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[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

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[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh
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BGB detains 36 Rohingyas for trespass
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Border Guard Bangladesh yesterday detained 36 Rohingyas, who illegally entered Bangladesh through the Bay of Bengal.

The Rohingyas arrived at the Teknaf shore in Cox's Bazaryesterday afternoon after crossing the Bay of Bengal on a fishing boat, BGB officials said, adding that they are now in custody and will be sent back to Myanmar.

Among the Rohingyas are five women, 10 children and 21 men, they said.

Lt Colonel Ashiqur Rahman, commanding officer of BGB Battalion-2 in Teknaf, said the 36 Rohingyas illegally entered Bangladesh through the Munderdale beach around one kilometre north of the BGB Khurermukh checkpoint around 1:40pm yesterday.

"The process of sending them back is underway."

Mohammad Salim, member of Teknaf Union Parishad, said they were informed that a boat carrying Rohingyas was seen floating near the Baharchara beach.

Among the detainees, Alam, 30, said he was from Nashong village in the east of Akyab (now Sittwe) in Myanmar.

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A BGB official stands guard next to 36 Rohingyas, who were detained after illegally entering Bangladesh through the Bay of Bengal yesterday afternoon. PHOTO: MOKAMMEL SHUVO

He said the "Mug Bagi (Arakan Army)" has been torturing the Rohingyas there, so they tried to sneak into Bangladesh. They left the place five days ago on a wooden boat.

"Today [yesterday], a trawler towed us towards the beach as our engine broke down, and handed us over to the BGB."

Jaher Alam, another Rohingya from a neighbouring village, said, "There are five Muslim villages in our area. The Arakan Army has been forcefully training us with weapons to stand against the junta troops. We Rohingyas were subjected to inhuman torture if we refused to join the 'Mug Bagi' group. We thought it was better to die in Bangladesh than fight in Myanmar."​
 

Junta air strike kills 40 in Rakhine
Agence France-Presse . Yangon 10 January, 2025, 00:44

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A man standing near a burning house at the site of a suspected air strike carried out by Myanmar’s military at Kyauk Ni Maw village in Ramree island in western Rakhine State on Thursday. | AFP photo

A Myanmar junta air strike killed at least 40 people in a village in western Rakhine state, a rescue worker and ethnic minority armed group said on Thursday.

The Arakan Army is engaged in a fierce fight with the military for control of Rakhine, where it has seized swathes of territory in the past year, all but cutting off the capital Sittwe.

The Rakhine conflict is one element of the bloody chaos that has engulfed Myanmar since the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in a 2021 coup, sparking a widespread armed uprising.

AA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha said a military jet bombed Kyauk Ni Maw, on Ramree island, around 1:20pm (0650 GMT) on Wednesday, starting a fire which engulfed more than 500 houses.

‘According to initial reports, 40 innocent civilians were killed and 20 were wounded,’ he said.

A member of a local rescue group whose team was helping people in the area said that 41 people were killed and 52 wounded.

‘At the moment, we don’t even have enough betadine and methylated spirit to treat them as the transportation is hard,’ the rescue worker said.

Photos of the aftermath of the bombing showed dazed residents walking through charred, smoking ruins, the ground littered with corrugated metal, trees stripped bare of leaves and buildings reduced to a few scraps of walls.

AFP has attempted to contact the junta for comment on the incident, but calls have not been answered.

Ramree island is home to a planned China-backed deep sea port that when completed will serve as a gateway for Beijing to the Indian Ocean, though construction has been stalled by the unrest.

The military is struggling to fight opposition to its rule on multiple fronts around the country and it has been regularly accused of using air and artillery strikes to hit civilian communities.

As well as youth-led ‘People’s Defence Forces’ that emerged to oppose the coup, the military is also battling numerous long-established and well-armed ethnic minority armed groups, including the AA, which control large areas of territory along the country’s borders.

In November, the UN Development Programme warned that Rakhine was heading towards famine as fighting squeezed commerce and agricultural production.

The United Nations last week said that more than 3.5 million people have been displaced by the conflict in Myanmar — an increase of 1.5 million from last year.

The outlook for the coming year was ‘grim’, the UN humanitarian agency OCHA said, with 19.9 million people — more than a third of the population — likely to need aid in 2025.​
 

Myanmar military air strike kills dozens in Rakhine village, UN says
REUTERS
Published :
Jan 11, 2025 10:34
Updated :
Jan 11, 2025 10:34

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Dozens of people were killed in an air strike by Myanmar's military government in the western state of Rakhine this week, the United Nations said, as the Southeast Asia nation's civil war nears its fourth year.

The civilian shadow government and the Arakan Army, an ethnic militia based in Rakhine fighting for the autonomy of the region, also reported the attack had killed dozens.

The junta hit Kyauk Ni Maw village of Yanbye township on Wednesday afternoon, destroying around 500 homes and killing more than 40 people, according to the National Unity Government and a UN statement released late on Friday.

Reuters could not immediately verify the reports. A spokesperson for the military did not answer phone calls seeking comment. The junta rejects accusations of committing atrocities against civilians, saying it is combating "terrorists".

The Arakan Army released the names of 26 Muslim villagers it said were killed and 12 injured in the attack.

Myanmar has been in turmoil since the military overthrew the elected government of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021, igniting mass protests that evolved into a widespread armed rebellion on multiple fronts.

The UN statement urged all parties to adhere to their obligations under international humanitarian law.

The Blood Money Campaign, a coalition of Myanmar activists working to cut off revenue to the junta, urged international governments to swiftly sanction entities supplying it with aviation fuel.

"Only when this support stops will the air strikes truly come to an end," said Mulan, spokesperson for Blood Money Campaign who goes by one name.​
 

Myanmar junta air strike kills 15 civilians
Agence France-Presse . Bangkok 13 January, 2025, 00:16

A Myanmar junta air strike killed at least 15 civilians and wounded 10 others at a market in a gold-mining area in northern Kachin state, a spokesman for an ethnic rebel group that controls the area said on Sunday.

The junta has been accused of carrying out multiple attacks on civilian targets as it struggles to quell resistance to its 2021 coup.

The latest attack happened around 11:00am on Saturday, Colonel Naw Bu, a spokesperson from the Kachin Independence Army, said.

‘All those killed were civilians including gold miners and local shopkeepers,’ he said.

The KIA, which can call on around 7,000 fighters, has been battling the military for decades for autonomy and control of local resources in Kachin state.

The state is home to huge jade mines and rare heavy earth elements, most of which are exported to China.

Naw Bu said the attack took place in a mining area in Tanaing Township, in the western part of the state.

Images from local media showed a large crater in the middle of an area completely flattened and strewn with debris.

A resident from the town said three of the 10 wounded had since died.

The KIA controls swathes of Christian-majority Kachin state — home to the world’s largest jade mines.

The region has seen heavy fighting in the wake of the 2021 putsch, with the junta accusing the KIA of arming and training the newer People’s Defence Forces that have sprung up to battle the junta.

Separately, the Arakan Army reported that the junta had dropped 15 bombs during three attacks Saturday on a public market in the town of Kyauktaw in Arakan State. It said some civilians had died and others were wounded, but did not specify how many.

The Arakan Army is engaged in a fierce fight with the military for control of Rakhine.​
 

Steps needed to stop recurrence of fires in Rohingya camps
19 January, 2025, 00:00

THE recurrence of fires in Rohingya camps is gravely concerning. More than 200 fire broke out in Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar in two years that left dozens dead and many injured, with hundreds of shelters having been destroyed. In the latest fire, a five-year-old child died and at least 100 houses were burnt in the Nayapara Mouchani camp early January 17. On December 24, an elderly man and a minor boy were burnt to death and 16 others burnt in a fire in Kutupalong camp at Ukhiya in the district. The fire also left 549 houses burnt to ashes and 263 houses and 197 infrastructure of several service-providers damaged. There hardly goes a month without a fire in the camps. While vulnerable structures and inadequate safety measures are responsible for many fires, a large number of them are acts of sabotage. A 2023 intelligence report, prepared by the army and submitted to the parliamentary standing committee, says that more than 27 per cent of the 222 fires that took place in Cox’s Bazar camps between January 2021 and December 2022 were acts of sabotage.

