Krishna with Flute
Senior Member
- Jan 26, 2024
- 5,665
- 3,033
- Axis Group
[🇧🇩] Is Bangladesh A security Threat to India?
- Thread starter Saif
- Start date
Bangladesh Defense
Saif
Senior Member
- Jan 24, 2024
- 20,444
- 9,566
- Nation
- Residence
- Axis Group
I disagree. Chicken's neck will become ant's neck at the soonest.
Krishna with Flute
Senior Member
- Jan 26, 2024
- 5,665
- 3,033
- Axis Group
To live in wishful thinking is a birth right of every radical Mullah. We respect that right. Pakistan was made to become the riasat e madina. It is made now. Same way BD aspires to make chicken neck an ant's neck. I wish you best of luck.
Saif
Senior Member
- Jan 24, 2024
- 20,444
- 9,566
- Nation
- Residence
- Axis Group
Thank you for wishing me best of luck. I definitely won't disappoint you
Saif
Senior Member
- Jan 24, 2024
- 20,444
- 9,566
- Nation
- Residence
- Axis Group
Three Pak Army brigadiers arrive in Dhaka before leaving for Bangladesh Army’s 10th Infantry Div HQ at Ramu.
Senior Bangladesh Army officers express concern over the visit to Ramu cantonment which is the hub for all military activity involving support to the Arakan Army
by Chandan Nandy June 29, 2025 in Neighbours
At 5:27 pm this afternoon, an Emirates flight (No. 586) landed at Dhaka’s Shah Jala International Airport. Three well-dressed bearded men alighted from the aircraft and calmly, but curiously, walked to a waiting bus which they boarded with other passengers.
The bus dropped the passengers near the gate leading into a large enclosure for immigration and security clearance.
The passports of the three men, supposedly belonging to the Pakistan Army Medical Corps, were duly stamped before they were met by their hosts – Bangladeshi officials and Pakistani diplomats stationed in Dhaka – who exchanged pleasantries before taking them quickly out of the airport into waiting staff cars.
The three Pakistani officers, Brigadier General Nadeem Ahmed, Brigadier General Muhammad Talha and Brigadier General Saood Ahmed Rao, are in Dhaka at the invitation of the Bangladesh Army.
They were first taken to Dhaka’s Radisson Blu Hotel.
The Pakistani officers’ travel documents and other papers, accessed by Northeast News, reveal a curious point: while the passport of Brig Gen Nadeem Ahmed was issued on April 30, 2025, that of Brig Gen Nadeem Ahmed and Brig Gen Muhammad Talha were issued on May 29 and May 26, respectively.
These are fresh machine-readable passports with no stamps or other markings on the leaves.
And the validity of each of the three passports is for a year, suggesting that they were issued with a specific purpose.
Even more importantly, the three Pakistan Army officers are scheduled to visit Bangladesh Army’s 10th Infantry Division headquarters at Ramu near Cox’s Bazar.
“These three are definitely under cover. Otherwise, why should they be visiting Ramu cantonment?” asked a Bangladeshi retired Major General.
Suffice it to say that since at least April this year, the Ramu cantonment has been turned into an ultra-sensitive military establishment.
It is said to be the main hub for the Bangladesh Army’s impending operations involving providing logistical and supply support to the Arakan Army.
Before their departure for Pakistan via Dubai on July 5, the Pakistani officers will also meet a host of senior Bangladesh Army officers, including those attached with the Directorate General of Medical Services, military’s Adjutant General’s office and other units.
Senior Bangladesh Army officers express concern over the visit to Ramu cantonment which is the hub for all military activity involving support to the Arakan Army
by Chandan Nandy June 29, 2025 in Neighbours
At 5:27 pm this afternoon, an Emirates flight (No. 586) landed at Dhaka’s Shah Jala International Airport. Three well-dressed bearded men alighted from the aircraft and calmly, but curiously, walked to a waiting bus which they boarded with other passengers.
The bus dropped the passengers near the gate leading into a large enclosure for immigration and security clearance.
