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The following video is about the background history of East Bengal Regiment. The video is in Bengali.
[🇧🇩-Land] History of East Bengal Regiment
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Bangladesh Defense
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East Bengal Regiment - Wikipedia
The East Bengal Regiment (Bengali: ইস্ট বেঙ্গল রেজিমেন্ট) is an infantry regiment of the Bangladesh Army. It was founded by Major Abdul Gani.
History
The East Bengal Regiment was formed on 15 February 1948, following the Partition of India into the Dominion of Pakistan and the Dominion of India in 1947. The core of the unit was made up of soldiers of the Bihar Regiment and the Bengal Pioneer Corps who had opted for Pakistan when partition divided the British Indian Army and the Pakistan Army was born. A shortfall of junior commissioned officers was made up from the Punjab Regiment until sufficient Bengali officers became available. Two companies composed of Bengali Muslims were regimented in to the first training regiment in East Pakistan and was named the East Bengal Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel V. J. E. Patterson as Commanding Officer and Major Abdul Waheed Choudhury as Officer Commanding (O.C.). Between 1948 and 1965, a total of eight battalions were raised. The East Bengal Regiment was primarily composed of Bengali men from East Pakistan.
1965 Indo-Pakistan War
At the end of the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965, a new battalion called the Lucky Tigers of the 7th East Bengal Regiment was created. The creation of the battalion was not finished until 1966. The East Bengal regiment soldiers defended Lahore, West Pakistan during the war. In which they were awarded 12 gallantry awards, The East Bengal Regiment was also known for also causing heavy casualties on the Indian side when, East Bengal Regiment personnel faced them, it was not just East Bengal Regiment, Many Bengalis in the Pakistani Air Force were shooting down many Indian planes, like Saiful Azam who took 12 Missions and caused heavy damage to India, and captured one Indian soldier, and shot down 1 IAF aircraft and Muhammad Mahmood Alam who shot down 5 IAF aircraft.
History during the Bangladesh War of Independence
In March 1971, in response to a crackdown on local populace in East Pakistan, the five battalions of the East Bengal Regiment under the command of Major Ziaur Rahman revolted against the Pakistan Army. Members of the East Bengal Regiment across East Pakistan organized and initiated the Bangladesh War of Independence. The East Bengal Regiment formed the core of the independence struggle forces, which became known as the Bangladesh Forces. The structure and formation of the Bangladesh Forces during the Independence War of 1971 was determined at the Sector Commander's Conference that was held from 11 to 17 July 1971.
Colonel M.A.G. Osmani (promoted to general after independence of Bangladesh) was the Commander-in-Chief of all Bangladesh Forces. Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Rab was appointed as the Chief of Army Staff and Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan, was appointed Bangladesh Military Representative to coordinate guerilla training at the largest training camp of the war effort at Chakulia, Bihar, India. The decision of the formation of three separate brigades were formed with East Bengal battalions. The East Bengal Regiment battalions that participated in the war were as follows:
Z Force, commanded by Major Ziaur Rahman, consisted of 1st, 3rd and 8th East Bengal Regiment. These battalions were formed during May~June 1971 at Teldhala village of Tura, Meghalaya, in 1971 by Major Ziaur Rahman. These three battalions principally constituted the backbone of Bangladesh Forces Sector 11, later commanded for a brief stint (24 days) by Major Abu Taher and subsequently by Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan from 3 November until 14 February. The main two battles fought in Bangladesh Forces Sector 11 was the Kamalpur battle (land attack), led by Major Zia and the Chilmari Battle (Amphibious attack (landing raid) led by Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan.
K Force, commanded by Major Khaled Mosharraf was created with 4, 9 and 10 East Bengal.
S Force, under Major K M Shafiullah, was created in October 1971 and consisted of 2 and 11 East Bengal. Further units were raised to replace those that remained stranded in West Pakistan. Following the foundation of Bangladesh, these units formed the core of the new army. However, the 7th Battalion was incorporated as 44th Battalion, Frontier Force Regiment of the Pakistan Army, which led to the raising of the 10th Battalion in 1971.
Colonel M.A.G. Osmani (promoted to general after independence of Bangladesh) was the Commander-in-Chief of all Bangladesh Forces. Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Rab was appointed as the Chief of Army Staff and Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan, was appointed Bangladesh Military Representative to coordinate guerilla training at the largest training camp of the war effort at Chakulia, Bihar, India. The decision of the formation of three separate brigades were formed with East Bengal battalions. The East Bengal Regiment battalions that participated in the war were as follows:
Z Force, commanded by Major Ziaur Rahman, consisted of 1st, 3rd and 8th East Bengal Regiment. These battalions were formed during May~June 1971 at Teldhala village of Tura, Meghalaya, in 1971 by Major Ziaur Rahman. These three battalions principally constituted the backbone of Bangladesh Forces Sector 11, later commanded for a brief stint (24 days) by Major Abu Taher and subsequently by Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan from 3 November until 14 February. The main two battles fought in Bangladesh Forces Sector 11 was the Kamalpur battle (land attack), led by Major Zia and the Chilmari Battle (Amphibious attack (landing raid) led by Squadron Leader M. Hamidullah Khan.
K Force, commanded by Major Khaled Mosharraf was created with 4, 9 and 10 East Bengal.
S Force, under Major K M Shafiullah, was created in October 1971 and consisted of 2 and 11 East Bengal. Further units were raised to replace those that remained stranded in West Pakistan. Following the foundation of Bangladesh, these units formed the core of the new army. However, the 7th Battalion was incorporated as 44th Battalion, Frontier Force Regiment of the Pakistan Army, which led to the raising of the 10th Battalion in 1971.
