[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh

[Saif]

Source: https://www.PKDefense.com

Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh​

By Saif​

The independence movement under the leadership of Congress was for establishing undivided independent India through the eviction of British rulers from the soil of India, but the degeneration of Hindu-Muslim relations into hostility and the subsequent demand of Muslim league for a separate state for the Muslims of the region thwarted the dream of an undivided independent India and made the partition of subcontinent inevitable. While the initial proposal for the partition met with steep resistance as most of the senior leaders of Congress namely, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad vehemently protested such proposal and termed it as British conspiracy to divide India, the Congress finally gave its nod of approval in the fear that outright rejection of the partition proposal might be used by the British colonial rulers against the independence movement to perpetuate their political domination over the country and in the hope that with a small resource base, peculiar geographic reality that separates both the wings of the country by one thousand miles, and paucity of leaders with high political experience, Pakistan would not survive too long and would reunite with India in the end.

There is no surprise that partition of India came as a shock to Congress leaders and that they could never reconcile themselves to the idea of an independent Pakistan because their freedom struggle was for undivided India, and therefore they wanted to roll back the geographical changes made to Indian subcontinent through partition and their intention was clearly demonstrated to Pakistan from the very beginning, which gave rise to a plethora of problems and a paucity of trust between the two nations.

What Pakistan needed in those formative years was national unity and balanced development in the two wings to ensure security and progress to consolidate its position as a powerful nation in the subcontinent and to thwart Indian attempt to undo the geographical arrangements after partition. But the then Pakistani leaders' myopic failure to recognize Bengalis as equal partners and unforgivable reluctance to give them due share of political power and economic opportunity caused widespread resentment among the East Pakistanis, which was cunningly used by India against Pakistan in the subsequent years. The Indian political leaders in later years used their diplomatic channels and intelligence agencies to cultivate close relations with East Pakistani political establishment in order to involve themselves in almost all political movements in East Pakistan to use the prevailing sense of deprivation among East Pakistanis to their own political advantage and to instigate East Pakistanis against West Pakistanis to accelerate

the process of disintegration of Pakistan firstly, to weaken it, and secondly, to bring it back to India's lap through various political machinations to realize the dream of undivided India.

No amount of political negotiations between the two wings could improve the situation in East Pakistan due, mainly, to the stubbornness of West Pakistanis, which gave rise to increasing sense of alienation and deprivation among the people of East Pakistan, and finally when Sheikh Mujib was denied the premiership in 1970, Bengalis decided to get out of the relationship once and for all. So, for the first time and certainly for the last time in history, the disintegration of Pakistan became a common goal for both India and Bengalis of East Pakistan as the former wanted to break Pakistan to realize its vision of undivided India and the latter wanted to establish a separate independent nation to rid themselves of an insensitive and repressive political regime.

 

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Evolution of Indian Strategic Goal

The Indian strategic goal underwent a gradual evolution since the independence of Bangladesh. The primary motivations for India to get involved in the liberation war of Bangladesh was the break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of a friendly but weak Bangladesh for the security of its North-East region. But aggressive endeavors were also conducted to gradually lure Bangladesh into a trap to make her India-locked strategically. This section will discuss:

• Specific Indian actions to help in the liberation war
• Indian motivations and seven point agreement
• 25 year friendship treaty and its impact

Steps Taken By The Indira Govt. To Help In The Liberation War


As soon as the Pakistani army cracked down on unarmed East Pakistanis, India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, took bold steps to help the Bengalis in their just struggle for independence against the fascist regime of Yahya Khan. The Indira government set the following objectives to ensure a desired outcome in the war for both Indians and East Pakistanis:

1. To give safe passage to top Awami League leaders to India and to help form the Mujibnagar government
2. To help form Mukti Bahini and to provide necessary training and weapons
3. To form Mujib Bahini as an alternative force and to use them in special operations
4. To provide asylum to refugees from East Pakistan
5. To launch a vigorous diplomatic campaign worldwide through its foreign services to garner support for East Pakistan's just struggle for freedom
6. To use its military and intelligence resources to the extent possible to help the freedom fighters sustain a prolonged war against the powerful Pakistan army

