[🇧🇩] Budget For 2026-2027

[🇧🇩] Budget For 2026-2027
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G Bangladesh Defense

Delivering the promises

Sabbir Ahmad

Published :
Jun 26, 2026 00:57
Updated :
Jun 26, 2026 00:57

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On the morning after the budget, Salma Begum unlocked her small grocery shop in Jatrabari as the radio replayed fragments of the finance minister's speech. She paid little attention to the headline figure. Instead, her focus remained on the price of a litre of soybean oil, her son's college fees, and the interest on a loan for her small business, all far removed from the trillions discussed in Parliament. Like her, most citizens see a budget not as what is announced in Parliament but as what it means at a shop counter, a classroom, and a hospital bed over the next twelve months. Since the speech, as economists and business chambers scrutinised the fine print, the conversation has rightly shifted from the size of the promise to how to keep it.

GRAND AMBITION, HARD ARITHMETIC: The FY2026-27 budget, presented on June 11 by the finance minister, is the largest in Bangladesh's history. At Tk 9.38 trillion (lakh crore), or 13.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), it represents a 19 per cent expansion over the revised budget of the previous year. On the road to a trillion-dollar economy by 2034, it sets an optimistic target of 6.5 per cent GDP growth and 7.5 per cent inflation.

The heart of this historic blueprint is unmistakably people-centric. Education spending is surging to Tk 1.36 trillion (roughly 2 per cent of GDP), while health funding nearly doubles to Tk 694.09 billion. The social safety net expands to Tk 1.44 trillion, anchored by a flagship Family Card paying Tk 2,500 a month to 4.10 million women-headed households. For ordinary consumers, withholding tax on sixty essential commodities, from rice and edible oil to onions and sugar, falls from up to 5 per cent down to a uniform 0.5 per cent, while the tax-free income threshold climbs to Tk 375,000. These macro choices speak directly to Salma Begum's needs at that shop counter.

Ambition, however, must be matched by arithmetic. In its June 12 review, the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) noted that the 6.5 per cent growth target contrasts with a provisional growth rate of only 4.14 per cent. Reaching that goal would require domestic investment to become far more productive quickly. The bigger challenge is private investment. The budget projects only a slight rise, from 21.2 per cent to 21.3 per cent of GDP, but even that modest increase would require an additional Tk 1.65 trillion in private capital. With private-sector credit growing at just 4.75 per cent against a 9.4 per cent target, the gap between ambition and reality is clear. This may not be a fatal flaw in the budget but highlights where the delivery plan must be strongest.

EARNING THROUGH SUSTAINABLE REFORM: The single most consequential number in the budget is the revenue target. The National Board of Revenue (NBR) must collect Tk 6.04 trillion. Given that collections previously hovered around Tk 3.69 trillion and are tracking towards roughly Tk 4.0 trillion this cycle, the state must find an extra Tk 2.0 trillion in 12 months.

Tax professionals are clear about the challenge. One expert noted that sources of this incremental revenue remain unclear. Bangladesh has about 12.8 million registered taxpayers, but only about 4 million file income tax returns. The credible path forward cannot involve squeezing the same compliant shops or salaried workers harder. That would deepen the unfairness people like Salma Begum already feel. Instead, the NBR must pull the untaxed economy into the net. Scaling up quarterly online VAT returns, expanding digital invoicing, and tightening mandatory identification linked to bank accounts are ways to do this.

The budget's most contested provision deserves an honest word. The decision to allow undisclosed income tied to land and flat transactions to be regularised has been defended by NBR. They see it as a narrow disclosure mechanism to address distorted property records, not a blanket amnesty. A credible revenue strategy must treat these schemes as a one-time correction of property valuation records, not a recurring habit.

THE EXECUTION GAP: If raising funds is the steepest hill, spending them efficiently is the most critical test. This is where the finance minister's candour is refreshing. He openly acknowledged that development spending in the first ten months reached a dismal 40.7 per cent of the program, an admission rarely made in a budget speech.

This gridlock repeats at the top. Of the 20 flagship mega-projects holding nearly a fifth of the development budget, none are expected to finish on schedule. Rooppur is at 68.3 per cent completion after nearly a decade, while a vital metro line is at 5.8 per cent after six years. Even more telling, the number of projects with a 'token allocation' of a lakh taka or less has climbed to 77. This indicates that the project pipeline is cluttered with entries that lack genuine financial commitment for the current cycle.

