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G Bangladesh Defense

Rooppur power plant: Equipment worth Tk 270 million purchased for Tk 2.14 billion

Mohammad Mostafa
Dhaka
Published: 30 Jun 2026, 13: 08

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Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant Project File Photo

Following the controversial “pillow scandal,” fresh irregularities have emerged in procurement for the housing project at the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. This time, the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has detected irregularities in the purchase of electrical substation equipment and generators for 11 residential buildings in the project’s “Green City” housing complex.

The audit found that the government paid nearly eight times the official price for the procurement. Equipment officially valued at around Tk 270 million was billed at Tk 2.1 billion, resulting in excess expenditure of approximately Tk 1.8 billion.

According to the CAG’s audit report, the government suffered substantial financial losses because the equipment was purchased at prices far higher than those fixed by the Public Works Department (PWD) and the official cost estimates.

The Rooppur project had previously come under scrutiny over unusually high spending on pillows, furniture and construction materials. This time, the audit has raised questions over almost every stage of procuring power supply equipment—from the preparation of tender documents and bid evaluation to the issuance of work orders, approval of bills and payment.

In September 2017, the office of the Executive Engineer of the Pabna Public Works Division invited tenders through the electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) system for external electrification work for 11 buildings.
A senior CAG official, speaking to Prothom Alo on condition of anonymity, said the audit found that the prices of several items had been set far above the government’s approved rates.

Although the total bid amount remained close to the official estimate, the prices of specific items were inflated several-fold. Failure to follow rules in bid verification, the formation of the estimation committee and bid evaluation resulted in significant financial losses to the government.

The official added that the audit recommended taking administrative action against those responsible and recovering the disputed amount for deposit into the state treasury.

Prices inflated through manipulation

The Public Works Department (PWD) implemented the construction of residential buildings under the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission’s Rooppur project. In September 2017, the office of the Executive Engineer of the Pabna Public Works Division invited tenders through the electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) system for external electrification work for 11 buildings.

The work included installing 1,600-kVA electrical substations, generators, lifts, air-conditioning systems, solar panels, security cameras, fire-fighting systems and internet connectivity. However, the audit calculated the financial losses primarily in relation to the electrical substation equipment and generators.

In contrast, the prices of several other items, including air-conditioning units, were quoted lower than the official estimates. As a result, the total bid value remained only 0.002 per cent below the official estimate.

After analysing the bids, auditors found that contractors had quoted abnormally high prices for electrical substation equipment and generators. In contrast, the prices of several other items, including air-conditioning units, were quoted lower than the official estimates. As a result, the total bid value remained only 0.002 per cent below the official estimate.

The audit report said that although the overall bid appeared acceptable on the surface, the prices of several key items had been inflated many times over.

Nearly Tk 180 million in excess spending on a single building

The pricing irregularities are particularly evident in the accounts for Building no. 7. The cost of the high-voltage control equipment for the building was estimated at Tk 45 million, although its official price under the Public Works Department’s schedule of rates was only Tk 1.032 million.

A distribution transformer was priced at Tk 44 million, despite having an official rate of Tk 4.04 million.

In the same building, low-voltage power control equipment was billed at Tk 30.2 million, whereas its official value was about Tk 1.631 million.

A power factor correction panel was priced at Tk 20 million, although its official value was less than Tk 1 million.

In addition, two generators were billed at Tk 56.8 million, while their official price was Tk 16.8 million.

Altogether, these five categories of equipment were billed at Tk 196 million for a single building, although their official value was only Tk 18.4 million. In other words, the excess expenditure on just one building amounted to approximately Tk 177.6 million.

Under the Public Procurement Rules, if a bidder quotes an abnormally high price for any item, the tender evaluation committee is required to seek a detailed explanation for the quoted price. If the prices of certain items are found to be abnormally inflated, the committee may also recommend increasing the performance security
Three contractors received an extra Tk 1.87 billion

According to the documents, Majid Sons Construction Ltd. was awarded contracts for five buildings. The company was paid about Tk 920 million, although the official value of the relevant equipment was approximately Tk 122.7 million. This resulted in excess payments of about Tk 797.3 million.

Sajin Enterprise was awarded contracts for four buildings. The company received Tk 824.9 million, while the official value of the equipment was Tk 98.2 million. Excess payments totalled about Tk 726.7 million.

Meanwhile, the MSCL-GKBPL joint venture carried out work on two buildings and received Tk 393.9 million, although the official value of the equipment was approximately Tk 49.1 million. This resulted in excess payments of around Tk 344.8 million.