Role
The East Bengal Regiment is the oldest infantry regiment of the Bangladesh Army. It's role is to engage and defeat an enemy in frontal combat, within a traditional infantry combat scenario. The regiment also aids the civilian government when called on and contributes regularly to Bangladesh's peacekeeping commitments overseas. Bangladesh is among the countries contributing troops to the United Nations.
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1965 Indo-Pak War: Busting the myth
THIS article is to recall the 17-day war of Sep 1965 between India and Pakistan that, among other things, helped to do two things as far as the Bengalis were concerned. One, it completely destroyed the myth created about the Bengalis being a non-martial race. And secondly, it exposed the lax...
965 Indo-Pak War: Busting the myth
1965 Indo-Pak War: Busting the myth
THIS article is to recall the 17-day war of Sep 1965 between India and Pakistan that, among other things, helped to do two things as far as the Bengalis were concerned. One, it completely destroyed the myth created about the Bengalis being a non-martial race. And secondly, it exposed the lax preparedness for the defence of the eastern wing of the country. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, in his book “Friends Not Masters”, had exposed the discriminatory mindset of the Pakistani establishment towards their Bengali compatriots. The September War was an opportunity for the Bengalis in the armed forces to vindicate their military prowess.
Forty nine years ago on 6 September 1965, a full-scale war broke out between India and Pakistan. It was a short 17-day war that was virtually confined to West Pakistan and parts of the disputed territory of Kashmir. As the war unfolded, the Bengalis all over Pakistan were excited over the stories of heroism by the 1st Battalion, The East Bengal Regiment (EBR) in the defence of the key Pakistani city of Lahore. Also in the air, stories of valour by Bengali pilots of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) greatly inspired the Bengali youths. The West Pakistanis used to belittle the Bengalis by calling them a non-martial race; this was belied by the military prowess and bravery shown by the officers and men of Bengali origin. The war also exposed the eastern wing's vulnerabilities with so little military assets to defend it. The war is virtually forgotten in Bangladesh today, despite the fact that the Bengalis played an important part in it.
Forty nine years ago on 6 September 1965, a full-scale war broke out between India and Pakistan. It was a short 17-day war that was virtually confined to West Pakistan and parts of the disputed territory of Kashmir. As the war unfolded, the Bengalis all over Pakistan were excited over the stories of heroism by the 1st Battalion, The East Bengal Regiment (EBR) in the defence of the key Pakistani city of Lahore. Also in the air, stories of valour by Bengali pilots of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) greatly inspired the Bengali youths. The West Pakistanis used to belittle the Bengalis by calling them a non-martial race; this was belied by the military prowess and bravery shown by the officers and men of Bengali origin. The war also exposed the eastern wing's vulnerabilities with so little military assets to defend it. The war is virtually forgotten in Bangladesh today, despite the fact that the Bengalis played an important part in it.
Pakistani leadership at that time had led the nation to a disastrous war that was fraught with serious political and military lapses. After the debacle in the border war with China in 1962, India started a massive expansion and modernization of its armed forces with generous aid from the Soviet Union and Western powers. Pakistani leadership realized that the possibility of militarily pressurizing India was fast slipping away as the power balance tilted more towards India. They started planning a secret military operation to force India to come to a negotiated settlement on Kashmir. In early August 1965, Pakistan launched a clandestine operation, code named “Operation Gibraltar”. The aim was to infiltrate inside Indian held Kashmir and to demolish bridges, cutoff supply lines, etc to create panic among the populace. They also set up a radio station, called “Sada-e-Kashmir”, purported to be the voice of the Mujahedin fighting for Kashmir's liberation. The assumption was that the radio broadcast, along with the guerilla activities, will trigger a general uprising among the Kashmiris. None of that happened. In fact, many of these infiltrators were arrested, killed in encounters and often were handed over to the authority by the locals. By the end of August, Operation Gibraltar petered out; remnants of the so-called Mujahedin tracked back to Pakistan.
On 1 September 1965, regular Pakistani troops crossed the cease fire line (CFL) and moved towards Jammu. The forces made quick advance and in the next couple of days threatened to cut Jammu-Srinagar road. The Indian PM gave a warning on 2 September that unless Pakistan withdrew its forces across the CFL, India would respond “at a time and place of its own choosing”. The Indian response came on 5-6 Sept night when it launched attacks across Sialkot and Lahore. The Indian response was full one month after the Pakistani incursion. The Indian forces, besides threatening two key cities, poised to cut the vital Grand Trunk (GT) road. At this time, the 1st Battalion of the EBR was deployed in the defence of Lahore along the Bambawali- Ravi-Bedian canal, commonly known as BRB canal. They held their ground despite repeated Indian attacks. At the end of the war, this regiment had the honour of being awarded the highest number of gallantry awards among all the regiments of Pakistan Army.
In the air war that followed, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had a qualitative edge over the IAF in terms of pilots and aircraft, which, despite IAF's quantitative advantage, gave PAF a slight edge in the end. Here too, a number of PAF pilots of Bengali origin earned high military honour. Many Bengali soldiers and airmen embraced martyrdom and many others were wounded in battle.
