[🇧🇩] Chicken Neck/Siliguri Corridor

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[🇧🇩] Chicken Neck/Siliguri Corridor
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Bangladesh Tries Creating Thorns In India’s Achilles Heal, A Region Defended By Rafale, BrahMos, S-400
By Air Marshal Anil Khosla -April 14, 2025

During his four-day visit to China from March 26 to 29, 2025, the Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government, Muhammad Yunus, made provocative statements against India.

Speaking in Beijing, Yunus referred to India’s northeastern states, known as the “Seven Sisters,” as a “landlocked region” with “no way to reach the ocean.”

He positioned Bangladesh as this region’s “only guardian of the ocean.” He suggested that this geographical situation presented a “huge possibility” for China to expand its economy through Bangladesh.

He proposed that China could “build things, produce things, market things, bring things to China, and distribute them to the rest of the world,” effectively framing Bangladesh as a strategic gateway for Chinese economic influence.

These offensive remarks triggered strong reactions in India. They underscore the “persistent vulnerability narrative” associated with India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor, or “Chicken’s Neck,” a narrow strip connecting the Northeast to the rest of the country.

These statements reflect a deeper strategic consideration and longstanding agenda. Yunus’s pitch came during a time of strained India-Bangladesh relations, following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024 and his decision to prioritize China over India for his first state visit.

His comments were seen as an attempt to leverage Bangladesh’s geographic position to attract Chinese investment. This shift in Dhaka’s alignment toward Beijing potentially complicates regional security dynamics, especially given the Northeast’s proximity to the sensitive Chicken’s Neck corridor.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi later cautioned Yunus during a meeting on April 4, 2025, at the BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand, urging him to avoid rhetoric that “vitiates the environment” and emphasizing the need for constructive bilateral ties.

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File Image: Muhammad Yunus

Political Upheaval & Anti-India Sentiment

The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government marked a turning point in Bangladesh’s domestic and foreign policy. Hasina’s administration fostered strong ties with India, emphasizing economic cooperation, security partnerships, and infrastructure development.

However, her ouster, driven by student protests and political unrest, brought to power an interim government that has adopted a less conciliatory tone toward India. Anti-India utterances have gained traction under the new regime.

Additionally, public and political discourse in Bangladesh has seen a rise in criticism of India, often centered on issues like water-sharing disputes and perceived interference in Bangladeshi politics. These sentiments are partly rooted in historical grievances and domestic pressures to assert sovereignty but have strained bilateral ties.

Cozying Up To China

Bangladesh’s deepening relationship with China is a significant development under the interim government. Beijing has long sought to expand its influence in South Asia, and Bangladesh’s strategic location makes it a key partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Yunus government has actively courted Chinese investment, signaling a shift from Hasina’s cautious balancing act between India and China.

China’s involvement in Bangladesh spans infrastructure, trade, and defense. In March 2025, Dhaka welcomed Chinese participation in multiple projects, including modernizing Mongla Port and expanding the China Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram.

Bilateral agreements signed during Yunus’s visit to Beijing included cooperation in the blue economy, maritime dialogue, and a potential Free Trade Agreement. These moves indicate Bangladesh’s intent to leverage China’s economic might to bolster its development agenda.

However, this pivot toward China has raised eyebrows in New Delhi. India views China’s growing presence in Bangladesh as part of a broader strategy to encircle it through the so-called “String of Pearls” – a network of strategic assets in the Indo-Pacific.

The shift is particularly concerning given Bangladesh’s proximity to India’s northeastern region, which is connected to the mainland by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, colloquially known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” India is concerned about the potential threat of China’s growing presence in Bangladesh.

The Teesta River Project: A Geopolitical Flashpoint

The Teesta River, which originates in Sikkim, flows through West Bengal, and enters Bangladesh, has long been a point of contention between India and Bangladesh.

The river is vital for irrigation and livelihoods in both countries, but disagreements over water sharing have persisted for decades. Bangladesh accuses India of restricting water flow through upstream barrages, particularly during the dry season, affecting millions in its northern districts like Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, and Kurigram.

The Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, estimated at $1 billion, has emerged as a new arena for Sino-Indian rivalry. Under Hasina, Bangladesh had leaned toward India for the project, with New Delhi expressing interest in funding it to counter China’s earlier proposal.

However, the interim government has shifted course, inviting Chinese participation. In February 2025, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Environment announced plans to collaborate with China on a master plan for the river’s conservation, involving dredging, embankment construction, and township development. This decision was framed as a response to public demand, with hearings held to build consensus.

For India, Chinese involvement in the Teesta project is alarming. The river’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor means that Chinese personnel or infrastructure near the border could provide Beijing with strategic leverage.

India fears that data on water flow or the presence of Chinese engineers could be used to monitor or influence the region’s security dynamics. The project’s geopolitical implications underscore the delicate balance Bangladesh must strike between economic development and regional stability.

The Lalmonirhat Airfield Project: A Security Concern

Another development raising red flags in India is Bangladesh’s plan to revive the World War II-era airfield in Lalmonirhat, located just 10 kilometers from the Indian border.

Reports suggest Dhaka has sought Chinese assistance to transform the abandoned site into a modern airbase, with discussions reportedly held during Yunus’s China visit. While Bangladesh frames the project as part of its military modernization under the Forces Goal 2030 initiative, India is wary of its potential implications.

The location of the Lalmonirhat airfield, near the Siliguri Corridor, presents a sensitive issue. If developed with Chinese support, the airbase could serve as a dual-use facility, potentially hosting Chinese military assets disguised as civilian infrastructure.

The mere prospect of Chinese involvement so close to India’s border is viewed as a provocative move, particularly in light of Bangladesh’s recent overtures to Pakistan, another rival of India.

The Chicken’s Neck: India’s Strategic Redline

The Siliguri Corridor, or Chicken’s Neck, is a narrow strip of land in West Bengal, approximately 20-60 kilometers wide, which connects India’s mainland to its northeastern states.

Bordered by Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, it is one of India’s most strategically located regions. The corridor is a lifeline for trade, communication, and military logistics to the northeast.

Any disruption in the Chicken’s Neck could isolate the northeast, a scenario India has long sought to prevent. The corridor’s importance has prompted New Delhi to bolster its defenses, deploying advanced assets like Rafale fighter jets, BrahMos missiles, and the S-400 air defense system.

Bangladesh’s moves to involve China in projects near the corridor – particularly the Teesta River and Lalmonirhat airfield – are seen as direct challenges to India’s security.

A Chinese presence in these areas could enable intelligence gathering, influence local dynamics, or even give Beijing a foothold to pressure India in a crisis. The corridor’s proximity to the Chinese-controlled Chumbi Valley, where tensions flared during the 2017 Doklam standoff, further heightens India’s concerns.

Improving Connectivity: Kaladan Project

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is a significant infrastructure initiative to enhance connectivity between India and Myanmar, foster economic growth, and strengthen bilateral ties.

Launched in 2008 under India’s Act East Policy, the project seeks to connect Kolkata’s seaport with Sittwe in Myanmar’s Rakhine State by sea, then link Sittwe to Paletwa through the Kaladan River, and finally extend from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the India-Myanmar border in Mizoram by road.

Spanning approximately 539 km by sea, 158 km by river, and 110 km by road, it offers an alternative route to India’s northeastern states, bypassing the narrow Siliguri Corridor and reducing travel distance by about 1,328 km.

Fully funded by India at an estimated cost of $484 million, the project faced numerous challenges, including delays due to political instability in Myanmar, the Rohingya crisis, conflicts involving the Arakan Army, and logistical issues like monsoons and rugged terrain.

While the Sittwe port and Paletwa jetty were completed by 2017, with dredging finalized, the road from Paletwa to Zorinpui remains under construction. The Arakan Army’s recent control of Paletwa has raised concerns about the project’s viability, though assurances of cooperation have been made.

The project promises substantial economic benefits, boosting trade and development in India’s landlocked Northeast by providing sea access to Southeast Asian markets.

