[🇧🇩] China is a Time Tested Friend and a Strategic Partner of Bangladesh

[Saif]

https://www.newagebd.net/post/power-energy/309858/chinese-solar-firms-eye-bigger-role-in-bangladeshs-renewable-goals

Chinese solar firms eye bigger role in Bangladesh’s renewable goals
Staff Correspondent 15 August, 2026, 00:07

Max Group chairman Ghulam Mohammad Alomgir, Astronergy APAC sales head David Zhang and BSREA president Mostafa Al Mahmud, among others, attend launch of Astronergy’s latest N7 Pro solar module at an event in the capital on Thursday. | Press release photo

Chinese solar technology companies are seeking to expand their role in Bangladesh’s renewable energy transition, as the country prepares for a major increase in solar generation and local businesses also move to tap into the emerging market.

The development comes amid government plans to expand solar power through utility-scale projects, rooftop systems and solar irrigation, creating growing opportunities for international technology providers and domestic companies.

Against this backdrop, China-based global photovoltaic company Astronergy organised its ‘Astronergy World Tour 2026 – Bangladesh Roadshow’ in the capital on Thursday, bringing together representatives of the company, local industrial groups, renewable energy businesses, distributors, strategic partners and other stakeholders.

A major highlight of the event was launch of Astronergy’s latest N7 Pro solar module on the Bangladesh market.

According to the company, the ASTRO N7 Pro series uses upgraded TOPCon 5.0+ cell technology, along with a quarter-cut design and 20BB technology.

The module offers high bifaciality, power output, efficiency and reliability, while reducing degradation and hot-spot risks.

The module has a maximum power output of 670 watts and maximum efficiency of 24.8 per cent, the company said.

The roadshow also marked the company’s 20 years in the solar industry and underscored its intention to strengthen partnerships in Bangladesh.

The company’s Bangladesh initiative comes as the country faces growing pressure to diversify its energy mix, reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels and meet rising electricity demand.

Speakers at the event said that the government was targeting the development of 10,000 megawatts of solar power within the next five years.

Attending the event, Max Group chairman Ghulam Mohammad Alomgir said that the timing of Astronergy’s initiative was appropriate as Bangladesh was increasingly focusing on renewable energy.

‘Government is very serious about solar power and solar business,’ he said, urging businesses and investors to take advantage of the emerging opportunities.

Alomgir said that he had known Chint Power System, the parent group of Astronergy, for more than a decade and had visited its factory in China around 10 years ago.

‘Today, I know that they are a global leader in the solar sector,’ he said.

He said that Bangladesh was now at an appropriate stage to accelerate solar development, particularly through utility-scale projects, rooftop solar and solar irrigation.

Max Group has experience in the power sector, including gas-based power generation and engineering, procurement and construction contracting, and has already installed around 2.5MW of solar capacity at one of its factories, he said.

The group is now preparing to expand into the solar business.

Alomgir said that Max Group had already invested around Tk 20 crore for solar-related materials, which are expected to arrive soon.

He viewed Chinese companies such as Chint as potential partners rather than competitors.

‘The market is big. The government is thinking of 10,000 megawatts of solar power within the next five years, and down the line it will be more and more,’ he said.

Alomgir also said that the company planned to introduce its own solar-related products and services in Bangladesh and work with Blue Carbon Technology, a manufacturer and supplier of photovoltaic solar systems, LiFePO4 lithium batteries, micro-energy storage units and solar lighting solutions.

Meanwhile, Bangladesh Sustainable and Renewable Energy Association president Mostafa Al Mahmud said that renewable energy had become a strategic necessity for Bangladesh.

He said that rising electricity demand, dependence on imported fuels and increasing climate risks made an accelerated transition to renewable energy increasingly important.

Solar power, rooftop systems and battery energy storage would play a growing role in improving energy efficiency and strengthening the country’s energy security, he said.

Mahmud, however, stressed that cooperation with international renewable energy companies should extend beyond technology sales.

He called for greater technology transfer, competitive financing, transparent and competitive bidding processes and long-term investment partnerships.

‘There is incredible potential for stronger cooperation between leading Chinese renewable energy companies and Bangladesh’s private sector,’ he said, adding that international companies should work closely with capable local partners.

The roadshow also featured an award ceremony recognising local organisations and representatives in Best Distributor, Best Strategic Partner and Best Solar Project categories.

A contract-signing session further highlighted the company’s plans to expand commercial cooperation in Bangladesh.