By the second week into the war, Pakistani forces were running out of ammunition and spares. US had imposed on both the warring sides an arms embargo which hurt Pakistan badly because almost all her weapons were of US origin. Pakistan had no option but to accept a UN resolution for a ceasefire to take effect from 22 September 1965. An initiative by the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, resulted in a peace deal, known as “The Tashkent Declaration”, signed by the warring parties on 4 January 1966 in Tashkent. The declaration was hailed as a new beginning of peace. It stated that both countries will pull back their forces to pre-war positions, will restore economic and diplomatic ties and will initiate orderly exchange of prisoners. The treaty was viewed by many Pakistanis as a diplomatic defeat for President Ayub. Ayub never recovered from the fall of his stature after Tashkent and was ousted four years later in the face of popular uprising.
This was a war that had no clear victor or vanquished. The aim of the Pakistani high command was to seize a portion of Kashmir to force India to the negotiating table; on the other hand, India's aim was to stop any Pakistani incursion and not to allow external interference in the Kashmir issue. In the end, India largely achieved her aim and objectives, while Pakistan was in disarray. The facade of democracy that President Ayub created was shattered because what to speak of the ordinary people, even the Parliament or the Cabinet was not consulted when the vital decision to send infiltrators into Kashmir was taken.
On the economic front, Pakistan suffered badly due to war. The 3rd Five Year Plan (1965-70) was virtually in tatters. 6% GDP growth rate of early 1960s almost stalled by the end of the decade. East Pakistan was cut-off from its western wing during the War. A deep sense of separatism and alienation grew in East Pakistan as an aftermath. The war raised the issue of the defence of East Pakistan. With only one infantry division, a squadron of fighters and no naval assets, except for a few patrol crafts, East Pakistan was virtually defenseless. In June 1966, the Awami League in its 6-Point Programme demanded greater defence investment in East Pakistan which soon became a rallying point for the Bengalis. Among the demands were shifting of the NHQ to Chittagong, establishment of an ordnance factory and raising of a paramilitary force to augment the defense of the eastern wing. The Bengali soldiers, sailors and airmen proved that as professional military men they are second to none. We honour those valiant sons of the soil who gave their best in the field of battle in September 1965 to keep up the honour and dignity of the Bengali nation. Many veterans of 65-War displayed the same valour in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.
The writer is Registrar, East West University, Dhaka
On 1 September 1965, regular Pakistani troops crossed the cease fire line (CFL) and moved towards Jammu. The forces made quick advance and in the next couple of days threatened to cut Jammu-Srinagar road. The Indian PM gave a warning on 2 September that unless Pakistan withdrew its forces across the CFL, India would respond “at a time and place of its own choosing”. The Indian response came on 5-6 Sept night when it launched attacks across Sialkot and Lahore. The Indian response was full one month after the Pakistani incursion. The Indian forces, besides threatening two key cities, poised to cut the vital Grand Trunk (GT) road. At this time, the 1st Battalion of the EBR was deployed in the defence of Lahore along the Bambawali- Ravi-Bedian canal, commonly known as BRB canal. They held their ground despite repeated Indian attacks. At the end of the war, this regiment had the honour of being awarded the highest number of gallantry awards among all the regiments of Pakistan Army.
In the air war that followed, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had a qualitative edge over the IAF in terms of pilots and aircraft, which, despite IAF's quantitative advantage, gave PAF a slight edge in the end. Here too, a number of PAF pilots of Bengali origin earned high military honour. Many Bengali soldiers and airmen embraced martyrdom and many others were wounded in battle.
By the second week into the war, Pakistani forces were running out of ammunition and spares. US had imposed on both the warring sides an arms embargo which hurt Pakistan badly because almost all her weapons were of US origin. Pakistan had no option but to accept a UN resolution for a ceasefire to take effect from 22 September 1965. An initiative by the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, resulted in a peace deal, known as “The Tashkent Declaration”, signed by the warring parties on 4 January 1966 in Tashkent. The declaration was hailed as a new beginning of peace. It stated that both countries will pull back their forces to pre-war positions, will restore economic and diplomatic ties and will initiate orderly exchange of prisoners. The treaty was viewed by many Pakistanis as a diplomatic defeat for President Ayub. Ayub never recovered from the fall of his stature after Tashkent and was ousted four years later in the face of popular uprising.
This was a war that had no clear victor or vanquished. The aim of the Pakistani high command was to seize a portion of Kashmir to force India to the negotiating table; on the other hand, India's aim was to stop any Pakistani incursion and not to allow external interference in the Kashmir issue. In the end, India largely achieved her aim and objectives, while Pakistan was in disarray. The facade of democracy that President Ayub created was shattered because what to speak of the ordinary people, even the Parliament or the Cabinet was not consulted when the vital decision to send infiltrators into Kashmir was taken.
On the economic front, Pakistan suffered badly due to war. The 3rd Five Year Plan (1965-70) was virtually in tatters. 6% GDP growth rate of early 1960s almost stalled by the end of the decade. East Pakistan was cut-off from its western wing during the War. A deep sense of separatism and alienation grew in East Pakistan as an aftermath. The war raised the issue of the defence of East Pakistan. With only one infantry division, a squadron of fighters and no naval assets, except for a few patrol crafts, East Pakistan was virtually defenseless. In June 1966, the Awami League in its 6-Point Programme demanded greater defence investment in East Pakistan which soon became a rallying point for the Bengalis. Among the demands were shifting of the NHQ to Chittagong, establishment of an ordnance factory and raising of a paramilitary force to augment the defense of the eastern wing. The Bengali soldiers, sailors and airmen proved that as professional military men they are second to none. We honour those valiant sons of the soil who gave their best in the field of battle in September 1965 to keep up the honour and dignity of the Bengali nation. Many veterans of 65-War displayed the same valour in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.
