[🇧🇩] - India's Water Terrorism Against Bangladesh | Page 11 | World Defense Forum
Reply
PK Defense Logo

Uniting Nations Through Defense and Political Dialogue

Defending Freedom of Expression!

[🇧🇩] India's Water Terrorism Against Bangladesh

  • Thread starter Thread starter Saif
  • Start date Start date
  • Replies Replies 164
  • Views Views 3K
G Bangladesh Defense Forum
@Sharma Ji Correct. Sharma is a prime example. They resort to brainplay.
Ofcourse, I am veryuvh afraid of him.
Do you know how funny Indians are?

In Galwan, a large number of Indian soldiers first attacked a Chinese soldier. Then India announced the death of one lieutenant colonel and 20 soldiers. And attempt to prove that 'more Chinese soldiers have died'.

The initial number given by India was' Chinese soldiers died 40, 50, 80... ' Until a Chinese told them that "108 soldiers died in China. Their names are Song Jiang, Wu Yong, Lu Junyi" and provided their nicknames...

Then Indians really believed that "List of 108 Chinese soldiers who died". And the Indian media used the "list" provided by the Chinese. Then Indians use this' list 'to mock the editor in chief of the Global Times.....

Screenshot_20250115_222407_com_microsoft_emmx_ChromeTabbedActivity.jpg


Do you want to know why Chinese people look down on Indians?

Low IQ. Likes to lie. Skilled in provocation, but not skilled in combat.

List of 108 Chinese soldiers who died


The Chinese opinion is that when Indians lose GALWAN, one lieutenant colonel and only 20 soldiers die (possibly). And a large number of Indian POWs were arrested by Chinese soldiers At this moment. I really enjoy watching funny performances by Indians.
 
Last edited:
Do you know how funny Indians are?

In Galwan, a large number of Indian soldiers first attacked a Chinese soldier. Then India announced the death of one lieutenant colonel and 20 soldiers. And attempt to prove that 'more Chinese soldiers have died'.

The initial number given by India was' Chinese soldiers died 40, 50, 80... ' Until a Chinese told them that "108 soldiers died in China. Their names are Song Jiang, Wu Yong, Lu Junyi" and provided their nicknames...

Then Indians really believed that "List of 108 Chinese soldiers who died". And the Indian media used the "list" provided by the Chinese. Then Indians use this' list 'to mock the editor in chief of the Global Times.....

View attachment 13049

Do you want to know why Chinese people look down on Indians?

Low IQ. Likes to lie. Skilled in provocation, but not skilled in combat.

List of 108 Chinese soldiers who died


The Chinese opinion is that when Indians lose GALWAN, one lieutenant colonel and only 20 soldiers die (possibly). And a large number of Indian POWs were arrested by Chinese soldiers At this moment. I really enjoy watching funny performances by Indians.

5 ft 50 kg weight Chinese defeated 6ft tall 85 kg weighted Indian Soldiers. Congratulations.
 

DAMS, DUCTS AND DIPLOMATIC DILEMMAS: India’s dominance and Bangladesh’s decision
Simon Mohsin 16 January, 2025, 00:00

1736985237000.png

The River Brahmaputra runs from its origin in western Tibet through India before flowing into the sea in Bangladesh. | Wikimedia Commons

INDIA is investing $1 billion to accelerate the construction of 12 hydropower projects in Arunachal Pradesh, aiming to harness the state’s estimated hydropower potential of more than 57,000MW. The strategy includes developing at least 135 hydroelectric projects along the River Brahmaputra. However, building dams upstream may worsen water shortage for Bangladesh, which relies on the Brahmaputra for 75 per cent of its dry-season river water and is already facing a 25 per cent shortfall. This situation raises concern about human security in the region.

To facilitate the transmission of electricity generated from these projects to the Indian mainland, establishing several high-capacity power transmission lines is essential. This presents a logistical challenge because of the existing development in Siliguri town’s chicken neck, commonly called the Siliguri corridor, which features a network of roads, canals and established electricity infrastructure. Consequently, implementing high-voltage electric lines in this region presents significant difficulties. Moreover, a military base in the Doklam Valley, under Chinese control, introduces additional complexity and risk to the situation. Given these factors, India wants to route this critical power grid transmission line through Bangladesh to mitigate potential risks and enhance overall security.

The Indian government is negotiating with Bangladesh to establish a power transmission corridor connecting northeast India to other regions. The Bangladesh-India joint working group is facilitating these talks. In a significant development during the group’s 22nd meeting on July 19, 2024, Bangladesh agreed to construct a 765kV transmission line from Katihar in Bihar, India, to Barnagar in Assam, via Parbatipur in Bangladesh, with a completion target of 2028. This agreement comes despite previous concern from Bangladesh about the necessity of the line for power import and its potential use for evacuating hydropower from northeast India. Bangladesh has raised issues regarding the security and maintenance of the line, suggesting a data-sharing agreement for feasibility studies and impact assessments. While India has denied a direct connection between the transmission line and hydropower projects in Arunachal Pradesh, the project’s implications for the Brahmaputra river system and Bangladesh’s water management need careful consideration.

