a problem of the expected return on productive capital relative to the total price of assuming risk. An entrepreneur facing borrowing costs near 12 per cent, comparatively attractive returns on safer financial assets, weak demand, and substantial banking, exchange-rate, governance and political uncertainties will require an unusually attractive prospective return before committing capital to a long-lived productive asset.
The policy challenge, therefore, is not merely to lower the price of money. It is to raise the expected return to productive investment while simultaneously reducing the matrix of risks surrounding it. Only then can cheaper credit translate reliably into factories, machinery, employment and productive capacity-and Bangladesh can begin climbing out of its investment-confidence trap, rather than cutting rates at its edge.
The writer is a Professor Emeritus of economics at Eastern Michigan University, USA, and former nuclear engineer at Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission.
Bangladesh Bank's recent 50-basis-point reduction in its policy rate, from 10 per cent to 9.5 per cent, was intended to give a weakening economy some breathing room. Yet the signal sent from the central bank has barely changed the calculation being made at the desk of an entrepreneur. The weighted-average lending rate remained close to 12 per cent, while private-sector credit growth had slid to roughly 4.5 per cent by mid-2026-a 33-year low. Bangladesh Bank itself acknowledged weak private investment and deteriorating growth prospects when it lowered the policy rate. [Central bank, however, in its quarterly monetary policy statement, issued on Wednesday, kept the policy repo rate unchanged at 9.50 per cent.]
The conventional explanation is that interest rates remain too high. That is true, but incomplete. Investment is not generated by one interest rate moving up or down. It is determined by a matrix of interacting economic, financial, institutional and political variables. The lending rate is only one cell in that matrix. Expected profitability, unused capacity, energy availability, banking-sector health, past loan defaults, money laundering, exchange-rate expectations, political stability, governance and confidence in monetary-policy independence all enter the same investment calculation. Some reinforce one another; others magnify risks originating elsewhere. The weakness of investment therefore cannot be understood by moving one monetary dial while assuming everything else remains unchanged.
THE RATE THAT REALLY MATTERS: A business does not borrow merely because the lending rate has declined. It borrows when the expected risk-adjusted return from an investment exceeds the financing cost by a sufficiently comfortable margin. With commercial borrowing still around 12 per cent, earning 12 or 13 per cent on a long-term project is plainly not enough. The investor must cover interest expenses, depreciation, taxes, operating risks, possible cost overruns, exchange-rate movements, supply disruptions and the opportunity cost of committing capital to an illiquid investment for years.
There is another comparison that matters just as much. Productive investment must compete with what the same capital can earn elsewhere with considerably less risk. Bangladesh Bank's September Treasury-bill auctions produced yields of about 8.3 per cent on 91-day bills and 8.45 per cent on 182-day bills, while its 91-day reference rate was still above 9 per cent later in September. An entrepreneur contemplating a factory, machinery purchase or ten-year expansion therefore asks a simple question: why accept business, regulatory, exchange-rate and political risks unless the expected return is substantially higher than what relatively safe financial assets already offer?
Under such conditions, an expected return of perhaps 20 to 25 per cent can become a plausible hurdle for some long-term private investments-a risk-free floor near 8-9 per cent, plus a premium wide enough to compensate for years of business, currency and policy uncertainty. This is not a universal numerical threshold; industries, leverage ratios, gestation periods and risk profiles differ substantially. The economic point is more important than the particular number: risky productive capital must promise a return comfortably above both the borrowing rate and the return available from safer financial alternatives. A 50-basis-point reduction in the policy rate does relatively little if the entrepreneur's required return remains many percentage points above it.
THE INVESTMENT MATRIX: The problem becomes clearer once the remaining cells of the matrix are brought into the calculation. Firms operating with unused capacity have little reason to borrow for expansion when their existing plants can produce more without additional fixed investment. Weak demand lowers expected sales and profitability. Energy constraints raise production costs. External supply disruptions add uncertainty to imported inputs, transportation and inventory management. Exchange-rate uncertainty can transform a profitable project on paper into an unprofitable one once imported machinery, intermediate goods and foreign obligations are repriced.
