[🇧🇩] Insurgencies in Myanmar. Implications for Bangladesh

[Saif]

Will Rohingya crisis be resolved in near future?

Myanmar's military junta has dissolved its State Administration Council (SAC) and replaced it with a new interim caretaker setup, the so-called 'State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC)'. On July 31,2025, the February, 2021's coup leader, Senior General Ming Aung Hlaing lifted the state of emerge

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Will Rohingya crisis be resolved in near future?

SYED FATTAHUL ALIM
Published :
Aug 18, 2025 01:03
Updated :
Aug 18, 2025 01:03

Rohingya refugees gather to mark the seventh anniversary of their fleeing from neighbouring Myanmar to escape a military crackdown in 2017, during heavy monsoon rains in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, August 25, 2024 — REUTERS Photo

Myanmar's military junta has dissolved its State Administration Council (SAC) and replaced it with a new interim caretaker setup, the so-called 'State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC)'. On July 31,2025, the February, 2021's coup leader, Senior General Ming Aung Hlaing lifted the state of emergency he had extended seven times to continue his regime's grip on Myanmar since he had toppled the country's elected government four and a half years ago. The aim of this move is to hold what junta leader calls an election 'on the path to a multiparty democracy' in December 2025 and January 2026.Interestingly, the junta on August 1, declared a new state of emergency and martial law on 63 townships across Myanmar including areas where ethnic armed groups and the National Unity Government (NUG) comprising lawmakers and members of parliament of the elected government deposed earlier by coup are now in control.

Clearly, this is an attempt by the Naypyidaw junta to present itself before the world in a new-look package. The election it plans to hold is nothing but a gimmick to hoodwink the world into believing that the new government to be formed after the so-called election will be a democratic one. Now the fact remains that the military junta in Naypyidaw is losing control on substantial parts of the country, especially in the border regions, to the rebels including, for example, the Arakan Army (AA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) etc. So, its authority over the country is increasingly coming into question. The rebel ethnic group armies already control large parts of the Rakhine, Shan, Kachin, Karen and Chin states. Also, a large chunk of Mandalay and Sagaingregions have gone under rebel occupation.

The Arakan Army (AA), for instance, controls some 270km of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border areas. It has meanwhile captured Paletwaand Buthidaungtowns bordering Bangladesh. In fact, the Naypyidaw junta still maintains control on major urban centres using its airpower such as in Sittwe, the capital of the Rakhine state.

Against this backdrop, the Bangladesh government has to rethink its strategy about who and how to deal with when it comes to repatriation of over 1.1 million Rohingya refugees in the overcrowded camps in Cox's Bazar with reports of arrivals of around 150,000 fresh waves of refugees during the last eighteen months. More importantly, until the ongoing civil war comes to an end, the authority of the current Naypyidaw government will remain questionable. So, even if any deal is reached with the Naypyidaw junta, its acceptability in the future will remain uncertain. Consider the offer made in April this year by the Myanmar authority on the sidelines of BIMSTEC meeting in Bangkok to take back 180,000 Rohingya refugees out of the list of some 800,000 Rohingya members that Bangladesh government submitted in six separate batches to the Myanmar authority between 2018 and 2020. But many Rohingya feared that the move by the Naypyidaw regime lacked necessary political will, security guarantees and restoration of citizenship as a prerequisite for their return. In response to that offer by Naypyidaw authority, King Maung, Executive Director of the Rohingya Youth Association (RYA), according to the news outlet, Rohingya Khobor, for instance, said, "We are not asking how many will return. If we are sent back without land, rights or recognition, it's not repatriation-it's re-persecution". 'We want justice, security, and our place in Arakan' Maung added.

Dr Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser to the interim government of Bangladesh, recently expressed his intention, as part of intensifying international efforts, to resolve the Rohingya crisis. To this end, three international conferences during this year would be held, he informed. Dr Yunus said this during a recent interview with the Malaysian national news agency, Bernama.

Dr Yunus is learnt to have further informed that the first of the conference would be held by the end of this August in Cox's Bazar, to mark the eighth year of the Rohingya's arrival on a large scale following 2017's ethnic cleansing campaign by the Myanmar government. The second conference will be held in September next on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. The third conference would be held by the year end in Doha, capital of Qatar.