In total, the three contractors were paid approximately Tk 2.13 billion, whereas the official value of the same equipment stood at Tk 269.9 million.

Rules ignored despite clear provisions

Under the Public Procurement Rules, if a bidder quotes an abnormally high price for any item, the tender evaluation committee is required to seek a detailed explanation for the quoted price. If the prices of certain items are found to be abnormally inflated, the committee may also recommend increasing the performance security.

However, the audit report states that no such measures were taken in this case.

The auditors also found no evidence that an authorised estimation committee had been formed to prepare the official cost estimate. Despite this, the estimates were prepared at rates higher than prevailing market prices and the Public Works Department’s schedule of rates, providing undue financial benefits to the contractors, the report said.

In response to the audit objection, the relevant department argued that the contractors’ quoted prices were within the limits of the official estimate. The auditors rejected this explanation, saying that compliance cannot be judged solely on whether the overall bid falls within the estimated cost. The reasonableness of the price of each major item must also be examined.

With many other mega projects currently underway in the country, it was imperative to conduct a thorough investigation into the alleged corruption and ensure exemplary punishment for those responsible-----TIB Executive Director Iftekharuzzaman.

According to the audit summary, the tender evaluation committee was chaired by Md Nazibur Rahman, then Additional Chief Engineer of the Rajshahi Public Works Zone. The member secretary was Mohammad Masudul Alam, then Executive Engineer of the Pabna Public Works Division. Another member was a Sub-Divisional Engineer, whose name was not mentioned in the records. The audit also identified Md Arifuzzaman Khandaker, then Executive Engineer of the Pabna Public Works Division, as the official who authorised the bill payments.

Masudul Alam was arrested by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2019 in connection with a case involving the purchase of furniture and other items at abnormally inflated prices. The ACC also questioned Nazibur Rahman, who chaired the tender evaluation committee.

The ACC also arrested Shahadat Hossain, owner of Sajin Construction, and Asif Hossain, owner of Majid Sons Construction, in connection with the case. G.K. Shamim, owner of GKBPL, was arrested by law enforcement agencies later that year on separate charges.

Recommendation to recover funds and take administrative action

The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, under construction in Ishwardi, Pabna, will comprise two 1,200-megawatt units, with a combined generation capacity of 2,400 megawatts. Construction of the first unit began in November 2017, while work on the second unit started the following year.

A residential complex known as “Green City” was built to accommodate officials and employees of the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission working on the project. The audit identified excess expenditure of nearly Tk 1.87 billion solely in the procurement of electrical equipment for the complex’s 11 residential buildings.

The audit report recommended taking administrative action against members of the tender evaluation committee, as well as the officials responsible for approving and disbursing the payments. It also recommended recovering the disputed Tk 1.86 billion from those responsible and depositing the amount into the state treasury.

Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has expressed concern over the purchase of electrical equipment at inflated prices, which resulted in excess payments of about Tk 1.87 billion in the country’s largest infrastructure project.

Describing the incident as “mega corruption,” TIB Executive Director Iftekharuzzaman told Prothom Alo on 28 June that reliable information confirmed the project had been subjected to large-scale financial plunder and corruption.

Iftekharuzzaman said that although the government had made political commitments to combat corruption, no specific governance or anti-corruption safeguards had been incorporated into the implementation of mega projects. He also said that internal resistance within sections of the bureaucracy could delay efforts to hold those responsible accountable.

He further said that, with many other mega projects currently underway in the country, it was imperative to conduct a thorough investigation into the alleged corruption and ensure exemplary punishment for those responsible. Otherwise, he warned, it would be impossible to send the right message against the misuse and plundering of public funds.​
 

Why anti-corruption reforms often fail

Matiur Rahman

Published :
Jul 03, 2026 00:21
Updated :
Jul 03, 2026 00:21

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Corruption is widely recognised as one of the most significant barriers to economic development, efficient governance, and public trust. Yet despite decades of reform efforts across the developing world, corruption remains remarkably resilient. Governments establish anti-corruption commissions, introduce transparency laws, digitise public services, and strengthen oversight mechanisms. International development partners spend billions of dollars supporting governance reforms. Nevertheless, corruption frequently survives, adapts, and reappears in new forms.

