[🇧🇩] Banking Industry in Bangladesh

Quick Reply ✓ Posted!
Quick Reply ✓ Posted!
[🇧🇩] Banking Industry in Bangladesh
446
21K
More threads by Saif

G Bangladesh Defense

Rate cut vs investment outlook


1790895855266.webp


Bangladesh Bank's recent 50-basis-point reduction in its policy rate, from 10 per cent to 9.5 per cent, was intended to give a weakening economy some breathing room. Yet the signal sent from the central bank has barely changed the calculation being made at the desk of an entrepreneur. The weighted-average lending rate remained close to 12 per cent, while private-sector credit growth had slid to roughly 4.5 per cent by mid-2026-a 33-year low. Bangladesh Bank itself acknowledged weak private investment and deteriorating growth prospects when it lowered the policy rate. [Central bank, however, in its quarterly monetary policy statement, issued on Wednesday, kept the policy repo rate unchanged at 9.50 per cent.]

The conventional explanation is that interest rates remain too high. That is true, but incomplete. Investment is not generated by one interest rate moving up or down. It is determined by a matrix of interacting economic, financial, institutional and political variables. The lending rate is only one cell in that matrix. Expected profitability, unused capacity, energy availability, banking-sector health, past loan defaults, money laundering, exchange-rate expectations, political stability, governance and confidence in monetary-policy independence all enter the same investment calculation. Some reinforce one another; others magnify risks originating elsewhere. The weakness of investment therefore cannot be understood by moving one monetary dial while assuming everything else remains unchanged.

THE RATE THAT REALLY MATTERS: A business does not borrow merely because the lending rate has declined. It borrows when the expected risk-adjusted return from an investment exceeds the financing cost by a sufficiently comfortable margin. With commercial borrowing still around 12 per cent, earning 12 or 13 per cent on a long-term project is plainly not enough. The investor must cover interest expenses, depreciation, taxes, operating risks, possible cost overruns, exchange-rate movements, supply disruptions and the opportunity cost of committing capital to an illiquid investment for years.

There is another comparison that matters just as much. Productive investment must compete with what the same capital can earn elsewhere with considerably less risk. Bangladesh Bank's September Treasury-bill auctions produced yields of about 8.3 per cent on 91-day bills and 8.45 per cent on 182-day bills, while its 91-day reference rate was still above 9 per cent later in September. An entrepreneur contemplating a factory, machinery purchase or ten-year expansion therefore asks a simple question: why accept business, regulatory, exchange-rate and political risks unless the expected return is substantially higher than what relatively safe financial assets already offer?

Under such conditions, an expected return of perhaps 20 to 25 per cent can become a plausible hurdle for some long-term private investments-a risk-free floor near 8-9 per cent, plus a premium wide enough to compensate for years of business, currency and policy uncertainty. This is not a universal numerical threshold; industries, leverage ratios, gestation periods and risk profiles differ substantially. The economic point is more important than the particular number: risky productive capital must promise a return comfortably above both the borrowing rate and the return available from safer financial alternatives. A 50-basis-point reduction in the policy rate does relatively little if the entrepreneur's required return remains many percentage points above it.

THE INVESTMENT MATRIX: The problem becomes clearer once the remaining cells of the matrix are brought into the calculation. Firms operating with unused capacity have little reason to borrow for expansion when their existing plants can produce more without additional fixed investment. Weak demand lowers expected sales and profitability. Energy constraints raise production costs. External supply disruptions add uncertainty to imported inputs, transportation and inventory management. Exchange-rate uncertainty can transform a profitable project on paper into an unprofitable one once imported machinery, intermediate goods and foreign obligations are repriced.

Banking history adds another dimension. Bangladesh enters the present slowdown carrying the legacy of large loan defaults, politically connected lending, money laundering and damaged bank balance sheets. These are not merely records of past misconduct-they shape present expectations. Repeated misallocation of credit changes how both lenders and sound borrowers evaluate the financial system. Banks grow more cautious about genuine commercial risk, even as well-connected borrowers have historically faced different incentives. The result can be a paradox: monetary conditions ease, but productive investment does not respond proportionately.

This is what may be described as an investment-confidence trap. The price of money can decline while the willingness to undertake productive investment remains subdued, because the expected return has not risen sufficiently relative to the total risk surrounding the investment. Monetary easing can make credit cheaper, but it cannot by itself manufacture profitable investment opportunities.