The remedy is not more money but more discipline. It points to a clear direction: fewer projects finished faster. Spreading a Tk 3 trillion development programme across more than a thousand projects virtually guarantees slow progress. Instead, concentrating those funds on works ready with land or resources acquired and designs finalised would better stimulate the economy.

The deeper fix is to pay for outcomes rather than invoices. Each disbursement should be tied directly to a functioning clinic, a trained teacher, or a completed section of road, all of which are verified and recorded digitally. India offers a working template for the "Direct Benefit Transfer" system, which routes welfare straight into bank accounts, saving documented Rs 3.48 trillion by eliminating leakages and ghost beneficiaries. Bangladesh's own Farmer Card initiatives reach 4.1 million women and 4.25 million marginal farmers via mobile banking. Built on this digital logic, these targeted programmes could become the most efficient use of money this state has ever made.

FINANCING WITHOUT A SAFETY NET: One vital feature of this budget has drawn less attention than it deserves: the government intends to finance a Tk 2.43 trillion deficit, 3.6 per cent of GDP, by relying on roughly $11 billion in foreign assistance. Notably, it plans to do this without an IMF programme. This is a bold statement of confidence. It carries real advantages, sparing the country a fresh round of externally imposed austerity conditions.

But walking away from the fund also removes a crucial cushion. Financing this layout relies heavily on foreign borrowing of Tk 1.55 trillion. Much of this is concessional. This approach limits domestic bank borrowing to Tk 1.12 trillion. Such restraint may leave vital banking liquidity for factory owners in Narayanganj or software founders in Banani. But concessional dollars arrive on the lender's timetable, not ours. By forgoing an IMF backstop, our internal delivery plan must remain flawless.

Health services, education stipends, and safety-net disbursements must be ring-fenced as untouchable regardless of the quarter. These are the lines that reach Salma Begum's family directly.

Physical infrastructure, by contrast, can breathe: works nearing completion that unlock immediate returns receive funding first, while long-term projects can be paced against actual quarterly revenue collections. The Tk 600 billion stimulus package, with its 6 per cent interest subsidy and promise of 2.50 million jobs, can powerfully amplify this momentum. However, it will only succeed if credit flows through the banking sector on pure commercial merit rather than political connection. This is not a retreat; it is the discipline required to protect the budget's promises from the risks that underlie them.

For Salma Begum, success will not be measured in trillions or lakh crores. It will be measured by the real-world cost of restocking her shelves, the quality of her son's education, and the actual affordability of credit to expand her business. The FY27 budget provides the government with both the resources and the mandate to address these ground realities. What the state must now ensure is the unforgiving standard of execution: honest targets, digital pipelines, finished projects, and the courage to prioritise. If it succeeds, this budget will be remembered not only as the largest in our nation's history, but as the one that finally taught us how to deliver.

Dr Sabbir Ahmad is an engineering and corporate leader with extensive global experience in digital connectivity, energy infrastructure, and sustainable development.​
 

FY2026-27 budget targets: A bridge too far?

Mustafizur Rahman

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FILE VISUAL: REHNUMA PROSHOON

In the budget for FY2026-27, the finance minister has proposed several important departures and new measures that deserve both attention and appreciation. These include some significant changes or initiatives in fiscal policies and measures, attempts to reset allocative priorities, and deregulation in several areas. The proposed budget has significantly increased allocations for health, education, and social safety nets, and set out plans to roll out targeted measures to stimulate investment and improve ease of doing business.

The above is reflected in measures to rationalise VAT and import duties, convert taxes deducted at source into advance income tax to be subsequently adjusted with payable taxes, widen the remit of bonded warehouse facilities and use of bank instruments to cover most export-oriented sectors, and calibrate import duties on intermediate and finished goods in support of import-substituting and export-oriented industries. Several measures have been proposed to encourage innovation, incentivise the creative economy, encourage youth-led entrepreneurship, and promote investment in IT-enabled services.

Whether these measures and signals would translate into real investment, supply-side response, job creation, lowering of the inflation rate, and attaining the government’s aspiration to graduate to a welfare state built on high economic growth, social inclusiveness, and environment-friendly development process remains to be seen. Much will hinge on the implementation of the budgetary proposals and their delivery to produce expected outcomes. This is where the policymakers are likely to face formidable challenges, originating both from within the budgetary framework and from institutional factors.