The persistence of corruption raises a fundamental question: Why do anti-corruption reforms often fail? The answer lies in the fact that corruption is not merely a legal or administrative problem. It is also a political, institutional, economic, and social phenomenon. Many reforms fail because they target symptoms rather than underlying causes. A growing body of scholarship suggests that anti-corruption initiatives often underestimate the complexity of the systems they seek to change.

The most influential framework for understanding corruption emerged from principal-agent theory, developed by economists Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling in their seminal 1976 work 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure'. According to this perspective, corruption occurs when public officials-agents-abuse authority entrusted to them by citizens. the principals. The solution appears straightforward: increase monitoring, improve transparency, strengthen auditing, and impose harsher penalties.

Many anti-corruption programmes around the world have followed precisely this logic. Governments create watchdog institutions, establish reporting requirements, and strengthen investigative powers. However, principal-agent reforms often fail because they assume the existence of honest and committed principals. In reality, political leaders, senior bureaucrats, and powerful economic actors may themselves benefit from corrupt arrangements. When those responsible for enforcing accountability are embedded within patronage networks, oversight institutions become vulnerable to political influence, selective enforcement, and regulatory capture.

This limitation prompted a major shift in corruption studies. Political scientists Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell argued in their influential 2013 article 'Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail: Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem' that corruption in many countries is not primarily a principal-agent problem. Instead, it is a collective-action problem.

Their argument draws on Mancur Olson's classic 1965 book 'The Logic of Collective Action'. Olson demonstrated that individuals often fail to cooperate in pursuit of common goals when they believe others will not do the same. Applied to corruption, this means citizens pay bribes because they expect others to pay bribes. Businesses offer unofficial payments because competitors do. Public officials engage in corrupt practices because they assume honesty will place them at a disadvantage.

Under these conditions, corruption becomes self-sustaining. Even individuals who personally oppose corruption may continue participating because they lack confidence that others will behave differently. As a result, anti-corruption campaigns that focus solely on punishing individual offenders often yield disappointing outcomes. They fail to alter the expectations and social norms that sustain corrupt behaviour.

Another powerful explanation comes from institutional economics. In 'Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance' (1990), Nobel laureate Douglass C. North argued that formal rules tell only part of the story. Informal institutions-social norms, patronage systems, political relationships, and cultural expectations-often exert greater influence than laws and regulations.

Many developing countries have anti-corruption laws similar to those in advanced democracies. Yet governance outcomes differ dramatically. The reason is that informal institutions frequently override formal rules. Patron-client relationships, political loyalty, and personal connections may determine access to opportunities, contracts, promotions, and services. Consequently, reforms produce impressive legislation without substantially changing behaviour.

This helps explain why externally driven anti-corruption reforms often fail. Laws can be imported relatively easily, but institutional culture cannot. Without changes in incentives and norms, legal reforms frequently remain confined to paper.

The sociological perspective further deepens our understanding. Max Weber's classic work 'Economy and Society' (1922) highlighted the importance of rational-legal bureaucracy based on merit, professionalism, and impersonal rules. Where bureaucratic systems are shaped by personal loyalties, kinship ties, and political patronage, corruption becomes embedded within the functioning of institutions rather than existing outside them.

Corruption, therefore, cannot always be understood as individual deviance. In many contexts, it becomes part of the social order itself. Individuals often participate because doing otherwise may carry high professional, economic, or political costs.

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu added another dimension through his work on social capital and power networks. In 'Distinction' (1979) and subsequent writings, Bourdieu argued that elites maintain influence through interconnected networks of economic, political, and social capital. Anti-corruption reforms often underestimate the ability of these networks to adapt to new regulations while preserving their advantages.

Political economy perspectives provide perhaps the most realistic explanation. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued in their influential 2012 book 'Why Nations Fail' that institutions reflect underlying power relations. Corruption often survives because it serves the interests of powerful groups. Those benefiting from opaque procurement systems, discretionary regulations, monopolistic privileges, and weak oversight mechanisms frequently resist meaningful reform.

From this perspective, corruption is not simply a governance failure; it is often a political equilibrium. Reform efforts fail not because policymakers lack technical knowledge, but because effective reforms threaten established interests.

The political-settlement approach developed by economist Mushtaq Khan reaches a similar conclusion. Khan argues that anti-corruption reforms frequently fail when they ignore the underlying distribution of political power. Reform strategies that challenge entrenched interests without altering power relations often produce limited results. Institutions may change formally while informal practices remain intact.