What is completely unacceptable is that the authorities rarely conduct any criminal investigation to identify the saboteurs and establish other causes of the fires. Intelligence and media reports have time and again highlighted that various gangs that prowl the camps often engage in fighting and infighting, creating an atmosphere of fear and paving the way for acts of sabotage. The gangs are also reportedly engaged in criminal and subversive activities, including drug peddling and human trafficking. Various syndicates, composed of local people, government officials and Rohingyas, are also known to be prowling the camps, facilitating the Rohingyas getting Bangladeshi passports and fleeing the camps. The law enforcement agencies have busted a number of such syndicates and detained a number of their members. The syndicates and their criminal activities, however, continue. All this suggests that there are lapses in efforts to ensure the safety and security of the Rohingyas, who have fled violence and persecution in Myanmar and taken refuge in Bangladesh. When Bangladesh needs to enhance security measures to protect the Rohingyas from any act of sabotage, the international organisations that are engaged there also need to look into the issues of safety and security.

The government should, therefore, investigate recent and earlier fires and address the vulnerabilities that have contributed to the rising number of such incidents. The authorities also need to carry out criminal investigation to look into how many of the fires were acts of sabotage and bring the saboteurs to justice. Local administration and international organisations should also coordinate among themselves to ensure safety and security in the camps and enhance their response capacity to stave off and fight fires.​
 

Arakan Army’s strategic mastery in Rakhine
Kawsar Uddin Mahmud 20 January, 2025, 00:00

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A handout photo released on January 9 by the Arakan Army ethnic minority armed group shows a man standing near a burning house at the site of a suspected air strike carried out by Myanmar’s military at Kyauk Ni Maw village in Ramree island in western Rakhine State. | Agence France-Presse/Handout/Arakan Army

THE Arakan Army on December 20, 2024 captured the headquarters of the Myanmar military’s western command in Ann town, marking a historic occasion for the organisation’s meteoric rise to power in Rakhine State controlling majority of the parts. The Arakan Army now controls 14 of 17 townships of Rakhine State, including Paletwa township in neighbouring Chin State.

The Arakan Army’s sweeping victory in Rakhine State since November 2023 has shifted the balance of power over a wide area in western Myanmar. The Arakan Army has systematically dismantled junta control by starting with coordinated attacks as part of Operation 1027 with its Brotherhood Alliance partners. They controlled all of Myanmar’s 168-mile border with Bangladesh after the liberation of Maungdaw in December 2024. The subsequent fall of Ann township and the western command headquarters has left the military junta clinging to three coastal townships — Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Munaung.

Behind the success of the Arakan Army comes the methodical way of building power under the visionary leadership of commander-in-chief Twan Mrat Naing. The organisation was founded in 2009 with 26 members and has produced a comprehensive road map for liberating Rakhine State that it has implemented systematically over 15 years. The Arakan Army made its stand on being very different from other armed movements in Arakan as Oo Hla Saw, Mrauk U’s political commissar, is reported to have said.

For 2009–2011, the first four batches of fighters trained there in Kachin State had about 400 members. The trained cadres were stationed with the Kachin Independence Army to gain on-the-ground combat experience while others were assigned to work in major cities such as Sittwe, Mandalay and Yangon to build networks and recruitment channels.

In 2014, the Arakan Army began infiltrating and sowing functionaries on various locations and identifying and recruiting student leaders and monks for local support there. The organisation is at its organised spread into Rakhine State proper. It came as the Arakan Army leadership’s first public appearance in uniforms at an Arakanese conference in Kyaukphyu, signalling the start of its more visible presence in the region.

The Arakan Army leadership knew precisely what to do in controlling key strategic areas and trade routes. The initial choice of focus on northern Rakhine and the region around the Myanmar-India-Bangladesh tri-junction was specifically made, an Arakan Army colonel heading a regional command explained, because ‘it was necessary to control the trade routes and into and out of India and Bangladesh.’

The foresight to put administrative capacity as well as military capabilities into place was demonstrated by forming the United League of Arakan in 2015 with the Arakan Army as its political wing. It mattered for governance in liberated areas and the establishment of international legitimacy. The Arakan Army leadership also showed advanced organisational ability setting up nine military regional commands, which are directed in a war office on a secret location where Twan Mrat Naing and his deputy Brigadier Venereal Dr Nyo Twan Aung coordinates operations with senior officers.

The other side of the leadership’s careful cultivation of public support, however, has been equally important: inclusive messaging and nation-building rhetoric. Whereas previous armed groups in Arakan favoured discrimination along racial or religious lines, the Arakan Army was the first to openly espouse an inclusive vision. The Arakan Army entered an informal ceasefire with the military in November 2020 which it had used to empower its positions and get ready for further operation. Following another ceasefire, hostility resumed early in 2022, but the Arakan Army continued to promote strategic flexibility as it built to the decisive November 2023 offensive that has made the Arakan Army dominant in Rakhine State.

Significant demographic and recruitment advantages have enabled the Arakan Army to expand from 26 initial members to a force able to defeat Myanmar’s military across Rakhine State. The large pool of potential recruits for the Arakan Army is the result of the socioeconomic conditions in Rakhine State. World Bank data say that 78 per cent of Rakhine people live below the poverty line and the young Rakhine people have limited economic opportunities. The combination of a demographic youth bulge within the Arakan Army and economic marginalisation has acted as a reservoir of potential fighters who perceive joining the organisation as a chance to wage a fight for the community’s dreams.

In addition, the Arakan Army has also showed flexibility in its recruitment approach directing older recruits, above 35 years, into the United League of Arakan’s administrative apparatus as opposed to combat roles. The assigning of roles in this age-appropriate manner has contributed to combat effectiveness while it gas also contributed to developing capacity in civilian governance. In addition, the organisation has integrated former senior political activists from other parties into the United League of Arakan without compromising its military efficiency while achieving political expansion.

In recent battles, the contrast between the Arakan Army’s motivated young fighters and the increasingly demoralised junta forces has become a crucial factor. It has also been observed that the Myanmar military is lacking in morale and demotivation, especially since confronting the Arakan Army’s cadres. In particular, this has been especially evident in recent operations — the capture of the BGP5 base when hundreds of demoralised junta soldiers finally capitulated to the Arakan Army forces. In addition, the organisation also made declarations of the ‘Way of Rakhita’ and ‘Arakan Dream’ in 2019 which struck a chord with the Rakhine people’s desire for autonomy and growth.

The Arakan Army’s military success has greatly been a result of its comprehensive understanding and exploitation of Rakhine State’s geography. However, the geography of Rakhine State — a long, thin place, mostly flat with rivers and streams cut through it — has been to the Arakan Army’s advantage, the military to its disadvantage. Because o f the poor condition of highways, the river became the main transport arteries in the region and the Arakan Army took the full advantage of its superior riverine capabilities.

This flexible approach to river transport has conferred an important mobility advantage, enabling the Arakan Army forces to concentrate rapidly on operation and maintain supply lines to frontline units. In contrast, the military relies on poor road networks that have left their forces at risks of ambush while it has become more and more difficult to resupply.

Arakan Army and United League of Arakan offices still have access to satellite internet, satellite phones and tactical radio networks. However, the Arakan Army intimately knows its local geography and it has been able to isolate and reduce military strong points. This was most obvious when it came to the siege of BGP5, the last big junta position in northern Rakhine. Because it understood the terrain, the Arakan Army could cut off the military supply routes while keeping its logistics up and running, forcing hundreds of junta troops to surrender. A similar exploitation of geographic advantages was showed in the capture of Ann township and the western command headquarters.

Since 2015, the Arakan Army joined the Northern Alliance along with the Tang National Liberation Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and what was then known as the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army has cultivated solution-oriented partnership in advancing its objectives while still staying operationally independent.

Organisational participation in the United Wa State Army-led Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee since 2017 and involvement in the Three Brotherhood Alliance in 2019 show its capacity to be in several, supplementary alliance networks. Operation 1027, launched in October 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, proved to be valuable to the military of these alliances. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance and the National Liberation Army fought junta forces north of Shan State, seizing the strategic city of Lashio and the northeast regional command while the Arakan Army initiated its offensive in Rakhine State against a military already spread thin.

Formally declining association with the National Unity Government, the Arakan Army has, nevertheless, trained and supplied weapons to various PDF units around the country, creating useful relationships without severing the association. The Arakan Army has particularly grown to be significant with its alliance with the Chin Brotherhood Alliance in the neighbouring Chin State. This partnership also gave a demonstration of the military value of joint operation to Matupi in June 2024, capturing vital supply lines from India’s Mizoram state. This relationship has renewed the Arakan Army with strategic depth and has protected the Arakan Army’s northern flank whilst concentrating on operations in Rakhine State.