The passports of the three men, supposedly belonging to the Pakistan Army Medical Corps, were duly stamped before they were met by their hosts – Bangladeshi officials and Pakistani diplomats stationed in Dhaka – who exchanged pleasantries before taking them quickly out of the airport into waiting staff cars.
The three Pakistani officers, Brigadier General Nadeem Ahmed, Brigadier General Muhammad Talha and Brigadier General Saood Ahmed Rao, are in Dhaka at the invitation of the Bangladesh Army.
They were first taken to Dhaka’s Radisson Blu Hotel.
The Pakistani officers’ travel documents and other papers, accessed by Northeast News, reveal a curious point: while the passport of Brig Gen Nadeem Ahmed was issued on April 30, 2025, that of Brig Gen Nadeem Ahmed and Brig Gen Muhammad Talha were issued on May 29 and May 26, respectively.
These are fresh machine-readable passports with no stamps or other markings on the leaves.
And the validity of each of the three passports is for a year, suggesting that they were issued with a specific purpose.
Even more importantly, the three Pakistan Army officers are scheduled to visit Bangladesh Army’s 10th Infantry Division headquarters at Ramu near Cox’s Bazar.
“These three are definitely under cover. Otherwise, why should they be visiting Ramu cantonment?” asked a Bangladeshi retired Major General.
Suffice it to say that since at least April this year, the Ramu cantonment has been turned into an ultra-sensitive military establishment.
It is said to be the main hub for the Bangladesh Army’s impending operations involving providing logistical and supply support to the Arakan Army.
Before their departure for Pakistan via Dubai on July 5, the Pakistani officers will also meet a host of senior Bangladesh Army officers, including those attached with the Directorate General of Medical Services, military’s Adjutant General’s office and other units.
Saif
Senior Member
- Jan 24, 2024
- 20,444
- 9,566
- Nation
- Residence
- Axis Group
Urgent need to plan against 3-front threats
The public has often heard of the two-front threat to India’s border security. However, for the first time in recent history, the country finds itself confronti
Urgent need to plan against 3-front threats
India faces risks on its borders with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh. The fact that the fronts represent three different types of threat increases the complexity in strategic thinking
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)
Updated on:
08 Jul 2025, 12:30 am
The public has often heard of the two-front threat to India’s border security. However, for the first time in recent history, the country finds itself confronting an active and complex threat environment on three distinct fronts. Each adversary—Pakistan, China and potentially Bangladesh—presents a unique security challenge demanding entirely different response spectrums.
Bangladesh is really not an adversary yet. But in view of the current dynamics in bilateral relations, it’s fair enough to consider threat options from that direction too. Together, this creates a continuous arc of strategic tension along India’s western, northern and eastern borders. Managing this tri-junction of pressure calls not just for better resource optimisation, but for a complete review of how India perceives threats, including those in concert, in the near future.
In the case of Pakistan, it’s all about hybrid war under a conventional and nuclear umbrella. The conventional military equation remains in India’s favour, but the role of Pakistan’s military remains dangerous because of its historic irrationality, an offensive nuclear posture and the continued patronage of radical non-state actors. The terrain here is a complicated mosaic—high-altitude battle zones in J&K, riverine and canal obstacle systems in Punjab, and deserts in Rajasthan.
While Pakistan’s army remains a professional conventional force, its real warfighting doctrine continues to be hybrid in nature. Radical proxies, extremist ideological mobilisation, information operations, cyber warfare, and cross-border terrorism remain the preferred instruments. Despite the recent failings in West Asia in the domain of hybrid conflict, Pakistan is likely to persist with its more refined and technologically proficient versions.
Importantly, Pakistan is also increasingly reliant on air and missile deterrence. The emphasis appears to be on counterbalancing India’s emerging air dominance and growing missile strike capabilities. Pakistan’s strategy also appears designed to pose limited but credible offensive threats— particularly to ensure India keeps its reserve formations committed in the proximity of the western theatre, creating the inevitable decision dilemma about insufficient reserves for the northern borders.