In this context, the interim government of Bangladesh has two primary responsibilities. First, it should protest at India’s unilateral decisions to construct 12 hydroelectric power projects upstream the Brahmaputra basin and take diplomatic steps to deter India from proceeding. Second, it should cancel the approval of the Katihar-Parbatipur-Barnagar transmission line project immediately so that India cannot use it to evacuate the hydropower generated by damming the Brahmaputra.

Of the estimated 150 trans-boundary rivers, 54 flow through the Bangladesh-India border. In a total disregard for international laws, India is constructing one dam after another across the rivers and unilaterally blocking or releasing water. The more dams India constructs upstream Bangladesh, the more such incidents will increase. Thus, there is valid concern that if India is given a power corridor, several Indian agencies can arrange for investment to construct many planned barrages upstream Bangladesh. So, assisting India to construct a power corridor would be a suicidal decision for Bangladesh.

Bangladesh must undertake robust diplomatic and international initiatives to prevent India from unilaterally constructing dams. Reports indicate that when officials within the power department raised concern regarding the design risks associated with the Barnagar-Parbatipur-Katihar 765KV transmission line, they faced either transfers or harassment. It is essential to reconsider the India-centric political decisions made during the tenure of the Awami League government. The Power Grid Company of Bangladesh engaged consultants to develop a design for this corridor line, with another consultant being appointed by the power cell for environmental clearance. This process should be suspended pending further research and a comprehensive political, economic and environmental reassessment.

In a significant development, a trilateral power-sharing agreement involving Nepal, India and Bangladesh was implemented on Friday, coinciding with Nepal’s export of 40MW of electricity to Bangladesh, which has high energy demand for its economic needs. This agreement formally initiates electricity trade between the two nations, facilitated through the Indian power grid. Notably, Nepal and Bangladesh do not share a direct territorial connection, as the Siliguri corridor separates them — a 22-kilometre segment located within the Indian state of West Bengal between southern Nepal and northern Bangladesh. According to the Nepal Electricity Authority, this initial export represents the sole transaction planned for the current year with Bangladesh. Under the power agreement established between Kathmandu and Dhaka on October 3, Nepal is set to export 40MW of electricity annually from June 15 to November 15 for five years.

Meanwhile, Muhammad Yunus, the chief adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government, convened with the Social Business Group in Baku, Azerbaijan, during the UN climate conference COP29. He emphasised the necessity of establishing a South Asian electricity grid to facilitate sharing hydroelectric power produced by Nepal and Bhutan. Yunus articulated that a significant portion of the hydroelectric potential in the Himalayan nations remains under-used because of the absence of interconnected electricity grids in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan. He noted that Nepal could generate 40,000MW of hydroelectricity, substantially reducing reliance on fossil fuels in countries such as India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh also plans to import power from Bhutan, a feat that would require Indian support once again, given geographic realities.

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi and Chinese premier Xi Jinping held their first formal talks in 2024 year after five years. The meeting comes days after the two countries agreed a deal to resolve a four-year military standoff on their disputed Himalayan border. Although the two leaders have showed willingness to resolve issues in the Himalayan border, the Doklam issue is unlikely to be resolved soon. Thus, India’s geopolitical and geostrategic compulsions to acquire the power corridor remain high.

Power geopolitics in the BBIN region offers mutual benefits by enhancing energy security, reducing costs and fostering economic growth. It strengthens India’s regional influence while Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan gain access to reliable, affordable electricity. This cooperation promotes stability and integrated development.

Power trade between Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan is intricately linked to crossing Indian territory, giving India a dominant geopolitical position in shaping the region’s energy dynamics. Given geographical realities, India is critical in establishing a regional power grid that connects the four countries — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal. India’s relatively advanced transmission infrastructure gives it significant leverage to dictate terms in the electricity trade, ensuring it remains the central node of the regional energy network. As the facilitator of power flow, India can influence trade agreements, prioritise its energy needs and dictate pricing, thereby consolidating its political and economic influence over the BBIN sub-region.

Bangladesh must urgently revisit its position regarding the power corridor with India, weighing the long-term implications for its water security and regional sovereignty. While regional connectivity remains vital, Bangladesh must ensure that India’s hydropower ambitions do not compromise its interests. India, in turn, must demonstrate a greater commitment to being a trustworthy interlocutor by fostering transparent and cooperative dialogue, respecting Bangladesh’s concern and prioritising mutual benefits. Only through such a recalibrated approach can both countries navigate their complex interdependencies and ensure sustainable, equitable development for the entire region.

Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst.​
 

Latest Posts

Back