MONETARY CREDIBILITY: Confidence in monetary governance belongs in the same matrix. Md Mostaqur Rahman became governor of Bangladesh Bank in February 2026. Bangladesh Bank describes him as a cost and management accountant with decades of professional experience and extensive involvement with business organisations and financial governance; contemporary reporting identified him as the first businessman to head the central bank.

The issue is not whether a businessman is inherently incapable of managing a central bank. The relevant economic question is one of institutional credibility. The appointment represented a departure from the more conventional background of economists, monetary specialists and career regulators. At a time when confidence in banking governance was already fragile, such a departure inevitably places greater weight on demonstrating that monetary-policy decisions remain insulated from the immediate preferences of the political government.

Markets price institutions as well as interest rates. Businesses making investments with ten- or twenty-year horizons must form expectations about inflation, exchange rates, banking regulation and future monetary policy. Central-bank independence therefore matters not simply as an institutional ideal but as an input into the investor's calculation of risk. Advanced economies reinforce this credibility through different mechanisms-long or staggered terms, specialist monetary-policy committees, formal protections against direct government instruction. The arrangements differ, but the underlying logic is the same: monetary policy works more effectively when economic actors believe its formulation will not fluctuate with short-term political convenience.

POLITICAL RISK: The investment matrix cannot stop at the doors of Bangladesh Bank. The continuing disagreement over implementation of the July National Charter and the referendum has added another layer of uncertainty. The Jamaat-led 11-party alliance has rejected the government's preferred parliamentary route for constitutional amendments and has continued to demand implementation of the referendum verdict through the mechanism it considers mandated by the July Charter. The alliance has also warned of broader political mobilisation if the dispute remains unresolved.

The constitutional merits of that dispute are separate from its economic consequences. Investors do not need to take sides politically to price political uncertainty economically. A long-term investment is a wager on future rules as much as on future sales. The entrepreneur must form expectations about taxation, regulation, import policy, energy pricing, exchange-rate management, credit conditions and the broader institutional environment over the life of the project-and political confrontation adds one more governance premium to that calculation.

Each variable in the matrix alters the others, and their combined effect determines whether a proposed project clears the entrepreneur's hurdle rate. A 50-basis-point monetary easing can be overwhelmed if the matrix simultaneously adds several percentage points of perceived economic, institutional and political risk.

BEYOND A 50-BASIS-POINT SOLUTION: Bangladesh Bank's rate cut was not pointless. Lower borrowing costs help existing borrowers and can encourage new investment when other conditions are favourable. But 50 basis points cannot repair bank balance sheets, eliminate bad loans, recover laundered money, generate reliable energy supplies, improve capacity utilisation, settle institutional disputes, or persuade entrepreneurs that the rules governing tomorrow's investment will resemble those governing today's.

Bangladesh's investment problem is consequently deeper than expensive money. It is a problem of the expected return on productive capital relative to the total price of assuming risk. An entrepreneur facing borrowing costs near 12 per cent, comparatively attractive returns on safer financial assets, weak demand, and substantial banking, exchange-rate, governance and political uncertainties will require an unusually attractive prospective return before committing capital to a long-lived productive asset.

The policy challenge, therefore, is not merely to lower the price of money. It is to raise the expected return to productive investment while simultaneously reducing the matrix of risks surrounding it. Only then can cheaper credit translate reliably into factories, machinery, employment and productive capacity-and Bangladesh can begin climbing out of its investment-confidence trap, rather than cutting rates at its edge.

The writer is a Professor Emeritus of economics at Eastern Michigan University, USA, and former nuclear engineer at Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission.​
 

Digital bank vs digital banking: Competing to bank the unbanked

Mamun Rashid


1791071006170.webp


Last week, a friend called after learning that Bangladesh Bank had given initial approval to five digital banks, including bKash Digital Bank, Boost backed by Robi Axiata, Nova backed by VEON and Square, DK Digital Bank and Kori, approved under the earlier political regime. His question was simple: “I already use my bank’s app. Why do we need another bank without a branch?”

It is a fair question.

Established banks have done commendable work. Citytouch, Astha, SkyBanking, Cellfin, NexusPay, MyPrime and Smart Banking show that customers are comfortable paying bills, transferring funds and managing deposits by phone. But digital banking is largely a new window on an old house. It still carries branch costs, legacy systems and, in too many cases, a mountain of default loans.