While in other regions of Myanmar, multiple armed groups are vying for legitimacy and resources, the Arakan Army does not face a serious rival in the ranks of the Rakhine Buddhist community. At the same time, the previous Rakhine armed groups have seen their rise in the Arakan Army coincide with their decline or marginalisation. The Arakan National Council, which once had enough clout to join the United Nationalities Federal Council in 2011, has fallen off the map. The Arakan Liberation Party and its armed wing, the Arakan Liberation Army, have broken into combatant groups that have not yet been able to marshal a fighting force and no more than 100 ALP members are fighting, with the bulk of them still based in Sittwe.

Both military success and political acumen have led to the consolidation of representation. In 2019, the Arakan Army’s declarations of the Way of Rakhita and Arakan Dream acted as a highly effective expression of the popular desire for self-determination and a more sophisticated and inclusive vision than previous movements.

The major areas of potential challenge to the Arakan Army authority are some of the Rohingya militant organisations such as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army based in the northern part of Rakhine State. However, these groups have largely fled to Bangladesh following Arakan Army advances. This now reveals the challenges that the Arakan Army will face in governing an ethnically diverse region due to its complex relationship with the Rohingya community — promising such integration while simultaneously conducting military operations against Rohingya militants. Yet the Arakan Army is unchallenged within the core of resistance to a central authority, the Buddhist Rakhine, which forms the backbone of the organisation. By providing the Arakan Army and its political wing, the United League of Arakan, with a unified military and political leadership, has been able to devise and communicate a coherent strategy.

In summary, the transformation of the Arakan Army from a 26-member organisation in 2009 to a dominant force in Rakhine state is the largest success the ethnic armed organisations have seen in the history of armies in Myanmar. Its grip on 14 out of 17 Rakhine townships, along with the capture of the western command headquarters, hints at the possibility of a de facto autonomous region beaming out from across Myanmar’s western frontier. Such a development has big implications for Myanmar’s political future and regional stability. There are still significant challenges to be accomplished, especially in leading a populace that is diverse and managing relationships with else in the world including China and Bangladesh.

Kawser Uddin Mahmud, a researcher at the KRF Centre for Bangladesh and global affairs, is a geopolitical analyst and international relations author based in Dhaka.​
 

Myanmar junta air strike kills 28
Agence France-Presse . Bangkok 20 January, 2025, 00:17

A Myanmar junta air strike killed 28 people, including children, and wounded 25 at a temporary detention area in western Rakhine state, an ethnic minority armed group said on Sunday.

The Arakan Army is engaged in a fierce fight with the military for control of Rakhine, where it has seized swaths of territory in the past year, all but cutting off the state capital Sittwe.

The Rakhine conflict is one element of the bloody chaos that has engulfed Myanmar since the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in a 2021 coup, sparking a widespread armed uprising.

The AA posted on its Telegram channel that a military jet bombed a detention area in Mrauk-U Township around 4.45pm (10:15 GMT) on Saturday, where family members of junta soldiers were being held by the AA.

‘Those who were killed and wounded were family members of soldiers in Myanmar’s Army. We arrested them during fighting,’ the AA said in the post.

‘As we were preparing a plan to release them, they were bombed,’ the AA said.

Nine children were among those dead, including a two-year-old boy, it said.

The others killed were women, according to a list of the dead posted by the AA.

Photos of the aftermath posted on the Telegram channel showed a long row of bodies laid on the floor in a grassy area, covered in white sheets. A number of people could be seen grieving close by.

AFP has attempted to contact the junta for comment about the incident but calls have not been answered.

The military is struggling to fight opposition to its rule on multiple fronts around Myanmar and it has been regularly accused of using air and artillery strikes to hit civilian communities.

It is unclear whether the strike in Mrauk-U Township was mistargeted or if the junta was unaware the area was being used as a detention site for soldiers’ families.

As well as youth-led ‘People’s Defence Forces’ that emerged to oppose the coup, the military is also battling numerous long-established and well-armed ethnic minority armed groups.

These groups, which include the AA, control large areas of territory along Myanmar’s borders.

The UN Development Programme warned in November that Rakhine was heading towards famine as fighting squeezed commerce and agricultural production.

The United Nations said this month more than 3.5 million people have been displaced by the conflict in Myanmar, an increase of 1.5 million from last year.

Meanwhile, Southeast Asian foreign ministers told Myanmar’s junta to prioritise a ceasefire in its civil war over fresh elections during a meeting in Malaysia on Sunday.

The Myanmar military seized power in February 2021, making unsubstantiated claims of massive electoral fraud in 2020 polls won resoundingly by the Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy.

The junta then unleashed a bloody crackdown on dissent and, as fighting ravaged swaths of the country, it has repeatedly delayed plans for polls that critics say would be neither free nor fair.

‘One thing that we know, they want to have an election. But we told them that election is not a priority at the moment,’ Malaysian foreign minister Mohamad Hasan told reporters after the meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers on the Malaysian island of Langkawi.

‘The priority now is for a ceasefire and everybody to stand down. It’s very simple,’ Mohamad said.

Malaysia is this year’s rotating chair of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations — long derided by critics as a toothless talking shop.

Myanmar was represented on Sunday by Aung Kyaw Moe, the junta’s foreign affairs secretary.

Mohamad said Aung Kyaw Moe briefed the ministers about the junta’s plans to hold an election without giving any dates.​
 

Atrocities against Rohingyas: Arakan Army also under scanner of investigators, says UN official
FE Online Report
Published :
Jan 19, 2025 20:58
Updated :
Jan 19, 2025 20:58

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The UN investigation team on Myanmar will also look into the alleged involvement of the Arakan Army in atrocities against the Rohingyas in the Rakhine State in Myanmar, a senior UN official said on Sunday.

“We have a mandate to collect evidence of crimes committed by anyone, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or nationality, against anyone, regardless of the victims,” said Nicholas Koumjian, head of the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar.

He said that it was very important to look at any evidence showing the Arakan army and any other force had committed serious international crimes.

The investigation team head added that the UN had requested information from them about allegations of crimes, including crimes allegedly committed by the Arakan Army.

“They told us they would respond, but we have not received a response, and we are awaiting that. We'll be sending more requests to them for more information”.

“We want all players, all participants in the conflict in Myanmar to know we exist. There's a body watching, collecting evidence of these serious international crimes, and one day we are seeking justice for these crimes that people will be held to account” he added.

Responding to a question, he said unfortunately, there is an increase in violations of very serious crimes recently.

“We've seen bombings that are affecting civilians all over the country, very serious attacks on targets that do not appear to be military in nature. We've also seen crimes in detention, including sexual violence and torture of people in detention”.

“Obviously, the aerial bombings are done by the military authorities. We've seen, unfortunately, evidence of very serious crimes committed by other groups also in Myanmar, and this also falls within our mandate [to check] if they qualify as serious international crimes. So we're trying to gather as much of this information as possible,” he said.

About his meeting with the foreign ministry high ups, he said, “In the meetings, we all acknowledged that the situation, unfortunately, is not getting better. It's getting worse. We see continued violence, and it's important we send a message to all the people in Myanmar, and particularly potential perpetrators, that someone is watching and collecting evidence”.​
 

Prospect of repatriating Rohingya refugees has dimmed further
Muhammad Zamir
Published :
Jan 19, 2025 21:42
Updated :
Jan 19, 2025 21:42​

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Rohingya refugees sit on wooden benches of a navy vessel on their way to the Bhasan Char island in Noakhali district, Bangladesh, December 29, 2020 Photo : REUTERS

Myanmar consider that the evolving scenario is casting a long shadow on hopes of repatriation of Rohingya refugees. They have started suggesting that prospects for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar are dimming as the Rakhine state descends deeper into conflict and humanitarian crisis.

Some have also suggested that since July 2023, nearly 60,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh amid acute food shortage, prolonged farming disruptions, and recruitment drives by the Arakan Army (AA). This ongoing turmoil is underscoring the escalating challenges facing both Myanmar and Bangladesh in addressing the plight of the stateless minority.

It is correct that the Bangladesh government has been officially opposing the accepting of new Rohingya arrivals and is also struggling to stem their flow of refugees but there is another continuing dimension which is exacerbating the situation. These new refugees are entering through unofficial routes. Corruption at the border is also aggravating the situation.