Head of APAC sales of Astronergy David Zhang, GTS engineer Kathy Kong, sales manager of CPS Jackie Jiang also spoke at the event.​

 

[Saif]

China's corridor proposal

On June 26, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward a concrete proposal to Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman: the development of a China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBEC), linking China's Yunnan Province through Myanmar to Bangladesh's

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

China's corridor proposal
Take the offer, but keep its options open

On June 26, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward a concrete proposal to Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman: the development of a China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBEC), linking China's Yunnan Province through Myanmar to Bangladesh's territory and ports. The proposal deserves serious consideration. It is not simply another expression of diplomatic goodwill. It is a potentially transformative connectivity initiative, and Dhaka now faces a strategic question: how much should it embrace, on what terms, and within what broader foreign policy framework?

The proposed corridor is ambitious. It envisages highways, railways, inland waterways, seaports, land ports, energy infrastructure, special economic zones, and digital connectivity, building on the existing China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and extending its reach toward Bangladesh's Chattogram and Mongla ports.

For Bangladesh, this is not connectivity beginning from scratch. Important pieces of the physical infrastructure are already in place. The Dohazari Cox's Bazar railway has been operational since 2023, while the proposed extension toward Ghumdhum on the Myanmar border has long been part of Bangladesh's connectivity plans. A functioning corridor could provide renewed strategic and economic justification for infrastructure that has remained incomplete or underutilized.

The economic argument is equally compelling. China has been Bangladesh's largest trading partner for years, but the relationship remains heavily imbalanced. Bangladesh imported goods worth around $18.56 billion from China in the last fiscal year, while its exports to China were only about $694 million. The resulting trade deficit, approaching $17.87 billion, highlights both the scale of Bangladesh's dependence on Chinese imports and the urgency of diversifying and deepening the country's export capacity.

This is where the corridor could become more than a transportation project.

China remains the world's largest manufacturing powerhouse, but its economy is also undergoing structural change. Rising production costs, demographic pressures, technological upgrading, and the relocation of some labour-intensive industries are encouraging Chinese companies to seek new production bases and international markets. Bangladesh, with its large workforce, expanding consumer market, strategic location, and growing industrial capacity, has an opportunity to attract a greater share of this investment.

The CMBEC could therefore help Bangladesh move from being primarily a major destination for Chinese goods to becoming a more integrated participant in regional production networks. If properly negotiated, improved connectivity could support Chinese investment in Bangladesh, facilitate technology transfer, strengthen local supply chains and create opportunities for Bangladeshi firms to enter wider Asian markets.

But Bangladesh should not confuse connectivity with dependency.

This distinction matters most in the digital component of the proposed corridor. Bangladesh is simultaneously trying to establish itself as a hub for technology and digital services. The government has begun promoting semiconductors as a potential next major export industry after ready-made garments, while the country is also seeking greater capacity in artificial intelligence (AI), data services and advanced digital technologies.

At the recent National Semiconductor Symposium and BEAR Summit in Dhaka, the government explicitly highlighted global partnerships as central to building Bangladesh's semiconductor future. The participation of companies such as GlobalFoundries, NXP, Applied Materials and SanDisk, as well as the Vietnam Semiconductor Alliance, demonstrates that Dhaka is already looking beyond a single technology partner.

That approach needs to continue.

Chinese investment in fibre-optic networks, data centres, cloud infrastructure, smart logistics, and digital platforms could significantly accelerate Bangladesh's technological development. But these investments should complement, not replace, partnerships with the United States (US), Japan, South Korea, the European Union (EU), Singapore, and other technology economies. Bangladesh's objective should be technological capability, not technological dependence.

The same principle should guide infrastructure development.

Bangladesh needs better roads, railways, ports, energy networks and digital infrastructure. China has demonstrated both the financial capacity and technical expertise to contribute to such projects. Refusing Chinese participation solely on geopolitical grounds would therefore be economically counterproductive. At the same time, accepting Chinese infrastructure without competitive procurement, transparent financing and careful assessment of long-term economic returns would be equally unwise.

The answer is not to choose between Beijing and Washington. It is to make Bangladesh valuable to both.

This is becoming increasingly important as geopolitical competition intensifies. Washington has its own expectations regarding Bangladesh's trade and strategic orientation, while China remains one of Bangladesh's most important sources of imports, infrastructure finance and investment. Bangladesh therefore has little to gain from entering a binary geopolitical contest in which it must choose one side.

Its strongest position is strategic diversification.

