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[🇧🇩] National Security of Bangladesh

[🇧🇩] National Security of Bangladesh
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G Bangladesh Defense

The case for a National Security Council that is truly fit for purpose

20 April 2026, 13:00 PM

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'A reformed structure should include a national security council chaired by the prime minister, supported by a permanent national security council secretariat led by a security adviser.' File photo: STAR

In its election manifesto, BNP mentioned plans to establish a National Security Council alongside formulating a new national security strategy (page 21, under “Defence System”). Tarique Rahman, the party chairperson and now prime minister of Bangladesh, reiterated the plan while addressing retired officers of Bangladesh Armed Forces on February 7, 2026, where he said if BNP assumed office, the government would engage former and serving army officers to set the groundwork for an effective National Security Council. As I was attending the address that day, I thought this emphasis on structural security reform was noteworthy.

Bangladesh’s security environment has gone through some major changes in the last few decades. Cross-border militant networks, cyber threats, digital financial vulnerabilities, maritime competition in the Bay of Bengal, geopolitical rivalry in the region, violent extremism, radicalisation, and transnational crime now intersect in ways that blur the line between internal and external security. Domestic stability may now be influenced by foreign clandestine activities and digital campaigns. Maritime security affects economic resilience, and regional tensions can quickly generate internal consequences. Managing such complexity requires a structured, permanent system that synthesises intelligence, aligns defence policy with national strategy, and anticipates risk before it escalates.

Bangladesh currently relies on several coordination mechanisms. The National Committee for Security Affairs (NCSA)—established in 2019 after the cabinet approved the National Defence Policy 2018—is headed by the prime minister and includes senior ministers, the service chiefs, intelligence heads, and top civil servants. The NCSA is the highest policy-making authority on national security in Bangladesh. Then there is the National Committee for Intelligence Coordination (NCIC), established in 2009, that focuses on intelligence sharing among key security agencies. The National Security Affairs Cell under the Cabinet Division, formed in 2019, provides administrative support, although it does not have the authority or resources to act as a strategic nerve center.

These mechanisms represent steps towards coordination. However, they remain committee-based rather than system-based. The NCSA is large and consultative, but it does not operate through a permanent strategic secretariat with defined analytical divisions. The intelligence coordination structure improves information sharing, but it does not institutionalise unified national assessment or long-term planning. This results in fragmentation. Bangladesh has capable intelligence institutions such as the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), National Security Intelligence (NSI), Special Branch (SB), Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), and the Coast Guard, etc. Yet responsibilities are dispersed, and there is no single professional authority tasked with synthesising assessments from different security agencies into consolidated national advice.

This model can create confusion over who defines national security priorities, who harmonises internal and external intelligence, and who ensures that defence modernisation aligns with broader strategic objectives. Large committees are effective for consultation but are not substitutes for continuous analytical work supported by dedicated professional staff. Hence, the absence of a national security adviser’s (NSA) role can be considered a weakness, as without an NSA-led secretariat, coordination remains dependent on leadership bandwidth rather than institutional design, and security governance becomes reactive rather than anticipatory.

However, reform does not mean diminishing existing agencies. On the contrary, it can strengthen them. For example, the DGFI can continue to provide defence and external intelligence. NSI may remain central to internal security intelligence and counterterrorism. And law enforcement and border agencies may retain operational mandates. An effective national security council secretariat would not replace these institutions. It would integrate their outputs, identify intelligence gaps, harmonise reporting cycles, and ensure that national leadership receives unified assessments rather than fragmented briefings.

India undertook similar structural reforms and institutionalised a secretariat led by the national security adviser beneath the political leadership. The innovation here was not simply the creation of a council but the establishment of a permanent analytical engine with defined verticals for strategic planning, intelligence synthesis, and defence coordination. Bangladesh can adopt a similar strategy with its own constitutional framework. Most importantly, national security must be nonpartisan, as security threats do not distinguish between governments. An effective National Security Council must be institutional, accountable, and continuity-focused.