Malaysia's leading role in Southeast Asia, especially as the head of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, (ASEAN), Dr Yunus believes, can play an important role in resolving the Rohingya crisis. It is worthwhile to note that the interim government since its assumption of office in early August 2024 has made a number of efforts towards mobilising international support to resolve the Rohingya issue. Notably, in November 2024, the interim government's lobbying resulted in a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a 'high-level conference' in the second half of 2025 to a 'comprehensive, innovative, concrete and time-bound plan for the sustainable resolution of the crisis including voluntary, safe and dignified return of Rohingya Muslims to Myanmar".

Given the ever-worsening conditions of the Rohingya in the cramped refugee shelters of Cox's Bazar and the international assistance for their sustenance dwindling to a trickle, international conferences are, of course, necessary if only to draw the global community's attention afresh to the near-forgotten Rohingya refugees Bangladesh has been playing host to for too long.

But mere talk at conferences will not be enough to ensure resettlement of the Rohingya that sought refuge in Bangladesh as well as at other places in their ancestral homeland. The international community needs also to play a strong role in seeing that the Myanmar civil war ends with transition to a civil government. At the same time, the international community brokering such transition in Myanmar should also include in its talks with the political stakeholders of Myanmar in question the accommodation of the Rohingya refugees and their secure, dignified and rightful return and resettlement in their homeland.

Bangladesh has been hosting about 1.2 million Rohingya refugees not only for the last eight years, but for decades after then-Myanmar government-engineered large-scale violence against and persecution of Rohingya leading to similar repatriation efforts in 1978 and 1992. In fact, pushing Rohingya people into Bangladesh has been a sinister design of successive governments in Myanmar whether civil or military, which betrayed Bangladesh government's weakness in handling the situation. What is necessary is to face them from a position of strength. Of course, it must get the international community on its side through astute diplomacy.​

 

[Saif]

China’s interests, America’s dilemma

THE rugged hills and the coastline of Myanmar’s Rakhine State have become the stage for a complex geopolitical play beyond the borders. At the centre of this drama is the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed organisation that has evolved from a fledgling...

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RAKHINE AND ROHINGYAS
China’s interests, America’s dilemma

A view of the Kutupalong Rohingya camp in Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar. | Agence France-Presse/Munir uz Zaman

THE rugged hills and the coastline of Myanmar’s Rakhine State have become the stage for a complex geopolitical play beyond the borders. At the centre of this drama is the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed organisation that has evolved from a fledgling insurgent group in 2009 into a reckonable political and military force in 2025 with the control of 85 per cent of Rakhine State. Its rise has not only shifted the balance of power in Myanmar’s long-running civil war but also drawn the attention of major external powers, each with their own strategic imperatives. The engagement between China and the Arakan Army, the potential calculus of the United States, the quiet anxieties of India and the profound dilemmas facing Bangladesh together constitute an intricate geopolitical puzzle. Understanding these interconnected relationships is crucial to deciphering the future of the Bay of Bengal region and the broader Indo-Pacific contest.

Conditional partnership

THE relationship between China and the Arakan Army is often characterised as a straightforward patron-client dynamic. In reality, it is a conditional engagement, dictated entirely by Beijing’s core national interests, which can sometimes conflict.

The primary channel for this engagement, in the recent past, is the Brotherhood Alliance, a coalition of three powerful ethnic armed organisations — the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. The latter two groups operate directly on the Chinese border and have deep historical, ethnic and logistical ties to Beijing. This alliance provides for a unified command structure through which China can exert influence, negotiate ceasefires and manage stability along its southern periphery. The Arakan Army benefits from this association by gaining political cover and access to China’s diplomatic weight and, perhaps, some material support funneled through its allies.

China’s paramount interest in Rakhine State is the protection of its massive infrastructure investments, which are central to its Belt and Road Initiative. The most critical of these is the Kyaukphyu deep-sea tank terminal on Madey Island and the accompanying dual pipelines that transport oil and natural gas across Myanmar to landlocked Yunnan province. An energy corridor involving $1.2 billion is a strategic asset for Beijing which allows it to reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca and secure a direct route for crucial hydrocarbon imports from the Middle East and Africa.

China’s engagement with the Arakan Army is, therefore, fundamentally risk mitigation and stability assurance. Beijing may seek an Arakan Army that can have negotiating power but not so disruptive that it jeopardises Chinese assets to keep Naypyitaw at check in the western Myanmar. When fierce fighting between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military threatened the vicinity of Kyaukphyu and other important sites in 2019, Chinese diplomats actively brokered temporary ceasefires.