Foreign Adviser Md. Touhid Hossain has acknowledged the government's challenges on the border. It has also been noted that despite Dhaka's repeated calls for a sustainable resolution, conditions in Myanmar are moving in the opposite direction. With the Arakan Army nearing full control of Rakhine, the possibility of creating a safe and stable environment for Rohingyas to return is rapidly vanishing.

Bangladesh in the meantime has offered to provide support for rebuilding the Rakhine State economy, emphasising the importance of peace, stability, and democracy in Myanmar as a foundation for commencing the repatriation of forcibly displaced Rohingyas to their homeland. "Bangladesh has every interest to see lasting peace, stability and democracy in Myanmar, and a conducive environment in Rakhine State for the Rohingya to have confidence to go back there in safety and dignity", said Foreign Adviser Md. Touhid Hossain. He made this call when speaking at an Informal Consultation at the Ministerial level among Myanmar and its five neighbouring countries recently in Bangkok. The six-nation consultation was held in the third week of December, 2024 under the Chairmanship of the Thai Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa. The meeting was also attended, among others, by the Myanmar Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister U Than Swe.

Touhid Hossain has also offered Bangladesh's assistance in rebuilding Rakhine's economy when the time is appropriate, reiterating Dhaka's call for a comprehensive roadmap for Rohingya repatriation, with stability in Rakhine as a priority. He has also urged ASEAN and other key regional actors to play a proactive role in restoring peace, security and democracy in Myanmar. The Bangladesh Foreign Adviser expressed concerns over the protracted Rohingya humanitarian situation. He also raised serious concerns over the ongoing armed conflicts along the border areas as well as transnational crimes, involving trafficking in persons, drugs and arms.

In this context, the Bangladesh Adviser also reiterated the three-point proposals made by the Interim Government Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus during the 79th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York in September 2024. In November, Bangladesh's determined lobbying resulted in the United Nations General Assembly adopting a Resolution calling for a "high-level Conference" in 2025. It was also observed that the Conference would contribute to "a comprehensive, innovative, concrete and time-bound plan for sustainable resolution of the crisis, including the voluntary, safe and dignified return of Rohingya Muslims to Myanmar", according to the Resolution. Both Bangladesh and Qatar were mentioned as potential venues for the conference, which the Bangladesh government said it expects to take place in September or October, 2025 with arrangements finalised by April.

Organisers of this Rohingya Conference, however, now face two immediate questions. First, how to define the scope of the conference? Second, how to ensure that the perspectives of the de facto authorities in Rakhine are reflected?

Estimates indicate that there are 2.8 million Rohingya around the world, of whom just 23 per cent remain in their home country of Myanmar - a vivid reminder of the decades of brutal oppression and discrimination. Aside from Myanmar, the four countries with the largest Rohingya populations are Bangladesh with 1.1 million, Pakistan with 400,000, Saudi Arabia 340,000 and Malaysia 210,000.

The situation of the Rohingya, however, differs between these countries. In Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, for example, most Rohingya arrived several decades ago and their children have never seen their homeland. MSF found that while 76 per cent Rohingyas who fled within the past five years wanted to return to Myanmar, this fell to just 28 per cent among those who have spent more than 20 years abroad. This suggests that solutions should be tailor-made and guided by the objectives of the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, including easing pressure on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to third-country solutions, and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

Given the Rohingya refugee burden Bangladesh has been shouldering since the 1970s, its demand for speedy and effective repatriation is understandable. The UN resolution is a welcome effort to ensure the Rohingya crisis remains a global priority. It is also notable because there is presently no credible international dialogue about the crisis.

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine armed group, has apparently hardened its grip over much of the state, further destabilising the region. Reports suggest the AA is also preparing to declare either independence or autonomy, intensifying clashes with other factions, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation. These developments, coupled with Myanmar's broader political upheaval, have rendered efforts to facilitate a dignified return for the Rohingya increasingly vain.

It needs to be recalled at this point that Bangladesh has been hosting nearly 1.2 million Rohingya refugees since the mass exodus triggered by a Myanmar military crackdown in 2017. Despite international pressure and periodic talks, progress on repatriation has been negligible. Observers are now arguing that without engaging the AA, now a crucial stakeholder in Rakhine, any meaningful resolution to the crisis remains unlikely. Some have also stressed that ignoring the AA's role in the region's power dynamics could promote failure rather than any success related to repatriation.

International Relations analyst Professor Imtiaz Ahmed has made some interesting observations about the evolving scenario. He has pointed out that it is crucial not only to establish communication with all ethnic groups in Myanmar but also understand that "the fragmented sovereignty within Myanmar has created a complex situation, and our security forces already have some connections with the ethnic minorities there. If we had engaged with the Arakan Army, the situation might have unfolded differently. Our communication should not be limited to the AA. We must build connections with other ethnic groups as well. These relationships do not necessarily have to be open; they can be developed through various discrete channels. The AA's control over a significant area is a reality that we must acknowledge. While key strategic points remain under Tatmadaw's control. Communication does not need to be confined to traditional diplomatic channels." He has also added that incentives should be offered to encourage the AA to facilitate the repatriation of Rohingyas.

There is also another dimension that needs to be remembered by the relevant authorities in their efforts to resolve the repatriation crisis. We are currently in an awkward position. We need to clearly understand that resolving this issue will be impossible without the involvement of China and India, as both nations have aligned interests in this matter.

There is also a different aspect that needs to be recognised. Inside Myanmar, over 400,000 Rohingyas remain in Rakhine-- many confined in 33 squalid internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. With farming disruptions now stretching into a second year, entire communities are being forced to abandon their homes. This has led to recruitment efforts by the Arakan Army targeting young people in rural villages, further compounding fears of a large-scale migration that would definitely perpetuate instability across the region.

References have also emerged about another perspective that needs to be carefully monitored. It relates to shifting from a state-centric approach. The Resolution and debate at the UN General Assembly reflected a traditional state-centric approach, one that assumes that in Myanmar a central government can shape political life in all its component parts. The multiple references to "Myanmar" appear to refer exclusively to the military regime. However, the SAC appears to have now lost control of much of the country. In Rakhine, it barely retains a toehold: following recent heavy losses and its authority is limited to the state capital Sittwe, the island of Munaung, and small sections of Kyaukphyu and Gwa townships - with the latter seemingly about to fall.

Consequently, we all have a difficult challenge ahead which needs to be overcome with great care.

Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador, is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance.​
 

Myanmar rebel group admits to beheadings
Agence France-Presse . Yangon 25 January, 2025, 01:07

A Myanmar rebel group said on Friday its members beheaded two prisoners in a rare admission of deadly violence as it fights the ruling junta to maintain control of the country’s western borderlands.

The incident, which ‘violated military discipline’, occurred in February last year during an Arakan Army offensive on Kyauktaw township in Rakhine state, according to the militant group’s spokesman Khaing Thu Kha.

‘Our local AA militias were unable to control their anger and committed crimes... in retaliation for the terrorist Myanmar army soldiers who had unjustly arrested, tortured, and killed their families,’ he said.

In a two-minute clip that circulated on social media, around seven men — some wearing AA uniforms and holding firearms — kicked and beat two shirtless men on the ground.

In another video, the same alleged killers were seen beheading the captives with machete-like knives.

Khaing Thu Kha admitted on Friday that the videos were authentic and the perpetrators were members of the AA ethnic armed group.

Rakhine state in Myanmar’s west is riven with ethnic and religious divisions.

It came under the global spotlight after a bloody 2017 army crackdown that forced some 7,40,000 Rohingya Muslims over the border into Bangladesh.

The military junta took control of the country in a 2021 coup against the democratically elected Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government.

The AA says it is fighting for more autonomy for the ethnic Rakhine people, a population that is also accused of aiding the military in their expulsion of the Rohingya.

The militant group claimed complete control of a key region along the Bangladesh border in December, piling further pressure on the junta battling opponents elsewhere across the country.

The human rights organisation Fortify Rights has called on the International Criminal Court to investigate war crimes committed by the AA in connection with the beheadings, in a report published Thursday.

Khaing Thu Kha said the AA had identified and punished all those involved in the incident and added the group did not accept unlawful killings.​
 

Addressing Rohingya crisis: New Canadian envoy assures support

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Photo: PID

Newly-appointed Canadian High Commissioner Ajit Singh has assured maximum support to Bangladesh in addressing the Rohingya crisis as well as ease visas for the Bangladeshi students.

The assurance came when he called on Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain at the foreign ministry today.