A reformed structure should include a national security council chaired by the prime minister, supported by a permanent national security council secretariat led by a security adviser. Beneath that office, defined directorates for strategic planning, intelligence coordination, defence affairs, foreign policy integration, cybersecurity, maritime security, and crisis response would provide analytical depth and structured oversight. Staffing should blend experienced civil servants with former military officers, former intelligence professionals, and former foreign service officials.

Bangladesh stands at a point where incremental adjustments are no longer sufficient. Our growing geopolitical and economic profile demands a mature and disciplined security architecture. Establishing a structured, accountable, and non-partisan security council system would not be a political victory for any party. Instead, it would be an institutional investment in the long-term stability and resilience of the state.

Brig General (Retd) Md Manzur Qader is a security and intelligence analyst, and executive director of Rohingya Advocacy Centre.​
 

PM to lead new high-level committee on national security, social stability

The National Coordination Committee will assess threats, prepare integrated action plans and recommend legal changes if needed

Star Online Report

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File photo

A National Coordination Committee has been formed, headed by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, to ensure the country's security and social stability.

The Cabinet Division published a notification in this regard yesterday (Sunday).

Under its terms of reference, the committee has been tasked with carrying out a comprehensive assessment of the country’s overall security situation.

In the 13-member committee, the home minister has been appointed as the vice-chairman, while the prime minister's defence adviser has been appointed the chief coordinator. The other members include high-ranking government officials.

Generally, after forming a new government, various cabinet committees are constituted for different sectors. However, insiders said no committee under this specific name, headed by the prime minister, existed under any other recent government.

According to its terms of reference, the committee will define critical issues, fields, and scopes related to national security and social stability, as well as formulate integrated action plans. The committee is also responsible for setting national security priorities, supervising coordination among agencies, and outlining the operational boundaries for law enforcement and security agencies.

Furthermore, the committee will recommend amendments to existing laws and regulations, propose drafting of new laws, if necessary, and establish a system for the regular monitoring of online platforms.

The National Security Intelligence (NSI) will provide the required manpower and infrastructural support to act as the secretariat for this committee.

The members of the committee are the cabinet secretary, principal secretary to the PM, principal staff officer of the Armed Forces Division, inspector general of police (IGP), and the directors general of DGFI, NSI, BGB, NTMC, and Rab, as well as the additional inspector general of police of the Special Branch (SB).

Additionally, four officers have been included to assist the committee. They are: the additional IGP of CID, additional IGP of Special Security Unit (SSU), the head of the Bangladesh Bank Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU), and the CEO of the National Security Cell under the Cabinet Division.​
 

What Bangladesh can learn from Iran war

SYED MUHAMMED SHOWAIB

Published :
Jun 06, 2026 00:06
Updated :
Jun 06, 2026 00:06

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There is often a reluctance to discuss military matters in public. In mainstream discourse, far more attention is devoted to diplomacy, development and cooperation and there is nothing wrong with that preference as far as it goes. But when wars are raging on multiple fronts across the world including in Bangladesh's immediate neighbourhood and when some of those wars continue to challenge long-held assumptions about traditional warfare, it is only sensible to ask whether our own armed forces are prepared for the realities of modern conflict. After all, refusing to confront a country's military weaknesses in peacetime is an invitation to discover them in crisis.

The military remains one of the few institutions in Bangladesh that commands genuine public respect. That respect, however, does not change the reality that its actual strength falls short when assessed against contemporary security challenges and operational expectations. The Independence Day parade held on March 26 after a long gap offered the public a fresh look at the equipment currently in service with the armed forces and, as expected, it drew a wave of dismay online. Such reaction was hardly surprising. Today's audiences observe modern warfare unfolding in real time where precision munitions, fifth-generation aircraft and cheap loitering drones have fundamentally changed the nature of combat. Against that backdrop, much of the hardware paraded before the nation appeared to belong to a previous era altogether. By all appearances it seemed, the 8th most populous country on earth marking 54 years of independence now fields armed forces, the technological standing of which neither projects strength nor provides a credible basis for deterrence.

There are those who would argue that ours is a peaceful country with no territorial ambitions and no quarrel with anyone, and therefore no one will threaten Bangladesh. That argument is historically illiterate. The vast majority of countries invaded throughout history did nothing to provoke the power that attacked them. This is because aggression is not primarily a response to provocation but to vulnerability. Ukraine did not threaten Russia before the invasion of 2022. Moscow simply calculated that Ukraine was sufficiently weak and moved to seize territory by force. In a similar vein, perceptions of Iranian weakness after internal unrest and decades of sanctions led the United States and Israel to launch major military operation. The political leadership in Washington and Tel Aviv believed that the government in Tehran was so enfeebled that it would last only a few days if attacked.

Apparently, that confidence was not without basis. Combined American and Israeli military budgets dwarf Iran's by a factor of at least one hundred, and their technological advantages are also similarly vast. Yet this massive asymmetry failed to produce the rapid and decisive outcome they expected, and arguably, they emerged as the larger losers. This does not mean Iran emerged unscathed. Its military installations suffered heavy damage and its armed forces absorbed significant losses. Nevertheless, Iran retained the capacity to fight back and impose costs on its adversaries. As a result, the war that was supposed to last days became a conflict the US could not bring to a close on its own terms. So how did this happen? Three reasons actually, and each carries a direct lesson for Bangladesh.

The first is Iran's domestic defence industry. Shut out of Western arms markets by sanctions for decades, Iran had no choice but to build its own. Over time, that necessity produced a state-owned industrial complex capable of manufacturing wide range of military equipment including armoured vehicles, MANPADs, UAVs, missiles and submarines. Few of these systems match the most sophisticated Western technologies but that was never the point. What mattered was that they could be produced domestically, repaired domestically and replaced domestically. That self-sufficiency in arms production changed the strategic equation entirely. Iran was able to field its weapons in large quantities precisely because it made those itself, while its adversaries found themselves burning through irreplaceable stockpiles simply to defend against them.

Second reason is education and research. The weapons Iran has today did not emerge from nowhere. They are the product of decades of deliberate investment in the scientific foundations required to build them. Iranian universities have developed advanced programmes in aerospace engineering, missile guidance systems, drone propulsion and nuclear physics, and the research produced within those institutions feeds directly into the defence industry.

The third is infrastructure built to survive attack. Missile storage sites, weapons production facilities and launch infrastructure were placed inside mountainous terrain and buried within underground complexes designed to survive sustained aerial bombardment. When two of the world's most capable air forces ran an extensive campaign against them, much of that capacity survived intact. A country that can absorb punishment and still strike back is a country that cannot be quickly defeated and that endurance, more than any single weapon or battle, is what denied the attacking powers a swift victory they had counted on.

Bangladesh has none of these three things. There is no meaningful defence industrial complex and no electronics sector oriented towards weapons development. This is, however, not necessarily a reflection of institutional shortcomings within the armed forces themselves. The Bangladesh military has demonstrated through a range of commercial and engineering undertakings that it is capable of managing large and complex projects with discipline over the long term, which means the capacity for institutional ambition is present. What is absent though is the political will to direct it towards defence production and the governmental framework to support such an effort.

Bangladesh does not need to become a military superpower, nor does it need to match the arsenals of larger neighbours. But it does need a serious reckoning with the foundations of national sovereignty, one that moves deliberately towards greater self-reliance. Iran's experience demonstrates that such a transition is achievable, even from a position of isolation and constraint. Naturally, a credible defence capacity will not emerge overnight. It will definitely not emerge without a decision made at the highest levels of government that building one is a national priority worth pursuing.​
 

Why experts say Bangladesh needs a national security agency now
Former military officials and academics say advanced weapons alone will not provide protection without integrated surveillance, command and operational systems

Star Online Report

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File photo/STAR

Bangladesh must strengthen its defence capabilities and establish a national security agency to coordinate responses to emerging threats, speakers said at a dialogue in Dhaka today.

They said the country could no longer rely on fragmented institutions as military, cyber and maritime vulnerabilities continued to test its sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

Speaking as the chief guest at a high-level national dialogue, titled "Securing Bangladesh's Future: Rethinking National Security in a New and Changing Era", organised by the Center for Peace Studies at North South University, National Professor Mahbub Ullah said Bangladesh alone could not ensure its security and must build alliances with countries that shared its security risks.

The eminent economist and educationist said that Bangladesh had failed to give adequate attention to its armed forces, particularly air and naval defence, and should allocate a larger share of the national budget to strengthening defence.

Professor Mahbub said Bangladesh should not be intimidated by major powers and needed a national consensus on its identity to become a unified force capable of defending the country.

A determined smaller nation could resist a stronger power, he said, citing Vietnam's war against the United States.

He said alliances with friendly countries could strengthen Bangladesh's ability to defend itself in a conflict. He also called for a national security council to formulate patriotic, meaningful and cost-effective policies.

Maj Gen (retd) Fazle Elahi Akbar, chairman of the Foundation for Strategic and Development Studies, said a national security council alone would not be enough.

He proposed establishing a national security agency headed by a national security adviser, with the council serving as its central decision-making body under the prime minister.

The agency, he said, should gather information, assess issues with national security implications and place major decisions before the council.

"Unless and until we have a national security agency, we will keep harping on issues. We will be having seminars, and we will not have anything," he said.

Maj Gen (retd) Akbar said Bangladesh's airspace remained vulnerable and warned that buying advanced military platforms without integrated command, surveillance and operational systems would have little value.

"We are thinking of buying expensive toys," he said, adding that without proper integration such platforms could be destroyed within the first 24 hours of a conflict.

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Photo: Courtesy

He also argued that Bangladesh could not remain neutral indefinitely and should evaluate possible alliances under a "Bangladesh first" approach.

Lt Gen (retd) Mohammad Mahfuzur Rahman, chairman of the Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies, said Bangladesh needed "smart defence" rather than an arms race.

He said only 3.4-4 percent of the defence budget was available for development and capital purchases, while the remainder was spent on personnel and maintenance.

Bangladesh lacked an overarching national security policy and continued to depend on the 2018 defence policy, he said, adding that the armed forces faced capability and coordination gaps.

Lt Gen (retd) Mahfuzur said the country needed a national security council at the political level and a higher defence organisation, including a chief of defence headquarters, at the operational level.

Citing Singapore's experience, he said credible deterrence was necessary for a country to pursue economic development without external pressure.

Referring to the 2017 Rohingya crisis, he said Myanmar did not "leave Bangladesh alone" because the country lacked credible deterrence.

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He also said Myanmar had violated Bangladesh's airspace 19 times and mines were still being laid along the border. Earlier, he said, the Tatmadaw had bullied Bangladesh, while the Arakan Army was now doing the same.

Maj Gen (retd) Ibne Fazal Shayekhuzzaman, former commandant of the Defence Services Command and Staff College, said cyber security was no longer an IT issue but a matter of national security.

He said Bangladesh remained digitally connected but not digitally sovereign because its hardware, software, data storage and networks depended on foreign systems.

Maj Gen (retd) Md Wahid-Uz-Zaman, former commandant of the Military Institute of Science and Technology, said artificial intelligence had transformed cyber warfare by becoming a tool, a target and a threat in itself.

Commodore (retd) Syed Misbah Uddin Ahmad, director general of the Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development, said Bangladesh must move beyond "sea blindness" and treat maritime security as the protection of trade, energy, undersea cables, resources and strategic interests extending beyond its territorial waters.

Rear Admiral (retd) M Anwar Hossain, academic adviser at the National Defence College, called for an apex maritime security body, an integrated maritime information architecture and AI-enabled maritime domain awareness.

Prof Abdul Hannan Chowdhury, vice-chancellor of North South University and chair of the session, said Bangladesh must identify its strategic friends and adversaries and prepare for future warfare shaped by cyber capabilities, drones, robotics and maritime power.

CPS Director Prof M Jashim Uddin moderated the discussion.​