China practises a policy of ‘dual engagement’ or ‘multi-vector diplomacy’ in Myanmar. China’s engagement with the Arakan Army demonstrates that Beijing views it as a de facto governing authority in large parts of Rakhine whose cooperation is essential for project security. It maintains robust military, economic and diplomatic ties with the Tatmadaw and the central government in Naypyidaw. This approach ensures that regardless of which party holds power in Rakhine, China’s interests will be protected. It is a delicate balancing act, empowering the Arakan Army enough to keep the Tatmadaw in check while also restraining the Arakan Army to prevent it from derailing the projects that China needs the central government to legitimise.

Beyond single patron

WHILE China is the most influential external actor the Arakan Army engages with, labelling Beijing as its ‘principal backer’ oversimplifies the group’s sources of strength. The Arakan Army’s resilience stems from a powerful domestic foundation. Its most significant asset is the popular support among the ethnic Rakhine population. The Arakan Army has skillfully propagated the narrative of defending Rakhine identity and rights against decades of neglect and oppression by the Bamar-dominated central state. This grassroot legitimacy provides for a steady stream of recruits, intelligence and a social licence to operate.

The Arakan Army is widely considered one of the financially solvent ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar. It has reportedly developed a sophisticated self-funding model that includes: Control of economic zones: It taxes goods and movement through territories it controls. Natural resources: It exploits local resources, including timber and possibly minerals. Business conglomerates: It runs a network of legitimate and illicit business. Its financial solvency is a key differentiator allowing the Arakan Army to make strategic decisions without being beholden to a single foreign patron’s demands.

Other sources of support include its formal and informal alliances with other ethnic armed organisations sand financial contributions from the Rakhine diaspora. Therefore, China acts as a strategic facilitator and a necessary geopolitical interlocutor, but the Arakan Army’s principal backer is, in many ways, its own cause and its disciplined, self-sustaining organisational model, which elevated it into a formidable force in Rakhine in a short span of time.

US strategic dilemma

OFFICIALLY and directly, the United States seems to have no engagement with the Arakan Army. The Burma Act is slated to support Myanmar’s democratic forces, primarily the ousted National Unity Government and its armed wing, the People’s Defence Force. Engaging with the Arakan Army, which operates independently of the National Unity Government and pursues a distinctly ethno-nationalist agenda, would undermine this central pillar of US policy. Furthermore, the Arakan Army’s tactics, including allegations of abductions, extortion and illicit businesses, place it outside the bounds of the group that Washington would traditionally partner with. This leads to a compelling strategic dilemma. Would it be wise for the United States to engage the Arakan Army to reduce China’s influence and deny its access to the Indian Ocean?

Apparently, the logic is very attractive. By cultivating a relationship with the group that controls the coastline hosting China’s geopolitical and geoeconomic assets, the United States could theoretically threaten Beijing’s strategic bypass of the Malacca Strait. It could be seen as a low-cost way to check Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean. However, a different thought shows this to be a high-risk, low-reward strategy fraught with peril:

Moral and strategic hazard: In the present context, aligning with an armed ethno-nationalist group would undermine the US narrative of supporting federal democracy and human rights in Myanmar. It would betray the Nationbal Unity Government and risk fracturing the broader anti-junta resistance. However, the National Unity Government and Arakan Army alignment for democratic push may change the narrative.

Unpredictable outcomes: The Arakan Army’s primary loyalty is to the Arakan cause, not to US geopolitical interests. There is no guarantee that a stronger Arakan Army-controlled Rakhine State would not eventually cut a more favourable deal with China. In this context, the United States would be investing in a partner with potential blow back.

Blowback on regional allies: Any US support for the Arakan Army would trigger immediate concerns for other major powers in the region. China maintains an uncompromising stance in Myanmar, primarily focused on protecting its geostrategic assets, while India would view American intervention in Rakhine as potential threat to its own interests. Consequently, Bangladesh would find itself caught in a five-way struggle between China, the United States, India, the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army.

China’s home-field advantage: Myanmar is China’s non-negotiable asset. China holds all the tactical cards: direct border access, long-standing relationships and immense economic leverage. The United States would be engaging in a proxy contest on China’s doorstep, a contest it is ill-positioned to win.

Alternatively, a US strategy could avoid direct engagement with the Arakan Army and, instead, double down on supporting an inclusive, federal democratic solution for all of Myanmar. A stable, democratic and decentralised Myanmar would naturally be less susceptible to Chinese dominance and a more reliable long-term partner for the United States and its allies. Yet, this vision remains a distant possibility. The path to democracy is fraught with immense obstacles, not least the Tatmadaw’s firm grip on power and the profound challenges of achieving a nationwide political settlement.