Strategically, it enhances India’s regional influence, countering China’s presence. However, ongoing conflicts and coordination issues underscore the need for diplomatic engagement with local stakeholders to ensure timely completion, making the Kaladan Project a critical yet complex endeavor for regional connectivity and economic integration.

Indian Concerns & Regional Implications

India’s concerns about Bangladesh’s recent trajectory are multifaceted.

First, the rise in anti-India rhetoric threatens to erode the goodwill built over decades of cooperation. Projects like the Akhaura-Agartala rail link and India’s $8 billion in credit lines for Bangladeshi infrastructure underscore the depth of bilateral ties, but these are now at risk due to political uncertainty.

China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh challenges India’s influence in its immediate neighborhood. New Delhi fears that Bangladesh could become a key node in China’s regional strategy, undermining India’s role as a counterweight in the Indo-Pacific.

With planned visits by its foreign minister and secretary in April 2025, Pakistan’s involvement adds another layer of complexity as Islamabad seeks to capitalize on Dhaka’s shift.

Further, the strategic projects near the Siliguri Corridor raise immediate security concerns. India has responded by enhancing its military posture but recognizes the need for diplomatic engagement.

The meeting between Yunus and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit in April 2025 was described as “constructive,” with discussions on water sharing, border issues, and minority rights. However, tangible progress remains elusive.

Indian Retribution

Since 08 April, India has terminated a trans-shipment facility that allowed Bangladesh to route export goods through Indian ports, airports, and land customs stations to third countries.

Established in 2020, the arrangement facilitated cost-effective and efficient trade, particularly for Bangladesh’s garment industry, which relied on Indian infrastructure to reach markets in Europe and the Gulf.

India cited logistical challenges, including port and airport congestion, as the primary reason for the withdrawal. Indian exporters, especially in apparel, had long complained that the facility strained capacity, inflating costs and delaying shipments.

However, the timing suggests a strategic response to Bangladesh’s growing alignment with China, raising regional security and influence concerns.

Exceptions were made for exports to Nepal and Bhutan, aligning with World Trade Organization obligations for landlocked nations. The move disrupts Bangladesh’s trade logistics, forcing reliance on longer, costlier routes through its ports like Chittagong.

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s recent developments reflect a complex interplay of domestic priorities and geopolitical ambitions. The interim government’s outreach to China and anti-India rhetoric have set off alarm bells in New Delhi, particularly regarding the Teesta River and Lalmonirhat airfield projects.

The Chicken’s Neck remains a critical concern, with India taking no chances to secure its lifeline to the northeast. As Bangladesh navigates its path, it must balance economic imperatives with regional stability while India grapples with the challenge of maintaining influence in a rapidly changing neighborhood.

The coming months will test the resilience of India-Bangladesh relations and the broader dynamics of South Asian geopolitics.

Air Marshal Anil Khosla is a former Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS) of the Indian Air Force and AOC in C of Eastern Air Command.​
 
The Indian army has conducted a military drill near chicken's neck to test their combat readiness. "Tista Prahar" is the first ever military drill by the Indian army near sensitive Siliguri corridor. Heavy artillery has been used in the drill.

 
The Indian army has conducted a military drill near chicken's neck to test their combat readiness. "Tista Prahar" is the first ever military drill by the Indian army near sensitive Siliguri corridor. Heavy artillery has been used in the drill.



This is in response to Younus inviting China to establish a base near Siliguri Corridor and his bluff about seven sisters. This will convey a message to China.
 

India deploys Rafale Jets, S-400 at Siliguri corridor: Indian media report
Staff Correspondent 31 May, 2025, 01:03

India has fortified its most vulnerable but strategically important stretch, the Siliguri Corridor, which is also known as the Chicken’s Neck, by deploying Rafale fighter jets and Russian-made S-400 air defence system, according to an Indian media outlet report.

The 20–22km-wide corridor is India’s only land link to its north-eastern states and sits at the crossroads of Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and China.

With Pakistan already rattled, New Delhi had now turned its strategic gaze eastward and was drawing red lines, said the Zee News report published online on May 29.