The northern border with China presents a different class of threats—of intimidation, strategic distraction and geopolitical messaging, rather than imminent all-out war. Unlike Pakistan, China does not rely on proxies. It employs a calibrated strategy of grey-zone operations—transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), military infrastructure buildup, psychological warfare and diplomatic signalling.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is technologically far more advanced, better funded and integrated. But it’s untested in modern conflict. Its preference has been to maintain controlled tensions along the LAC without triggering full-scale war. From Galwan to Yangtze, the PLA has sought political dividends from military standoffs while keeping escalation tightly managed. Missile exchanges, cyber intrusions, isolated special forces engagements, and forward base upgrades are more likely PLA scenarios than a full-frontal assault.
The strategy comes at a steep cost for us. India must commit significant, high-quality troops year-round to Ladakh, Arunachal and Sikkim, often dual-tasked with other roles. This stretches human endurance, operational readiness, and logistics in some of the world’s harshest terrains. The application of pressure on the Himalayan borders is designed to divert focus from maritime aspirations that China has in the Indian Ocean, where its freedom of operation is linked to its export-led growth story.
The third front is perhaps the least expected. Bangladesh, until recently a dependable— if delicate—partner, has now become a strategic question mark. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government and the rise of a radicalised political ecosystem marked by Jamaate-Islami’s resurgence, has changed the character of Dhaka’s policy orientation.
At a purely military level, Bangladesh is not in the same league as Pakistan or China. Yet, its nine-division army has strategic utility for India’s adversaries. A hostile or neutral Bangladesh creates two immediate problems for India. First, it makes the Siliguri Corridor more vulnerable than ever. Just the threat of disruption in this 22-km wide corridor is enough to force us to keep disproportionate reserves here.
Second, it could facilitate the rekindling of dormant insurgencies in the Northeast. Bangladesh could become a permissive environment for insurgents, facilitate illegal cross-border movement of people and arms, and undertake psychological operations aimed at destabilising sensitive frontier states like Assam, Manipur and Tripura.
India’s problem is not just that it faces threats on three fronts—it is that these fronts represent three different types of threats. One is a hybrid ideological-proxy threat with conventional overtones (Pakistan), the second, a grey-zone standoff with a technological superpower (China), and the third, a hybridpolitical challenge with potential for escalation of militancy in our vulnerable Northeast (Bangladesh). Greater force flexibility will be needed. Military formations should be able to switch theatres based on scenarios. Rapid reaction formations, especially for the eastern theatre, would be a boon.
Managing strategic reserves would need prudent pre-positioning. Instead of static reserves waiting to be called upon, we would need agile force packages that can airlift, rail-shift or road-redeploy at short notice. Warfighting doctrines may need customisation. For example, responding to Chinese intrusions with excessive concentration is unnecessary and potentially escalatory. Likewise, overcommitting to the Bangladesh border may dilute posture on the more potent fronts. Precision, speed, and jointness—not sheer numbers—should define the response. There is no inkling yet where the theatre command system rests.
The central and state armed police forces must be integrated for hybrid warfare response models. These forces may be required to deal with insurgency support or street-level political disorder that falls below the military’s engagement threshold.
Pakistan’s ISI, China’s PLA Strategic Support Force, and radical groups in Bangladesh may not coordinate with each other formally—but the effect of their actions could be synchronised unintentionally. India’s intelligence set-up has over the years become far more integrated. We must have a threat picture that considers second and third-order linkages between seemingly unrelated developments. The age of the single-front war is over. India’s strategic planners must accept this stark reality and plan accordingly. Each border presents a separate category of challenge, and all three could operate simultaneously with different objectives and thresholds of escalation. Understanding and accepting this is half the battle.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
India faces risks on its borders with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh. The fact that the fronts represent three different types of threat increases the complexity in strategic thinking
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)
Updated on:
08 Jul 2025, 12:30 am
The public has often heard of the two-front threat to India’s border security. However, for the first time in recent history, the country finds itself confronting an active and complex threat environment on three distinct fronts. Each adversary—Pakistan, China and potentially Bangladesh—presents a unique security challenge demanding entirely different response spectrums.