India’s calculations

CONFLICT in Rakhine State is a source of deep strategic anxiety for India. New Delhi’s primary interest is the security, connectivity and development of its land-locked northeastern states. To create an opening into the Bay of Bengal, it has invested heavily in the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a connectivity initiative that runs from the Indian port of Kolkata to Sittwe in Rakhine State to Mizoram. The success of this project, intended to be India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the region, is entirely dependent on stability in Rakhine.

The Arakan Army’s ascendancy directly threatens the Kaladan project. Clashes near Sittwe and along the Kaladan River have repeatedly disrupted work and highlighted the project’s vulnerability. India is caught in a bind. It maintains cordial relations with the Tatmadaw, seen as a bulwark against Chinese influence. It cannot ignore the Arakan Army’s growing power and engaged the Arakan Army to reduce risks to its projects. A direct confrontation with the Arakan Army is not feasible. So, India is forced into a cautious, reactive stance, hoping for a political settlement that secures its infrastructure investments.

Furthermore, India fears that instability in Rakhine and Chin states could spill over its border, fuelling insurgencies in its north-east. Its complex and delicate relationship with Bangladesh also means that it must carefully calibrate its response to avoid alienating Dhaka. India’s role, therefore, is that of a concerned and heavily invested neighbour, watching the crossfire with anxiety, its own strategic ambitions held hostage by a conflict it cannot control.

Risks and Opportunities in Rohingya crisis

FOR Bangladesh, the situation in Rakhine State presents an acute and immediate national challenge centred on the presence of over a million Rohingya refugees. The geopolitical swirl surrounding Rakhine State adversely impacts the prospects for their safe and dignified repatriation.

The ongoing conflict makes repatriation a practical and political impossibility. The Tatmadaw which evicted the Rohingyas from their ancestral abode had no intention to take back refugees. The Arakan Army, while controlling the territory, is also not keen on seeing the Rohingyas return to their homeland. The group’s Rakhine nationalist ideology is historically at odds with the Rohingya community. This perpetual limbo poses severe risks for Bangladesh.

Humanitarian and economic burden: The refugee camps place an immense strain on local resources and the national economy.

Security degradation: The protracted crisis has led to rising crime, trafficking and the risk of radicalisation in the overcrowded camps and a demographic imbalance at Teknaf and Ramu.

Environmental disaster: The massive, makeshift camps have caused severe deforestation and environmental damage.

Fleeting opportunity

Paradoxically, the Arakan Army’s consolidation of power could eventually create a new, more stable political reality. If a credible political settlement, although extremely unlikely, is reached between the Arakan Army and Myanmar’s central government, granting Rakhine significant autonomy, it could create a single, accountable authority with whom Bangladesh can negotiate. The Arakan Army, as a governing force, might see the value in resolving the refugee issue to gain international legitimacy and facilitate reconstruction.

However, this opportunity is fragile. The Arakan Army might also pursue policies that further marginalise the Rohingya, making the repatriation even more dangerous and effectively cementing the refugee crisis. Bangladesh’s best hope is to engage in quiet, multilateral diplomacy, involving China and ASEAN, to push for a comprehensive political solution in Rakhine State that explicitly includes a credible road map for a refugee return. The status quo, however, remains the most likely and risky outcome.

The Arakan Army is no longer just a local insurgent group. It is an important node in the regional geopolitical system. China’s engagement is a calculated effort to secure its strategic corridors while the US abstention reflects the moral and strategic complexities of a distant power. India watches with anxiety as its regional ambitions are threatened and Bangladesh takes the direct shot of humanitarian and security consequences.

The interplay of the forces suggests that the conflict in Rakhine State is likely to be protracted and warring parties resistant to easy solutions. The great game being played out in its hills and along its coast is not one of clear alliances, but of shifting arrangements where local actors like the Arakan Army skilfully leverage their position to advance their own goals.

Lasting stability in the Myanmar or in Rakhine State will not come from picking sides in this crossfire, but from a concerted international effort to foster a political settlement that addresses the legitimate aspirations of all of Myanmar’s peoples, a goal that remains as elusive as it is essential.

Mohammad Abdur Razzak-- a retired commodore of the Bangladesh Navy, is a security analyst and a research director at the Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies.​