Vietnam offers a useful example. Its approach, often described as "Bamboo Diplomacy", seeks to maintain flexibility by deepening economic relations with competing major powers without formally aligning itself with any one of them. Hanoi has benefited from Chinese investment and supply chains while simultaneously expanding trade and investment ties with the US, Japan, South Korea and Europe.

Bangladesh should not copy Vietnam mechanically. Its economic structure, geopolitical position, and security environment differ. But the underlying lesson remains: a middle power can maintain strategic autonomy by ensuring no single external partner becomes indispensable.

The biggest obstacle to the CMBEC, however, may not be geopolitics between China and the US. It may be Myanmar itself.

The corridor depends heavily on stability and connectivity through Myanmar, a country that has been deeply affected by political conflict and armed violence since the military takeover in 2021. Previous projects under the CMEC have also faced delays. The proposed Mandalay Kyaukphyu railway, for example, has made limited progress despite earlier agreements.

For Bangladesh, Myanmar also cannot be viewed simply as a transit country. The Rohingya crisis remains a major security and humanitarian concern. Dhaka has consistently emphasised that any sustainable improvement in relations with Myanmar must include the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Rohingya refugees. China's willingness to facilitate dialogue between Bangladesh and Myanmar could therefore give Beijing a constructive diplomatic role beyond infrastructure development.

This is another reason Bangladesh should approach the corridor as a long-term strategic framework rather than a single construction project. The political and security conditions necessary for a fully operational corridor may take years to emerge.

Yet waiting for perfect conditions would also be a mistake.

Bangladesh has already demonstrated its intent to deepen economic engagement with China. The groundbreaking of the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Anwara, Chattogram, on an 800-acre site expected to attract more than $1 billion in investment and create around 100,000 jobs, is a key indicator of the direction economic relations are taking.

The more Bangladesh becomes connected to regional production networks, the more important it will be to ensure that its ports remain genuinely open and commercially competitive. Chattogram and Mongla should not become gateways for a single country. They should serve as platforms connecting Bangladesh with China, India, Southeast Asia, Japan, Europe and the wider global economy.

That is where the CMBEC can become strategically valuable.

A successful corridor could give Bangladesh access to new markets, lower logistics costs, attract investment and integrate the country more closely into Asian supply chains. It could also encourage greater regional interdependence, giving neighbouring countries a stronger economic stake in stability.

But Bangladesh must negotiate from its own interests.

Every major infrastructure agreement should be assessed on commercial viability, debt sustainability, technology transfer, local employment, environmental impact, and the extent to which Bangladeshi companies can participate. Infrastructure should generate productive capacity rather than simply increase physical connectivity.

The newly agreed "2+2" dialogue mechanism between the foreign and defence ministries of Bangladesh and China could also become useful in this regard. Rather than treating it as a ceremonial diplomatic arrangement, Dhaka should use the mechanism to discuss the security implications of connectivity, regional stability, maritime interests and the management of strategic dependencies.

The central principle should be simple: economic engagement with China should strengthen Bangladesh's strategic autonomy, not diminish it.

Bangladesh should therefore say yes to the corridor, but not yes to everything.

It should welcome Chinese capital, technology and infrastructure expertise while maintaining competitive engagement with the US, Japan, India, South Korea, the EU and other partners. It should use Chinese connectivity to expand Bangladeshi exports rather than deepen import dependence. It should welcome digital infrastructure while ensuring interoperability, competition and domestic technological capacity. It should pursue the corridor while remaining committed to peaceful regional diplomacy and resolving the Rohingya crisis.

The real opportunity presented by the CMBEC is not to place Bangladesh in China's economic orbit. It is to position Bangladesh at the centre of a wider network of Asian trade, investment and connectivity.

That distinction matters.

A confident Bangladesh need not choose between China and the West. It can work with China on infrastructure, with the US and Europe on markets and technology, with Japan and South Korea on industrial upgrading, and with India and Southeast Asia on regional connectivity. The objective should not be alignment. It should be diversification.

The CMBEC can become an important part of that strategy. But its success will ultimately depend less on the size of the Chinese offer than on the quality of Bangladesh's own decisions.

Bangladesh should take the corridor. It should take the investment. It should take the opportunity to deepen its connections with regional supply chains and emerging technologies.

But it should keep its options open.

That is not diplomatic indecision. It is strategic autonomy.

Md Saikat Hosen is a PhD candidate in the School of International Economics and Politics at Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics in China. Mohammad Saiyedul Islam, PhD, is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher in the School of Overseas Education (School of Foreign Languages) at Sanming University in Fujian Province, China, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Daffodil International University Belt and Road Research Centre in Bangladesh.​