Banking history adds another dimension. Bangladesh enters the present slowdown carrying the legacy of large loan defaults, politically connected lending, money laundering and damaged bank balance sheets. These are not merely records of past misconduct-they shape present expectations. Repeated misallocation of credit changes how both lenders and sound borrowers evaluate the financial system. Banks grow more cautious about genuine commercial risk, even as well-connected borrowers have historically faced different incentives. The result can be a paradox: monetary conditions ease, but productive investment does not respond proportionately.
This is what may be described as an investment-confidence trap. The price of money can decline while the willingness to undertake productive investment remains subdued, because the expected return has not risen sufficiently relative to the total risk surrounding the investment. Monetary easing can make credit cheaper, but it cannot by itself manufacture profitable investment opportunities.
MONETARY CREDIBILITY: Confidence in monetary governance belongs in the same matrix. Md Mostaqur Rahman became governor of Bangladesh Bank in February 2026. Bangladesh Bank describes him as a cost and management accountant with decades of professional experience and extensive involvement with business organisations and financial governance; contemporary reporting identified him as the first businessman to head the central bank.
The issue is not whether a businessman is inherently incapable of managing a central bank. The relevant economic question is one of institutional credibility. The appointment represented a departure from the more conventional background of economists, monetary specialists and career regulators. At a time when confidence in banking governance was already fragile, such a departure inevitably places greater weight on demonstrating that monetary-policy decisions remain insulated from the immediate preferences of the political government.
Markets price institutions as well as interest rates. Businesses making investments with ten- or twenty-year horizons must form expectations about inflation, exchange rates, banking regulation and future monetary policy. Central-bank independence therefore matters not simply as an institutional ideal but as an input into the investor's calculation of risk. Advanced economies reinforce this credibility through different mechanisms-long or staggered terms, specialist monetary-policy committees, formal protections against direct government instruction. The arrangements differ, but the underlying logic is the same: monetary policy works more effectively when economic actors believe its formulation will not fluctuate with short-term political convenience.
POLITICAL RISK: The investment matrix cannot stop at the doors of Bangladesh Bank. The continuing disagreement over implementation of the July National Charter and the referendum has added another layer of uncertainty. The Jamaat-led 11-party alliance has rejected the government's preferred parliamentary route for constitutional amendments and has continued to demand implementation of the referendum verdict through the mechanism it considers mandated by the July Charter. The alliance has also warned of broader political mobilisation if the dispute remains unresolved.
The constitutional merits of that dispute are separate from its economic consequences. Investors do not need to take sides politically to price political uncertainty economically. A long-term investment is a wager on future rules as much as on future sales. The entrepreneur must form expectations about taxation, regulation, import policy, energy pricing, exchange-rate management, credit conditions and the broader institutional environment over the life of the project-and political confrontation adds one more governance premium to that calculation.
Each variable in the matrix alters the others, and their combined effect determines whether a proposed project clears the entrepreneur's hurdle rate. A 50-basis-point monetary easing can be overwhelmed if the matrix simultaneously adds several percentage points of perceived economic, institutional and political risk.
BEYOND A 50-BASIS-POINT SOLUTION: Bangladesh Bank's rate cut was not pointless. Lower borrowing costs help existing borrowers and can encourage new investment when other conditions are favourable. But 50 basis points cannot repair bank balance sheets, eliminate bad loans, recover laundered money, generate reliable energy supplies, improve capacity utilisation, settle institutional disputes, or persuade entrepreneurs that the rules governing tomorrow's investment will resemble those governing today's.
Bangladesh's investment problem is consequently deeper than expensive money. It is a problem of the expected return on productive capital relative to the total price of assuming risk. An entrepreneur facing borrowing costs near 12 per cent, comparatively attractive returns on safer financial assets, weak demand, and substantial banking, exchange-rate, governance and political uncertainties will require an unusually attractive prospective return before committing capital to a long-lived productive asset.
The policy challenge, therefore, is not merely to lower the price of money. It is to raise the expected return to productive investment while simultaneously reducing the matrix of risks surrounding it. Only then can cheaper credit translate reliably into factories, machinery, employment and productive capacity-and Bangladesh can begin climbing out of its investment-confidence trap, rather than cutting rates at its edge.
The writer is a Professor Emeritus of economics at Eastern Michigan University, USA, and former nuclear engineer at Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission.