[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

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US opens direct talks with Myanmar's generals, reversing years of isolation

The Trump administration has begun direct talks with Myanmar’s military-installed government, according to US officials and others familiar with the outreach, in a sharp reversal of Washington's efforts to isolate the country’s generals after the 2021 coup.

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US opens direct talks with Myanmar's generals, reversing years of isolation

Reuters
Washington
Published: 08 Oct 2026, 22: 50

Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing inspects an honor guard during a welcoming ceremony ahead of his meeting with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim at the Prime Minister’s Office in Putrajaya, Malaysia, Thursday, 8 Oct 2026. Reuters

The Trump administration has begun direct talks with Myanmar’s military-installed government, according to US officials and others familiar with the outreach, in a sharp reversal of Washington's efforts to isolate the country’s generals after the 2021 coup.

The US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Michael Vance, played a leading role in the outreach, which has focused on shutting down scam centers that target Americans but could lead to broader engagement, including on Myanmar’s rare-earth mineral deposits, according to seven current and former officials and others familiar with the policy shift.

Vance joined talks with coup leader-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing in the capital Naypyitaw on September 15-16. The meeting was aimed at securing the release of American businessman Adam Castillo but also provided an opening for further engagement, four of the people said.

Last month’s meeting — the highest‑level contact since the coup — underscores a broader Trump‑administration foreign policy tilt away from democracy promotion toward transactional engagement.

The presence of Vance, who was confirmed as the State Department’s top intelligence official in August, and his ongoing role in US policy toward Myanmar have not been previously reported.

Military leader remains under US sanctions

Min Aung Hlaing, the former military chief, remains under US sanctions for human rights abuses, including the 2016-2017 mass killings and expulsions of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims that Washington declared a genocide. Less than two weeks after Vance’s visit, Myanmar’s military conducted an airstrike on a crowded marketplace in Rakhine state, killing over 50 people and injuring scores more, according to United Nations human rights officials.

The State Department said it engages with all groups in Myanmar on issues affecting US interests and raises the need to cease violence and release political prisoners.

“You don't solve problems by ignoring them. You solve problems by addressing them,” spokesperson Tommy Pigott said in a statement.

A spokesperson for the military-backed government did not respond to a request for comment. Min Aung Hlaing, who has cited electoral fraud to justify the coup and labeled his opponents as terrorists, is seeking international legitimacy for his nominally civilian government.

Current and former officials say Vance has met players from all sides of Myanmar’s complex conflict and helped shape the Trump administration’s policy toward the country.

Intelligence chiefs — such as Vance — do not typically steer policy because of concerns about compromising analytic independence.

“If you let policy dictate to intelligence, you can't be sure you're getting a real honest assessment of the facts,” said Richard Betts, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who has consulted for US intelligence agencies.

Pigott declined to address Vance’s role but said the administration “operates as a team with the president as the lead.”

A detained American, and an opening

Castillo, a former head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar, was detained at Yangon airport on 11 June by Myanmar authorities on what his supporters have described as trumped-up charges. The US government has not commented on whether Castillo was wrongfully detained.

People familiar with the matter said White House, National Security Council and State Department officials held back-channel negotiations with Myanmar officials to secure his release. One person said Myanmar asked only "to have an official engagement at the right level with the US government" in return.

Castillo declined to comment beyond crediting President Donald Trump for his release.

The meeting builds on a June meeting between US and Myanmar officials in Tokyo also involving Vance, four people said. One of the people said officials from the Treasury Department, which oversees sanctions, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Pentagon took part.

It was unclear who represented Myanmar at the talks.

Vance, who became involved in Myanmar policy while advising Vice President JD Vance on Asian affairs, has also met in person and virtually with the democratic opposition and ethnic armed groups fighting the military, five of the people said.

A major focus of the US push is getting Myanmar's help shuttering scam hubsoperating on its territory that run romance and other frauds, which have scammed Americans out of billions of dollars. Two people familiar with the matter said the FBI has had direct contact with Myanmar’s authorities on cyber scams.