Bangladesh is really not an adversary yet. But in view of the current dynamics in bilateral relations, it’s fair enough to consider threat options from that direction too. Together, this creates a continuous arc of strategic tension along India’s western, northern and eastern borders. Managing this tri-junction of pressure calls not just for better resource optimisation, but for a complete review of how India perceives threats, including those in concert, in the near future.
In the case of Pakistan, it’s all about hybrid war under a conventional and nuclear umbrella. The conventional military equation remains in India’s favour, but the role of Pakistan’s military remains dangerous because of its historic irrationality, an offensive nuclear posture and the continued patronage of radical non-state actors. The terrain here is a complicated mosaic—high-altitude battle zones in J&K, riverine and canal obstacle systems in Punjab, and deserts in Rajasthan.
While Pakistan’s army remains a professional conventional force, its real warfighting doctrine continues to be hybrid in nature. Radical proxies, extremist ideological mobilisation, information operations, cyber warfare, and cross-border terrorism remain the preferred instruments. Despite the recent failings in West Asia in the domain of hybrid conflict, Pakistan is likely to persist with its more refined and technologically proficient versions.
Importantly, Pakistan is also increasingly reliant on air and missile deterrence. The emphasis appears to be on counterbalancing India’s emerging air dominance and growing missile strike capabilities. Pakistan’s strategy also appears designed to pose limited but credible offensive threats— particularly to ensure India keeps its reserve formations committed in the proximity of the western theatre, creating the inevitable decision dilemma about insufficient reserves for the northern borders.
The northern border with China presents a different class of threats—of intimidation, strategic distraction and geopolitical messaging, rather than imminent all-out war. Unlike Pakistan, China does not rely on proxies. It employs a calibrated strategy of grey-zone operations—transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), military infrastructure buildup, psychological warfare and diplomatic signalling.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is technologically far more advanced, better funded and integrated. But it’s untested in modern conflict. Its preference has been to maintain controlled tensions along the LAC without triggering full-scale war. From Galwan to Yangtze, the PLA has sought political dividends from military standoffs while keeping escalation tightly managed. Missile exchanges, cyber intrusions, isolated special forces engagements, and forward base upgrades are more likely PLA scenarios than a full-frontal assault.
The strategy comes at a steep cost for us. India must commit significant, high-quality troops year-round to Ladakh, Arunachal and Sikkim, often dual-tasked with other roles. This stretches human endurance, operational readiness, and logistics in some of the world’s harshest terrains. The application of pressure on the Himalayan borders is designed to divert focus from maritime aspirations that China has in the Indian Ocean, where its freedom of operation is linked to its export-led growth story.
The third front is perhaps the least expected. Bangladesh, until recently a dependable— if delicate—partner, has now become a strategic question mark. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government and the rise of a radicalised political ecosystem marked by Jamaate-Islami’s resurgence, has changed the character of Dhaka’s policy orientation.
At a purely military level, Bangladesh is not in the same league as Pakistan or China. Yet, its nine-division army has strategic utility for India’s adversaries. A hostile or neutral Bangladesh creates two immediate problems for India. First, it makes the Siliguri Corridor more vulnerable than ever. Just the threat of disruption in this 22-km wide corridor is enough to force us to keep disproportionate reserves here.
Second, it could facilitate the rekindling of dormant insurgencies in the Northeast. Bangladesh could become a permissive environment for insurgents, facilitate illegal cross-border movement of people and arms, and undertake psychological operations aimed at destabilising sensitive frontier states like Assam, Manipur and Tripura.
India’s problem is not just that it faces threats on three fronts—it is that these fronts represent three different types of threats. One is a hybrid ideological-proxy threat with conventional overtones (Pakistan), the second, a grey-zone standoff with a technological superpower (China), and the third, a hybridpolitical challenge with potential for escalation of militancy in our vulnerable Northeast (Bangladesh). Greater force flexibility will be needed. Military formations should be able to switch theatres based on scenarios. Rapid reaction formations, especially for the eastern theatre, would be a boon.