A digital bank starts without branches and can potentially lend smarter. Wallet and telecom usage data can help identify people who earn regularly and repay on time. Small loans based on alternative data could carry lower default risks than the concentrated corporate lending that has strained the banking sector. Sceptics point out that several sponsors are telecom and fintech operators rather than traditional bankers. They bring reach and agility. bKash brought mobile financial services to remote villages, while telecom companies built nationwide networks. Banking expertise can be hired, but digital banks need experienced risk managers and technology-focused product teams. Bangladesh Bank should require that balance from the start.

The model will work only if digital banks do more than replicate mobile financial services. MFS providers rely heavily on cash-out, send-money and merchant fees. Digital banks need wider revenue streams, including lending, merchant payments, cards, remittances, insurance, savings and investment products. Transfers within the bank should be free or nearly free, while agent withdrawals should cost less than current wallet charges.

Product design will also matter. Beyond young customers, salaried professionals and corporates, digital banks could serve elderly people through simple pension accounts with Bangla voice assistance, healthcare payments and easy support from children abroad. Students, homemakers, farmers and small shopkeepers also need tailored products. The Tk300 crore paid-up capital should strengthen technology, risk management and lending, not just marketing.

The biggest risk is a closed ecosystem. If a digital bank serves only its parent network’s customers, deposits and risks could become concentrated. Universal interoperability through NPSB and Bangla QR should therefore be enforced across SIMs and wallets. Financial inclusion will also require partnerships with RMG payrolls, microfinance institutions, cooperatives and agricultural networks. Existing agent networks, ATMs and deposit machines should be used where regulations allow. In rural and suburban areas, local agents and voice helplines can help customers move to digital banking.

Purpose-built technology can further distinguish digital banks. Cloud-native systems, behavioural credit scoring, real-time fraud detection, biometric onboarding and open APIs could turn people without formal credit histories into bankable customers.

The regulator’s role remains crucial. Digital banks need a functional sandbox, clear data-hosting rules, access to credit bureaus, liquidity facilities and strong cybersecurity requirements. Consumer protection is equally important, as easy access to digital credit must not become easy debt.

To my friend, my answer remains: You may not need another bank. But millions of Bangladeshis still outside formal finance do. If these institutions keep that purpose at their core, they could open a new chapter in financial inclusion.

The writer is a lead partner with Financial Excellence Limited.​
 

Rebuilding investor trust: developing BD's capital market


1791157234564.webp


Bangladesh today faces challenges in both pillars of its financial system-the banking sector and the capital market.

The banking sector is under significant stress, withhigh levels of non-performing loans, capital inadequacy, liquidity pressures and weak asset quality. At the same time, Bangladesh's capital market suffers from a serious lack of investor confidence.

These two problems must not be solved by transferring the weakness of one financial sector into the other.

The capital market should certainly become a stronger alternative source of long-term financing for Bangladesh's businesses. It must not become a dumping ground for distressed companies, non-performing businesses or habitual loan defaulters seeking public money primarily to repay problematic bank loans.

At its core, a capital market ultimately operates on trust. Investors must believe that financial information is reliable, issuers are genuine businesses, public money will be properly utilised, intermediaries will perform meaningful due diligence, trading will be fair, regulators will act independently and fraud or misuse of investors' money will have consequences.

Normal investment losses are part of market risk. However, losses arising from manipulation, false disclosure, poor-quality issues, misuse of public money, governance failure or regulatory inaction.

The capital market therefore needs a strong firewall between raising capital for productive business and risk transfer from distressed borrowers to public investors.

However, financially distressed but fundamentally viable companies should not be automatically excluded from capital-market access. Where a credible turnaround plan, transparent disclosure, independent due diligence and a sustainable path to recovery can be demonstrated, such companies.

A company should not qualify for public investment merely because banks are unwilling or unable to provide further financing. Before allowing public fundraising, regulators need to assess its business viability, cash flow, debt history, repayment record, sponsors' responsibility and use of new capital. Its banking and credit history should also be appropriately assessed, including CIB Status, classified or rescheduled loans, default history and material outstanding liabilities.

Loan repayment from IPO proceeds requires particular caution. Repaying debt with equity capital is not inherently wrong. A fundamentally sound company may legitimately use part of an IPO to optimise its capital structure, reduce expensive borrowing and improve future profitability.

The governing principle, therefore should be clear: IPO money should create future shareholder value-not merely repair yesterday's balance sheet.

Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) need to ensure quality issuers, protect investors, maintain fair and compliant trading and monitor listed companies. At the same time, Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) requires to undertake a coordinated review of non-operational companies, chronically non-compliant issuers, seriously distressed listed companies with significant unresolved investor or regulatory concerns.