The writer is Registrar, East West University, Dhaka
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40 East Bengal Regiment provided nat’l flag
40 East Bengal Regiment provided nat�l flag
40 East Bengal Regiment provided nat’l flag
Staff Correspondent
Thursday, 08 November, 2018,06:00PMArmy Chief General Aziz Ahmed poses for a photo with high-ranking officials and others at a programme marking the providing of the national flag to 40 East Bengal Regiment (Mechanized) at East Bengal Regimental Centre in Chattogram on Thursday.
Army Chief General Aziz Ahmed gave a national flag to 40 East Bengal Regiment (mechanized) during a military parade at East Bengal Regimental Centre in Chattogram on Thursday.
GOC Army Training and Doctrine Command (ARTDOC) Lt Gen Md Nazimuddin, GOC 24 Infantry Division and Area Commander, Chittagong Area Maj Gen SM Matiur Rahman and Papa Tiger, East Bengal Regimental Centre Brig Gen Md Habibul Karim welcomed the army chief at the parade ground.
The flag was provided for the regiment’s contribution to competence, dutifulness, military and national development as well as for the regiment’s heroic contribution during war and peace.
The 40 East Bengal Regiment (Mechanized), “Chiranjib Challish’ (Forever Forty), which was established on April 30, 1982, has been awarded this rare honour in recognition of 36 years of uninterrupted service and contribution.
Later, the army chief laid a foundation stone for the the ‘Tigers Museum’ to preserve the history and heritage of East Bengal Regiment.
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The first resistance against Pakistan: March 19, 1971
“Don't leave me alone, make sure I am with you”, that was what Lieutenant Mokhtar Kamal Chowdhury told Second Lieutenant Ibrahim.
The first resistance against Pakistan: March 19, 1971
March 2, 1971: the flag of independent Bangladesh was hoisted in the Arts Building of Dhaka University. Photo: Aftab Ahmed
“Don't leave me alone, make sure I am with you”, that was what Lieutenant Mokhtar Kamal Chowdhury told Second Lieutenant Ibrahim. The time was about 5pm, March 27, 1971. Mokhtar Kamal was a doctor. In military language he was the Regimental Medical Officer (RMO), of the battalion. Ibrahim was the youngest officer in the battalion. Both being junior officers, Ibrahim and Mokhtar were usually spending their time in the office of the Adjutant of the Battalion, if there was no other duty for them. While manning the office, Ibrahim's duty was to monitor the telephone, receive messages coming through the wireless or signal center, forward those to the relevant person, remain aware of the various important activities in the battalion itself, and the like. A very important duty was to ensure that no non-Bengali officer of the battalion could use the telephone or the wireless to communicate with anyone outside the battalion. The battalions of the East Bengal Regiment (EBR)had individual nicknames. The First Battalion was the known as the Senior Tigers, the Second Battalion was called the Junior Tigers, the Third Battalion was named Minor Tigers, The Fourth Battalion the Baby Tigers, and so on. We are talking of the Second Battalion of the EBR (Second Bengal) which had been passing immensely busy time for the last 10-12 days, if not more.
In keeping with the tradition of battalions, the junior most officer of the battalion would be the 'Intelligence Officer' (IO) of the Battalion and would usually be available to the Commanding Officer (CO) of the battalion at very short notice, irrespective of the time of the day or night. Not all infantry battalions have a Regimental (and resident) Medical Officer always. But the Second Bengal had a resident doctor, it being located in an isolated place, many miles from the nearest military hospital, in Dhaka. The battalion was located at the palace of the Bhawal Raja at Joydevpur which was a Thana headquarters in the district of Dhaka, located about 30 kilometers North of Dhaka. Since 1984 it has been the headquarters of Gazipur district. During the days of March 1971, the RMO would often be offering a helping hand to one or the other officer, because his medical commitments were very few. The battalion was intensely busy every day of the month of March. It revolted against the Pakistan government on the 26th of March 1971 and prepared itself to abandon the accommodation in the Rajbari on the evening of March 27. There could always be a slip between the cup and the lip, so the doctor of the battalion, Lieutenant Mokhtar Kamal did not want to miss the occasion. He warned Ibrahim likewise. Both Mokhtar Kamal and Ibrahim had taken oath at the time of their commission in the Pakistan Army “to defend the Constitution of Pakistan, to remain loyal to the President of Pakistan, to carry out the orders of any superior officer even to the peril of life.” Now, on the early hours of the March 26, 1971, Mokhtar Kamal and Ibrahim were revolting against the Pakistan Army and the President of Pakistan. The young educated readers of this column would surely be able to envisage the scenario: Mokhtar Kamal and Ibrahim were revolting, mutinying! Indeed, the entire Second Bengal was revolting and mutinying. It is but natural to enquire, why would disciplined soldiers revolt? Therefore, let me go back in history to a couple of days or weeks of March 1971, and present a review of the events to the readers, majority of whom are likely to be Bangladeshi generation, that is, born in, or after, 1971.
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman addressing the March 7 rally at Race Course. source: File photo
The elections to the national assembly of Pakistan and the provincial assemblies were held in the month of December 1970. The Army was deployed all over the province of East Pakistan to help civilian authorities in the holding of peaceful election. A platoon of thirty soldiers was deployed in the north-eastern area of Jamalpur sub-division, in Sherpur Thana. I was the platoon commander, just over 21 years of age. I and and all the other young soldiers mixed very easily with the local youths. On the one hand we had to maintain a posture of seriousness about maintaining law and order so that election could be held freely and fairly. On the other hand, we went all out to know the feelings of, and boost, the nationalistic spirit of the people. The election was held as scheduled, and the Awami League won a super-landslide victory, and people were eagerly waiting for the party to form a government and frame a new constitution for Pakistan. The inaugural meeting of the national assembly was knocking at the door. However, the dawn of hope for the Bengalis was a false dawn. We belonged to the army. And if we could read the pulse of the people, surely our colleagues or seniors could also read the same. But the interpretation could be different. The eyes of the Panjabi (that is to say Pakistanis) would most likely read differently than the eyes of a Bengali. Indeed, that was what happened.