Managing strategic reserves would need prudent pre-positioning. Instead of static reserves waiting to be called upon, we would need agile force packages that can airlift, rail-shift or road-redeploy at short notice. Warfighting doctrines may need customisation. For example, responding to Chinese intrusions with excessive concentration is unnecessary and potentially escalatory. Likewise, overcommitting to the Bangladesh border may dilute posture on the more potent fronts. Precision, speed, and jointness—not sheer numbers—should define the response. There is no inkling yet where the theatre command system rests.
The central and state armed police forces must be integrated for hybrid warfare response models. These forces may be required to deal with insurgency support or street-level political disorder that falls below the military’s engagement threshold.
Pakistan’s ISI, China’s PLA Strategic Support Force, and radical groups in Bangladesh may not coordinate with each other formally—but the effect of their actions could be synchronised unintentionally. India’s intelligence set-up has over the years become far more integrated. We must have a threat picture that considers second and third-order linkages between seemingly unrelated developments. The age of the single-front war is over. India’s strategic planners must accept this stark reality and plan accordingly. Each border presents a separate category of challenge, and all three could operate simultaneously with different objectives and thresholds of escalation. Understanding and accepting this is half the battle.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
Saif
Senior Member
- Jan 24, 2024
- 20,444
- 9,566
- Nation
- Residence
- Axis Group
CDS Chauhan says covergence between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh has implications for regional stability
CDS Chauhan said over the past five years, Pakistan had acquired “almost 70% to 80% of its weapons and equipment from China” | India News
www.hindustantimes.com
CDS Chauhan says convergence between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh has implications for regional stability
By
Rezaul H Laskar
, New Delhi
Updated on: Jul 09, 2025 03:49 AM IST
CDS Chauhan said over the past five years, Pakistan had acquired “almost 70% to 80% of its weapons and equipment from China”
FILE PHOTO: CDS Gen Anil Chauhan during a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on April 29, 2025(PTI)
A convergence of interests between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh may have implications for regional stability and security at a time when India faces several challenges in its neighbourhood, Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Tuesday.
Unlike past conflicts between India and Pakistan, there was no activity along India’s borders with China during the four days of hostilities in May after the launch of Operation Sindoor, Chauhan said while delivering an address on the theme of “India’s evolving national security landscape” an at event organised by the Observer Research Foundation.
However, Chauhan listed other indications of the close military and security links between China and Pakistan, such as Islamabad acquiring almost 80% of its weaponry from Beijing in the past five years and the presence of representatives of Chinese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in Pakistan.
Referring to challenges faced by India within the neighbourhood, Chauhan pointed to economic instability in countries such as Myanmar, economic distress in nations in the Indian Ocean region that has allowed “outside powers to leverage their influence”, and frequent shifts in government in South Asia.
In this context, he said: “There’s a possible convergence of interest…between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh which may have security implications for regional stability and security dynamics.”
Referring to Operation Sindoor, which was launched by India on May 7 to target terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack in April, Chauhan said that “there was no unusual activity on the northern borders during the duration of this conflict”.
He added, “In past conflicts, there had been trouble on the [northern] borders…But that’s a fact that there was no activity on the northern borders.”
Over the past five years, he said, Pakistan had acquired “almost 70% to 80% of its weapons and equipment from China”. He added, “A reasonable assumption would be that Chinese OEMs will have commercial liabilities which they have to fulfill and will have people in Pakistan…That equipment has to be serviced, it has to function.”
Chauhan also alluded to sharing of information between China and Pakistan, such as commercially available satellite imagery from Chinese companies. “So that’s possible. How much state support will be there, it’s very difficult to define. When this information turns into intelligence, it’s also very difficult to define,” he said.
He further said that Operation Sindoor had shown that there is scope for “further expansion of space in conventional operations”. He noted that Operation Sindoor was unique as the “only example of a conflict between two nuclear weapon states”.
“I think that in this particular conflict, we thought that there was a lot of space for conventional operations,” Chauhan said, listing three reasons for his argument.
“First is India’s nuclear doctrine, that is no first use. I think that gives us strength and that contributes to creating this particular space between us and Pakistan.
Second is the way we responded actually…we destroyed terrorist camps in response to terror attacks as part of a prevention strategy,” he added.
