[🇧🇩] Energy Security of Bangladesh

[Saif]

No legal bar to foreign investment in deep-sea oil and gas exploration as chamber court stays HC order

The Chamber Court of the Appellate Division on Thursday has ruled that there is currently no legal bar to foreign investment in the exploration of oil, gas and other mineral resources in the deep sea of the Bay of Bengal, staying an earlier High Court order on the matter. The chamber court fixed J

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

No legal bar to foreign investment in deep-sea oil and gas exploration as chamber court stays HC order

UNB

Published :
Jun 25, 2026 23:05
Updated :
Jun 25, 2026 23:13

The Chamber Court of the Appellate Division on Thursday has ruled that there is currently no legal bar to foreign investment in the exploration of oil, gas and other mineral resources in the deep sea of the Bay of Bengal, staying an earlier High Court order on the matter.

The chamber court fixed June 29 for a hearing before the full bench of the Appellate Division.

The latest order allows the government's offshore bidding round and the participation process of foreign companies to continue for the time being.

Earlier, the High Court had issued a rule and several directives after holding a preliminary hearing on a writ petition challenging the legality of allowing foreign companies to explore oil, gas and mineral resources in the deep sea.

The state subsequently filed an appeal with the Chamber Court against the High Court order.

During the hearing, lawyers for the state argued that the government had invited international tenders for offshore blocks to ensure the country's energy security.

They said deep-sea exploration would be difficult without foreign investment and technological expertise and that the government's ongoing initiatives would be hampered if the High Court order remained in force.

On May 24, the government announced the "Bangladesh Offshore Bidding Round-2026," under which international oil companies (IOCs) were invited to bid for exploration rights in 26 blocks in the Bay of Bengal, including 15 deep-sea and 11 shallow-sea blocks.

To attract foreign investment, the government has also introduced a revised Production Sharing Contract (PSC), tax incentives and other benefits.

According to the Energy and Mineral Resources Division, domestic gas production has been declining steadily, increasing the country's dependence on imported energy.

The government's objective is to strengthen energy security by discovering and developing new gas fields in offshore areas.

With the chamber court's latest order, there is currently no legal obstacle to the participation of foreign companies in Bangladesh's offshore exploration activities. However, the final decision will depend on the outcome of the hearing before the full bench of the Appellate Division on June 29.​

 

[Saif]

Expanding renewable energy in Bangladesh

We need to remember that decisions about renewable energy and potential energy investments, can and will, influence not only electricity supply, but also industrial competitiveness, public health, climate resilience, and the sustainability of future growth Currently, Bangladesh's power sector stan

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Expanding renewable energy in Bangladesh

Muhammad Zamir

Published :
Jun 29, 2026 00:39
Updated :
Jun 29, 2026 00:39

Staffers work at the floating commercial solar power plant in Chapainawabganj district, Bangladesh, June 5, 2023 —Xinhua Photo

We need to remember that decisions about renewable energy and potential energy investments, can and will, influence not only electricity supply, but also industrial competitiveness, public health, climate resilience, and the sustainability of future growth

Currently, Bangladesh's power sector stands at an important crossroad. Expanding electricity generation to support economic growth is viewed as obligatory. Bangladesh has succeeded in building generation capacity, yet the next phase of development will depend on how sustainably, competently, and durably that energy is produced. This needs to be taken forward to generate a win-win scenario. It will then assist in improving the daily lives of citizens while opening major strategic and fiscal opportunities for the government.

It has been pointed out that the government's Renewable Energy Policy 2025 reflects a shift. It sets a target of sourcing 20 per cent of electricity from renewable energy by 2030 and 30 per cent by 2040. These targets represent an important milestone in Bangladesh's energy journey, but they also highlight the scale of the task ahead.

According to the Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority, the country has a total installed renewable energy capacity of approximately 1,781 MW. Solar energy accounts for the overwhelming majority of this capacity at around 1,488 MW, including approximately 1,105 MW of on-grid generation and 383 MW of off-grid installations.

While these achievements demonstrate growing momentum, they also underscore the scale of expansion required to meet the targets outlined in the Renewable Energy Policy 2025.