According to a foreign ministry statement, they had discussions on key issues, including agricultural cooperation, trade and investment, financial sector, and Rohingya crisis.

The foreign adviser mentioned the daunting challenges faced by Bangladesh in hosting around 1.3 million Rohingyas in Bangladesh and sought international cooperation including Canada's strong support for their sustainable return to their homeland.

He also requested expedited processing of Canadian visas for Bangladeshi nationals, with particular emphasis on student visas.

"The High Commissioner noted these concerns and assured maximum support in addressing them," the statement said.​
 

Rohingya crisis: a call for shared responsibility and lasting solutions

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Reuters file photo

The Rohingya crisis has become an enduring humanitarian disaster, with renewed violence in Myanmar forcing nearly 80,000 more refugees to seek shelter in Bangladesh since August last year.

This has further strained the already overstretched resources of Cox's Bazar, home to over 1.2 million displaced Rohingyas. This burden cannot remain the sole responsibility of one nation. The international community must act decisively to address the root causes of this crisis and support Bangladesh in its efforts to manage it.

Bangladesh, despite its limited resources, has demonstrated immense compassion by sheltering such a vast number of refugees. However, this has come at a significant cost. The Rohingya camps are overwhelmed, with living conditions deteriorating and gender-based violence escalating. The study by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies and the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, published in The Daily Star on January 26, depicts a grisly picture of widespread insecurity, forced marriages, and psychological trauma within the camps. The growing involvement of armed groups like ARSA, RSO, and the Arakan Army further exacerbates the crisis, with thousands of young men forcibly recruited.

Moreover, the refugees' reliance on informal labour, such as salt cultivation and deep-sea fishing, underscores the inadequacy of the daily allowance they receive. While these activities offer a semblance of livelihood, they expose refugees to exploitation and unsafe working conditions, adding another layer of vulnerability to their plight.

The Rohingya crisis is not merely a regional issue -- it is a global humanitarian challenge. Yet, international support has been insufficient and fragmented. While countries like Malaysia and China have engaged diplomatically, their efforts need to be more robust and result-oriented.

A multi-pronged approach is essential to address the crisis. Firstly, global actors must intensify diplomatic efforts to ensure Myanmar creates conditions conducive to the safe and dignified repatriation of Rohingyas. This includes holding the Myanmar government accountable for the human rights abuses that have led to this exodus.

Secondly, the international community must provide more financial and technical support to Bangladesh. Thirdly, addressing gender-based violence should be a priority. Establishing community-led programmes that challenge patriarchal norms and provide psychological support, legal aid, and rehabilitation for survivors of violence can create safer environments in the camps.

Finally, regional diplomacy must take centre stage. The UN and other global bodies should lead peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar, focusing on restoring governance and preventing further displacement.

Bangladesh cannot continue to bear this burden alone. As Women and Children's Affairs Adviser Sharmeen S Murshid rightly noted, this is not just another humanitarian crisis -- it is a cycle of violence rooted in decades of instability. To break this cycle, the world must act collectively and decisively.​
 

Fresh Rohingya influx will deteriorate the refugee crisis
World leaders must address renewed concerns over funding

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VISUAL: STAR

It's alarming to learn that renewed violence in Myanmar has forced around 80,000 more Rohingyas to take shelter in Bangladesh since August last year, adding to the staggering 1.2 million already rising here. This has been revealed by a study conducted by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (BICC) and the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU). It goes without saying that the fresh influx puts Bangladesh in a particularly tight spot, as it finds itself scrambling to not just address the challenges festering within the overcrowded camps but also to handle the pressure of new arrivals amid renewed concerns over funding sparked by the policy shift under the new president of the United States—the largest donor for the Rohingya refugees.

Funding shortages have been a persistent issue since nearly a million refugees entered Bangladesh in 2017, with each passing year widening the gap between funding requirements and provisions. For example, the total funding requirement in 2024 was $852.4 million, but donors provided only $548.9 million. Since 2017, the US has provided nearly $2 billion in humanitarian assistance. However, with the recent suspension of US funding for development projects in Bangladesh for at least three months, there is uncertainty about how this will affect Rohingya funding and whether previous commitments will be honoured. The declining donor support in recent years speaks volumes about the international community's waning attention to the crisis, leaving critical services underfunded. The World Food Programme, for instance, has had to repeatedly cut rations due to funding shortfalls, pushing refugees further into desperation.

With such uncertainties around, the state of the camps is likely to worsen. The RMMRU study paints a grim picture of living conditions, gender-based violence, and security concerns in these camps. With each refugee receiving a meagre allowance of Tk 16 per day, many have been forced into informal labour or criminal activities. The crisis is further illustrated by escalating gender-based violence, with physical assault, sexual abuse, forced marriages, and severe psychological trauma becoming commonplace. There have also been reports of increasing militarisation with armed groups, including ARSA, RSO, and the Arakan Army, forcibly conscripting young men. One estimate suggests that between 3,000 and 5,000 were recruited in the first half of 2024 alone.

This is not a burden that Bangladesh should be expected to bear alone. Bangladesh has repeatedly urged the international community to take meaningful action to resolve the Rohingya crisis so that these displaced individuals can return to their homeland. Their safe repatriation to Myanmar remains the only sustainable solution. We, therefore, urge world leaders to step up efforts to resolve the crisis, and increase funding while such efforts are underway. At the same time, Bangladesh does have a responsibility to ensure that Rohingya refugees within our borders are protected. It must work to improve conditions in the camps. It also must take decisive action to address the reality of new arrivals.​
 

Geopolitics rewritten: The Arakan Army’s unprecedented rise

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Rohingya refugees gather behind a barbed-wire fence in a temporary settlement set up in a "no man's land" border zone between Myanmar and Bangladesh. PHOTO: AFP

The rise of the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar's Rakhine State marks a historic shift in South and Southeast Asian geopolitics, redefining regional power and security. Between October and December 2024, the AA seized over 80 percent of Rakhine State, including its 271 km border with Bangladesh—a rare instance of a non-state actor controlling an international border. The seizure of the regime's Western Command headquarters in Ann town, after the fall of Maungdaw, represents a territorial as well as strategic reshuffling that undermines the military junta's grip on power and raises fundamental issues for the region.

The shifting power dynamics

After decades of centralised military control, the AA has shifted Rakhine's power dynamics, emerging as the de facto authority. In particular, the past 15 to 16 months have seen the AA transform dramatically, seizing dozens of townships and army outposts, culminating in the seizing of Western Command headquarters in Ann town—marking a serious blow to the legitimacy of the military junta.

There are various reasons behind the group's success. Its military capabilities have increased tremendously and it can now mount effective operations against well-entrenched military positions. However, the AA has shown a level of military sophistication beyond that of many other armed organisations in Myanmar, proving its ability to capture and hold territory. Its capability to coordinate operations with allies in the Three Brotherhood Alliance was particularly evident as these forces secured important areas on multiple fronts.

Politically, the AA, as the United League of Arakan's (ULA) military wing, has established parallel governance in the areas it controls. It demonstrates a deep understanding of the need to synthesise military victories with political legitimacy, as seen in its efforts to weave a governance framework that includes both Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim populations. The junta's loss of control in Rakhine State is the second regional military command to fall under the control of ethnic rebels in five months. The loss of the Western Command headquarters alone could signal the start of a domino effect, further weakening the military's grip on power.

The Rohingya question

With more than one million Rohingya currently in Bangladesh, the issue of their return and future status under AA control has become a major regional concern. The AA leadership—particularly through its political wing, the ULA—has outlined a vision of Rakhine that includes both Buddhist and Muslim populations, such as the Rohingya. This marks a significant departure from Myanmar's historically exclusionary stance. However, this position must be viewed in the context of the AA's historically troubled relationship with the Rohingya community, whatever form that relationship has taken in the past.

Complicating matters are reports that both the AA and the Myanmar military recruit Rohingya for their respective causes. This exploitation of the vulnerable community raises questions about the AA's true commitment to Rohingya rights and inclusion. Some analysts argue that elements of the AA's vision of an "Arakan Dream" are influenced by Burmese nationalist discourse, which could potentially erase evidence of the Rohingya's presence.

The refugee crisis remains a major regional challenge, particularly for Bangladesh, which now hosts the bulk of Rohingya refugees. The AA's new control over the border region introduces new variables into potential repatriation efforts. While the AA's claimed willingness to accept Rohingya return offers some hope, any repatriation programme would face significant challenges without guarantees of citizenship rights, security, and economic integration.