Bangladesh offers a compelling illustration of these theoretical insights. Over the past two decades, Bangladesh has achieved impressive progress in economic growth, poverty reduction, export expansion, infrastructure development, and digital transformation. The country has also introduced numerous governance reforms, including electronic government procurement systems, digital public services, financial monitoring mechanisms, and institutional strengthening initiatives.

Yet corruption remains a significant challenge. According to Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), released in February 2026, Bangladesh scored 24 out of 100 and ranked 150th out of 182 countries. Although the score improved marginally from 23 in the previous year, Bangladesh remained the 13th most corrupt country globally and scored far below the global average of 42. Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) noted that this was the country's second-lowest score in the past fourteen years. TIB further argued that widespread corruption persists due to the absence of meaningful state reforms and the failure to implement key recommendations from anti-corruption institutions. TIB Executive Director Dr Iftekharuzzaman warned that Bangladesh is "losing control of corruption" despite the slight statistical improvement.

The Bangladesh case illustrates the limitations of principal-agent reforms. Anti-corruption laws exist. Oversight institutions exist. Digital governance initiatives have expanded considerably. Yet corruption-related concerns continue to emerge in sectors such as banking, public procurement, land administration, taxation, local government, and public service delivery.

The banking sector offers a particularly important example. Governance failures, loan irregularities, weak accountability mechanisms, and politically connected financial decisions have repeatedly raised concerns about institutional integrity. Similarly, public procurement reforms have improved transparency, yet allegations regarding collusion, project cost inflation, and preferential treatment continue to surface.

Collective-action theory helps explain why these challenges persist. Citizens often expect unofficial payments to facilitate administrative processes. Public officials may similarly assume that informal transactions are a normal practice. When corruption becomes an accepted expectation, changing behaviour becomes considerably more difficult than merely changing regulations.

Institutional theory also sheds light on the persistence of corruption. Formal governance structures have evolved significantly, but informal incentives often remain unchanged. Patronage networks and influence-based decision-making continue to shape outcomes in ways that formal regulations cannot easily control.

The economic costs are substantial. Corruption raises transaction costs, discourages investment, distorts market competition, reduces tax collection efficiency, weakens public service delivery, and undermines investor confidence. The World Bank and numerous development economists have consistently shown that countries with stronger governance institutions tend to attract more investment, achieve better development outcomes, and sustain higher long-term growth.

The broader lesson is that corruption cannot be eliminated solely through laws, commissions, or technology. Principal-agent theory highlights the importance of accountability. Collective-action theory emphasises social expectations. Institutional theory focuses on formal and informal rules. Weberian sociology points to bureaucratic structures. Political economy approaches reveal the central role of power and vested interests.

Each perspective captures part of the problem. Together, they reveal why anti-corruption reforms frequently disappoint.

Successful reform requires more than prosecution. It requires strengthening institutional independence, protecting oversight bodies, enhancing transparency, improving judicial effectiveness, encouraging civic participation, reducing discretionary power, and transforming the incentives that sustain corrupt behaviour. Most importantly, it requires political commitment to challenge vested interests rather than accommodate them.

The history of anti-corruption reform suggests that corruption is rarely defeated by technical solutions alone. Sustainable progress occurs when institutions become genuinely accountable, rules apply equally to all actors, and citizens believe integrity is rewarded rather than punished.

Until reforms address these deeper political and institutional realities, anti-corruption campaigns will continue to produce impressive rhetoric, occasional prosecutions, and limited long-term change. The challenge is not designing more anti-corruption programmes. It is creating the conditions under which those programmes can actually work.

Dr Matiur Rahman is a researcher and development professional.​
 

Reconstituting the ACC

FE

Published :
Jul 04, 2026 00:43
Updated :
Jul 04, 2026 00:43

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In a move awaited since long, the incumbent BNP government reportedly formed a search committee to select key members of the new anti-graft body. Already four months have elapsed since the chairman and two commissioners of the seventh Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) reportedly resigned voluntarily. Ostensibly, their exit was to make way for the newly elected BNP government to select the state's oversight body to combat corruption in line with its political manifesto. But effective measures had been lacking for long under the incumbent government to fill the void created by the resignations, though the ACC Act 2004, requires that it should be done within 30 days of any vacancy.

But this long absence of the top ACC officials has created legal and administrative bottlenecks, preventing the graft-fighting body from approving new cases, initiating investigations, filing charge sheets, or issuing travel bans. Notably, under the ACC Act, critical actions like formally starting a criminal inquiry or freezing properties require direct approval from the commissioners. In consequence, without a commission in place, hundreds of pending case files are remaining in limbo. Foreign governments require formal criminal proceedings in Bangladesh before providing legal assistance to trace and repatriate siphoned-off funds. But the ACC with this void at the top is unable to approve Mutual Legal Assistance Requests (MLARs) thereby stymieing international asset recovery efforts.