The Pakistani military high command in Dhaka thought that the battalions of the Bengal Regiment might emotionally tilt towards the Bengali population. These battalions consisted of about fifty percent Bengali officers and about ninety percent of Bengali troops. In the opinion of the Pakistani high command, these battalions were potential volcanoes, which could erupt, ignited by a very volatile political environment. Thus, the Pakistani leadership in Dhaka decided to split the battalions into various acceptable groups and deploy them to the countryside on some plausible excuse. The Second Bengal was deployed in its own operational area, that is, the district of Mymensingh and Tangail. The high command publicised that, in a politically unstable time, neighboring Thus, the military must be prepared to meet the threat. But as I have explained, the aim was to disperse the battalions so that it was no longer in a position to take collective decisions, thus reducing its effectiveness. But alas, the Pakistanis misjudged the situation entirely.
Brigade Commander Col. Moinul Hossain Chowdhury, BB inspecting a 2 East bengal parade on unit's Raising Day, Feb 15, 1973
The first day of March brought the first shock. President Yahya Khan announced that the newly elected national assembly of Pakistan, which was schedule to meet for its inaugural session in Dhaka on the 3rd of March, would not meet -- the date was postponed. The people of East Pakistan burst into protest. On the March 2, the student leaders of Dhaka University hoisted the newly designed flag of an independent Bangladesh atop the Arts Faculty Building of Dhaka University. On the March 3, the student leaders on their own read out the proclamation of independence of a new country called Bangladesh. One day in the first week of March, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan (Commander, Eastern Command of Pakistan Army), addressed his farewell Darbar with Second Bengal. His short talk was very meaningful. The soldiers of Bengal Regiment were following the events closely. But since there were many Bengali officers in the battalions, the soldiers did not have to look beyond their own officers. They had confidence in the Bengali officers of their respective battalions. So was the case with Second Bengal. The soldiers of this battalion were spread all over, in the district of Mymensingh and Tangail, in their permanent location in Joydevpur, in Ordnance Factory Gazipur located five miles away from Joydevpur, and in the Ammunition Depot at Rajendrapur, eight miles from Joydevpur. The local people in all these locations interacted freely with the Bengali troops, thus bolstering each other's morale. The entire nation heard the speech of Bangabandhu delivered on March 7. The speech conveyed a lot. We in Second Bengal were no different from the other Bengalis. Our CO and second in command were Bengalis, and we had eight more Bengali officers in the battalion. Joydevpur in those days was the hub of political activism. Trade unionism was ripe in the surrounding areas. There was a big ground in Joydevpur, where political meeting could be held. Thus, the civilian and the military were more or less on the same frequency. The Second Bengal, being alone at Joydevpur, away from Dhaka Cantonment, had great freedom in planning its own activities. Let me jump back a few days.
On Junior Tigers' Raising Day, February 15, 1973
Our battalion was equipped with obsolescent weapons. The Pakistani high command, in order to enhance the battalion's effectiveness, issued a fresh set of weapons to the battalion before January of 1971. Those were Chinese semi-automatic 7.62 mm caliber weapons. In a way, Second Bengal had two sets of weapons for one set of soldiers. In early March of 1971, the Pakistani high command in Dhaka ordered Second Bengal to deposit the old set of weapons. The battalion made efforts to deposit the extra weapons to the ordnance depot in Dhaka Cantonment which was 21 miles away, but could not do so because of continuous political turmoil which used to disrupt road communication. Thus, the battalion continued to hold nearly double the quantity of authorised weapons. A time came when the seniors of the battalion thought, “why should we deposit these weapons; these could be of use in the very near future.”The Second Bengal was part of 57 Infantry Brigade which was a part of 14 Infantry Division, both located in Dhaka Cantonment. The Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab.
That Second Bengal was holding on to extra weapons which was a matter of serious headache for the Pakistani higher military command in Dhaka. So, Brigadier Arbab decided to recover the extra weapons in possession of Second Bengal. He sent a message to the CO that he would come to say 'hello' to the battalion since the battalion must be feeling “lonely in a politically hostile environment.”He wanted to come and express 'military-solidarity' with the troops of Second Bengal at Joydevpur. He fixed March 19, 1971 for that. Little could the Brigadier imagine that he was helping Second Bengal write new pages of history, he was giving the opportunity to the people of Joydevpur to express their anger and condemnation of the government's policies.
On Junior Tigers' Raising Day
The prevailing psyche and sensitivity of the locals need explanation. The people of Joydevpur, through various means reliable to them, had come to know of the impending visit of the Brigadier. They also learned or assumed with reasonable logic that the Brigadier was coming to snatch away the weapons from Second Bengal. The emotions of the people ran very high; they resolved not to allow the Brigadier to do so. The Brigadier came, accompanied by a team of seventy or so officers and soldiers. It was an imbalanced team. There were too many officers in the team than should have been, too many light machine guns and automatic weapons than the organisational rules permitted. None had any doubt that the Brigadier came with a camouflaged intention, that is, disarm Second Bengal. However, the Brigadier and the team misread the ability of the officers of Second Bengal to decipher his actual intention. The officers of Second Bengal stood in full battle readiness to welcome the team. Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab was amazed and taken by surprise. He decided to make an honorable withdrawal to Dhaka. It was then that trouble for him began, indeed the trouble for Pakistan began; the first page of battle history of 1971 was being written.