The great power game

With its control over Rakhine State, the AA has introduced a new dimension to the great power contest between China and India in the region. Rakhine is vital to China's $1.5 billion investment in oil and gas pipelines to Kunming and its Belt and Road Initiative in the region. These investments, including a $2.5 billion oil and gas pipeline project, a $7.3 billion port project at Kyaukphyu, and a $2.7 billion special economic zone (SEZ), are critical for reducing China's dependence on energy imports via the Malacca Strait.

In retrospect, China has enjoyed a close relationship with Myanmar's military junta and is its principal trade partner and biggest weapons supplier, but the ground reality has compelled it to move with a more nuanced attitude. Recent developments show that Chinese officials have been having talks with the AA's allies in an attempt to broker ceasefires, indicating a pragmatic accommodation with shifting relative power.

India's strategic interests in the region are equally significant but differ in focus. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport and Transit Project (KMTTP) represents India's major strategic investment in establishing connectivity between Kolkata, Sittwe port, and India's northeastern states via Mizoram. India's Act East policy has traditionally relied on ties with Myanmar's military but is now compelled to consider engaging with the AA to safeguard its strategic interests in the face of shifting ground realities.

Bangladesh's strategic dilemma

With the AA in control of their shared 271-kilometer border, Bangladesh faces an unprecedented diplomatic and security challenge. Over the past few months, Bangladeshi security experts and former diplomats have increasingly called for engagement with the AA, given the new reality on the ground. Former defence attaché to Myanmar, Major General (Retd) Md Shahidul Haque, stated that engagement with the AA would be a "win-win situation" for Bangladesh, both from security and economic perspectives. This perspective reflects a growing sense within Bangladesh's security establishment that traditional diplomatic approaches may need reconsideration.

Nevertheless, Bangladesh's foreign ministry spokesperson Mohammed Rafiqul Alam and others have reiterated the country's official position of not working with non-state actors, stating that relevant ministry departments would take appropriate action. While engagement with the AA could address border security concerns and facilitate Rohingya repatriation, it might also complicate Bangladesh's relations with Myanmar's central government and other regional powers.

The battle for infrastructure control

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project in India has been thrown off its course due to the changing security landscape. How the group stands in respect to this project will play an important role in India's strategic position in the region. Because of the AA's influence over maritime traffic and potential development projects in the Bay of Bengal coastline, its position along the Bay of Bengal shoreline is vital.

Also, the case of Kyaukphyu is particularly evident as the terminus for China's strategic oil and gas pipelines. Security expert Ye Myo Hein of the US Institute of Peace said the AA theoretically could launch a military campaign to seize Kyaukphyu, it appears to be employing a more calculated strategy, leveraging its control as a bargaining chip in broader regional negotiations.

The rise of the AA in Rakhine State demonstrates that non-state actors can reshape regional dynamics in ways that compel traditional power structures to adapt. It is worth recalling that the regional security architecture is not static, but evolves itself to the new power configurations. The future of South and Southeast Asian security will depend, in part, on how regional stakeholders navigate these changes while striving to preserve stability.

Kawsar Uddin Mahmud is a geopolitical analyst and a researcher at the KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs.​
 

FOUR YEARS SINCE COUP: UN probe warns Myanmar violence may worsen
Agence France-Presse . Geneva 30 January, 2025, 23:56

UN investigators said on Thursday that serious international crimes had been committed in the four years since Myanmar’s military coup, warning this would only worsen unless the perpetrators faced justice.

Nicholas Koumjian, head of the United Nations’ Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, said impunity was emboldening the perpetrators to commit further violence.

Myanmar’s ruling junta seized power in a February 1, 2021 coup that ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government, ending a 10-year experiment with democracy and plunging the Southeast Asian nation into bloody turmoil and a humanitarian crisis.

‘Since then, according to substantial evidence collected and analysed by the IIMM, serious international crimes have been committed across the country,’ Koumjian said in a statement.

Myanmar has been rocked by fighting between numerous ethnic rebel groups and the army. The civil war has displaced more than 3.5 million, according to the UN.

‘Protests against the military regime were suppressed with often lethal violence. Thousands of perceived opponents have been unlawfully imprisoned, where many have suffered torture, sexual violence and other abuses,’ said Koumjian.

‘Increasingly frequent and indiscriminate air strikes, artillery and drone attacks have killed civilians, driven survivors from their homes, and destroyed hospitals, schools and places of worship.’

He said that while most of the evidence collected so far concerned crimes committed by the military, investigators were also probing ‘disturbing’ reports of atrocities committed by other armed groups, including rape, killings and torture.

The IIMM was established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect evidence of the most serious international crimes and prepare files for criminal prosecution.

In November, the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for junta chief Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes committed against the Rohingya minority during clearance operations in 2016 and 2017.

There are no judicial proceedings under way for any serious international crimes committed since the military takeover, said Koumjian.

‘We believe that impunity for crimes emboldens perpetrators to commit more violence, and ending this impunity is necessary,’ he said.

‘The mechanism stands ready to assist authorities who are willing and able to investigate and prosecute these cases. Until the perpetrators are brought to justice, violence will continue to spiral.’

The UN estimates that 19.9 million people, or more than a third of Myanmar’s population, will need humanitarian aid in 2025.​
 

Myanmar junta extends state of emergency
Agence France-Presse . Yangon 01 February, 2025, 01:21

Myanmar’s junta extended a state of emergency by six months on Friday, four years after it seized power triggering a civil war that has claimed thousands of lives.

The country is mired in a bloody, multi-sided conflict stemming from the February 1, 2021 putsch that ended a 10-year experiment with democracy.

The military is struggling to contain armed resistance to its rule, suffering a series of damaging battlefield losses over the past year to an alliance of ethnic minority armed groups in the north and west of the country.

The ruling military council headed by army chief Min Aung Hlaing unanimously approved the extension, the junta’s information team said in a statement.

‘All members of National Defence and Security Council including the commander in chief as well as acting president decided in unison for the extension of the state of emergency for another six months,’ the statement said.

Elections cannot be held under a state of emergency, so long-promised polls the junta has said will be held in 2025 will not take place until the second half of the year at the earliest.

Min Aung Hlaing told the ruling council that ‘peace and stability is still needed’ before the state of emergency can be lifted and polls held.

Critics and Western governments have said that any elections held under the auspices of the junta will be neither free nor fair.

The military seized power after making unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in 2020 elections which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won in a landslide.

It has extended the state of emergency multiple times since as it battles established ethnic minority armed groups and newer pro-democracy ‘People’s Defence Forces’.

More than 6,000 civilians have been killed since the coup, and more than 20,000 arrested, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners onitoring group.

On Thursday the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar said serious international crimes had been committed in the four years since the coup.

The conflict has forced more than 3.5 million people to flee their homes, while an estimated 19.9 million people — or more than a third of Myanmar’s population — will need humanitarian aid in 2025, according to the UN.

Earlier this month, foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations regional bloc urged the junta to prioritise a ceasefire in the conflict over holding elections.

ASEAN has led international efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis but, despite multiple meetings and declarations, has made no substantial progress.​
 

MYANMAR’S CRISIS: Regional threat, strategic response
MA Hossain 04 February, 2025, 00:00

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The photograph shows a view of the Kutupalong Rohingya camp in Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

MYANMAR’S ongoing civil war has reached a critical point, with the rise of ethnic armed organisations significantly altering the balance of power in the country. Among these groups, the Arakan Army has gained substantial control over Rakhine State, capturing key border areas near Bangladesh. This shift in power has further complicated the already dire situation of the Rohingya, who remain stateless, persecuted, and caught between conflicting forces. As Myanmar’s political and military landscape continues to evolve, the crisis has transformed into a regional security concern, extending beyond its borders to impact neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh.

For years, Bangladesh has struggled to find a sustainable resolution to the Rohingya crisis, relying primarily on diplomatic efforts that have yielded little success. Myanmar’s junta has consistently stalled negotiations, using misinformation and leveraging its relationships with China, Russia, and India to avoid accountability. Given these challenges, it is now essential for Bangladesh to move beyond its traditional reactive approach and adopt a proactive strategy that secures diplomatic, economic, and military leverage. A well-coordinated plan will enable Bangladesh to pressure Myanmar’s actors into meaningful negotiations while ensuring regional stability and safeguarding its national interests.