While Pakistan escalated the conflict into a “fully conventional domain”, it reduced its option to “raise the threshold [to a] nuclear conflict”, Chauhan contended. “Thirdly, I think there is space because there was no capture of territory involved…I think that further expansion of space in conventional operations is possible in each ladder of that escalation, by taking it to newer domains of warfare like cyber, electromagnetic spectrum…So we can still expand space for conventional operations,” he said.
Chauhan, however, pointed to an evolving military challenge in the shape of vulnerability to long-range weapons and long-range precision strikes. “There is currently no full-proof defence mechanism against ballistic missiles, hypersonics, cruise missiles and large-scale attacks by drones or loiter ammunition, especially when they were all used in conjunction with one another,” he said.
By
Rezaul H Laskar
, New Delhi
Updated on: Jul 09, 2025 03:49 AM IST
CDS Chauhan said over the past five years, Pakistan had acquired “almost 70% to 80% of its weapons and equipment from China”
FILE PHOTO: CDS Gen Anil Chauhan during a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on April 29, 2025(PTI)
A convergence of interests between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh may have implications for regional stability and security at a time when India faces several challenges in its neighbourhood, Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Tuesday.
Unlike past conflicts between India and Pakistan, there was no activity along India’s borders with China during the four days of hostilities in May after the launch of Operation Sindoor, Chauhan said while delivering an address on the theme of “India’s evolving national security landscape” an at event organised by the Observer Research Foundation.
However, Chauhan listed other indications of the close military and security links between China and Pakistan, such as Islamabad acquiring almost 80% of its weaponry from Beijing in the past five years and the presence of representatives of Chinese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in Pakistan.
Referring to challenges faced by India within the neighbourhood, Chauhan pointed to economic instability in countries such as Myanmar, economic distress in nations in the Indian Ocean region that has allowed “outside powers to leverage their influence”, and frequent shifts in government in South Asia.
In this context, he said: “There’s a possible convergence of interest…between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh which may have security implications for regional stability and security dynamics.”
Referring to Operation Sindoor, which was launched by India on May 7 to target terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack in April, Chauhan said that “there was no unusual activity on the northern borders during the duration of this conflict”.
He added, “In past conflicts, there had been trouble on the [northern] borders…But that’s a fact that there was no activity on the northern borders.”
Over the past five years, he said, Pakistan had acquired “almost 70% to 80% of its weapons and equipment from China”. He added, “A reasonable assumption would be that Chinese OEMs will have commercial liabilities which they have to fulfill and will have people in Pakistan…That equipment has to be serviced, it has to function.”
Chauhan also alluded to sharing of information between China and Pakistan, such as commercially available satellite imagery from Chinese companies. “So that’s possible. How much state support will be there, it’s very difficult to define. When this information turns into intelligence, it’s also very difficult to define,” he said.
He further said that Operation Sindoor had shown that there is scope for “further expansion of space in conventional operations”. He noted that Operation Sindoor was unique as the “only example of a conflict between two nuclear weapon states”.
“I think that in this particular conflict, we thought that there was a lot of space for conventional operations,” Chauhan said, listing three reasons for his argument.
“First is India’s nuclear doctrine, that is no first use. I think that gives us strength and that contributes to creating this particular space between us and Pakistan.
Second is the way we responded actually…we destroyed terrorist camps in response to terror attacks as part of a prevention strategy,” he added.
While Pakistan escalated the conflict into a “fully conventional domain”, it reduced its option to “raise the threshold [to a] nuclear conflict”, Chauhan contended. “Thirdly, I think there is space because there was no capture of territory involved…I think that further expansion of space in conventional operations is possible in each ladder of that escalation, by taking it to newer domains of warfare like cyber, electromagnetic spectrum…So we can still expand space for conventional operations,” he said.
Chauhan, however, pointed to an evolving military challenge in the shape of vulnerability to long-range weapons and long-range precision strikes. “There is currently no full-proof defence mechanism against ballistic missiles, hypersonics, cruise missiles and large-scale attacks by drones or loiter ammunition, especially when they were all used in conjunction with one another,” he said.