Neither the Bangladesh foreign ministry nor the Border Guard Bangladesh responded to New Age queries about the Indian media report over the deployment of military equipment in the bordering areas. Wellness retreats

‘While tension with Pakistan eases, India’s eyes are now on Beijing and Dhaka. Recent Chinese military drills near the India-Bhutan border and fast-moving political shifts in Bangladesh, according to The Asia Live, have put New Delhi on alert,’ the report from New Delhi mentioned.

What is worrying is that the interim government in Dhaka, under Mohammad Yunus, is reportedly leaning towards China and Pakistan—a potential axis that is likely to reshape the strategic balance in India’s east as mentioned in the report.

‘India, in response, has tightened Unmanned Aerial Vehicle restrictions within 10 kilometres of its international border and stepped up aerial surveillance across the entire eastern front,’ it said.

‘India’s anxiety has spiked after reports surfaced that Bangladesh may acquire 32 Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, which are equipped with AESA radar, EW pods and long-range missiles,’ the report said.

Active Electronically Scanned Array or AESA is a highly advanced radar system and Electronic Warfare pods or EW pods are devices that provide aircraft with electronic warfare capabilities.

Responding to the shifting ground, India has made its intentions clear. The deployment of the S-400 air defence system, which is capable of neutralising threats up to 400 kilometres away, along with a Rafale squadron at Hashimara Airbase, is more than just tactical positioning. It is a strategic warning, according to the report.

Political party merchandise

India’s military had also adopted a multi-zone deterrence doctrine, combining real-time ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) integration, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, seamless tri-service coordination and fortification of key roads, tunnels and rail links in the Siliguri Corridor for rapid military mobilisation, the report mentioned.

It referred to India’s External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stating that India was ‘closely monitoring developments in the region’ and would take decisive action if needed.

Asked for comment, retired Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, president of the independent think tank Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, said on Friday that India could take security measures on their side, but Bangladesh should assess its security threats in case of the installation and movement of such heavy military equipment near its border.​
 
The video below talks about India's extra agility to militarize chicken's neck to protect it from Bangladesh and China. Bangladesh's military doctrine is defensive. Their Training and military equipment are fully compatible with defensive military doctrine. Bangladesh army cannot conduct military mission to occupy lands beyond its border. Nonetheless, India has chosen the path of confrontation with Bangladesh to remedy its strategic weakness in North East. The video is in Bengali.

 
Retired Brigadier General of Indian army SK. Chatterji says that the recent military deployment by the Indian army in Siliguri Corridor is for defensive purposes only. The Indian army has no plan to occupy Bangladeshi land to widen Siliguri Corridor. The video is in Bengali.


 

Why Chicken’s Neck is a perennial security challenge
After Yunus highlighted the fragility of Northeast India during his recent trip to China, India curbed exports to Bangladesh, signaling the costs of challenging its regional autonomy.

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Bangladesh's Chief Advisor Yunus , Chinese President Xi discuss bilateral issues Photo | ANI

Jayanth Jacob

NEW DELHI: The narrow Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck,” is once again at the centre of regional strategic attention — this time triggered by remarks from Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus during his recent China visit. Yunus referred to India’s Northeast as “landlocked,” implying its dependence on transit routes through Bangladesh. The comments have sparked swift diplomatic and economic responses from New Delhi, revealing the corridor’s deep-rooted strategic importance.

What is the Siliguri Corridor?

The Siliguri Corridor is a narrow stretch of land in West Bengal that connects India’s mainland to its northeastern states — Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya, collectively known as the Seven Sisters. This land bridge, just about 22 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, lies between Nepal to the north and Bangladesh to the south.

Its geographical fragility and criticality have earned it the nickname “Chicken’s Neck” in strategic and military circles. Any disruption in this corridor — be it from military conflict, natural disaster, or internal unrest — would sever India’s northeastern states from the rest of the country.

Why it is back in the news

The recent tension emerged after Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s interim chief advisor, made pointed references to India’s “landlocked” Northeast in Beijing. Though subtle, the comment implied India’s dependence on Bangladeshi territory for transit to its own territory — a point India is deeply sensitive about.