India Never Lost Sight of Its Strategic Goal

Some people may argue that India's decision to help in 1971 was based purely on humanitarian grounds, but the reality is that India's decision to extend its wholehearted support to Bangladesh's liberation war was a premeditated one and was primarily based on its own strategic goal of disintegrating Pakistan to undo the changes made through partition. Former Indian foreign secretary Mr. Dixit said, "We helped in the liberation of Bangladesh in mutual interest, it was not a favor”, and a senior RAW intelligence officer said, "Bangladesh was the result of a 10 year long promotion of dissatisfaction against the rulers of Pakistan”. These statements from two former top Indian government officials are testaments to the fact that Indian help for Bangladesh was not an altruistic one, but rather a carefully planned strategic maneuver to disintegrate Pakistan and that the intelligence agencies of India were engaged in fomenting unrest in East Pakistan long before 1971. With their strategic goal in mind, India concluded a seven point agreement with Mujibnagar government to seal the fate of a negotiated settlement between East and West Pakistan, to cripple Bangladesh by depriving it of its sovereign right to raise a standing army, and to strip Bangladesh of her power to independently formulate foreign policy. Now, for the benefit of the readers let me briefly describe the points of the 'seven point agreement':

1. Bangladesh government will select only those people for administrative posts who have actively participated in the liberation war and any shortfall therein will be filled by the Indian government officials.
2. A joint force will be formed comprising of the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini and this force will be placed under the command of the chief of staff of the Indian army who will lead the liberation war.
3. Bangladesh will have no standing army.
4. India will help raise a paramilitary force to protect internal law and order of the country.
5. Open market will be the basis for trade relation between the two nations and this arrangement will be subject to periodical reviews.
6. The Indian army will be stationed in Bangladesh for an indefinite period of time, but the time frame for their gradual withdrawal will be determined through annual meetings between the two governments.
7. Bangladesh will formulate her foreign policy only in consultation with India.

The conclusion of the seven point agreement only ensured that the Mujibnagar government would continue the war until Bangladesh gained full independence from Pakistan, but it did not give the guarantee that China and America would not interfere in the event the Indian army directly intervened in East Pakistan. So, the Indira government approached the former Soviet Union for a security guarantee against impending Chinese and American threats, and it was made available to them in the shape of '25 year friendship treaty' by the erstwhile Soviet Union, which was also seeking to play a substantial role in the subcontinent to expand its own sphere of influence.

The signing of the seven point agreement with Mujib Government and the 25 year friendship treaty with the Soviets removed all obstacles for the Indian forces to directly intervene in East Pakistan, and it took them less than two weeks to overrun the defensive positions of the Pakistan army, which was already exhausted by a nine month long guerrilla war against Mukti Bahini and was at the final stages of disintegration and collapse. At the end of the war, Bangladesh got her much cherished independence and India could break Pakistan into two pieces for which it had been scheming since 1947.

 

[Saif]

Bangladesh Steps Into A Strategic Trap

While the public of Bangladesh, in general, and the Mujib government, in particular, were extremely grateful to India for its help and support in the war of liberation and wanted to maintain the best possible relationship with the Indian people, the Indians were not complacent with friendship from 'ex-East Pakistanis' and were making their own strategic plans in line with the seven point agreement to reduce Bangladesh's relevance as an independent nation through limiting her power to formulate national policies so as to protect their long term strategic interest in North-East India. A strategic trap was set for Bangladesh in the form of '25 year friendship treaty' which took away most, if not all, options for Bangladesh to independently establish foreign, defense, and economic relations with other nations in the world. I would like to briefly mention a few clauses of the '25 year friendship treaty' that had deleterious effects on our foreign, defense, and economic interests:

Article 4: Both the nations will hold regular meetings with each other at all levels to discuss major international issues for mutual benefits.​