Even after years of investment, renewable energy still represents only a modest share of Bangladesh's overall installed generation capacity, which exceeds 30,000 MW. Meeting the government's target of sourcing 20 per cent of electricity from renewable energy by 2030 will therefore require a significant acceleration in project development, grid integration, and private-sector investment. This relates not only to an equation pertaining to climate stability but also to an economic dimension.

It needs to be noted that as electricity demand grows alongside industrialisation, urbanisation, and rising living standards, reducing these vulnerabilities has become a strategic priority. At the same time, Bangladesh remains vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Rising temperatures, erratic rainfall, riverbank erosion, flooding, salinity intrusion, and increasing pressure on agriculture and water resources are already affecting communities and economic activity across the country.

While Bangladesh contributes only a small fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions, it bears a disproportionate share of climate-related consequences. According to the World Bank, climate change could reduce Bangladesh's GDP by up to 9 per cent by 2050 under severe climate scenarios if adaptation measures are not adequately implemented. The significance of renewable energy lies in its ability to address both challenges simultaneously.

Among renewable technologies, solar power has emerged as one of the most practical opportunities available to Bangladesh. More importantly, solar power generates electricity without fuel combustion, produces no air pollutants during operation, and emits no greenhouse gases while generating power. As concerns about air quality, public health, and climate resilience continue to grow, these environmental benefits also carry increasing economic value potential.

Bangladesh is already witnessing what large-scale solar deployment can achieve. Recent utility-scale solar projects, including the Teesta Solar 200 MW facility in Gaibandha, have already supplied hundreds of millions of units of clean electricity to the national grid-thereby demonstrating that large-scale solar generation is both technically and commercially viable in Bangladesh.

However, the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) has referred to a significant challenge ahead. It has been estimated that Bangladesh requires US Dollar 35.2 to US Dollar 42.6 billion to achieve the 30 per cent renewable electricity target by 2040, with most financing needed between 2025 and 2035 if it is to remain on track towards achieving the renewable energy targets. Such environmental investment should in fact be seen as an investment in energy security, economic resilience, industrial competitiveness, and long-term national development.

As global supply chains place greater emphasis on sustainability and environmental performance, expanding renewable energy capacity can strengthen Bangladesh's attractiveness as an investment destination while supporting the long-term competitiveness of its export-oriented industries.

Bangladesh entered its renewable energy era in 2017 with the launch of a 3MW solar power plant in Sarishabari, Jamalpur, currently, as of 2024, 459 Megawatts were being generated from 10 solar power plants in Bangladesh. The largest is the Teesta 200 MW Solar Park in Gaibandha which was launched in 2023.

This underlines that with decisive policy implementation, institutional reform, and investment support, Bangladesh has the potential to emerge as a regional leader in distributed renewable energy development.

Bangladesh is entering a decisive phase in its energy transition. To meet some of the ambitious targets -- including generating 40 per cent of electricity from renewable sources by 2041 -- the government has recently announced sweeping reforms aimed at accelerating solar energy deployment.

These initiatives include a target of 10,000 MW of solar power generation by 2030, mandatory rooftop solar installation on public buildings, tax exemptions for renewable energy producers, and expanded access to solar systems for urban households.

Bangladesh has historically applied feed-in tariffs (FiTs) mainly to selected utility-scale renewable energy projects. However, in recent years, the government has gradually shifted toward competitive reverse auctions for large-scale solar procurement to reduce electricity generation costs and improve market efficiency. Despite these transitions, FiT may still remain relevant for small and medium-sized rooftop solar projects, particularly during the early expansion phase of the renewable energy sector.

Analysts have pointed out that to support such transformation, Bangladesh could increasingly rely on two key policy mechanisms: feed-in tariff (FiT) and net metering (NEM). Both are designed to encourage private-sector participation and decentralized electricity generation, although they differ significantly in structure and economic impact.

FiT is a policy mechanism designed to accelerate investment in renewable energy technologies by guaranteeing renewable energy producers a fixed, long-term payment for every kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity supplied to the national grid. By contrast, net metering allows electricity consumers who generate their own solar power to offset their electricity bills by exporting excess electricity to the grid.