In response, New Delhi promptly restricted certain Bangladeshi exports through its entry points, exempting the land-locked Nepal and Bhutan and accelerated work on alternative connectivity projects that bypass Bangladesh. Mainly among these is the long-talked about Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project, which aims to connect Kolkata to Mizoram via Myanmar, reducing dependence on Bangladeshi transit routes.

This reaction is not just about infrastructure. It’s geopolitical signaling — a warning to Dhaka that undermining India’s strategic autonomy in the region comes with consequences, economic and political.

Shifting power dynamics post-Hasina

India’s concerns have intensified since the departure of Sheikh Hasina from power in August 2024. The Hasina regime maintained friendly, understanding and warm ties with New Delhi, but the interim administration led by Yunus has taken a markedly different tone. Anti-India rhetoric has gained mainstream space in Bangladesh’s political discourse, along with the politically-motivated attacks against Hindu minorities, that Dhaka denies.

Dhaka’s growing closeness with Beijing is viewed with alarm in Indian policy circles. Two recent developments have particularly heightened Indian anxieties: Dhaka’s plans to move the $1 billion Teesta River project from India to China; and reviving the Lalmonirhat airbase in northern Bangladesh with Chinese assistance.

Both projects lie close to India’s border and have major implications for Indian security — especially regarding surveillance and the possibility of foreign military use.

Why Lalmonirhat matters

The Lalmonirhat airfield, originally built in 1931 by the British and used in World War II, has been largely dormant since Bangladesh’s independence. The current revival plan, reportedly supported by China, could turn it into a logistics or surveillance hub. While it presently hosts a Bangladesh Air Force maintenance unit, Indian agencies are concerned that it could be upgraded for full-scale military operations or dual-use missions that will be against New Delhi’s strategic interests.

A functional Lalmonirhat airbase would lie perilously close to the Siliguri Corridor. India will need to see if Bangladesh will allow other countries like China and Pakistan to use it. Bangladesh has the right to develop airfields for their security reasons, but that should not be used against India is India’s position.

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Historical, geopolitical context

The strategic relevance of the Siliguri Corridor is not new. Its current geography is a result of complex historical shifts — from the Anglo-Gorkha war, the Duar war, and treaties such as Sugauli and Punakha, to the creation of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) and the redrawing of borders by colonial powers. These artificial boundaries cut through long-standing social, cultural and economic ties in the region.

Today, the corridor serves as the only land route connecting the Indian mainland to its northeastern states. It is also a transit point to Nepal, Bhutan and even Bangladesh, making it an artery not just for national integration, but for regional diplomacy.

The town of Siliguri, at the heart of the corridor, is a crucial transport hub, handling road, rail, and air traffic. This logistical importance has made it a magnet for both legal and illegal cross-border activity — from trade and migration to drug trafficking and human smuggling.

Security challenges

The corridor’s narrow geography makes it exceptionally vulnerable. At its narrowest between Phansidewa (near the Bangladesh border) and Panitanki (on the Indo-Nepal border), it is susceptible to both military incursions and internal disturbances. The proximity to the Chumbi Valley tri-junction — where India, Bhutan, and China meet — adds another layer of complexity.

Chinese infrastructure build-up in the Chumbi Valley has triggered border standoffs, including the 2017 Doklam crisis. Analysts warn that any hostile movement from the north — combined with instability or pressure from the south (Bangladesh) — could potentially choke the corridor, cutting off northeast India.

The corridor is also seen as a choke point in any future military conflict involving China. If China were to ally more directly with Bangladesh or secure access to bases like Lalmonirhat, it would give Beijing new leverage in a region.

China’s expanding footprint

Under Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s military and economic ties with China have deepened further. Beijing remains Dhaka’s largest arms supplier — delivering fighter jets, artillery and naval vessels. It is also a major infrastructure partner, involved in building roads, railways, bridges and airports across Bangladesh. The two countries frequently conduct joint military exercises, and Chinese companies have gained influence over strategic infrastructure, raising alarms in Indian strategic circles. China’s growing role in Bangladesh has transformed the Siliguri Corridor from a logistical asset into a geostrategic vulnerability.