Article 5: Both the nations will cooperate with each other in the field of trade, transport, and communications on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and the most favored nation principle.​

Article 8: None of the nations will ever enter into a military alliance against each other and will refrain from allowing a third party from using their soil for military purposes that could constitute a threat to national security for either of the nations.​

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Article 9: Both the nations will refrain from providing any assistance to a third party taking part in an armed conflict against either of the nations to ensure regional peace and security.​

Article 10: Neither of the parties will undertake any commitment, secret or open, toward one or more states, which may violate the spirit of the treaty.​

Article 4 practically eliminated Bangladesh's power to devise an independent foreign policy and made it compulsory for Bangladesh to consult India about any major foreign policy matter.

Article 5 created an unequal economic relation between the two nations because contrary to India, Bangladesh, being a smaller economy, was unable to avail itself of the opportunities of most favored nation status.

Article 8 ensured that if there was a military conflict between Bangladesh and India, Bangladesh, as a weaker power, could not seek help from outside world to protect her territorial integrity.

Article 9 greatly diminished Bangladesh's own security by making her a party to the Indian strategic plan for the North-East and by putting her on a collision course with the insurgents who had nothing against Bangladesh and in fact were a great help in the liberation war, but India itself broke the sanctity of this clause by providing military and political assistance to Shanti Bahini in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Article 10 restricted Bangladesh's power to sign a defense deal with a third party to improve her armed forces.

By dint of this treaty India was able to diminish Bangladesh's power to protect herself and her right to establish political and economic relations with other nations independently, and consequently became the de-facto power over Bangladesh to whom the new born country had to depend for her security and economic development only to lose her relevance as a sovereign nation.

 

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Strategic Importance of Bangladesh

Notwithstanding her small geographical size, Bangladesh does have certain strategic advantages that make her important to regional and extra regional powers which may draw her into a complex geopolitical scenario of big power rivalry. Bangladesh being the land-bridge between South and South-East Asia, and between East and North-East India provides the most cost-effective and the safest way for inter-regional and intra-regional connectivity. Describing the strategic importance of Bangladesh in relation to India, a renowned security analyst Mr. C. Raja Mohan, said “Relations with Bangladesh are too important to be left to traditional ways of doing diplomatic business. Bangladesh is one of the few Islamic nations of the world where a fragile democracy is taking root; it is a large market for Indian goods and has a huge bearing on India's security and development challenges in the North East." Now, Bangladesh may be seen as a key player in strategic game plan of the U.S.A., China, India, and Pakistan because of the following reasons:

1. Bridge between East and North-East India: The unique geographical location of Bangladesh which cuts the troubled North East region of India off from the mainland constitutes a significant security weak point for India for the fact that the region shares border with China and that various insurgent groups are active within the region who are fighting against the Indian government for self determination. In light of their experience in Indo-China war in 1962, the Indian defense planners consider the 'strategic chicken neck' to be inadequate and see Bangladesh as the safest and the shortest route to transport military logistics to North-East region in case of a future military conflict with China. A strategic corridor through Bangladesh is also seen as important to conduct sustained military campaign against the insurgents in North East. The corridor through Bangladesh has economic significance as well because it is the most cost effective route to connect North-East to the rest of India for transshipment of industrial goods to improve the economic condition of this land-locked region. Describing the economic significance of a corridor through Bangladesh for India, Mr. G. Srinivasan said, “The road route between East India and Northeast India through Bangladesh reduces transport distance by more than 60 per cent in comparison to the current route around Bangladesh through Siliguri”
2. Bridge between SAARC and ASEAN: Bangladesh which is the land-bridge between SAARC and ASEAN has enormous geographical advantage for her proximity to Myanmar and other South-East Asian nations to promote inter- regional economic, political, and security cooperation. Once connected via Asian Highway (AH-41) and Trans-Asian Railway, Bangladesh will be the main transit point for inter-regional economic interactions amongst South and South-East Asian nations. Bangladesh with appropriate policies and infrastructures in place will be playing a pivotal role in defining the direction of economic relations between these two emerging regional groups.
3. Gateway to Bay of Bengal: Bangladesh is considered the gateway to Bay of Bengal with her 45000 sq. miles of sea territory in which lies valuable marine resources such as hydrocarbon, fisheries etc. Her well developed sea ports are of enormous importance because India can use these port facilities to increase trade with its landlocked North-East region while other South and South East Asian countries and China can use them to increase intra-regional and inter-regional economic cooperation. The Chinese navy is also making rapid progress in developing naval relations with coastal nations such as Myanmar and Bangladesh to gain access to their port facilities so as to conduct sustained naval operations in the sea to control the oil transshipment and trade routes in the Indian Ocean. In light of the recently concluded Indo-U.S. Strategic agreement, it is understood that any Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal may be construed as strategic interference in South Asia, and the U.S.A and India may act to prevent Bangladesh from allowing any permanent naval base facilities to China. Therefore, Bangladesh is considered a country of enormous strategic maritime importance for major powers to establish strategic control over South Asia.
4. Energy security: Because of its burgeoning population, high economic growth rate, and rapid industrialization, India has become the sixth largest energy consumer in the world, but it has to import oil to meet 70% of its domestic demand which cost 40% of its total export earnings. It has to diversify import source for uninterrupted supply of energy, but due to international politics importing hydrocarbon from Iran and Venezuela has become uncertain leaving Bangladesh and Myanmar as only cheap and secure sources of energy supply. While Bangladesh has a speculative gas reserve of 33 TCF, her proven reserve is only 12 -15 TCF which is inadequate to meet her own domestic demand so the government has already decided against exporting gas to other countries unless new reserves are found. Even though Bangladesh has expressed her inability to export gas at the moment, India considers Bangladesh a major source of energy in the long run because of her potentials to discover huge hydrocarbon reserves in the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh also is the most cost effective route for India to import gas from Myanmar, and therefore Bangladesh may emerge as a significant player in regional strategic energy game.
5. Balance of power: Bangladesh is significant because of the complex strategic scenario that has emerged due to India's strategic alliance with the U.S.A to contain China and its rivalry with Pakistan for regional supremacy. India has to take cognizance of the fact that Bangladesh has established deep military relations with China and has somewhat repaired her fractured relations with Pakistan to correct the problem in balance of power situation with India. So, the possible military role of Bangladesh in case of a war either between India and China or between India and Pakistan could be a strategic concern for India.

 

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Indian strategic plan to dominate Bangladesh

In light of Bangladesh's endeavors to take control of her own affairs and her attempts to seek greater independence in foreign policy matters, India formulated a detailed strategic plan to deny Bangladesh a fair opportunity to

build capacity commensurate with her strategic importance and national strength to reduce India's strategic vulnerabilities and to keep Bangladesh within its own sphere of influence as part of its greater regional game plan. In this section we will discuss what goals and objectives India is pursuing and the strategies they have put in place to achieve them.

Strategic Goals

1. To reduce strategic and economic vulnerabilities of North-East India through improving connectivity and accessibility, and through gaining access to the Sea.
2. To diminish strategic advantage of Bangladesh and to gain disproportionate influence on Bangladesh's national policies in general, and foreign, defense, and economic policies in particular.

Strategic objectives

1. To obtain unrestricted transit facilities to transport goods, industrial or military, to and from North-East India and to obtain perpetual rights to use Chittagong sea port.
2. To stop Bangladesh from marching toward the East to confine her within Indian sphere of influence and to reduce Bangladesh's options for integrating her economy with other emerging economies in adjacent regions in order to restrict growth potentials.
3. To extend political help and support to promote friendly elements in domestic politics in order to extract undue favors and privileges from Bangladesh.
4. To deter and discourage Bangladesh from seeking outside help to resolve outstanding issues so as to impose bilateral-ism to negotiate from the position of strength.