Researchers say many scams are run from areas under militia control, with some proceeds flowing to the military, raising doubts about whether Myanmar’s leaders are serious about enforcement.

US officials also discussed access to Myanmar’s massive deposits of heavy rare earths that are used in electric vehicles and wind turbines. US officials acknowledge obstacles: the deposits mainly lie in territory held by ethnic armies fighting Myanmar’s military government, and China, currently the main importer, could see any US role as a challenge.

Still, with Washington seeking to diversify supply chains away from China, Myanmar's deposits remain a recurring topic in conversations, the people said.

From sanctions to engagement

After the 2021 coup, President Joe Biden's administration froze Myanmar's assets at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and imposed sanctions on senior officers and military‑linked businesses.

In 2022, Congress authorized non-lethal support for the opposition, funding early-warning systems for airstrikes and incentives for officers to defect.

Most of those programs were cut during Trump’s foreign-aid overhaul last year, according to four current and former officials and State Department correspondence with Congress reviewed by Reuters.

The State Department said its engagement with the military government does not diminish its relationships with other groups. The US continues to provide assistance to areas outside military control, it said, without detailing that aid.

Representative Gregory Meeks, the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the shift was “contrary to both our values and our interests.”

“By engaging Min Aung Hlaing while failing to implement congressionally mandated sanctions and deploy appropriated democracy funding, Secretary (Marco) Rubio is ceding U.S. leadership and providing this murderous regime greater international legitimacy,” Meeks said in a statement to Reuters.

Myanmar's government, installed after elections criticized by rights groups as a sham, has hired lobbyists to press its case in Washington.

In April, Roger Stone, a longtime Trump adviser, began consulting for DCI Group on behalf of Myanmar's Ministry of Information, according to Foreign Agents Registration Act filings. Stone was convicted in 2019 of obstructing a congressional investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election. Trump later pardoned him.

A newsletter distributed by DCI warned in June that Washington risked being shut out of access to critical minerals if it did not engage with Myanmar.​

 

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Australia provides Tk 1.55b to support Rohingyas, host communities in Bangladesh

Australia has signed an AUD18 million (about Tk 1.55 billion) agreement with BRAC to support Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh.

en.prothomalo.com

Australia provides Tk 1.55b to support Rohingyas, host communities in Bangladesh

Prothom Alo English Desk
Dhaka

Refugee Camp in Kutupalong, Cox's Bazar, BangladeshFile photo

Australia has signed an AUD18 million (about Tk 1.55 billion) agreement with BRAC to support Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh.

Australian High Commissioner Susan Ryle and BRAC Executive Director Asif Saleh signed the agreement. The announcement was made in the presence of Disaster Management and Relief Minister Asadul Habib Dulu.

The funding will provide flexible, multi-year support for essential services for Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char, according to a press release issued by the Australian High Commission.

Under the agreement, BRAC will provide support in areas including healthcare, water and sanitation, education, disaster risk management, skills development and protection services in the refugee camps and surrounding host communities.

The programme will also support local organisations through BRAC’s localisation fund. The fund is intended to strengthen the capacity of national partners, support cost-effective delivery of services at scale and expand coverage in underserved camps, according to the release.

The new agreement is part of Australia’s AUD370 million (about Tk 31.6 billion) humanitarian package for 2026–2028. The package will support Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh as well as people affected by the crisis in Myanmar.

Since 2017, Australia has committed AUD1.26 billion (about Tk 107.7 billion) in humanitarian assistance in response to the regional crisis, the release said.

Australia remains committed to supporting the Bangladesh government in providing humanitarian assistance to displaced Rohingyas and their host communities, it said.

The Australian government said continued access to essential support for the Rohingya was critical until conditions are in place for their voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return to Myanmar.​

 

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87pc of Rohingyas unwilling to return unless 5 conditions met

According to them, given the violence they experienced in Myanmar, their repatriation would not be sustainable unless these conditions are met.

en.prothomalo.com

87pc of Rohingyas unwilling to return unless 5 conditions met

 

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Bangladesh firm on safe, voluntary, sustainable Rohingya repatriation: Home minister

Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed has reaffirmed Bangladesh’s commitment to the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation of forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals to their homeland. "Coordinated regional and international diplomatic efforts are being strengthened to ensure their re

thefinancialexpress.com.bd

Bangladesh firm on safe, voluntary, sustainable Rohingya repatriation: Home minister

Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed has reaffirmed Bangladesh’s commitment to the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation of forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals to their homeland.

"Coordinated regional and international diplomatic efforts are being strengthened to ensure their return," he said.

The home minister was speaking as the chief guest at a seminar titled “Rohingya Crisis: Way Forward – Towards Sustainable Repatriation and a Durable Regional Solution”, organised by the Foundation for Strategic and Development Studies (FSDS) at the Antara Hall of Radisson Blu Water Garden in Dhaka on Sunday.

Md. Ismail Zabiullah, adviser to the prime minister on the Ministry of Public Administration, with the rank of a minister, attended the event as the special guest.

FSDS Chairman Major General (retd) Fazle Elahi Akbar chaired the seminar, reports BSS.

Addressing the seminar, the home minister said Bangladesh’s unilateral efforts would not be sufficient to ensure sustainable repatriation of the Rohingyas.

He stressed the need to develop a strategic regional alliance and a coordinated approach involving China, ASEAN, the United Nations, Japan and all other relevant stakeholders.

Ahmed added that the prime minister is scheduled to visit Japan later this month, where further discussions are expected on accelerating the repatriation process.

Referring to the changing geopolitical and security situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the home minister said, “The de jure government, the Arakan Army (AA) controls a substantial part of the territory.”

Against this backdrop, Bangladesh is exploring avenues for a solution through various diplomatic channels, including informal communication, he said.

The minister emphasised that peaceful repatriation remains the principal objective and that Bangladesh will continue diplomatic dialogue while keeping all avenues open as a last resort.

Speaking as the special guest, Public Administration Adviser to the Prime Minister Md. Ismail Zabiullah said the Rohingya crisis was not merely a humanitarian problem or a bilateral issue, but one deeply connected to national interests, regional stability and international geopolitics.

Considering the issue’s multifaceted complexities over the past decades and Myanmar’s changing political and military circumstances, he said Bangladesh needs to move from crisis management towards strategic diplomacy, from temporary relief assistance towards sustainable repatriation, and from fragmented initiatives towards an integrated national strategy.

He also underscored the importance of protecting the Rohingyas’ humanitarian rights and ensuring their security, while mobilising international support and exerting pressure on Myanmar to facilitate their safe and dignified return to their homeland.

Speaking to journalists after the seminar, the home minister said Bangladesh’s representative being elected President of the United Nations General Assembly this year had created an opportunity to raise the repatriation issue more forcefully before the international community.

He expressed optimism that discussions with the international community supported by neighbouring and partner countries including China, Japan, India, the United States and the European Union, could help identify a pathway towards swift and sustainable repatriation.

The seminar was attended by distinguished local and foreign diplomats, representatives of international organisations, retired military officers, researchers, academics and representatives of various media outlets.​

 

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https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/317675/colonial-roots-of-anti-rohingya-xenophobia

Colonial roots of anti-Rohingya xenophobia

Habib Siddiqui

Rohingya refugees walking to safety in Bangladesh during the 2017 mass exodus from Myanmar.