The process of forming a search committee to appoint new commissioners has been too slow. Moreover, structural reform efforts have come to a standstill after parliament allowed the Anti-Corruption Commission (Amendment) Ordinance proclaimed by the interim government to lapse. Going into history, the anti-graft body has fallen into similar crises for the fourth time since its establishment in November 2004 by the then-BNP government of prime minister Khaleda Zia replacing the previous anti-graft body, styled, Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC). Since then six anti-corruption bodies came and went till the July 24 uprising (when the sixth commission stepped down on October 29, 2024). The commission also experienced a similar state of vacuum for about one and a half months until the constitution of the seventh ACC in December 2024.

The last (the 7th) ACC constituted under the Dr Yunus-led interim government moved, despite its limited mandate, fast to clean some of the rot left by the previous (now-defunct Awami League) government. It took sweeping action against some crony oligarchs, ghost corporate bodies and affiliates of then-ruling party who considered the state exchequer their personal property. Against this backdrop, it is deeply disconcerting that the anti-corruption watchdog has been experiencing such a state of paralysis for so long when there is no political vacuum in the country. Critiquing such crises in the process of creating a constitutional body to fight country's systemic corruption, independent anti-corruption watchdog groups like Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) have noted that ACC activities have historically struggled to remain free from political influence, with past biases in investigating or withdrawing cases dampening public confidence and necessitating deep institutional overhauls. Unsurprisingly, the present government has meanwhile drawn a lot of flak from various concerned quarters for the laxity. Even the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACC) reportedly expressed similar concerns to the government.

Now, the formation of a 5-member search committee chaired by a Supreme Court Appellate Division Justice to recommend qualified candidates as chairman and commissioners for the anti-graft body is, though belated, a commendable one. But it needs to accelerate its pace of work to complete the remaining tasks so the massive backlog of pending anti-graft cases could be duly addressed. According to the gazette notification to this effect, the search committee formed under Section 7 of the ACC Act, 2004, would recommend at least two candidates for each post of chairman and commissioner. The president would recommend the new chairman and commissioner from the list. Hopefully, through reconstitution of the ACC, the present government would thus fulfil one of its 31-point state-reform agenda.​
 

NBR warns taxpayers against fraud, extortion attempts
Staff Correspondent 05 July, 2026, 11:57

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A file photo shows the National Board of Revenue headquarters in the capital. | New Age photo

The National Board of Revenue has urged all taxpayers to remain vigilant against fraudsters attempting to extort money by falsely claiming that their files have been selected for audit.

In a press release issued on Sunday, the NBR said that it had recently observed that organised fraud groups were contacting taxpayers from various mobile phone numbers, claiming that their tax files had been selected for audit.

The fraudsters reportedly promise exemption from audit or threaten legal complications in an attempt to illegally collect money.

In this regard, the NBR asked taxpayers to pay special attention to certain issues.

The NBR said that no official or employee communicated with taxpayers regarding tax audits through personal mobile phone numbers or any unauthorised channels.

If a tax file is selected for audit, the taxpayer will be notified solely through an official written notice, it said.

The revenue agency also said that any outstanding tax or government fee must be paid only into the state treasury through the prescribed government payment system.

‘No tax official or any other individual is authorised to receive tax payments personally or through mobile financial services such as bKash, Rocket or Nagad, or through any personal bank account,’ it added.

The NBR said that taxpayers receiving any suspicious phone call, SMS or email related to tax audits were advised not to be misled.

Instead, it said, they should immediately contact the office of the relevant deputy tax commissioner to verify the authenticity of the communication.

Moreover, if anyone impersonating an NBR official demands money, taxpayers are requested to inform the nearest law enforcement agency immediately and preserve the caller’s phone number as evidence, the revenue authority added.

The NBR reiterated its commitment to providing transparent, hassle-free services to taxpayers and urged the public not to engage in any financial transactions with such fraudsters under any circumstances.​
 

Bangladesh Bank offers exit for loan defaulters
Interest-free facility will be in force till Dec 31

Md Mehedi Hasan and Ahsan Habib

View attachment 27972
Cartoon: Biplob Chakroborty

Bangladesh Bank has announced a one-time “special exit” facility for defaulting borrowers, allowing banks to waive interest and let them settle bad loans with a single payment.