Myanmar’s internal conflict and the Rohingya dilemma

MYANMAR’S political landscape has been in turmoil since the military coup in 2021, which led to widespread resistance against the junta. Various EAOs, including the AA, have gained ground, seizing control of multiple regions and significantly weakening the military government. The AA’s dominance in Rakhine State has been particularly noteworthy, as it has captured strategic locations, including Maungdaw and Taungup townships, both of which border Bangladesh. The fall of Ann, the headquarters of the junta’s Western Military Command, further demonstrated the shifting power dynamics in the region.

Despite these changes, the fate of the Rohingya remains uncertain. Historically, the Rohingya have faced persecution from Myanmar’s military, culminating in the 2017 crisis that forced over a million of them to flee to Bangladesh. While the AA has positioned itself as a defender of Rakhine’s autonomy, its stance on the Rohingya remains ambiguous. There have been reports of hostilities against Rohingya civilians, sometimes as a result of the junta’s strategic manipulations. Additionally, the use of derogatory language, such as referring to the Rohingya as ‘Bengali Muslims,’ signals that discriminatory attitudes persist.

The Rohingya are now in an increasingly precarious position. Forced conscription by the junta, accusations of affiliation with armed groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, and growing hostility from the AA have further marginalised them. Without a clear framework for their repatriation and protection, their status remains in limbo, making a resolution to the crisis even more urgent.

Bangladesh’s strategic approach

BANGLADESH has long sought a peaceful resolution to the Rohingya crisis, but its efforts have been repeatedly undermined by Myanmar’s unwillingness to engage in meaningful negotiations. Myanmar has successfully used diplomatic cover from China, Russia, and India to delay repatriation efforts while continuing to receive political and economic support. Given these circumstances, it is imperative for Bangladesh to shift its strategy from passive diplomacy to one that establishes firm leverage over Myanmar.

The new approach should be built on three key pillars: diplomatic engagement with ASEAN, policy-driven advocacy, and strategic military preparedness. By strengthening regional alliances, utilising research-based arguments, and reinforcing its defence capabilities, Bangladesh can create a position of strength that forces Myanmar to take repatriation efforts seriously.

Building regional alliances with ASEAN

ONE of the most effective ways for Bangladesh to gain leverage over Myanmar is by solidifying its ties with ASEAN nations. Historically, ASEAN has been divided over Myanmar’s crisis, with some member states favouring diplomatic engagement while others have advocated for stricter measures. However, Bangladesh has the opportunity to bridge these divisions by presenting the Rohingya crisis as a regional security threat rather than just a humanitarian issue.

By engaging directly with ASEAN leaders, Bangladesh can highlight the broader implications of instability in Rakhine State. The ongoing conflict poses risks such as transnational crime, arms trafficking, and potential extremist recruitment, which could affect countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. By framing the crisis as a shared security concern, Bangladesh can push for a unified ASEAN stance that increases diplomatic pressure on Myanmar’s military and the AA.

A united ASEAN front would make it more difficult for Myanmar’s allies, particularly China and Russia, to continue supporting the junta without facing international backlash. China, which has significant investments in Myanmar’s Belt and Road Initiative, values stability in the region. If ASEAN collectively demands action, Beijing may be compelled to reconsider its position, thus weakening Myanmar’s ability to stall negotiations.

Policy advocacy and data-driven diplomacy

WHILE diplomatic efforts lay the foundation for engagement, Bangladesh must also reinforce its position through rigorous, data-driven policy advocacy. Collaborating with ASEAN-aligned think tanks and research institutions can provide concrete evidence of the economic, security, and humanitarian consequences of the Rohingya crisis.

Research efforts should focus on three critical areas. First, documenting human rights violations committed by both the junta and the AA will create stronger international pressure for a rights-based resolution. Second, assessing the economic impact of instability in Rakhine can demonstrate how disrupted trade routes and declining cross-border investments affect regional economies. Finally, analysing security threats related to stateless Rohingya populations can highlight the risks of radicalisation and criminal exploitation, making a compelling case for ASEAN intervention.

By shifting the narrative from a humanitarian plea to a policy-backed security concern, Bangladesh can strengthen its diplomatic engagements and build a broader coalition of support. This approach will also help counter Myanmar’s misinformation campaigns, ensuring that the international community remains aligned with Bangladesh’s objectives.

Military readiness and strategic defence cooperation

ALTHOUGH diplomacy should remain the primary tool for engagement, Bangladesh must also prepare for potential security challenges along its border with Myanmar. The increasing volatility in Rakhine State, coupled with the AA’s rising confidence, necessitates a visible and well-coordinated military presence.

Bangladesh can enhance its strategic position by participating in joint military exercises with ASEAN nations that share concerns over Myanmar’s instability. Strengthening defence ties with countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand can send a strong message to Myanmar’s actors, particularly the AA, that regional forces are closely monitoring the situation.

Additionally, Bangladesh can leverage provisions of the US BURMA Act, which authorises support for resistance groups opposing Myanmar’s military junta. While direct military involvement is not an option, utilising available resources for border security and intelligence-sharing can help Bangladesh maintain a strong defensive posture. A visible military presence along the border will also serve as a deterrent, discouraging any spillover of violence into Bangladesh’s territory.

Global implications and the role of major powers


THE Rohingya crisis is not just a bilateral issue between Bangladesh and Myanmar — it has far-reaching geopolitical implications. China, Russia and India have played significant roles in shaping Myanmar’s political landscape, often prioritising strategic interests over human rights concerns. But one crucial aspect overlooked by all stakeholders is that these Rohingya refugee camps could become breeding grounds for transnational terrorist organisations. These vulnerable populations are under the hawkish eyes of international terrorist organisations seeking to exploit them.

China, in particular, has deep economic stakes in Myanmar, including infrastructure projects linked to the BRI. While Beijing has traditionally backed the junta, a unified ASEAN stance could force it to reassess its position. Similarly, Russia’s military support to Myanmar may become increasingly difficult to justify if international pressure mounts. India, balancing its interests between countering China’s influence and maintaining regional stability, may also reconsider its approach.

For Bangladesh, the challenge lies in navigating these complex geopolitical dynamics while securing commitments for Rohingya repatriation. Strengthening alliances with Western nations, particularly the United States and European Union, could provide additional diplomatic leverage. Furthermore, advocating for an UN-monitored safe zone in Rakhine may be a viable solution to ensure that returning Rohingya populations are protected from further persecution.

By leveraging international support, engaging in multilateral negotiations, and maintaining strategic pressure on Myanmar, Bangladesh can push for a sustainable solution. Bangladesh must also assert its sovereignty while upholding humanitarian principles, ensuring that Myanmar fulfils its responsibility to reintegrate the Rohingyas into their homeland.

Conclusion

THE crisis in Myanmar has entered a new phase, with the AA’s growing influence reshaping governance in Rakhine State. While this shift presents challenges, it also offers Bangladesh an opportunity to recalibrate its strategy and assert greater control over the diplomatic process.

Moving beyond reactive diplomacy, Bangladesh must secure the strategic high ground by strengthening regional alliances, utilising research-driven policy advocacy, and reinforcing military preparedness. By framing the Rohingya crisis as a regional security issue rather than just a humanitarian concern, Bangladesh can shift the balance of power and force Myanmar’s actors into meaningful negotiations.

There should be continuous efforts for empowering Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to develop leadership skills, assert their rights, and facilitate repatriation efforts. A proactive, multi-dimensional approach will not only facilitate Rohingya repatriation but also ensure long-term regional stability, positioning Bangladesh as a key diplomatic force in South Asia.

M A Hossain is a political and defence analyst based in Bangladesh.​
 

To solve the Rohingya crisis, we must address the root causes

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The world seems to have forgotten the Rohingya people and their persistent suffering in Myanmar. FILE PHOTO: REUTERS

The Rohingya crisis continues to mystify everyone with its uncertainties. In 2017, close to a million Rohingya people took refuge in Bangladesh over a period of only one month after a most brutal genocide and violent exodus in recent history. The influx of refugees continued in October-December 2024 due to the rise in armed conflicts between various armed groups and the military junta, as well as the impacts of the long-running brutal civil war inside Myanmar. Amid this, the Rohingya in Cox's Bazar refugee camps still hope to return to their homes in northern Rakhine—their old heartland in Myanmar.