Bangladesh should strengthen mechanisms for restitution, compensation and asset recovery. Genuine business failure must be distinguished from fraud: business failure is an investment risk, fraud is not.

Accountability should also extend across the entire IPO chain, including issuers, merchant banks, issue managers, brokers and other intermediaries.

Alongside, DSE and CSE must become market-development institutions, contributing to issuer monitoring, market surveillance, transparent price discovery, foreign investment, bond-market development and appropriate new products.

A nationwide investor awareness and financial literacy Program should also be established to educate investors on investment risks, corporate disclosures, market conduct, investor rights and responsible investment decisions.

Merchant banks must become true gatekeepers. An issue manager's objective cannot simply be to get IPO approval, then raise the money and collect the fee. Likewise, brokers must protect their investor base. Brokerage houses should increasingly become professional investment-service institutions rather than transaction-generation businesses.

We should also work on developing strong mutual funds and institutional investors. Good companies should be brought to the market. Fundamentally strong businesses in productive sectors should be encouraged to this list.

Continuously monitoring use of public money is also important criterion for retaining investors' trust. Technology can make much of this monitoring systematic, while material deviations should be investigated promptly.

The focus needs to be placed on protecting investors, not artificial prices. Regulators should protect investors against fraud, manipulation, insider abuse, false disclosure and misuse of investor assets.

There is no alternative to coordinating the policies of Bangladesh Bank and BSEC without transferring losses from one sector to another. Bangladesh Bank is responsible for banking-system stability, whereas BSEC is responsible for capital-market integrity and development.

A strong capital market is essential to reduce excessive dependence on bank financing. Long-term industrial expansion should increasingly be financed through a balanced combination ofequity capital, corporate bonds, sukuk, institutional investment and appropriate bank financing.

The fundamental purpose of the capital market is capital formation, mobilising savings and directing long-term capital towards productive enterprises, employment, infrastructure and sustainable economic growth. That is when confidence and liquidity can return, good companies will have greater incentive to list.

In this regard, a national Capital Market Trust-Restoration Program can be initiated. BSEC should lead the coordinated program, with DSE, CSE and appropriate participation from other relevant stakeholders.

For the national way forward, Bangladesh needs a simple financial-market framework on reform, investor protection, recovery, enforcement and fairness. Weak banks and distressed assets should not be shifted to public investors while viable companies and genuine entrepreneurs should be encouraged to raise equity through rigorous due diligence and accountability across the IPO process.

We need to rebuild trust before asking for more money. Bangladesh has entrepreneurs, businesses, substantial savings and millions of potential investors at home and abroad. What the capital market most urgently lacks is confidence.

Investors cannot be repeatedly asked to bring fresh money into a market without demonstrating that existing investors' rights are respected, problematic issuers are addressed, and public money is properly monitored.

The ultimate test of reform should therefore not be tomorrow's index. It should be whether an ordinary investor can confidently say: "I trust the information, I trust that my rights are protected and I am willing to invest again."

That is when confidence and liquidity can return, good companies will have to incentive to list, and Bangladesh's capital market can become a genuine engine of capital formation, employment and sustainable economic growth.

The writer is banking, capital market and financial analyst.​
 

Banks sink deeper into distress
Central bank submits report to JS body on finance ministry

Moinul Haque . Dhaka 05 October, 2026, 00:29


1791159518753.webp



Financial distress in Bangladesh’s banking sector is deepening despite a series of reform and rescue measures, exposing deep-rooted fragility that continues to undermine depositor confidence and the broader economy.

A Bangladesh Bank report placed before the parliamentary standing committee on the finance ministry on Sunday showed soaring non-performing loans, mounting losses and capital shortages across the sector.

The report also highlighted banks’ growing dependence on central bank support, with asset quality and profitability under severe strain.

BB recommendations

- Quarterly reviews of banks with classified loans above 10pc

- Recovery action plans and NPL Resolution Strategy

- Legal review of wilful defaulter lists

- Tighter limits on single-borrower exposure

Economists said weak corporate governance, new influential syndicates and banks’ growing dependence on BB support were making it harder to restore financial discipline and implement meaningful reforms.

They said that the sector was facing a deepening financial crisis as major loan defaulters remained largely untouched by effective recovery and legal action, while repeated rescheduling failed to bring in funds.

The BB report showed that NPLs across the banking system exceeded Tk 6,06,555 crore as of 30 June 2026, which accounted for 31.41 per cent of total loans, underscoring the scale of the asset-quality crisis.