To illustrate this point, one of the budget’s key weaknesses concerns the FY2025-26 benchmarks against which the FY2026-27 targets have been set. Several instances may be cited in this connection. For example, while the BBS projection of GDP growth for the outgoing FY2025-26 is 4.14 percent, the corresponding figure cited in the budget is 5 percent. So to reach the target of 6.5 percent planned for FY2026-27, GDP will have to actually grow by 2.4 percentage points, and not 1.5 percentage points as envisaged in the budget. Similarly, revenue income for FY2025-26 has been estimated at Tk 5,88,000 crore, but the actual figure for the July-April period of FY2025-26 is only about Tk 3,27,000 crore. This will necessitate a 221 percent rise in revenue collection during the last two months of May and June 2026 compared to the corresponding two months of FY2024-25.

Thus, if the FY2026-27 revenue generation target is to be attained, the growth of revenue must be higher than the 18 percent mentioned in the budget speech. The growth rate will need to be perhaps as high as 35 to 40 percent, a formidable task by any count.

Moreover, BBS figures show that the average inflation rate for the July-May period of FY2025-26 was 8.63 percent. However, the budget mentions a relatively lower average inflation rate for the year: 7 percent. Although export growth for July-April, FY2025-26 is negative, at -2.5 percent, the budget envisages a growth rate of 9 percent in FY2025-26! Indeed, exports will have to grow by an impossible 155 percent in June compared to the previous year if the growth mentioned in the budget is to be attained in FY2025-26. The projection of remittance flows is also quite surprising. During the first 11 months of FY2025-26, $32.76 billion remittance has been received—a 19 percent growth over FY2024-25, averaging almost $3.0 billion each month. Yet, the budget’s projection for FY2025-26 is only 10.1 percent growth from the $30.328 billion of remittance received in FY2024-25. This would mean remittances in June 2026 would be a meagre $0.6 billion when in June 2025 the amount was $2.8 billion, or a negative growth of 78.6 percent.

These misalignments of key performance indicators for FY2025-26, used as reference points for designing the FY2026-27 budget, call into question the veracity and soundness of the performance targets set out for the upcoming fiscal year. The newly elected government had a reason and an opportunity to depart from this budget tradition often followed by previous political governments, too. BNP was at the helm of power only during the fourth quarter of FY2025-26 (March-June, 2026) and didn’t have control over attaining the FY2025-26 budget targets. As such, a more realistic baseline would have allowed it to set more attainable macroeconomic targets, but the government didn’t choose to take advantage of this opportunity.

As noted before, the quality of budget implementation will determine whether investment is stimulated, inflation is reduced, and new jobs are created as planned. Here, three factors would be crucial: (a) institutional capacity to deliver the budgetary targets, (b) quality of macroeconomic management, and (c) good governance and accountability in all spheres of budget implementation.

Reduction of import duties and waiver of VAT and advance income tax on many items would no doubt have revenue implications. Against this backdrop, full-scale digitalisation, based on interoperable and integrated systems, should be implemented to attain the high revenue mobilisation target of Tk 6,95,000 crore. Many countries have established a QR-based and cashless system of transactions, which Bangladesh should adopt if the tax base is to be broadened and income and expenditure statements are to be reconciled.

While astute budgetary proposals, resource allocations, and fiscal measures are necessary, they are not sufficient for implementation to produce the expected results. For that, a conducive business environment, broader macroeconomic management, and institutional capacity to implement the proposals and measures are required.

Concerned institutions, therefore, must have the capacity to manage resources, ensure allocative efficiency, and attain expected outcomes and impacts. For example, the education and health sectors have been allocated significantly higher allocations in the FY2026-27 budget compared to any time in the past. This is justified. However, experience shows that these sectors have previously struggled to spend even much lower allocations. Thus, the ability to spend the newly allocated resources by ensuring good value for money is a must to achieve the education and health sector-related outcomes on the ground.

Close involvement of local communities and service-receivers in implementing the social safety net programmes, including the Family Cards and Farmers Cards; transparency and accountability in resource utilisation; and an effective system of grievance redressal are necessary to implement these programmes effectively. A welcome initiative in this context is the budget’s promise to set up digital platforms and dashboards for monitoring progress and redressing grievances.

Curtailing inflation will depend, to a large extent, on stimulating supply-side response through higher investment. But of no less importance will be the quality of market management. Overseeing, monitoring, and managing the various players operating between customs points and retail points, and between farm gate and consumers, will be crucial. Public institutions tasked with these responsibilities will need to play a proactive role here.