There is a railway crossing at Joydevpur. The military installation was on the eastern side of the level crossing.
On the western side were the Joydevpur market and the built-up area. Thousands of local people under the leadership of local political leaders like Kazi Azimuddin, A.K.M. Mozammel, Nazrul Islam Khan and Abdul Mottaleb Chowdhury, had thronged the bazaar. They fixed two spots to empty railway wagons on the level crossing to effectively block the communication. The Pakistani Army contingent under Brigadier Arbab could not cross the level crossing because of the barricade. They tried to disperse the crowd, but failed. The Brigadier then ordered Second Bengal to clear the barricade and the roadblock and facilitate the honorable withdrawal of the contingent to Dhaka, with the order to the contingent of the battalion to shoot to kill if needed; the road had to be cleared by any means. The battalion raised its voice of protest. They refused to kill people. The Brigadier threatened them with severe punishment for what he termed as mutiny or at least, disobedience of command. Second Bengal agreed to take the punishment. Local people in thousands, who had thronged the bazaar, were aflame in their emotions and ready to start a skirmish. It was an uphill task to contain popular emotion. The mob fired at Second Bengal and at the Pakistani troops. However, the senior officers of regiment who were on ground, close to the site, used patience and tact to pacify the angry crowd. The roadblock was cleared with the help of the people. The Arbab contingent started their way back towards Dhaka, registering the disconcerting fact for the Pakistanis the Bengalis and the Bengali troops had revolted. The news of the revolt spread like wildfire. 26th March appeared to be too late incoming.
Wife of a Shaheed laying wreath at the memorial in honour of martyrs of the regiment at Junior Tigers' unit lines
The CO of Second Bengal on that historic day, the 19th of March 1971, was Lieutenant Colonel Masoudul Hossain Khan; the Second in command was Major K.M. Safiullah. Major Moinul Hossain Chowdhury commanded the contingent which was ordered to confront the crowd with fire. Captain A.S.M. Nasim, Captain Mohammad Azizur Rahman, Captain Ejaz Ahmed Chowdhury performed other duties. Second Lieutenant Ibrahim, being the IO, hung around the CO, Colonel Masoud. Three days later, the CO was removed from command and placed under virtual house arrest in his house in Dhaka Cantonment, and Major K.M. Saifullah took care of the battalion for a day or two. One Lieutenant Colonel MA Rakib was placed in command or unit. The Commandant of the East Bengal Regimental Center, Brigadier MR Majumder, came in person to pacify the troops and make it easy for Colonel Rakib to settle down. Col Rakib, however, hardly had time to familiarise with the battalion, because events moved too fast.
Honour Guard saluting the memorial
I have not mentioned or discussed all that was happening in the-then provincial capital city of Dhaka between the President of Pakistan General Yahya Khan and leader of the people, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But the events were creating an indelible impact on the minds of the Bengali people. Their sentiment and emotion had reached the zenith. We the soldiers were silent observers, apart from the events that I have described, our emotions were no different than the people's. The Pakistani military junta decided to use brute military force to solve the political problem. Following the day of 25th March 1971, at midnight, the crackdown began. 'Operation Search Light' was launched. Not only were civilian population and students attacked, unsuspecting young soldiers, sleeping unaware, were also attacked and killed in hundreds and thousands in many military barracks.
The Bengali officers and soldiers of the battalions of the East Bengal Regiment had made up their minds, but now they had to act on the decision – which was to revolt and join the war of liberation. They did it. The First and Third Bengal Regiments had to fight it out, taking a day or two. The remaining battalions did so instantly. In Chittagong Major Ziaur Rahman in Sholoshohor, Captain Rafiqul Islam in Halishohor, Captain Harun Ahmed Chowdhury in Kaptai, and Major Khaled Mosharraf with 4 Bengal, mutinied against the Pakistani higher command. Major Safiullah, with the elements of Second Bengal at Joydevpur and Gazipur revolted on the 26th. We took a day two organise our logistics to move out with everything that we had but nothing personal. We moved out to join our troops in Tangail and Mymensingh. Thus, ended the days of waiting and began the days of fighting.
The writer is a retired army officer.
The elections to the national assembly of Pakistan and the provincial assemblies were held in the month of December 1970. The Army was deployed all over the province of East Pakistan to help civilian authorities in the holding of peaceful election. A platoon of thirty soldiers was deployed in the north-eastern area of Jamalpur sub-division, in Sherpur Thana. I was the platoon commander, just over 21 years of age. I and and all the other young soldiers mixed very easily with the local youths. On the one hand we had to maintain a posture of seriousness about maintaining law and order so that election could be held freely and fairly. On the other hand, we went all out to know the feelings of, and boost, the nationalistic spirit of the people. The election was held as scheduled, and the Awami League won a super-landslide victory, and people were eagerly waiting for the party to form a government and frame a new constitution for Pakistan. The inaugural meeting of the national assembly was knocking at the door. However, the dawn of hope for the Bengalis was a false dawn. We belonged to the army. And if we could read the pulse of the people, surely our colleagues or seniors could also read the same. But the interpretation could be different. The eyes of the Panjabi (that is to say Pakistanis) would most likely read differently than the eyes of a Bengali. Indeed, that was what happened.