India’s response

Faced with this encirclement risk, India is fast-tracking alternate connectivity projects. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project will connect Mizoram to Kolkata via Sittwe Port and Paletwa in Myanmar. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway aims to link Manipur with Southeast Asia, reducing India’s dependence on Bangladesh for regional connectivity. Domestically, India is investing in robust rail and highway infrastructure through the corridor, ensuring redundant and rapid deployment of military and civilian assets. By expanding its network of access points, New Delhi hopes to mitigate the strategic risks posed by both geography and geopolitics.

The Chicken’s Neck is not just a cartographic curiosity; it is a strategic fulcrum for India’s northeastern policy, its neighbourhood diplomacy, and its military doctrine. What makes it so vital is not just its role as a connector — but its potential as a vulnerability. Any disruption here — intentional or accidental — could have outsized consequences for India’s unity and security.

With rising regional tensions, Dhaka’s growing tilt towards Beijing, and heightened Chinese military activity near the border, the Siliguri Corridor’s strategic significance is once again at the forefront of Indian policymaking. What happens in this narrow strip of land will continue to influence the future of India’s engagement with both its Northeast and its neighbours.

Corridor factoids

The Siliguri Corridor has around 80 small towns and villages lying within the areas of Kishanganj district of Bihar, Darjeeling district, northern parts of Uttar Dinajpur district as well as the districts of Jalpaiguri, Alipurduar and Cooch Behar in West Bengal

Siliguri town is the transit point for road, air and rail traffic to Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal along with the northeastern states of India. Its location on the foothills of the Himalayas makes it strategically important. Its role as the main trading and commercial centre of north Bengal adds to its economic significance

At its narrowest, the strip is just 21-22 km wide linking the mainland to the northeastern states

It is flanked by three countries - Nepal to its west, Bhutan to north and Bangladesh to the south

Major road and rail infrastructure towards the northeast passes through it

India’s 2017 Doklam standoff — at the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and Tibet Autonomous Region — over infrastructure construction by China was also in the context of the Siliguri Corridor becoming vulnerable

Bhutan-China border talks will have its shadow on the corridor, as China is claiming 89 sq km in Chumbi Valley, close to the Siliguri Corridor

Indian steps to secure it

The Army on May 8-9 conducted the ‘Teesta Prahar’ integrated field exercise at the Teesta Field Firing Range in North Bengal, near Siliguri Corridor

In January 2023, battle preparedness practice of the security forces using latest weapons and equipment in a networked, integrated environment, involving all arms and services of the Army, the Indian Air Force and CAPFs was done

In 2023, a decision was taken to deploy border guarding forces - BSF, ITBP, SSB - at the corridor during peacetime

There is increase in deployment on the Chinese side since May 2020 leading to precautionary deployment by the Indian forces in the region.​
 

Yunus chokes the chicken's neck in Beijing
The Bangladesh chief advisor’s mention of the strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor in China justifiably worries India. Muhammad Yunus seems to be playing Pakistan's hand against India.

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Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)

Ever since August 5, 2024—when Sheikh Hasina was overthrown by a turbulent coup in the streets, with the Bangladesh Army looking on—it has been evident from the flow of events that Pakistan’s hand was behind it. Since then, I have not been alone in often saying that Pakistan never left Dhaka—not in 1971, not ever. It remained embedded in Bangladesh in different ways, cultivating its interests among radicals, various political parties, the army and even intellectuals.

Till Hasina ruled, there was no question of a Pakistani upper hand. In August 2024, the situation was created with the connivance of external elements, with Muhammad Yunus, a supposed liberal, leading the pack to bring about the meltdown. Perhaps Hasina erred in her dictatorial ways; perhaps she should have had her finger on the pulse of the nation. That is important, but currently insignificant.

Since that event, Yunus, who parachuted back from the US to his homeland to be chief advisor to the interim government, has never been in favour of India in any of his utterances. Prior to the illegal change of government, Yunus’s oft-expressed views never really targeted India. He spoke in favour of regional cooperation and connectivity between Bangladesh and India, seeing it as a mutual benefit for both. He often emphasised the importance of trade, economic ties, and collaboratively resolving regional issues. Now Yunus has made it a point to be unpleasant towards India in the post-August 5 configuration. He has also found time to pass remarks against his bête noire on India’s linkages with his country’s original ‘first family’.