CONTRARY to the popular misconception that anti-Rohingya sentiment is a contemporary phenomenon, the roots of ethnic and religious xenophobia in Burma (now Myanmar) run exceptionally deep. While modern attention often focuses on post-colonial developments, exclusionary hostilities can be traced back to the imperial rulers of Myanmar since at least the 11th century when King Anawrahta Minsaw founded of the Pagan Empire. A pivotal historical turning point occurred in 1784, when Burmese King Bodawpaya annexed the independent state of Arakan. This conquest resulted in the enslavement and forced deportation of tens of thousands of Rohingya Muslims to Mandalay, while triggering a massive exodus of indigenous Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists seeking refuge in the Chittagong district, then administered by the British East India Company.

This complex demographic landscape was fundamentally upended following the total British conquest of Burma in 1886 following the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Burmese War in November 1885. To consolidate the administration of the new province under the British Raj, the colonial government imported a vast apparatus of educated Indians and Bengalis. Trailing behind this administrative influx came British financial institutions and speculative capital, which paved the way for non-Burmese financial actors. Among them were Chettiars — a caste of Hindu moneylenders from the Tamil region — as well as Marwaris. Engaging in aggressive predatory lending, these usurers frequently seized the land and property of defaulting Burmese peasants. By the early 1930s, Chettiars controlled roughly a quarter of Burma’s lower agricultural landmass. This extensive land loss and economic marginalisation fostered intense, widespread resentment among the native population. Crucially, the indigenous population did not differentiate between predatory financiers and working-class South Asian immigrants; anyone possessing South Asian facial features became a target for xenophobia, drawing Tamils, Bengalis and the indigenous Muslims of Arakan into a singular, hated category.

This volatile atmosphere provided the perfect fertile ground for right-wing, ethno-nationalist groups like the Dobama Asiayone (We-Burmans Association) and radical figures like U Saw (Galon U Saw). Together, they systematically weaponized these economic grievances into violent anti-Indian and anti-Muslim riots throughout the 1930s. The outbreak of World War II pushed these tensions to a horrific climax. When Japanese forces advanced into Burma in 1942, the British administration hastily retreated, leaving behind generations of South Asian and Muslim communities who had built their lives in the country.

As radical Burmese nationalists aligned themselves with the fascist Japanese forces, these abandoned populations became the immediate targets of vicious pogroms. Even the indigenous Rohingyas of Arakan — widely targeted under the accusation of being pro-British collaborators — faced horrific violence executed with a definitive genocidal intent. The resulting fascist pogroms escalated into the region’s first major genocide, during which entire Rohingya-majority towns in southern Arakan were ethnically and religiously cleansed. This systematic violence forced the surviving Muslim populations to flee en masse to the north, creating a segregated demographic concentration bordering modern-day Bangladesh. It also triggered a harrowing mass exodus to India known as the ‘Long March,’ forcing hundreds of thousands of Bengalis and Indians to flee the country on foot before Burma finally achieved independence in 1948.

Economic strife and the rise of Dobama Asiayone

TO FULLY comprehend the rapid ascent of ethno-nationalism in the 1930s, one must examine how the socio-economic structure of colonial Burma buckled under global pressures. Following its annexation, Burma was tightly integrated into the global marketplace, primarily serving as the primary rice bowl of the British Empire. This economic machine relied heavily on the imported South Asian workforce to fill structural gaps. By the early 20th century, South Asian immigrants held a dominant position in urban labour markets, dock yards, financial networks and the lower ranks of the civil bureaucracy in major hubs like Rangoon (Yangon).

When the Great Depression struck, global trade collapsed and the crash of rice prices plunged the indigenous Burmese peasantry into immediate bankruptcy. Unable to service their debts to the Chettiar moneylenders, millions of native farmers suffered land dispossession. Displaced from their ancestral villages, native Burmans migrated to urban centres in search of basic livelihood, where they found themselves in direct, desperate competition with established South Asian labourers.

Amid this widespread economic trauma, the Dobama Asiayone was founded in Rangoon in 1930. Born in the volatile months following deadly racial clashes between native Burman and Indian dock workers, the association sought to overthrow British imperialism while simultaneously asserting Bamar cultural and political supremacy. The organisation popularised an uncompromising, ethno-centric slogan that left no room for minority inclusion: ‘Burma is our country; Burmese literature is our literature; Burmese language is our language.’