Loans classified as “bad” and “loss” as of June 30, 2026, will be eligible under the scheme, according to a BB circular issued yesterday.

The move is aimed at curbing the rising volume of non-performing loans (NPLs) and restoring banks’ lending capacity, the central bank said.

The special facility will remain in effect until December 31 this year.

According to BB data, the NPL ratio rose to 32.26 percent of total outstanding loans at the end of March this year, up from 30.6 percent in December last year. Total classified loans climbed by Tk 31,487 crore to Tk 5.89 lakh crore from Tk 5.57 lakh crore.

View attachment 27973

“Through this policy, the central bank has essentially provided commercial banks a way out. Now it is up to the banks to use it prudently. At the same time, the central bank must maintain close oversight.”-----Prof Mustafizur Rahman, distinguished fellow at the CPD.

The central bank said the facility would allow banks to reduce NPLs while improving their capacity to disburse new loans, which it said would support production, investment, and employment generation.

It has asked banks to prioritise short-term agricultural credit and loans to the Cottage, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise (CMSME) sector.

Following the BB move, analysts have given mixed opinions, saying the facility may help banks clear balance sheets but could also encourage more defaults.

Syed Mahbubur Rahman, managing director of Mutual Trust Bank, told The Daily Star that this process of cleaning up banks’ balance sheets is not a bad approach. Instead of carrying the burden of bad loans indefinitely, he said, it is better if defaulting borrowers exit after settling liabilities through a one‑time concession.

Mahbubur, also former chairman of the Association of Bankers, Bangladesh, cautioned that care must be taken to prevent misuse of the facility.

Prof Mustafizur Rahman, distinguished fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue, said the facility was being offered under exceptional circumstances. Since the policy states that exits should be based on the bank-client relationship, he argued, the decision should ultimately rest with banks.

“In the past, many such decisions were made on political considerations. If similar undue pressure is exerted now, it will not lead to positive outcomes. But if a bank allows an exit based on its relationship with the borrower, it could help clean up balance sheets and provide relief.”

He cautioned that the process must be handled carefully, noting that many borrowers have collateral. In such cases, banks should first recover principal and accrued interest by selling off the collateral.

“Through this policy, the central bank has essentially provided commercial banks a way out. Now it is up to the banks to use it prudently. At the same time, the central bank must maintain close oversight. Moreover, such facilities should not be extended to new loans in the future,” he added.

Meanwhile, Toufic Ahmad Choudhury, former director general of the Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management, criticised the move, saying it was not a sound policy and would likely encourage more defaults.

“There was a general expectation that the new government would take a tougher stance against loan defaulters. Instead, the policies being introduced appear to favour the errant borrowers.”

He warned that delegating authority to waive interest to banks could allow directors to write off dues in ways that serve their own interests. Decisions on rescheduling and waivers, he argued, should remain with the Bangladesh Bank.

He believes that given the already massive volume of NPLs, waiving accumulated interest would raise questions about how banks would pay depositors and cover operating costs.

“Ultimately, such concessions risk creating a new generation of irresponsible borrowers and encouraging future defaults,” Toufic added.

Deen Islam, professor of economics at Dhaka University, agreed that the BB’s special exit policy could provide relief to the banking sector.

In the short run, he noted, the policy may improve liquidity, support credit growth, and help viable businesses retain or create jobs, particularly in SMEs and agriculture.

“However, repeated reliance on such exit facilities could reduce borrowers’ incentives to repay on time if they expect future concessions.”

He said this weakens credit discipline and distorts resource allocation by rewarding default over prudent behaviour.

While the policy has clear short‑term benefits, it must be accompanied by stronger governance, stricter risk management, and improved recovery mechanisms to ensure long‑term stability and sustainable growth, Deen added.​

The govt. does not want to needle loan defaulters too much - because most of their own MPs (BNP in our case) and their friends are big schemers of securing loans without collateral. Gorai Golod. How does a bank official process a loan without collateral? I'm sure they are getting a cut of the money which I know. These people should be jailed - if not, much worse.

Loan defaulters should be treated much, much more harshly and also given long jail sentences and travel ban imposed (house arrest). The toughest treatment for bank loan defaulters can be found in the UAE, where legal consequences can include civil lawsuits, financial penalties, and even travel bans if the debtor is deemed a flight risk. Additionally, banks can pursue the provisional seizure of debtor funds (property collateral included) and impose fines for non-compliance with court orders.
 

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