Home Watch Videos Wars Movies Login

[🇮🇳] India---News & Views

[🇮🇳] India---News & Views
58
3K
More threads by Saif

G   Indian Defense
India’s miscalculations and regional reset

1768526462546.webp


BANGLADESH stands at a defining crossroads. With the close of Sheikh Hasina’s long and dominant political chapter, the country is entering an uncertain yet profoundly consequential phase. This transition is not merely a domestic political shift; it is embedded in the wider currents of South Asian geopolitics. From New Delhi to Washington, capitals are recalibrating their lenses, and India’s growing strategic unease rooted in fears of diminishing influence in Dhaka is becoming increasingly visible.

For decades, India sought to entrench itself as Bangladesh’s primary and almost exclusive political partner. In reality, however, policies articulated in the language of friendship often translated into asymmetric dependencies. On critical issues such as trade imbalances, border management, water sharing, maritime agreements and transit, Bangladeshi interests were frequently sidelined. Sheikh Hasina’s government proved to be a dependable custodian of Indian strategic priorities, but the relationship rarely rested on genuine equality. Over time, this imbalance fostered resentment among broad segments of Bangladeshi society sentiments that are now finding renewed political expression.


India’s foreign policy faces searching questions in this post-Hasina moment. New Delhi appears to have invested heavily in a single political equation, neglecting to cultivate broader and more resilient channels of engagement. This strategic short-sightedness is now evident as India’s traditional leverage in South Asia encounters mounting challenges. China, the United States, Turkey and several Middle Eastern countries are positioning themselves as alternative partners in Bangladesh’s evolving diplomatic landscape. As a result, Bangladesh is no longer a one-directional strategic space dominated by India; it has become a multi-actor arena of competition manifest in everything from medical diplomacy to people-to-people exchanges and commercial networks.

Domestically, Bangladesh’s internal transformation is amplifying these external dynamics. In the power vacuum left behind, a struggle to reconfigure the balance of authority has begun. Within the state apparatus often described as the ‘deep state’ calculations are underway. Military and civilian bureaucracies, intelligence agencies and diplomatic institutions appear engaged in quiet preparations aimed at engineering a controlled transition. Stability, or at least its appearance, remains the guiding objective. Yet a fundamental question persists: how compatible is a ‘managed transition’ with the demands of democratic renewal?

At the same time, long-suppressed opposition forces are re-emerging. The BNP and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami claim to champion the restoration of genuine popular representation. Still, scepticism remains. Have these parties truly absorbed the lessons of the past and adapted to the political language of a new generation? Or are they once again constrained by leader-centric structures and cycles of reactive politics? The BNP, in particular, now confronts a defining choice: to lead a broad-based democratic reawakening or to relapse into fragmented, personality-driven resistance.


Jamaat-e-Islami faces an even more complex dilemma. Still burdened by the unresolved legacy of 1971, the party remains politically cornered. Survival in the new context demands more than tactical repositioning; it requires a substantive shift away from rigid religion-centric politics towards civic engagement, institutional legitimacy and constitutional norms. The international environment has also changed. Across the Middle East, even religiously inspired political movements are embracing pragmatic economic agendas and flexible foreign policies. Jamaat’s future hinges on whether it can learn the grammar of contemporary politics rather than remain trapped in outdated frameworks.

On the global stage, Bangladesh’s strategic geography has become its greatest asset. The Bay of Bengal, the geo-economic significance of the Padma–Meghna–Jamuna river system and the country’s centrality to South Asian transit routes have elevated its importance as never before. This moment presents a rare opportunity to redefine external relations on the basis of equality, to assert strategic autonomy and to participate in regional politics with dignity. But such an opportunity carries a clear condition the transformation must be people-centric, democratic and institutionally grounded.

For India, this juncture demands a fundamental reassessment of its neighbourhood policy. Sustainable regional leadership cannot be built on political loyalty alone; it must rest on mutual respect and balanced interests. Viewing post-Hasina Bangladesh as an inherently ‘unreliable’ strategic space would be a serious miscalculation. The political consciousness of Bangladesh’s younger generation, its vibrant social dynamism and the unrestrained flow of information have already eroded the effectiveness of traditional influence strategies. Enduring partnerships are forged through trust, dignity and reciprocity not coercion or complacency.

Post-Hasina Bangladesh, therefore, represents more than a transfer of power. It marks a moment of psychological and diplomatic reawakening. Democratic restoration, state restructuring and administrative reforms are now being tested simultaneously. India will watch this transition with concern, China will view it as an opportunity and the United States will assess it through the prism of regional stability. Amid this triangular diplomacy, Bangladesh’s greatest strength remains its people and their evolving political consciousness.

