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[🇧🇩] Monitoring Bangladesh's Economy

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[🇧🇩] Monitoring Bangladesh's Economy
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Too many holidays are bad for any growth economy

18 March 2026, 00:05 AM
Mamun Rashid

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VISUAL: SALMAN SAKIB SHARYAR

Amid the prevailing Middle East crisis and economic lull, Bangladesh is heading into a prolonged holiday period around Eid-ul-Fitr. Officially, the government has declared a seven-day holiday beginning on March 17 and ending on March 23. Offices will reopen briefly on March 24-25, but the Independence Day observance on March 26, followed by the Friday-Saturday weekend, will effectively extend the holiday atmosphere across the country. In reality, many officials and employees are likely to take additional leave on the two working days in between, meaning that economic activity would considerably slow down for 12 consecutive days.

At first glance, extended holidays during festivals appear harmless, even desirable. Festivals are deeply embedded in the country’s social fabric. Eid, in particular, is not merely a religious event but a powerful cultural moment that reconnects families and communities. However, the economic implications of long, veritable shutdowns are often underestimated.

Our recent experience suggests that extended holidays can disrupt supply chains, slow down production, and ultimately contribute to inflationary pressures. The country witnessed a clear example of this in 2025. During Eid-ul-Fitr that year, it observed a nine-day holiday between March 28 and April 5. Later in the same year, the Eid-ul-Azha holiday stretched even longer from June 5 to June 14, effectively suspending economic activities for 10 days. In the weeks that followed, prices of essential commodities such as rice, eggs, poultry, and vegetables increased noticeably. Various surveys and studies confirmed that the extended holidays had disrupted agricultural supply chains and contributed to price increases.

One important factor behind these price movements is the seasonal shift in consumption patterns during Eid. Millions of people travel from major cities to their hometowns and villages to celebrate the festivals with their families. This mass migration alters the geographic pattern of demand for food and consumer goods. Goods that are usually consumed in urban centres must suddenly be transported to rural markets located far from traditional supply hubs. This shift increases pressure on the transport system and raises logistics costs. When goods need to travel longer distances within a limited time frame, freight charges inevitably rise.

This year, however, the situation is further complicated by fuel shortages caused by the ongoing Middle East crisis. Business leaders and transport operators report that many filling stations are struggling to meet demand, even after the withdrawal of fuel rationing. Drivers are forced to wait in long queues to refuel, and transport operators are already reporting freight cost increases by 20-25 percent. Truck shortages are also emerging in long-distance routes, a problem that may intensify once the Eid holiday progresses.

Such developments matter because Bangladesh’s economy is currently navigating a fragile macroeconomic phase. High inflation, weak investment growth, rising unemployment, and concerns about energy security have already placed the economy under stress. In such circumstances, extended nationwide shutdowns can amplify vulnerabilities.

The economic logic here is straightforward. Each additional day of nationwide closure interrupts production, slows trade, and weakens supply chains. Factories suspend operations, banks close their counters, administrative decisions are delayed, and port activities slow down. Even if these disruptions are temporary, their cumulative impact can be significant.

Trade and logistics are particularly sensitive to such interruptions. For example, if a cargo vessel is forced to remain idle at a port for several days due to reduced operations or banking closures, demurrage charges begin to accumulate. Eventually, these additional costs are passed on to consumers through higher product prices.

Agricultural supply chains are even more vulnerable. Following the extended Eid-ul-Azha holiday last year, the Bangladesh Bank conducted a study covering 61 upazilas across 18 districts to examine the efficiency of agricultural value chains. The findings were revealing. During the survey period, the retail price of coarse rice stood at Tk 61 per kg, compared with Tk 55 in the same period of the previous year. Fine rice was selling at Tk 78 per kg, up from Tk 70 a year earlier. In other words, prices increased by around 10.9 percent for coarse rice and 11 percent for fine rice within a single year.

The study indicated that extended holiday closures were one of the contributing factors. Many rice mills remained closed for around 10 days during Eid. At the same time, banking services were suspended, preventing normal transactions between farmers, traders, and mill owners. As a result, farmers and wholesalers delayed selling their paddy and instead held onto their stocks. When the mills reopened after the holiday, they attempted to resume production simultaneously. This created a sudden surge in demand for paddy while supply remained limited. The imbalance pushed up paddy prices, which quickly translated into higher rice prices for consumers.

Of course, extended holidays were not the only reason behind the price increases. Rising labour costs, higher irrigation expenses, shrinking arable land, and import duties also played roles. Nevertheless, the study clearly highlighted that prolonged holiday shutdowns can aggravate supply disruptions.

This brings us to a broader question: does Bangladesh have too many holidays?

Compared with many emerging economies, the country observes a relatively large number of public holidays throughout the year. In addition to religious festivals, there are numerous national commemorations and administrative holidays. When combined with two days of weekly breaks, the total number of non-working days becomes substantial.

In contrast, many growth economies, including our neighbour, maintain a more concentrated holiday structure. China, for example, observes a long holiday during the Lunar New Year but maintains a strong work culture during the rest of the year. Bangladesh, apart from regular earned, casual, and sick leave, however, experiences multiple extended holidays throughout the calendar, each of which temporarily slows economic momentum. Government-declared special holidays particularly impact the growing private sector most.

This does not mean that cultural traditions should be diminished. For us, the challenge is not to eliminate holidays but to manage them more strategically. A balanced approach, where cultural priorities co-exist with economic efficiency, would be essential. Otherwise, celebration may gradually translate into supply disruptions, higher inflation, and additional pressure on an already strained economy.

Mamun Rashid is an economic analyst and chairman at Financial Excellence Ltd.​
 
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Remittance inflow surges to $2.8 billion in 23 days of March

UNB
Published :
Mar 24, 2026 21:48
Updated :
Mar 24, 2026 21:48

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Bangladesh’s remittance inflows have maintained a powerful upward trajectory during Eid-Ul Fitr, recording a robust 7.4 per cent monthly growth in 23 days of March 2026, compared to the same period last year.

According to the latest data from Bangladesh Bank (BB), expatriates sent US$ 2.82 billion to Bangladesh during the first 23 days of March, up from $2.63 billion in 2025.

The current fiscal year FY 2025-26 continues to set new benchmarks. Cumulative remittance from July 2025 to March 23, 2026, reached $25.28 billion, representing a significant 19.7 per cent growth over the $21.12 billion recorded during the corresponding period of the previous fiscal year.

The surge was particularly visible in the first half of the month. Expatriate workers sent home $2.20 billion in the first 14 days of March alone, marking a massive 35.7 percent jump compared to the $1.62 billion received during the same timeframe in 2025. Between March 16 and March 23, an additional $392 million flowed into the country as non-resident Bangladeshis (NRBs) increased transfers ahead of the Eid-ul-Fitr celebrations.

The steady growth in foreign currency is providing a critical lifeline to the nation’s forex reserves. As of March 16, 2026, gross reserves stood at $34.22 billion. Under the IMF’s BPM-6 calculation method, net reserves are currently valued at $29.52 billion.​
 
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Bangladesh's unfinished financial transition

Syed Abul Basher
Published :
Mar 25, 2026 00:31
Updated :
Mar 25, 2026 00:31

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For many years, financial progress in Bangladesh was measured by counting the number of new bank branches opened. When a branch appeared in a rural bazaar, people took it as proof that development had arrived. This way of thinking shaped policy for decades. State banks expanded into rural areas, private banks followed commercial centers, and microfinance institutions filled the remaining gaps. Financial inclusion meant geographic inclusion, and the map of development was literally a map of branches.

Today that map has almost stopped changing. Bangladesh Bank data show that between December 2018 and July 2025 the total number of bank branches increased from 10,281 to 11,388, a rise of barely 11 per cent in nearly seven years. But the total hides an important shift. Rural branches actually peaked around mid-2023 at roughly 5,347 and have since fallen to 5,172, while urban branches continued to climb. The system is not just slowing down in the countryside. It is pulling back. For a village that loses its branch, the loss goes beyond services.

Yet financial activity did not slow. It grew through channels that did not exist a decade ago. Over the same period, mobile financial service (MFS) accounts more than doubled from 68 million to 146 million. Agent banking accounts rose tenfold, from 2.5 million to 24.6 million. Internet banking customers grew from barely two million to 11.6 million. Issued debit cards tripled to 44 million, while prepaid cards went from 243,000 to 9.8 million. Monthly MFS transaction volumes tripled from 210 million to 625 million, and the value flowing through them rose nearly fivefold from Tk 321 billion to Tk 1,486 billion. Internet banking transactions grew twenty-three-fold in number and thirty-fold in value. None of this required new buildings in new places.

But the slowdown in branches does not mean the system stopped investing in physical infrastructure. It stopped investing in one particular kind. Point-of-sale terminals nearly tripled from 48,000 to over 134,000. Cash recycling machines went from 126 to more than 7,600. Agent banking outlets tripled from about 7,000 to over 20,000. Large fixed structures gave way to smaller, cheaper devices placed in retail shops, pharmacies, and local markets. Calling this a shift from physical to digital misses what actually happened. The same services moved into spaces people already visited for other reasons. The branch did not disappear because distance stopped mattering. It became unnecessary because banking functions spread across ordinary commercial life.

Much of this migration had a clear starting point. Between December 2019 and July 2020, monthly MFS transactions jumped from 236 million to 319 million and never came back down. Government-to-person transfers through MFS, which had been running at a few hundred million taka per month, reached Tk 11.8 billion in July 2020 as emergency payments went out digitally during the pandemic. What normally takes years of gradual adoption happened in months because everyone faced the same constraint at the same time. After normal activity resumed, branch expansion did not restart. Meanwhile, electronic fund transfers at scheduled banks grew from 1.6 million to 7.5 million per month and the value of real-time gross settlement transactions went from Tk 966 billion to over Tk 5,000 billion. The shift was not just in how people transacted. It reached how banks settled with each other.

All of this raises a question about productivity. Branch numbers barely grew but the volume of transactions running through the financial system multiplied several times over. Output per unit of physical banking infrastructure clearly rose. But whether this counts as productivity growth in the banking sector depends on where you draw the boundary. The agent at a local shop who processes fifty cash-out transactions a day is doing work that used to require a teller in a branch, but no one counts herlabor as banking sector employment. The question has not been carefully examined.

But growth in access did not bring matching depth. School banking accounts grew from 1.6 million to 4.5 million, yet the average balance per account dropped from roughly Tk 9,000 to about Tk 4,700. If parents opened accounts to meet a program requirement but withdrew the balance when household expenses pressed, the account survives in the statistics but the saving habit never forms. Special accounts for farmers and social safety net recipients tell a similar story: 17 million accounts grew to 25 million, but the average balance remains below Tk 3,000. The system is good at opening doors. Whether anyone stays inside the room is a different question.

The MFS transaction data show the same pattern. The system now moves Tk 1.5 trillion per month, up nearly fivefold from 2018, and the uses have diversified. Person-to-person transfers, salary disbursements, utility payments, and merchant payments have all grown several times over. But the total balance sitting in MFS accounts is only Tk 129 billion. Money passes through. It does not stay. For the person using the account, this makes sense. Why leave money in a mobile wallet that earns nothing when you could hold cash, repay a neighbor, or buy inventory for a small shop? The question is not why people cash out. It is why we expected them not to, given what the accounts actually offer.

This is where the real gap lies. The financial system clearly works as a way of moving value. It does not yet work well as a way of holding or managing value across time. Saving, borrowing against bad times, investing in something productive, all of these require money to remain in the system longer than a single transaction. If accounts work mainly as conduits, the financial system handles payments well but manages risk poorly. A medical emergency can still push a family into debt not because they lack an account but because that account is empty when the emergency arrives.

Credit tells a similar story. Debit cards tripled and prepaid cards grew forty-fold, but credit cards barely doubled from 1.3 million to 3 million over seven years. The system built instruments for receiving and spending but not for borrowing. Why not? Is it regulatory caution, product design, or something about how households think about formal credit compared to borrowing from people they know? When a garment worker borrows from a relative, there is no interest rate but there is a relationship that adjusts to circumstances, a flexibility that a standardized loan product cannot easily match. We do not yet have the evidence to tell these explanations apart.

One finding in the data that gets less attention involves gender. Female MFS accounts doubled from 31.5 million to 63.5 million between December 2018 and July 2025. In agent banking, female accounts went from 841,000 to 12.1 million, reaching and slightly passing the male total. Women entered the financial system primarily through agents and mobile channels, not through bank branches. This may not be surprising. An agent operating out of a local shop that a woman already visits is a different experience from walking into a bank, speaking to an official, signing papers, and waiting. A phone is private in a way a bank visit is not. Whatever the precise mechanism, this is one of the largest expansions of female financial participation in Bangladesh's history, and understanding what made these channels work for women could help in designing services that still skew heavily male.

Even the replacement infrastructure is showing its own limits. Agent banking outlets tripled from 7,000 to about 20,000 between 2018 and 2022 but have barely grown since. When every market town already has an agent, adding another one does not extend the reach. It only splits the business. Yet the deposit base has grown from Tk 30 billion to Tk 457 billion, with rural deposits accounting for Tk 380 billion, and inward remittances through agents reached Tk 27.8 billion per month, up from Tk 2.7 billion. Agent banking is doing something rural branches never managed at this scale. But if the outlet network has levelled off, where does the next phase of rural financial deepening come from? The people who remain underserved are not those without a nearby access point. They are those for whom the existing access point does not yet do enough.

What the data reveal, taken together, is that Bangladesh has completed a transition that was never formally announced. The binding constraint on financial development is no longer physical distance. It shifted, over roughly five years, to something harder to fix: the fit between how financial services are designed and how households actually manage their economic lives. Most financial products assume stable monthly income and regular repayment schedules. Much of Bangladesh does not work that way. Earnings move with seasons, with opportunity, and with the composition of the household. Expenses show up irregularly. Obligations are social as much as contractual. Under these conditions, an account may be useful as a channel but hard to use as a reserve. The gap between what the system offers and what daily life demands is not a failure of access. It is a problem of design.

Several questions follow that the existing data can raise but not answer. If branch expansion has ended and agent outlets have levelled off, what is the next form through which financial depth can grow? Why has formal credit remained so shallow relative to the growth in transactions and accounts? And is the growth of female participation in agent banking durable, or does it remain limited to receiving transfers? These are not questions that administrative data alone can settle. They require understanding how households actually manage money, and that calls for a different kind of evidence.

The plateau in branch growth should not be read as failure. It marks the end of one stage of development. Bangladesh has largely solved the problem of reaching people. The harder problem is understanding why being reached has not yet meant being served. Infrastructure can be built by decision. How people relate to their money changes only when institutions pay attention to how households actually plan, cope, and get by. The data tell us clearly where Bangladesh has been. Where it goes next depends on asking better questions about what the numbers still cannot show.

The author is an independent researcher and former professor of economics at East West University.​
 
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