Bangladesh currently operates a net-metering framework where consumers can install solar systems up to 100 per cent of their sanctioned load capacity. While NEM promotes self-consumption and reduces electricity costs, it generally does not provide the additional financial incentives associated with FiTs.

Given Bangladesh's urgent renewable energy goals, a hybrid approach combining net metering with targeted feed-in tariffs may offer the most effective pathway toward rapid solar expansion.

The government has also recently announced a series of sweeping tax incentives ahead of accelerating the adoption of renewable energy and electricity vehicles. Under the proposed measures, the government plans to introduce a zero percent tax for the solar power sector until 2035 to encourage environmentally friendly and affordable electricity generation.

The benefits of renewable energy in Bangladesh through expanding the capacity in the electricity sector can be achieved cost-effectively through clean energy options (renewables and energy efficiency), which not only reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also increase jobs and improve human health by reducing air pollution. According to a report from the Low Emission Development Strategies Global Partnership (LEDS GP) and based on detailed modeling analysis, the benefits of increasing clean energy in Bangladesh's power generation mix relative to 'business-as-usual' could generate the following cumulative results by 2030-- reduce greenhouse gas emissions by up to 20 per cent and generate domestic employment of up to 55,000 full-time equivalent jobs

Though the government has reduced import duty, regulatory duty, supplementary duty, and advance tax on essential solar power components to zero percent until June 30, 2031, the benefits are not being extended equally across the solar industry. The Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) framework which dictates tax exemptions and mandatory installation policies for solar projects issued by the National Board of Revenue immediately after the Budget, favours only a number of companies.

Solar energy remains Bangladesh's most viable pathway towards sustainable development. With decisive policy implementation, institutional reform, and investment support, the country has the potential to emerge as a regional leader in distributed renewable energy development.

Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance.​

 

[Saif]

Japan signals support for raising energy assistance to $500m: PM's deputy press secretary

PM Tarique Rahman, Japanese delegation discuss energy crisis, airport terminal, and Rohingya repatriation

www.thedailystar.net

Japan signals support for raising energy assistance to $500m: PM's deputy press secretary

PM Tarique Rahman, Japanese delegation discuss energy crisis, airport terminal, and Rohingya repatriation

Star Online Report

Photo: PMO Bangladesh

Japan has responded positively to Bangladesh’s request to increase its assistance from $312 million to $500 million to help address the country’s ongoing energy crisis.

The development was confirmed during a meeting between Prime Minister Tarique Rahman and a Japanese delegation led by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Shimada Tomaki at the Prime Minister’s Office today.

PM's Deputy Press Secretary Md Zahidul Islam confirmed the outcome, noting that both sides discussed progress on several JICA-funded development projects, including the Matarbari deep-sea port, MRT lines, and the third terminal of Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport.

The prime minister expressed hope that work on the terminal would be completed on schedule, aiming for an opening in December.

The Japanese delegation also announced that Japan would provide five patrol boats to the Bangladesh Navy. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to expedite the Bangladesh-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.

The Rohingya crisis was a key topic of discussion. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman sought Japan’s continued support and a more active international role in ensuring safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

The delegation invited the prime minister to visit Japan, and Tarique Rahman expressed hope to do so at a convenient time.

Bangladesh’s side included Finance Minister Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury, Foreign Minister Dr Khalilur Rahman, advisers Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir and Humaiun Kobir, and Special Assistant for Foreign Employment in the Asia-Pacific Region Dr Md Shakirul Islam Khan.

The Japanese side was represented by Ambassador Saida Shinichi, International Cooperation Bureau Director Hirose Aiko, JICA President Dr Tanaka Akihiko, and JICA Bangladesh Chief Representative Takahashi Junko.​

 

[Saif]

https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/304807/offshore-gas-theft-abroad-or-failure-at-home

OFFSHORE GAS: Theft abroad or failure at home?

| — United News of Bangladesh

A CLAIM is moving from social media chatter into mainstream discussion: Bangladesh’s gas, it is said, is being stolen from beneath the Bay of Bengal. The fear is easy to understand. People watch India and Myanmar produce offshore oil and gas on either side of our waters while Bangladesh keeps importing expensive liquefied natural gas and leaves its own sea largely untested. Before dismissing the rumour, it is worth asking why it sounds believable to so many.