The sector’s profitability has also deteriorated sharply. Despite recording Tk 789 crore in operating profit, banks incurred a collective net loss of Tk 8,417 crore after accounting for provisioning, credit losses and other expenses.

The cumulative losses of the 22 loss-making banks reached Tk 2,53,938 crore.

The figures expose how little operating profit means when banks are forced to absorb the consequences of bad lending, weak asset quality and inadequate provisioning.

The banking sector faced a provision shortfall of Tk 2,22,980 crore against the required Tk 4,80,039 crore, having maintained provisions of Tk 2,57,004 crore.

Private commercial banks accounted for Tk 1,48,385 crore of the deficit, while state-owned banks faced a shortfall of Tk 75,639 crore.

Foreign and specialised banks maintained provision surpluses.

Policy Exchange Bangladesh chairman Masrur Reaz said the sector’s continued deterioration stemmed from past governance failures, the discovery of previously concealed NPLs through audits and a lack of decisive corrective measures.

He said the failure to resolve 10 distressed banks accounting for around 70 per cent of total NPLs, enact legislation for asset-management companies and implement timely restructuring had hindered recovery, leaving the sector’s average capital adequacy ratio negative, the lowest in South Asia.

Masrur added that despite recognition of the crisis and extensive policy discussions, concrete action remained lacking.

Institute for Inclusive Finance and Development executive director Mustafa K Mujeri told New Age that banking reforms would continue to fail without strict legal enforcement and genuine corporate governance.

He said there had been little progress in recovering loans from major defaulters, while repeated rescheduling had failed to ensure actual recovery and legal action remained largely unimplemented.

Mujeri said replacing bank directors had also failed to improve governance, with new board members forming fresh syndicates instead of bringing meaningful changes.

The BB report presented in the standing committee meeting indicated that high classified loans, provisioning requirements, capital shortages and poor asset quality were weighing heavily on banks’ earning capacity.

The central bank has also had to provide massive emergency support to keep troubled banks afloat. It has extended Tk 84,946 crore in emergency loans as the lender of last resort, with the facilities being rolled over after interest payments.

The continued reliance on central bank funding highlights the persistent financial weakness of these banks and their inability to address their underlying problems.

The central bank has also introduced a special exit facility for borrowers affected by factors beyond their control, allowing them to settle their entire liabilities in a single payment.

Separately, a five-member screening committee has provided policy support to nearly 300 business groups. The initiative is aimed at restructuring debts, reviving viable businesses and accelerating loan recovery.

The central bank also laid out short-, medium- and long-term plans to contain the NPL crisis.

These include quarterly reviews of banks with classified loans above 10 per cent, recovery action plans, an NPL Resolution Strategy, expected credit loss-based credit-risk rules, legal review of wilful defaulter lists, recovery incentives and benefits for good borrowers.

It also planned tighter limits on how much a single borrower can obtain from the banking system and legal measures to prevent borrowers from using court proceedings to stall loan recovery.

The central bank is considering two measures to reduce the pressure on banks. It is considering requiring financing of more than Tk 500 crore to be raised through bonds rather than bank loans and creating a legal framework to allow private asset-management companies to take over distressed assets from banks, according to the report presented in the meeting.

The meeting was chaired by committee chairman Mushfiqur Rahman and attended by committee members, including finance minister Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury, chief whip Nurul Islam Moni, Jalal Uddin, Moinul Islam Khan, Shafiqur Rahman Kiron, Saiful Alam, Syed Zainul Abedin and Abul Hasnat.

Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Jamaat lawmaker Saiful Alam said his party had proposed measures to restore discipline in the financial sector, including reducing the number of banks. Bangladesh, with around 63 banks, did not need so many financial institutions for its size.

He also proposed requiring BB approval before bank chairmen or boards could remove managing directors, additional managing directors or deputy managing directors.

Saiful said conventional audits were inadequate and called for forensic audits to determine banks’ actual NPLs, deposits and capital.

Meeting sources said Hasnat Abdullah called for steps to expedite the disposal of 74,679 cases involving loan recovery and those pending with the High Court, including the formation of separate benches if necessary.

Hasnat, a National Citizen Party lawmaker, also proposed sweeping reforms to address the NPL crisis.

He called for independent national credit scoring, strict enforcement of the 90-day loan-classification rule, suspension of relaxed rescheduling facilities for loans above Tk 10 crore and personal accountability for false credit reporting.​
 

BB takes short, long-term steps to curb NPLs


1791675455037.webp


The Bangladesh Bank has undertaken short, medium, and long-term measures to reduce non-performing loans (NPLs) alongside strengthening credit discipline and improving governance in the country's banking sector.