The Pakistani military high command in Dhaka thought that the battalions of the Bengal Regiment might emotionally tilt towards the Bengali population. These battalions consisted of about fifty percent Bengali officers and about ninety percent of Bengali troops. In the opinion of the Pakistani high command, these battalions were potential volcanoes, which could erupt, ignited by a very volatile political environment. Thus, the Pakistani leadership in Dhaka decided to split the battalions into various acceptable groups and deploy them to the countryside on some plausible excuse. The Second Bengal was deployed in its own operational area, that is, the district of Mymensingh and Tangail. The high command publicised that, in a politically unstable time, neighboring Thus, the military must be prepared to meet the threat. But as I have explained, the aim was to disperse the battalions so that it was no longer in a position to take collective decisions, thus reducing its effectiveness. But alas, the Pakistanis misjudged the situation entirely.
Brigade Commander Col. Moinul Hossain Chowdhury, BB inspecting a 2 East bengal parade on unit's Raising Day, Feb 15, 1973
The first day of March brought the first shock. President Yahya Khan announced that the newly elected national assembly of Pakistan, which was schedule to meet for its inaugural session in Dhaka on the 3rd of March, would not meet -- the date was postponed. The people of East Pakistan burst into protest. On the March 2, the student leaders of Dhaka University hoisted the newly designed flag of an independent Bangladesh atop the Arts Faculty Building of Dhaka University. On the March 3, the student leaders on their own read out the proclamation of independence of a new country called Bangladesh. One day in the first week of March, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan (Commander, Eastern Command of Pakistan Army), addressed his farewell Darbar with Second Bengal. His short talk was very meaningful. The soldiers of Bengal Regiment were following the events closely. But since there were many Bengali officers in the battalions, the soldiers did not have to look beyond their own officers. They had confidence in the Bengali officers of their respective battalions. So was the case with Second Bengal. The soldiers of this battalion were spread all over, in the district of Mymensingh and Tangail, in their permanent location in Joydevpur, in Ordnance Factory Gazipur located five miles away from Joydevpur, and in the Ammunition Depot at Rajendrapur, eight miles from Joydevpur. The local people in all these locations interacted freely with the Bengali troops, thus bolstering each other's morale. The entire nation heard the speech of Bangabandhu delivered on March 7. The speech conveyed a lot. We in Second Bengal were no different from the other Bengalis. Our CO and second in command were Bengalis, and we had eight more Bengali officers in the battalion. Joydevpur in those days was the hub of political activism. Trade unionism was ripe in the surrounding areas. There was a big ground in Joydevpur, where political meeting could be held. Thus, the civilian and the military were more or less on the same frequency. The Second Bengal, being alone at Joydevpur, away from Dhaka Cantonment, had great freedom in planning its own activities. Let me jump back a few days.
On Junior Tigers' Raising Day, February 15, 1973
Our battalion was equipped with obsolescent weapons. The Pakistani high command, in order to enhance the battalion's effectiveness, issued a fresh set of weapons to the battalion before January of 1971. Those were Chinese semi-automatic 7.62 mm caliber weapons. In a way, Second Bengal had two sets of weapons for one set of soldiers. In early March of 1971, the Pakistani high command in Dhaka ordered Second Bengal to deposit the old set of weapons. The battalion made efforts to deposit the extra weapons to the ordnance depot in Dhaka Cantonment which was 21 miles away, but could not do so because of continuous political turmoil which used to disrupt road communication. Thus, the battalion continued to hold nearly double the quantity of authorised weapons. A time came when the seniors of the battalion thought, “why should we deposit these weapons; these could be of use in the very near future.”The Second Bengal was part of 57 Infantry Brigade which was a part of 14 Infantry Division, both located in Dhaka Cantonment. The Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab.
That Second Bengal was holding on to extra weapons which was a matter of serious headache for the Pakistani higher military command in Dhaka. So, Brigadier Arbab decided to recover the extra weapons in possession of Second Bengal. He sent a message to the CO that he would come to say 'hello' to the battalion since the battalion must be feeling “lonely in a politically hostile environment.”He wanted to come and express 'military-solidarity' with the troops of Second Bengal at Joydevpur. He fixed March 19, 1971 for that. Little could the Brigadier imagine that he was helping Second Bengal write new pages of history, he was giving the opportunity to the people of Joydevpur to express their anger and condemnation of the government's policies.
On Junior Tigers' Raising Day
The prevailing psyche and sensitivity of the locals need explanation. The people of Joydevpur, through various means reliable to them, had come to know of the impending visit of the Brigadier. They also learned or assumed with reasonable logic that the Brigadier was coming to snatch away the weapons from Second Bengal. The emotions of the people ran very high; they resolved not to allow the Brigadier to do so. The Brigadier came, accompanied by a team of seventy or so officers and soldiers. It was an imbalanced team. There were too many officers in the team than should have been, too many light machine guns and automatic weapons than the organisational rules permitted. None had any doubt that the Brigadier came with a camouflaged intention, that is, disarm Second Bengal. However, the Brigadier and the team misread the ability of the officers of Second Bengal to decipher his actual intention. The officers of Second Bengal stood in full battle readiness to welcome the team. Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab was amazed and taken by surprise. He decided to make an honorable withdrawal to Dhaka. It was then that trouble for him began, indeed the trouble for Pakistan began; the first page of battle history of 1971 was being written.
There is a railway crossing at Joydevpur. The military installation was on the eastern side of the level crossing.