There is hope that the government will employ its best effort to ensure that the allocated money is actually spent on the ground. In case revenue mobilisation cannot reach the very high growth target set in the budget, the government might be compelled to borrow more than it was envisaged in the budget. Higher domestic borrowings could crowd out the private sector. Higher foreign borrowings are already creating a pressure of increased external debt servicing obligations in the budget. Already, a significant amount of money is being allocated in the budget against repayment of domestic and external debt; this amount is expected to rise over the near-term future. The debt situation should be kept under active monitoring and periodic review to reduce the attendant risks of falling into the dreaded debt trap.

In the 1977 film titled A Bridge Too Far, directed by Sir Richard Attenborough, the heroic objectives of the Allied mission could not be achieved because of delays, coordination failure, and unexpected resistance. One hopes that the present government will rise to the occasion and confront prevailing formidable challenges successfully to accomplish the mission, get to the bridge, and attain the lofty goals set out in the FY2026-27 budget.

Professor Mustafizur Rahman is distinguished fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).​
 

Budget FY27: Recovery, restoration, reconstruction!

M M Musa

Published :
Jun 27, 2026 23:59
Updated :
Jun 27, 2026 23:59

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On June 11 2026, Finance Minister Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury MP stood before parliament and announced a budget Bangladesh had never seen before: Tk 9.38 trillion, or roughly US$ 85 billion. The number is staggering. But numbers often hide more than they reveal.

This budget arrives at a critical moment. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which returned to power on February 12, 2026, governs an economy that has been quietly unravelling for several years. Growth has fallen. Revenues have missed targets by alarming margins. The banking sector is burdened by non-performing loans at levels that would trigger emergency reviews in most comparable countries. In this context, announcing a big budget is either strategic boldness or political theatre. The difference between the two is everything.

The 3R Strategy: The government has branded its approach the 3R Strategy: Recovery and Stabilisation, Restoration, and Reconstruction for Acceleration. The sequencing reflects sound instinct. One cannot rebuild if the foundations are sliding, and one cannot accelerate if the engine is not repaired. In that sense, the framework draws intelligently on structural adjustment thinking, though the government does not use that language.

Jeffrey Sachs, in The End of Poverty, argued that countries trapped in cycles of underdevelopment need coordinated, simultaneous investments across multiple sectors, such as health, education, infrastructure, and governance, and that piecemeal reform tends to fail because it leaves other bottlenecks in place. The 3R strategy has some of this logic, at least on paper.

Let’s compare with the experiences of a few nations. South Korea’s bold industrial policy of the 1960s and 1970s, and Taiwan’s export-led growth model were driven by extraordinary state capacity and tight feedback loops between policy, implementation, and correction. During Rwanda’s post-genocide reconstruction, institutional rebuilding was not an aspiration but a precondition for everything else. In these cases, coherent frameworks worked because the state could actually execute them. Bangladesh’s record on execution is mixed.

Trillion-Dollar Vision: The government’s vision of a US$ 1 trillion economy by 2034 has captured public imagination. Reaching the target from roughly US$ 450 billion within eight years requires sustained annual GDP growth of 8–9 per cent. This is not impossible. China and South Korea achieved it. Vietnam has been edging towards it. But none did so while carrying non-performing loan (NPL) ratios of 30 per cent, negative banking sector capital adequacy, and a revenue-to-GDP ratio which is among the lowest in South Asia.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, in Why Nations Fail, make a compelling case that economic institutions, not resources, not geography, not culture, are the primary determinant of long-run development trajectories. Their central insight is that extractive institutions, which concentrate power and divert rents to the politically connected, can persist for decades while producing short-term growth before eventually collapsing. The challenge for Bangladesh is not just to grow, but to restructure the institutional foundations that have produced endemic corruption, regulatory capture, and a financial sector systematically looted. A vision of a trillion-dollar economy means little if the institutions governing that economy remain unreformed.

Human Capital: The FY2026–27 education allocation of Tk 1.36 trillion, about 2 per cent of GDP, is a meaningful improvement from 1.39 per cent in the prior year. The health budget is Tk 694.09 billion, rising from 0.58 per cent to 1.01 per cent of GDP. These are real increases and deserve acknowledgement.

But perspective is necessary. Bangladesh’s education spending at 2 per cent of GDP remains below Vietnam’s 4.5 per cent, Malaysia’s 4.2 per cent, and far below the UNESCO benchmark of 4–6 per cent. The health figure of 1 per cent compares poorly with India at 1.8 per cent, Sri Lanka at 1.6 per cent, and Nepal at 1.4 per cent. The increases are in the right direction, but quantitatively insufficient for a country with Bangladesh’s human development deficit.