The central bank has taken a number of measures to accelerate recovery of classified loans, strengthen banks' credit risk management and establish a more disciplined lending culture, according to a report presented at the fourth meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Finance.

The committee, at its fourth meeting recently held at the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban with its chairman Mushfiqur Rahman, MP, in the chair, stressed ensuring transparency, accountability and economic stability in the country's financial institutions, particularly banks, reports BSS.

As part of its short-term plan covering one year, Bangladesh Bank will hold quarterly discussions with the senior management of banks where the classified loan ratio exceeds 10 per cent. The discussions will identify obstacles to loan recovery and require the concerned banks to prepare action plans to address those problems.

The central bank will also review the recovery progress of the top 20 defaulted or classified borrowers at every bankers' meeting.

It plans to formulate guidelines on NPL resolution strategy for banks with high classified-loan ratios and update the Credit Risk Management Guideline.

The central bank also plans to implement loan classification and provisioning based on Expected Credit Loss (ECL) in line with IFRS 9. The measure aims to improve governance in banks' loan management and mitigate credit risks.

The legal aspects of publishing lists of defaulted and willful defaulters are also under review.

When sought comments, World Bank Division Director for Bangladesh and Bhutan Jean Pesme said the discussion aims to encourage the progressive exit of forbearance. "We think that more needs to be done on the NPL to accelerate the NPL resolution mechanism by creating more incentives for the banks and the debtors to find a solution."

Under the medium-term plan ranging between two to three years, Bangladesh Bank will formulate a policy to provide special allowances to officials who work to recover classified loans and encourage them to intensify recovery efforts.

It will also review and update the existing policy for identifying and providing incentives to good borrowers - those who regularly repay their loans - with the aim of developing a sound credit culture in the country.

Under its long-term strategy ranging four to five years to contain the rising volume of defaulted loans, Bangladesh Bank plans to strengthen the overall credit management framework of banks and ensure greater discipline in loan sanctioning, monitoring, recovery and classification.

The long-term measures focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that contribute to the accumulation of non-performing loans rather than relying only on recovery drives after loans become classified.

The need for such long-term reforms has become more urgent as defaulted loans reached Tk 5,81,237.56 crore, or 31.41 per cent of total loans, as of June 30, 2026, up from Tk 5,64,105.64 crore, or 30.92 per cent, on March 31, 2026. The amount increased by Tk 17,131.92 crore, while the ratio rose by 0.49 percentage points during the three-month period.

In essence, the long-term strategy seeks to shift the banking sector from reactive recovery of already-defaulted loans toward preventive credit risk management, stronger governance, effective recovery mechanisms and greater accountability in lending.

The presentation also outlined progress in amending and modernising laws considered necessary for strengthening banking governance and recovering defaulted loans.

The draft Bank Companies (Amendment) Act, 2026 seeks to strengthen governance in the banking sector. A revised draft was sent to the Financial Institutions Division on August 24, 2026, following decisions taken at an inter-ministerial/stakeholder meeting on April 22 and instructions issued by the division on April 26.

The latest inter-ministerial/stakeholder meeting was held on September 20, 2026.

The authorities are also working to enact the Artha Rin Adalat (Amendment) Act, 2026, to improve loan recovery and related activities in the banking sector.

An inter-ministerial meeting was held at the Law and Justice Division of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs on January 7, 2026, to discuss the modernisation of the law.

Earlier, the Financial Institutions Division formed a committee headed by an additional secretary on January 19, 2026, to review the draft. The committee prepared a draft proposal and sent it to the Law and Justice Division on January 26, 2026, for necessary action.

A separate committee headed by an additional secretary of the Financial Institutions Division is currently working on preparation of the draft of the amended law.

The authorities are also working on the Distressed Asset Management Act (DAMA), 2026 to improve the recovery of defaulted loans in the banking sector.

In addition, the proposed Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act, 2026 seeks to modernise the existing Insolvency Act, 1997, align the insolvency regime with international best practices, strengthen the overall bankruptcy framework and support financial institutions in managing credit risks.

With assistance from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, the English draft of the new insolvency law has been finalised in a modern format.

The authorities have requested IFC's assistance in translating the draft into Bangla. After finalisation of the Bangla version, it will be sent to the Financial Institutions Division for further action.​
 

PKDefense Forums: Country-by-Country Military Discussions

Log In Register Forums