Start with one comparison. In five decades, Bangladesh has drilled about a hundred wells in search of gas. India drilled 545 in a single year. On the Indian side of the maritime line, oil began flowing from a deep-water field in early 2024. Off the Rakhine coast, Myanmar has produced gas since 2013 and pipes much of it to China. Neither neighbour found this easy. Both spent years, took risks and paid for data and wells. But both eventually moved from paperwork to rigs and platforms at sea.

On our side, the sea is quiet. These are waters Bangladesh won fair and square, against Myanmar at an international tribunal in 2012 and against India in 2014. Yet today the country has not a single producing offshore gas well. So the honest question is not first whether someone is stealing our gas. It is why Bangladesh has failed to turn legal victory into steady offshore production since the Sangu field ran dry.

The uncomfortable answer begins at home. For the 2025-26 fiscal year, Petrobangla reportedly set aside roughly Tk 580 billion to import LNG, while the money for finding our own gas was only about Tk 11 billion. That is a gap of about fifty to one. Imported LNG is also far costlier than local gas, and in 2024-25 the import bill crossed Tk 407 billion even as domestic output kept falling. This is not a geological mystery alone. It is a policy choice. A gap that wide is not a foreign conspiracy. It is the difference between an exploration effort that kept drilling and one that did not.

Idleness, though, is a symptom rather than a cause, and the cause has a paper trail. After winning its maritime boundaries, Bangladesh leased two promising shallow-water blocks, SS-04 and SS-09, to a consortium led by India’s ONGC Videsh and Oil India in 2014. The blocks remained with that consortium for more than a decade, and the contract was extended three times. Only one well, Kanchan-1, was drilled, and it did not show commercially viable gas. In February 2025, after the remaining work commitments were not completed, Petrobangla invoked the companies’ bank guarantees. The Indian firms then exited, having written off tens of millions of dollars.

This record should not be treated as a routine business disappointment. A foreign consortium held strategically important Bangladeshi acreage for fourteen years, failed to deliver a commercial discovery, did not complete the promised work programme and left. That does not, by itself, prove cross-border theft or a sabotage plot. But it does raise serious questions. Why were promising offshore blocks allowed to remain tied up for so long? Whose interests were served by repeated extensions and weak enforcement? Were there only commercial misjudgements, or were there political calculations, undue influence or corruption that kept Bangladesh behind? These questions deserve investigation. They also explain why many citizens now ask whether Bangladesh’s gas is being taken from outside, or whether the country was deliberately kept from testing and developing its own side of the sea. Either way, the outcome was the same: lost time, lost data and no offshore production.

Nor was this an isolated failure. Santos of Australia, ConocoPhillips of the United States and South Korea’s Posco-Daewoo also walked away, the last after seismic work indicated potential but before drilling, amid disputes over pricing and terms. The wider pattern shows that Bangladesh’s offshore problem cannot be reduced to one company or one country. Still, the Indian-led blocks matter because they sit at the centre of the public suspicion: India developed offshore resources on its own side while an Indian-led consortium delivered no producing result on Bangladesh’s side. That contrast is not evidence of cross-border extraction. It does, however, justify hard questions about contract design, state oversight, political bargaining and the cost of delay.

The failed 2024 offshore round made the same point at the system level. The government offered 24 offshore blocks. The geology drew real interest. Seven companies bought bid documents, and majors such as ExxonMobil and Chevron reviewed the data. Then not one placed a bid. They had studied our seabed and judged the terms not worth the risk. Even with pricing moved towards Brent, the gas price was still seen as too low. Pipeline costs and tariffs remained a worry, a 5 per cent workers’ profit levy sat on top, and the data package was too thin for a multi-billion-dollar frontier decision. The point is not to replace the rumour with another one. It is to show how clauses, delays and policy choices made at home priced exploration out of reach.

The encouraging part is that this can be fixed, and some of the work has begun. Over the past year the terms were rewritten. Gas prices are now linked to Brent crude with a floor and a ceiling. The new model adds tax relief, a pipeline-tariff mechanism, a lighter levy and conditional export rights subject to Petrobangla’s first right of refusal. In May 2026, a fresh round for 26 blocks opened, with bids due by November 30. But a better contract is not a working well. The test is no longer the wording on paper. It is whether the country can carry it all the way to a rig in the water.