On the western side were the Joydevpur market and the built-up area. Thousands of local people under the leadership of local political leaders like Kazi Azimuddin, A.K.M. Mozammel, Nazrul Islam Khan and Abdul Mottaleb Chowdhury, had thronged the bazaar. They fixed two spots to empty railway wagons on the level crossing to effectively block the communication. The Pakistani Army contingent under Brigadier Arbab could not cross the level crossing because of the barricade. They tried to disperse the crowd, but failed. The Brigadier then ordered Second Bengal to clear the barricade and the roadblock and facilitate the honorable withdrawal of the contingent to Dhaka, with the order to the contingent of the battalion to shoot to kill if needed; the road had to be cleared by any means. The battalion raised its voice of protest. They refused to kill people. The Brigadier threatened them with severe punishment for what he termed as mutiny or at least, disobedience of command. Second Bengal agreed to take the punishment. Local people in thousands, who had thronged the bazaar, were aflame in their emotions and ready to start a skirmish. It was an uphill task to contain popular emotion. The mob fired at Second Bengal and at the Pakistani troops. However, the senior officers of regiment who were on ground, close to the site, used patience and tact to pacify the angry crowd. The roadblock was cleared with the help of the people. The Arbab contingent started their way back towards Dhaka, registering the disconcerting fact for the Pakistanis the Bengalis and the Bengali troops had revolted. The news of the revolt spread like wildfire. 26th March appeared to be too late incoming.
Wife of a Shaheed laying wreath at the memorial in honour of martyrs of the regiment at Junior Tigers' unit lines
The CO of Second Bengal on that historic day, the 19th of March 1971, was Lieutenant Colonel Masoudul Hossain Khan; the Second in command was Major K.M. Safiullah. Major Moinul Hossain Chowdhury commanded the contingent which was ordered to confront the crowd with fire. Captain A.S.M. Nasim, Captain Mohammad Azizur Rahman, Captain Ejaz Ahmed Chowdhury performed other duties. Second Lieutenant Ibrahim, being the IO, hung around the CO, Colonel Masoud. Three days later, the CO was removed from command and placed under virtual house arrest in his house in Dhaka Cantonment, and Major K.M. Saifullah took care of the battalion for a day or two. One Lieutenant Colonel MA Rakib was placed in command or unit. The Commandant of the East Bengal Regimental Center, Brigadier MR Majumder, came in person to pacify the troops and make it easy for Colonel Rakib to settle down. Col Rakib, however, hardly had time to familiarise with the battalion, because events moved too fast.
Honour Guard saluting the memorial
I have not mentioned or discussed all that was happening in the-then provincial capital city of Dhaka between the President of Pakistan General Yahya Khan and leader of the people, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But the events were creating an indelible impact on the minds of the Bengali people. Their sentiment and emotion had reached the zenith. We the soldiers were silent observers, apart from the events that I have described, our emotions were no different than the people's. The Pakistani military junta decided to use brute military force to solve the political problem. Following the day of 25th March 1971, at midnight, the crackdown began. 'Operation Search Light' was launched. Not only were civilian population and students attacked, unsuspecting young soldiers, sleeping unaware, were also attacked and killed in hundreds and thousands in many military barracks.
The Bengali officers and soldiers of the battalions of the East Bengal Regiment had made up their minds, but now they had to act on the decision – which was to revolt and join the war of liberation. They did it. The First and Third Bengal Regiments had to fight it out, taking a day or two. The remaining battalions did so instantly. In Chittagong Major Ziaur Rahman in Sholoshohor, Captain Rafiqul Islam in Halishohor, Captain Harun Ahmed Chowdhury in Kaptai, and Major Khaled Mosharraf with 4 Bengal, mutinied against the Pakistani higher command. Major Safiullah, with the elements of Second Bengal at Joydevpur and Gazipur revolted on the 26th. We took a day two organise our logistics to move out with everything that we had but nothing personal. We moved out to join our troops in Tangail and Mymensingh. Thus, ended the days of waiting and began the days of fighting.
The writer is a retired army officer.
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Chief of Army provides national flag to 40 East Bengal Regiment
These flags have been provided to recognize the regiment’s contributions in times of war and peace
Tribune Desk
Publish : 08 Nov 2018, 04:18 PMUpdate : 08 Nov 2018, 04:18 PM
Chief of Army Staff (CAS) of Bangladesh Army General Aziz, BGBM, PBGM, BGBMS, PSC, G, has given a national flag to 40 East Bengal Regiment (Mechanized) through a military parade in Chittagong army's East Bengal Regimental Centre.
GOC Army Training and Doctrine Command (ARTDOC) Lieutenant General Md Nazimuddin, GOC 24 Infantry Division and Area Commander, Chittagong Area Major General SM Matiur Rahman and Papa Tiger, East Bengal Regimental Center Brigadier General Md Habibul Karim welcomed the chief of army staff on arrival at the parade grounds on Thursday.
The flag has officially been provided for the regiment’s contribution to: competence, dutifulness, military, and national development—as well as for the regiment’s heroic contribution in times of war and peace.
According to a press release, the 40 East Bengal Regiment (Mechanized), "Chiranjib Challish," loosely translated to, “Forever Forty,” which was established on April 30, 1982, has been awarded this rare honor in recognition of 36 years of uninterrupted service and contribution.
Offering his sincere congratulations to "Chiranjib Challish" for achieving the rare honor and glory of getting the national flag, the Chief of Army Staff said: "The flag that you received today is recognition of dedication, hard work and duty; I hope you will make any sacrifice for the sake of protecting its dignity. And hope you will always work hard in keeping the faith of the nation towards you."
Later, the head of the army laid the foundation for the construction of the "Tigers Museum" to preserve the history and heritage of East Bengal Regiment.
Senior army officers, including two former army chiefs, were present at the occasion.