Members adopted the title Thakin (Master) as a psychological rebellion against British colonial rulers, signalling that the indigenous population alone should be masters of the land. While the Dobama Asiayone contained various ideological factions — including leftist student radicals who would later lean towards socialism — its dominant right-wing elements capitalised heavily on popular survival anxieties. These right-wing factions systematically scapegoated the entire South Asian community, framing them not merely as tools of colonial exploitation, but as parasitic entities. This ideological pivot transformed a standard anti-colonial liberation struggle into an aggressive nativist campaign demanding the total political, social and economic exclusion of non-indigenous populations.

U Saw, Thuriya and the mechanics of exclusion

WHILE the Dobama Asiayone fostered an intellectual and grassroots base for ethno-nationalism, the practical mechanics of right-wing populism and media-driven anti-immigrant agitation were mastered by U Saw. A fiercely ambitious and ruthless political operator, U Saw built his political career by positioning himself as the ultimate champion of native Burman interests against foreign influence. Unlike the university-educated elite who dominated early nationalist circles, U Saw possessed a background as a provincial lawyer, a factor that heightened his populist appeal to the grievance-driven lower and middle classes.

U Saw’s primary vehicle for ideological dissemination was his ownership and editorial control of the highly influential Burmese-language newspaper Thuriya (The Sun). Under his guidance, Thuriya became a powerful mouthpiece for xenophobic and anti-Muslim propaganda. The publication regularly featured sensationalised reporting, aggressive polemics and editorials that portrayed South Asian immigrants — including Tamils, Bengalis and Muslims — as existential, cultural and economic threats to the native Buddhist population. By continuously running inflammatory narratives regarding immigration and religious friction, U Saw effectively stoked public resentment and manufactured a state of constant cultural panic.

This media-driven hostility found a destructive outlet during the widespread anti-Indian and anti-immigrant riots of 1930 and 1938. The 1938 riots, in particular, were directly aggravated by ethno-nationalist press coverage led by Thuriya, which seized upon a controversial religious pamphlet to instigate countrywide anti-Muslim and anti-Indian pogroms. U Saw capitalised on the chaos of these riots to strengthen his political capital, outmanoeuvre moderate opponents and solidify his stance on restricting immigration.

Beyond print propaganda, U Saw institutionalised his exclusionary agenda through physical force. He established the Galon Army (Galon Tat), a highly disciplined paramilitary organisation named after the mythical bird of Hindu-Buddhist lore that destroys the serpent (Naga). Dressed in uniforms and subjected to strict militaristic training, the Galon Army served as an instrument of intimidation. Through this potent combination of media manipulation and paramilitary force, U Saw’s political platform explicitly demanded the containment, disenfranchisement and eventual ouster of South Asian populations from Burma’s civic sphere.

Terminology transition and roots of modern identity

WHEN examining the exclusionary campaigns of 1930s Burma, a critical distinction must be made regarding the terminology of identity. In contemporary international discourse, the plight of the Muslim population of Arakan (Rakhine) State is intrinsically tied to the term ‘Rohingya.’ However, during the colonial era of the 1930s, this specific political and ethnic designation was not a part of mainstream public or administrative vocabulary.

Instead, the British colonial administration, along with Burmese nationalist groups, employed broad, collective and often derogatory categorisations. The Muslim populations residing in the western frontier of Arakan, alongside transient labourers arriving from the Chittagong division, were universally classified under generic headers such as ‘Bengalis,’ ‘Indians,’ or the sweeping vernacular term ‘Kala.’