The question, in the end, is straightforward yet profound: can this transition be shaped into a future defined by dignity rather than dependency? Bangladesh now stands before that rare historical opening. If it succeeds in reimagining its politics, foreign policy and institutions with vision and inclusivity, a new balance in South Asia may well emerge, one in which Dhaka becomes a central axis of regional politics, not a peripheral appendage of New Delhi.


Shahidul Alam Swapan is a Switzerland-based private banking financial crime specialist, columnist and poet.​
 
Analyze

Analyze Post

Add your ideas here:
Highlight Cite Respond

Indian forces kill 16 Maoists
Agence France-Presse . New Delhi, India 24 January, 2026, 05:00

Indian security forces have killed 16 Maoist rebel fighters, including a senior commander, in the eastern state of Jharkhand as authorities step up efforts to quash the long-running insurgency.

More than 10,000 people have died in the decades-long rebellion waged by the guerrillas, who say they are fighting for the rights of marginalised indigenous people in resource-rich pockets of India.

New Delhi has launched an all-out campaign against the insurgents, also known as Naxalites after the village in the Himalayan foothills where the Maoist-inspired insurgency began nearly six decades ago, and vowed to end the rebellion by March 2026.

Since 2024, more than 500 Maoist rebels have been killed, including some of the top commanders, according to government figures.

The latest gunfight was reported from West Singhbhum district in Jharkhand state, home minister Amit Shah said in a social media post late Thursday.

One of those killed was a ‘notorious bounty-wanted Naxal Central Committee member’ named Patiram Manjhi, Shah said. He had a bounty of over $1,00,000 on his head.

‘We are committed to eradicating Naxalism, which has been synonymous with fear and terror for decades, before March 31, 2026,’ he said.

‘I once again appeal to the remaining Naxals to abandon the ideology that connects to violence, terror, and arms, and join the mainstream of development and trust.’

The Naxalite rebellion once held sway across nearly a third of the country, with an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 fighters at its peak in the mid-2000s, but it has been dramatically weakened in recent years.​
 
Analyze

Analyze Post

Add your ideas here:
Highlight Cite Respond
  • Xi Jinping (+4)
Reactions: Egyptian

India-EU trade deal: a brief review

Muhammad Zamir
Published :
Feb 08, 2026 22:50
Updated :
Feb 08, 2026 22:50

1770684322326.webp


The European Union (EU) and India is signing free trade agreement that both sides have hailed as 'the mother of all deals'. The agreement came together after over nearly two decades of intermittent negotiations and during a geo-economic crisis triggered by United States President Donald Trump's trade war. The deal between India and the 27-nation EU covers about 2 billion people and represents a combined market of nearly US$ 27 trillion and about 25 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP). It is expected to significantly reduce tariffs for India and the EU as the deal is India's largest and most comprehensive trade agreement and covers goods, services and investments across the EU's customs union.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa were in New Delhi as honorary guests for the Indian Republic Day and its annual military parade and was joined by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

In 2023, the EU withdrew its generalised system of preferences (GSP) for India, exposing its exporters to higher tariffs. The new deal, analysts noted, could give India an edge in several sectors, including textiles, pharmaceuticals, machinery, steel, petroleum products and electrical equipment.

Overall, the EU is giving India access to 144 services subsectors while India is opening 102 subsectors to the EU, including in the financial, maritime and telecommunications industries.

Negotiations to reach a trade deal between India and the EU broke down in 2013 over New Delhi's reluctance to open its automobile sector. Under the deal announced on Tuesday last, however, New Delhi will open its domestic automobile market to EU imports, slashing tariffs on most cars from the EU to 30 to 35 per cent, which are to be then phased down to 10 per cent over several years.

HOW WILL THE DEAL BENEFIT THE EU: Indian tariffs on 30 per cent of goods imported from the EU will fall to zero immediately. Overall, tariffs on 96.6 per cent of EU goods exports to India will be eliminated or reduced, EU officials said. The deal will save up to 4 billion euros ($4.74bn) a year in duties on European products.

Besides the relaxation of tariffs on car imports from the EU, existing Indian tariffs of up to 44 per cent on machinery, 22 per cent on chemicals and 11 per cent on pharmaceuticals will, for the most part, be eliminated.

Tariffs on EU aircraft and spacecraft will also be eliminated for almost all products while those on optical, medical and surgical equipment will be eliminated for 90 per cent of products.

Meanwhile, spirits and wines imported to India from the EU, currently tariffed at 150 per cent, will be cut to 20 to 30 per cent for wines, 40 per cent for spirits and 50 per cent for beer.

India will also provide improved access for EU firms in financial and maritime services, and both sides will simplify customs rules and provide stronger intellectual property protections.

HOW WILL THE DEAL BENEFIT INDIA: The EU will scrap all tariffs on 90 per cent of Indian goods, and within seven years, that will be extended to 93 per cent of Indian goods.