The renewed violence has worsened the already precarious situation in Cox's Bazar camps. Last year alone, according to one source, armed groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and the Arakan Army (AA) recruited an estimated 5,000 men from the camps in Cox's Bazar to fight against the Myanmar military. The radicalisation inside the camps, the increase in criminal gang activities, the targeted killing of camp leaders by opposing militant groups, and the continued cycle of violence have led to a significant deterioration of safety among the Rohingya refugees. To add to this, the renewed fighting between these armed rebel groups and the Myanmar junta has further pushed back any potential repatriation plan due to the lack of peace and stability inside Myanmar.

Given this situation, can we ever find a viable solution to the Rohingya crisis? Is there any pathway to resolve the crisis with accountability and justice for all? And who will find it?

To do this, we need to look back and understand Rohingya history. The armed struggles inside Myanmar and the demand for Rohingya autonomy and rights clearly establish that the crisis is not just a current humanitarian issue but also a political one, long rooted in Arakan's history. In recent weeks, the AA has taken full control of 14 out of 17 townships, including Maungdaw near Teknaf, from the Myanmar military junta. Armed fighting still continues to capture the remaining government-held territories in Rakhine. In the process, many coerced Rohingya conscripts to the Myanmar Army have been killed or captured, further entangling the displaced people in a war they did not initiate. Any resolution of the crisis must understand and address both the political and humanitarian aspects.

Many people tend to think that the Rohingya crisis is a 21st-century issue. On the contrary, it encapsulates centuries of historical marginalisation, ethnic conflict, and geopolitical intricacies. The Rohingya have a 200-year history, starting from the violent occupation of the Arakan dynasty in 1784, which gradually evolved during the pre- and post-colonial periods in Burma. Their identity has been under sustained attack by the military and the Buddhist civilian majority through genocidal campaigns aimed at erasing their shared history and culture over the years. The 1974 constitution and the census that preceded it marked the clearest breaking point when "Rohingya" was replaced with "Indian or Pakistani" and later by "Bengali" among "non-indigenous or foreign races." This was followed by the adoption of the discriminatory Citizenship Act of 1982. The decades of brutal oppression that followed forced many Rohingya to flee the country over the past 40 years. Today, four out of every five Rohingya live as refugees in countries across the region and around the world. Those still inside Myanmar are in camps in Buthidaung and Maungdaw or under military surveillance.

The magnitude and duration of this crisis require a comprehensive understanding of the underlying causes, an assessment of humanitarian interventions, and an examination of avenues for justice and reconciliation. Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the regional and international communities must address the root causes of the Myanmar crisis, including the long-standing discrimination and statelessness faced by the Rohingya. Any measures short of that would not be sufficient to resolve the crisis and facilitate the return of the Rohingya to their homeland.

The world seems to have forgotten the Rohingya people and their crisis. The terrible genocide and ethnic cleansing happened in 2017, coincidentally the year US President Donald Trump took office for the first time. It is now the ninth year of this conflict, resulting from long-running battles between the Myanmar military and the anti-regime AA and other armed groups. The Myanmar military's continued violence grossly undermines the rule of law and the rights of the people recognised by international bodies and conventions for refugee populations. International sanctions and other measures by Canada, the US, the EU, and others against the Myanmar military junta have failed to deliver the intended outcomes.

Many international rights groups, including Amnesty International, have long demanded that the top generals in the Myanmar army be investigated for their roles in the genocides committed against the Rohingya and the people of Myanmar. The recent International Criminal Court (ICC) ruling for an arrest warrant for General Min Aung Hlaing, based on the historic case brought by The Gambia, seems to have had no traction at all. If the international community, including the US, is serious about resolving the Rohingya crisis, it should move beyond statements and sanctions. Myanmar generals must be held accountable for the Rohingya genocide, but who will make that call?

The regional implications of the crisis are already evident from the recent emergency meeting held in Bangkok in December 2024, attended by foreign ministers and senior officials from Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, China, Laos, and Cambodia to review the current situation in Myanmar, leading to a global conference on the Rohingya later this year. As evident from occasional dialogues and visits by army officials, Bangladesh's interim government is focused on repatriation as the primary solution, including creating a "safe zone" for the Rohingya in Myanmar's Rakhine state under UN supervision. This approach will be doomed without due attention to the absence of rights, including citizenship rights and the need for return with dignity and honor. The Bangladesh government is also trying to maintain informal contacts with the AA for potential support and resolution of the crisis, which should be encouraged and quietly expanded.

While the repatriation of refugees is urgently needed to reduce the long-endured burden on Bangladesh, the government should work more closely with countries having significant influence on Myanmar—for instance, India, China, Korea, Singapore, and Japan—to apply pressure to ensure accountability and to provide local autonomy for the Rohingya in the Rakhine state, aimed at creating conditions for their return with dignity and rights. The US government should also support efforts to hold Myanmar's military leaders accountable through the ICC. The second Trump administration has an opportunity to reflect on its past policies and take bold steps towards a more just and lasting solution. The Rohingya crisis and displacement should be of concern due to the strategic security interests of the US in the Southeast Asia region.

What is required now is to keep the global focus alive on the Rohingya crisis to find a durable solution. The international community must also increase humanitarian aid and assistance to support the refugees and improve living conditions and rights in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. The Rohingya people have been waiting and watching the indifference and inaction of the world for years. They are hoping for an early, safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation.

Dr Mohammad Zaman is a development and resettlement specialist. He is editor, with co-editors Robert Anderson and Kawser Ahmed, of 'The Rohingya Stories: History and Geopolitics in a Multipolar World' (forthcoming, Springer, 2025).​
 

Myanmar junta bans possible conscripts from foreign travel

Myanmar's embattled junta has banned anyone eligible for military conscription from leaving the country without permission, as it seeks to shore up its forces fighting rebel groups opposed to its rule.

The junta has lost control of swathes of the country to ethnic minority armed groups and other opposition forces in the civil war triggered by its coup d'etat four years ago.

A long-dormant conscription law was enforced last year as the army reeled from a string of battlefield defeats to ethnic armed groups and civilian "People's Defence Forces" seeking to oust it from power.

A bylaw passed late last month that has only just come to light imposes new restrictions on those eligible to be called up -- men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27.

"The person who receives the order shall not be allowed to leave for foreign countries without obtaining the permission of the Central Body," section 51 of the bylaw says.

The rule applies to those who have been called up and also those waiting for the outcome of appeals for exemption, reduction, or postponement of military service.​
 

Myanmar junta bid to sell Suu Kyi mansion flops for third time
AFP
Yangon
Published: 05 Feb 2025, 11: 52

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A woman stands outside the gates of the family house of detained Myanmar civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon on 5 February, 2025, during an attempt to sell the lakeside mansion AFP

Myanmar’s junta failed in its attempt to auction Aung San Suu Kyi’s lakeside mansion on Wednesday, with no bids submitted for the former democracy leader’s home—the third time the sale has flopped.

The two-storey Yangon house, with about 0.8 hectares (1.9 acres) of land, was put up for sale with a minimum price of $140 million following a decades-long dispute over the property between the Nobel laureate and her brother.

Suu Kyi, who spent years under house arrest at the mansion under a former junta, has been detained since the military seized power once again in February 2021.

Around a dozen journalists, watched over by security personnel in plain clothes, attended the kerbside sale outside the colonial-era house on leafy University Avenue, a few doors from the US embassy.

After calling for bids starting from 297 billion kyats—around $140 million at the official exchange rate—and getting no response, the auctioneer called off the sale, AFP reporters at the scene saw.

“I announce the auction is not successful after calling for bids three times,” the auctioneer said.

Similar auctions failed in March and August last year.

With Myanmar’s economy shattered by the civil war triggered by the military coup, it is unclear who in the country would be in a position to spend $140 million on a single, increasingly dilapidated property.

Real estate agents say similar-sized properties in upmarket Yangon areas might fetch $1 million to $2 million.

The house holds a special place in Myanmar history—Suu Kyi was confined within its crumbling walls for around 15 years after shooting to fame during huge demonstrations against the then-junta in 1988.

Cut off from her husband and children in England, Suu Kyi spent time playing the piano, reading detective novels and meditating as her status as a democracy leader grew.

Hundreds of people would regularly gather on the pavement outside to hear her talk about democracy and fighting military rule through non-violence.

After her release in 2010 she lived on in the villa, receiving a string of foreign leaders, including then US president Barack Obama, journalists and diplomats.

Suu Kyi, 79, is serving a 27-year prison sentence on charges ranging from corruption to not respecting Covid-19 pandemic restrictions—charges rights groups say are a junta sham designed to eliminate her politically.​
 

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