Recent diplomacy also points in the right direction, but it should be read with caution. In Kuala Lumpur, Dhaka invited Malaysian firms into Bay of Bengal exploration and encouraged direct talks between Petronas and Petrobangla. In Beijing, the agenda covered connectivity and a proposed Bangladesh-Myanmar-China economic corridor. If realised, such a corridor could open new possibilities for regional connectivity, infrastructure and energy cooperation. But it would not, by itself, solve Bangladesh’s offshore gas problem. Any route through Rakhine would face a hard security reality: much of the state and the border with Bangladesh are now shaped by conflict, while China’s older Myanmar corridor has already faced years of delay and uncertainty. Other major powers would also watch such a route closely, because infrastructure through the Bay of Bengal is never only about trade or energy; it is also about strategic influence. The deals Bangladesh should chase, therefore, are those that bring competitive drillers into its own offshore blocks, not those that turn a difficult corridor into a substitute for exploration at sea.

China’s offshore capability is real, and Bangladesh needs partners with technology, capital and deep-water experience. Chinese firms should be part of that conversation if they compete on fair and transparent terms. The real issue is over-reliance on any single partner, whether Chinese, Western, Malaysian or Indian. In offshore energy, data, infrastructure and pricing terms can shape future choices. That is why every deal must preserve Bangladesh’s bargaining power through competition and transparency, starting with a clean, open tender that keeps Petronas, Chinese majors, ExxonMobil, Chevron and other credible operators in the race. Caution is necessary, but it should not become paralysis. Fourteen years of Indian-led blocks delivered nothing, and over-caution now risks losing another decade. There is also a quieter question: who benefits when domestic exploration stalls and imports grow? Imported liquefied natural gas has built a large trading and regasification chain, while Bapex, the national exploration company, remains underfunded and without offshore drilling experience. Whichever flag the company flies, what matters is a fair process that serves Bangladesh’s interest and moves quickly.

This brings us back to the rumour. The claim that India and Myanmar are quietly sucking Bangladesh’s gas across the boundary, draining our reserves as if with a vacuum, is not supported by geology or evidence. Gas can be drawn across a boundary only where one continuous reservoir crosses it. Repeating the vacuum version does not protect Bangladesh; it weakens the argument. But the anxiety underneath the rumour is not foolish. It is badly explained. Gas reservoirs do not respect political borders and neighbouring discoveries matter. Myanmar’s Rakhine Basin to the east and India’s Mahanadi and Krishna-Godavari systems to the west show that gas-bearing petroleum systems sit on both flanks of our waters. That does not prove a shared reservoir. It does make Bangladesh’s failure to test its own blocks far harder to defend.

The real loss is not proven cross-border theft. It is strategic delay. Neighbours are proving reserves, producing gas and building markets while Bangladesh has not turned its maritime rights into a single producing well. When global gas was cheaper and offshore drilling looked costly, importing liquefied natural gas may have seemed practical. Since 2018, however, that bet has become a vulnerability. A single year’s LNG import bill now runs past Tk 400 billion, and dependence turns dangerous whenever distant wars or shipping disruptions move the market. Even a fraction of that money, spent earlier on seismic work and drilling, could have left Bangladesh with more data, more bargaining power and a stronger supply position today.

The way forward is not mysterious: finish the seismic surveys; make the data package bankable; hold bidders to firm drilling deadlines instead of repeating endless extensions; give Bapex the resources and partnerships it needs to become the national company it was meant to be; and turn winning bids into a dated drilling programme, not another file of promises. Bangladesh did not lose these waters. It won them. But sovereignty is not only a line on a map. It is the ability to explore, prove and use the resources that may lie within that line. The regional geology has already given Bangladesh enough reason to act. The only open question now is whether it can finally test its own side of the line.

Md Syful Islam is a PhD research fellow in the maritime, transport law and politics departmenbt at Ankara University in Türkiye. Dr Zobayer Ahmed is an associate professor at the Bangladesh Institute of Governance and Management.​