By failing to differentiate between multi-generational residents of the frontier regions and recently arrived economic migrants, 1930s right-wing nationalism established a dangerous precedent: it treated all individuals of South Asian descent as a singular, undesirable bloc. The formal introduction of the modern term ‘Rohingya’ into the public political lexicon did not occur until the post-World War II era. During the late 1940s and 1950s, as Burma transitioned towards independence from British rule, local intellectual and political elites in Arakan began utilising ‘Rohingya’ to assert a distinct indigenous identity, seeking constitutional recognition and protection from the central government.

Nevertheless, the foundational mechanics of exclusion developed in the 1930s — which equated South Asian ancestry and Muslim faith with foreign intrusion — persistently cast a shadow over this identity, leaving it vulnerable to state-sponsored rejection.

The cataclysm of World War II: fascist alliances and pogroms

THE structural xenophobia cultivated throughout the 1930s found its ultimate, catastrophic expression during World War II. In 1942, as the Japanese imperial army swept into Southeast Asia, the British colonial administration underwent a rapid and chaotic retreat. In their wake, the British abandoned hundreds of thousands of South Asians and Muslims who had built their homes in Burma over generations. Left without state protection, these minority groups immediately bore the brunt of deep-seated nationalist resentments.

Believing that the Axis powers would guarantee Burma’s absolute independence, radical Burmese nationalists formed a wartime alliance with the fascist Japanese forces. To these nationalist factions, the remaining South Asian population was viewed not merely as an economic burden, but as a hostile, fifth-column element fiercely loyal to the British Crown. The indigenous Rohingyas of Arakan were singled out for particularly brutal treatment under the accusation of being pro-British collaborators — a geopolitical alignment forced upon them as they sought British protection against local hostility.

The resulting collision of Japanese militarism and Burmese ethno-nationalism triggered a wave of fascist pogroms that escalated into the region’s first major modern genocide. In the southern regions of Arakan, nationalist militias carried out systematic campaigns of ethnic and religious cleansing. Entire Rohingya-majority towns and villages were razed and their populations were systematically executed or driven out. This targeted violence fundamentally altered the demographics of western Burma; surviving Muslims fled in desperate masses towards the north, seeking safety in numbers near the border of Chittagong (modern-day Bangladesh).

Simultaneously, the broader South Asian population across Burma faced complete dispossession. This sparked the harrowing historical exodus known as the ‘Long March’, during which upwards of 500,000 Indians, Tamils and Bengalis attempted to flee Burma on foot through treacherous mountainous terrain to reach British India. Countless thousands perished from disease, starvation and rebel attacks along the way. The descendants of those survivors who managed to escape or endure the march still carry the trauma of an exodus that permanently fractured their connection to the land they called home.

The lasting legacy of 1930s xenophobia

THE rise of right-wing ethno-nationalism in 1930s Burma provides a stark historical case study in how deep-seated cultural friction and economic trauma can be weaponized by populist leaders to justify systemic exclusion. Driven by the severe economic disruptions of the Great Depression and the predatory actions of colonial financial systems, the Dobama Asiayone successfully shifted public discourse towards an aggressive, monocultural definition of citizenship. This framework established the enduring national myth that Burma belonged exclusively to the ethnic Bamar majority. Concurrently, figures like U Saw demonstrated the volatile efficacy of combining media propaganda with paramilitary intimidation, transforming socio-economic grievances into violent anti-immigrant pogroms that laid the groundwork for wartime atrocities.

The rhetoric, tactics and demographic engineering forged during this era did not disappear with the conclusion of World War II or the achievement of independence in 1948. Instead, the practice of viewing Muslim and South Asian populations through a lens of permanent foreignness became deeply embedded within the institutional memory and legal frameworks of the modern state. By exploring the deep historical trajectory of King Bodawpaya’s early conquests, the economic displacement caused by the Chettiars and the fascist pogroms of U Saw’s era, one uncovers the direct ideological roots of the modern human rights crises that continue to isolate and persecute minority communities in the region today.

Habib Siddiqui, a peace and rights activist, is author of several books including The Forgotten Rohingya: Their Struggle for Human Rights in Burma.​