Amartya Sen’s capabilities framework, arguably the most influential development paradigm of the past 40 years, insists that development is about expanding what people can do and be. Nutrition, early childhood development, secondary retention rates, teacher quality, and healthcare access in rural areas are the substance of this approach. Announcing budget lines is necessary but not sufficient. The question Bangladesh must answer is: what does Tk 1.36 trillion in education actually produce? If it produces the same rote-learning outcomes with the same attendance crises in government schools, the figure is misleading. Recruiting 100,000 health workers, 80 per cent of who are female, reflects genuine thoughtfulness. Community health worker programmes in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and rural India consistently show that female health workers outperform their male counterparts in maternal health, child immunisation, and uptake of preventive care. The key question is whether effective recruitment, training, supervision, and retention systems support this initiative. In Bangladesh, announcements tend to outlast implementations.

Social Protection: The social protection allocation of Tk 1.44 trillion, 2.1 per cent of GDP, is the largest in Bangladesh’s history. The Family Card programme, targeting 4.1 million women-headed households with monthly cash transfers, reflects the mainstream of contemporary development thinking. The evidence base for cash transfers is now extensive and largely positive: Bolsa Família in Brazil, the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, BISP in Pakistan, and India’s PM-KISAN have all demonstrated that conditional or unconditional cash transfers, when well-targeted, can reduce poverty, improve nutrition, and increase school enrolment.

However, targeting quality is everything. Bangladesh’s history of social safety net leakage, politically driven beneficiary lists, elite capture at the union parishad level, and exclusion of the poorest due to documentation barriers is well known. A programme reaching 4.1 million households is impressive on paper. Whether those are the right households depends entirely on the quality of the beneficiary registry, the integrity of the verification system, and the political independence of the selection process.

Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee, in Poor Economics, repeatedly emphasise that the failure of well-designed programmes is rarely conceptual; it is almost always operational. The gap between the intervention as designed and the intervention as experienced by a poor woman in a remote coastal district of Bangladesh is where development dreams go to die.

Energy: The budget’s energy strategy reflects genuine forward thinking. Renewable energy’s share of the generation mix is targeted at 20 per cent by 2030. Investments in offshore gas exploration, LNG terminal development at Matarbari, and supply diversification address Bangladesh’s vulnerability to global energy price shocks. The Tk 400 billion allocated annually for energy subsidies is a fiscal pressure point the government correctly identifies as unsustainable in the long term. Geo-political context amplifies these risks. Middle East instability threatens both remittance flows and energy supply chains, simultaneously a double vulnerability that no budget can fully hedge against. Remittances are Bangladesh’s most reliable foreign-exchange earner; their disruption would cascade into import capacity, reserve adequacy, and exchange rate stability. Bangladesh pursues admirable renewable energy ambitions, but faces a compressed timeline, an insufficient grid, and an unpredictable regulatory environment for private investors.

Implementation: Bangladesh has a long history of well-designed policies that encounter institutional friction. These policies often emerge from the system as something unrecognisable. The Single Window clearance mechanism, mandatory online approvals within seven days, and simplified business registration are sensible reforms. Similar reforms have been announced in various forms for nearly a decade.

What is different this time? The honest answer is it is too early to know. The BNP’s landslide mandate creates political space for reform. Previously, coalition constraints blocked this space. But political will at the top does not automatically translate into bureaucratic compliance in the middle and operational layers of government. Most reforms live or die in these layers.

A Final Assessment: This budget is not cynical. It is not a crude vote-buying exercise dressed up in development language. The 3R strategy is coherent; the sectoral priorities are defensible; the commitment to human capital, however insufficient, is real. A government that doubles the health budget and significantly increases education spending is responding, at least partially, to the right pressures.

But there are reasons for caution beyond the standard caveats about implementation capacity. The macroeconomic assumptions are overly optimistic and risky. The banking sector crisis is referenced but not treated with the urgency it demands. A 30 per cent NPL ratio is not a background condition to manage around; it is a crisis requiring aggressive resolution, including write-offs, asset recovery, and potentially painful restructuring of state-owned banks. Without banking sector reform, no other part of the fiscal programme works as intended.

What this budget ultimately reflects is a government that understands the diagnosis but is more cautious than the disease warrants in prescribing the cure. Real recovery, in Bangladesh’s case, requires not just larger expenditure envelopes but a fundamental renegotiation of the relationship between the state and its citizens — one built on accountability, transparency, and the rule of law rather than political patronage and institutional capture.

M M Musa is a development practitioner and researcher.​
 

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