It’s in this context that Yunus’s recent statement in China has drawn intense flak in India. The exact statement, as quoted in the media, was, “India’s northeast is completely landlocked, and its access to the ocean is completely controlled by Bangladesh. The Siliguri Corridor is the only route that connects the northeast with the rest of India, and this connection passes through Bangladesh.” During such a high-level meeting in China, Yunus urged Beijing to establish an economic foothold in Bangladesh by leveraging the latter’s strategic position as the “only guardian of the ocean” for the “landlocked” northeastern region.

The provocation through this statement perhaps surpasses that generated by Hasina’s overthrow. To many, this may be construed as a direct slur towards India’s sovereignty and national security. The interpretations can be many, but one thing is obvious—the fact that Yunus has chosen to use words and occasions that promote confusion and obfuscation.

Do I find anything wrong in the physical description of India’s northeast given by Yunus? None whatsoever. But I find everything wrong with the context in which Yunus offered this description and its follow-up connotation, as per his perception. This cannot be treated as a standalone statement.

Obviously, Yunus and the Chinese officials, initially led by President Xi Jinping, had discussions that underscore a concerted effort to deepen the strategic partnership between Bangladesh and China, focusing on economic development, regional stability and collaborative infrastructure projects. Yunus knows that the Chinese have a deep interest in the Bay of Bengal and do not get optimum choices.

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor forms a part of the Belt and Road Initiative. It connects China’s Yunnan province to Myanmar and provides China with access to the Indian Ocean via Bay of Bengal. Several projects enhance the China-Myanmar-Thailand connection without being formally a part of the BRI. Yet, there is no link to or through it to Bangladesh. The Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-China corridor is a geopolitical disaster, leaving Bangladesh with no land link to the Chinese mainland. It appears obvious that Yunus, in his naiveté, was trying to draw the attention of the Chinese to the feasibility of a strategic Bangladesh-China linkage to offset India’s domination of the Bay of Bengal. However, in a ridiculous choice of words and objectives, he touched upon India’s sensitivity—the Siliguri Corridor.

The Siliguri Corridor, often called the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, is a narrow stretch of land in the state of West Bengal that connects mainland India to its northeastern states. It is a region of immense strategic importance due to its geographic, economic and security implications. It is bordered by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, and is very close to the Chinese border at Tibet. This makes it vulnerable to external threats, particularly from China, which claims parts of Arunachal Pradesh.

The corridor is near Doklam, where India and China had a 72-day-long military standoff in 2017. Any conflict in this region could cut off India’s northeast. The corridor is home to important railway lines, highways and oil pipelines that sustain the economy of the northeast and of India too. Thus, was Yunus’s deliberately-crafted statement a reminder to China and others of India’s vulnerability, and the force multiplication effect that Bangladesh’s border configuration could have for Sino-Bangladesh strategic advantage? This is how nations often project the worth of their geostrategic characteristics.

It is apparent that Bangladesh is not alone. It is abetted and advised by the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which is obviously licking its lips at the potential of an Indian strategic disadvantage being exploited. In the past six months, the ISI has gone to quite an extent to make known its interest. Visits by senior ISI officials with specific forays to areas of strategic significance were a way of conveying interest. It now seems to have gone beyond, with translation of the same into words uttered by none other than Bangladesh’s chief advisor.

Yunus is warming up to Pakistan because he probably perceives that the Pakistanis would be his best bet in the fight for survival, which may come faster than anyone thinks. The radical elements are already proliferating, but Yunus knows that his survival depends on the creation of an anti-minority sentiment and a pathetically skewed sense of Bangla nationalism—all of which will militate against India.