Among those benefitting from zero tariffs immediately are marine/seafood products, such as shrimp and frozen fish (currently levied at up to 26 per cent); chemicals (12.8 per cent); plastics and rubber (6.5 per cent); leather and footwear (17 per cent); textiles (12 per cent); apparel (4 per cent); base metals (10 per cent); and gems and jewellery (4 per cent).

There will be partial tariff cuts and quotas for about 6 per cent of Indian goods, bringing the EU's average tariff rate down from 3.8 per cent to 0.1 per cent. Overall, 99.5 percent of bilateral trade will benefit from some form of tariff concession.

India is still seeking improvements in tariff-free steel export quotas, and the outcome of these talks is due by June 30 before EU rules take effect on July 1. Under the deal as it stands, India would be allowed to export 1.6 million tonnes of steel to the EU duty-free, but this is only about half of what it exports annually at present.

The EU has not granted India an exemption from its carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which taxes "carbon-intensive" goods - those that require large amounts of energy to produce, such as steel, cement, fertiliser and electricity.

Only countries that are associated with the EU, such as Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are exempt from these due to their participation in the EU emissions-trading system or related agreements. Countries whose emissions-trading systems are linked directly to the EU's, such as Switzerland, are also exempt.

The US remains the biggest overall trading partner for both India and the EU. However, over the past decade, goods trade between India and the EU has grown substantially, rising from about $74bn in 2020 to $136bn in 2024-2025, making the EU India's largest goods trading partner.

India is the EU's ninth largest trading partner, accounting for 2.4 per cent of its total trade, compared with 17.3 per cent for the US and 14.6 per cent for China.

From 2019 to 2024, India-EU trade in services also grew with Indian exports rising from $22.5bn to $44bn while EU exports increased from about $17bn to $34bn. The two mainly traded in business consulting and IT services. Currently, India has a favourable trade surplus with the EU of more than $15bn as its exports of $75.85bn outpace imports of $60.68bn. EU exports are heavy on machinery, transport equipment and chemicals while India mostly exports chemicals, base metals, mineral products and textiles. The two sides hope to increase that to about $200bn by 2030.​

The EU says about 6,000 European companies operate in India while about 1,500 Indian companies have a presence in the EU.

TENSIONS WITH THE US: Despite Modi having relatively good relations with the US president, India is one of the most heavily tariffed countries by the US - at 50 per cent on goods - as a result of Trump's trade war. Half of that is punishment for India's continued purchase of Russian crude oil, which White House officials said is financing the Kremlin's war on Ukraine.

EU tensions with the Trump administration have been building as well, particularly over Trump's insistence that the US be allowed to buy Greenland, which is a territory of EU member Denmark.

This month, Trump threatened additional tariffs of 10 per cent - rising to 25 per cent in June - against eight European countries that had objected to Trump's demand to buy Greenland. Both Greenland and Denmark have repeatedly stated that the island, which is politically part of Europe but is geographically located in North America, is not for sale.

The EU is still subject to up to 15 per cent tariffs by the US under an EU-US trade deal signed last year. Experts said the finalisation of the India-EU trade agreement has been expedited, in part, in response to this pressure from the Trump administration.

The White House has already criticised the agreement. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent lashed out at the EU over the pact with New Delhi.

IMPACT ON BANGLADESH: With Bangladesh set to graduate from LDC status in November 2026, and its preferential access to the EU market expected to erode after a three-year transition period, the timing of this deal could not be more unsettling. While trade agreements of other countries lie beyond Bangladesh's control, this one demands utmost seriousness in assessing how competitive conditions would reshape in its most important export destination, and what that implies for preparedness, policy priorities, and the sustainability of an export model built largely on preferential margins rather than enduring competitiveness.

For decades, Indian exports of garments, textiles, leather, and footwear entered the EU facing substantial tariffs. The EU-India FTA dismantles this constraint almost entirely. For instance, it would slash duties on footwear from 17 per cent to zero, and apparel and textiles from 9-12 per cent to zero, substantially strengthening India's competitiveness.

Moreover, given the safeguard provisions embedded in the EU's Generalised System of Preferences, there is a genuine risk that even if Bangladesh qualifies for GSP+ after graduation, its garment exports could still face full MFN tariffs, fundamentally altering the competitive balance in the EU market.

The structure of exports to the EU differs sharply between India and Bangladesh. In 2024, India exported about $80 billion worth of goods to the EU from a diversified basket dominated by engineering goods, chemicals, minerals, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural products, with textiles and apparel accounting for less than 10 per cent. Bangladesh's exports, by contrast, amounted to about $21.4 billion in FY25, more than 90 per cent of which came from garments. Such concentration leaves Bangladesh particularly vulnerable to shocks in a single sector, with limited scope to offset losses through diversification.

Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance.
 
Analyze

Analyze Post

Add your ideas here:
Highlight Cite Respond

Members Online

Latest Posts

Back
 
G
O
 
H
O
M
E