India’s response has indeed been mature all through the developments of the last few months. Let us hope the meeting of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Yunus at the BIMSTEC summit brings a much-needed turn to the flow of Indo-Bangladesh relations.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)

Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
 

Geography’s Curse: India’s Vulnerable ‘Chicken’s Neck’
The Siliguri Corridor is a terrifyingly vulnerable artery in India’s geography.
By Ankit Panda

If you’ve been following The Pulse here at The Diplomat recently, you may have noted a few recent pieces (including one by yours truly) on India’s North-Eastern states. In any discussion of the governance problems or border issues in India’s North-East, a commonly mentioned word is “isolation.” The North-Eastern states are politically and geographically distant from New Delhi, and certain parts of the region share more in common culturally with Burma than they do with Punjab, or even West Bengal. A quirk of South Asian political geography has made it quite challenging for New Delhi to effectively integrate the North-Eastern states: the Siliguri Corridor.

Like most of the borders in South Asia, the Siliguri Corridor – known also as the “Chicken’s Neck”– is a cartographic relic of the British decolonization process. As the British Empire withdrew and partitioned British India along religious lines to create the modern states of India and Pakistan (which was then divided into East and West Pakistan), it drew the lines that lead to the Siliguri in an attempt to maintain contiguity between Bengal and Assam. The creation of East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh in 1971) along religious lines necessitated the awkward choke point in India’s contemporary geography. The Siliguri, at its slimmest point, puts less than a marathon’s distance between the Bangladeshi and Nepalese borders (14 miles).

All land trade between North-East India’s 40 million denizens and the rest of the country traverses the Siliguri owing to the lack of a free-trade agreement between India and Bangladesh. In 2002, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh joined India in discussing a proposal to create a free-trade agreement that would have facilitated the movement of goods across the Siliguri corridor, but no such agreement has been established. Further reinforcing the strategic precariousness of the region is the fact that a single-line railway is all that carries rail-based freight across the Siliguri. The harsh topography of the region makes the railway and roads subject to damage from frequent landslides and natural disaster; India’s North-East is known for its record-breaking levels of rainfall.

As if natural disasters were not enough to send the Siliguri to the top of the list of India’s strategic anxieties, the corridor has a complex and troubled political history. The situation has somewhat improved since the pre-1971 era, when icy relations with China in the north and East Pakistan meant that the region was a constant source of cross-border tension. Since the 1962 war with China, Indian strategists have envisioned a future scenario where "the Chinese may simply bypass and drop Special Forces to choke vulnerable Siliguri Corridor and cut off the Northeast.” China’s diplomacy with Bhutan gives reason to take this possibility seriously; in 1996, China began a concerted diplomatic effort to yield a border claim with Bhutan in exchange for the Doklam Plateau. The territorial swap with Bhutan would place in China’s hands the key to India’s choke point in the Siliguri.

India’s fortunes in the Siliguri were slightly ameliorated when the tiny monarchy of Sikkim – situated just north of the Siliguri, between Nepal, China, and Bhutan – merged with India in 1975 to become its second-smallest state. Sikkim had long been a subject of controversy between India and China. In the early 2000s, China refused to acknowledge Sikkim as part of India, maintaining that it was an independent state. The decision to do so was sparked by a controversy around the 17th Karmapa of the Black Hat branch of Tibetan Buddhism. Nevertheless, in 2003, China granted de facto recognition of Sikkim as a part of India by ceasing to list it as a separate state on its official documents and maps.

In acknowledgement of its importance to India’s national security, the state maintains a heavy patrol presence in the Siliguri region. The Indian Army, the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force, and the West Bengal Police all patrol the region. India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is known to closely observe Nepalese, Bhutanese, and Bangladeshi activity in the region as well. Among other issues, the Siliguri has been vulnerable to illegal Bangladeshi immigration into India. Certain analysts have also speculated that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has attempted to exploit the Siliguri via Nepal-based insurgents.

The Siliguri Corridor is a terrifyingly vulnerable artery in India’s geography. For Indians in the North-East, every look at a map is a sobering reminder of just how fragile their physical and economic tether to the rest of the country remains. Unlike so many of the problems India faces, the Siliguri Corridor’s vulnerability is a cruel endowment of political geography and essentially one it is stuck with. On the bright side, the current level of strategic vulnerability is far lower than it was in the past and can be further moderated with the establishment of a free-trade agreement between the states bordering the Siliguri.​
 

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