World Iran Vs Israel 2025 War Discussion

[Saif]

Israel stands down alert after Iran missile launch

Israel's military stood down an alert of incoming Iranian missile fire on Thursday, telling citizens they could now leave their shelters.

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Israel stands down alert after Iran missile launch

AFP
Published: 19 Jun 2025, 21: 55

People sit in a shelter after air raid sirens sounded warning of a fresh barrage of Iranian rockets in the Israeli city of Haifa on 19 June, 2025 AFP

Israel's military stood down an alert of incoming Iranian missile fire on Thursday, telling citizens they could now leave their shelters.

Air raid sirens had sounded across large parts of northern Israel after the latest launch on Thursday afternoon, the army's Home Front Command said.

But around 20 minutes later, the army released a statement saying people were permitted to leave their shelters.

Israel launched a massive bombing campaign on Iran last week that prompted Tehran to strike back with salvo after salvo of missiles and drones.

A hospital in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba was hit in a Thursday morning strike, injuring 40 people, its director said.​

 

[Saif]

Trump weighs US involvement as Israel, Iran keep trading missiles

Iran launched a fresh salvo of missiles at Israel on Thursday, with a hospital reported hit, as president Donald Trump warned he was weighing US military action in the conflict.

www.newagebd.net

Trump weighs US involvement as Israel, Iran keep trading missiles
Putin, Xi ‘strongly condemn’ attack, urge diplomatic solution

Agence France-Presse . Tehran 19 June, 2025, 12:02

Israeli troops walk amid debris outside the Soroka Hospital in the southern city of Beersheba, after it was hit by a missile fired from Iran on Thursday. | AFP photo.

Iran launched a fresh salvo of missiles at Israel on Thursday, with a hospital reported hit, as president Donald Trump warned he was weighing US military action in the conflict.

AFP journalists heard violent, sustained explosions in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and sirens sounded in several parts of the country to warn of incoming Iranian missiles.

Shortly afterwards, the army said citizens could leave their shelters, while the foreign minister said the Soroka hospital in southern Israel’s Beersheba had suffered ‘extensive damage’ in a strike.

Israeli rescuers said at least 32 people were injured in Iran’s latest missile attack. The explosions in Jerusalem were the loudest heard by AFP journalists since the conflict began last week. The barrage came after fresh Israeli strikes on Tehran and elsewhere, and with growing speculation about whether Washington would enter the fray.

Meanwhile, Russian president Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on Thursday strongly condemned Israeli attacks on Iran in a phone call and stressed the need for a diplomatic solution, Moscow and Beijing said.

Putin and Xi ‘strongly condemn Israel’s actions’, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov told reporters after the call.

He added that Moscow and Beijing believed the end to the hostilities ‘should be achieved exclusively by political and diplomatic means’.

Xi told Putin that a ceasefire was the ‘top priority’ and urged Israel to halt its attacks, Chinese state media reported.

‘Promoting a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities is the top priority. Armed force is not the correct way to resolve international disputes,’ Xi said, according to China’s state news agency Xinhua.

‘Parties to the conflict, especially Israel, should cease hostilities as soon as possible to prevent a cyclical escalation and resolutely avoid the spill over of the war,’ he added.

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei meanwhile rejected Trump’s demand for an ‘unconditional surrender’, despite claims from the US leader that ‘Iran’s got a lot of trouble and they want to negotiate’.

Trump has left his intentions on joining the conflict deliberately ambiguous, saying Wednesday: ‘I may do it, I may not do it. I mean, nobody knows what I’m going to do.’

‘The next week is going to be very big,’ he added, without further details.

The White House said Trump would receive an intelligence briefing on Thursday, a US holiday. Top US diplomat Marco Rubio is set meet his British counterpart for talks expected to focus on the conflict.

‘I have ideas as to what to do, but I haven’t made a final decision,’ Trump said. ‘I like to make the final decision one second before it’s due, because things change. Especially with war.’

The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump had told aides on Tuesday he had approved attack plans but was holding off to see if Iran would give up its nuclear programme.

Trump told reporters that Iranian officials ‘want to come to the White House’, a claim denied by Tehran.

The US president had favoured a diplomatic route to end Iran’s nuclear programme, seeking a deal to replace the 2015 agreement he tore up in his first term.

But since Israel unleashed the campaign against Iran one week ago, Trump has stood behind the key US ally.

The United States is the only country with the ‘bunker buster’ bombs needed to destroy Iran’s Fordow nuclear plant, but US military action is deeply unpopular with parts of Trump’s base.

Israel’s defence minister said Thursday that Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ‘can no longer be allowed to exist’, just days after reports that Washington vetoed Israeli plans to assassinate him.

Khamenei on Wednesday insisted Iran ‘will never surrender’, and called Trump’s ultimatum ‘unacceptable’.

‘America should know that any military intervention will undoubtedly result in irreparable damage,’ Khamenei added.

On Thursday morning, Israel said it was carrying out fresh strikes on Tehran and other parts of Iran, and warned civilians in two villages, Arak and Khondab, to leave ahead of new attacks.

An Israeli military official said Wednesday that Iran had fired around 400 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones since the conflict began on Friday.

About 20 missiles had struck civilian areas in Israel, the official added.

Iranian strikes have killed at least 24 people and injured hundreds since they began, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said on Monday.

Iran said Sunday that Israeli strikes had killed at least 224 people, including military commanders, nuclear scientists and civilians.

Both countries have not issued an updated official toll since then.

Israel says its surprise air campaign is aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Iran had been enriching uranium to 60 per cent — far above the 3.67-per cent limit set by the 2015 nuclear death but still short of the 90-per cent threshold needed for a nuclear warhead.

Israel has maintained ambiguity on its own atomic activities, but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute says it has 90 nuclear warheads.

Israel’s strikes have prompted mass evacuations and food and fuel shortages in Iran.

‘There are shortages of rice, bread, sugar and tea,’ a 40-year-old Iranian driver said at the Iraqi border crossing of Bashmakh.

There was also a ‘near-total national internet blackout’ in Iran on Wednesday, a London-based watchdog said, with Iran’s Fars news agency confirming heavier internet restrictions after initial curbs imposed last week.

The military campaign has sparked calls for a return to diplomacy.​

 

[Saif]

Khamenei ‘can no longer be allowed to exist’: Israel minister

Israel’s defence minister said on Thursday that Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ‘can no longer be allowed to exist’.

www.newagebd.net

Khamenei ‘can no longer be allowed to exist’: Israel minister
Agence France-Presse . Holon 19 June, 2025, 18:48

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei | AFP photo

Israel’s defence minister said on Thursday that Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ‘can no longer be allowed to exist’.

The comments from Defence Minister Israel Katz came after the Soroka Hospital in the southern city of Beersheba reported 40 people injured after an Iran missile strike.

‘Khamenei openly declares that he wants Israel destroyed -- he personally gives the order to fire on hospitals,’ Katz told journalists in Holon near Tel Aviv.

‘Such a man can no longer be allowed to exist.’

A senior US official told AFP on Sunday that President Donald Trump had ‘found out that the Israelis had plans to hit Iran’s supreme leader’.

‘President Trump was against it and we told the Israelis not to,’ said the US official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has neither confirmed nor denied the claim.

In a television interview on Monday, he did not rule it out, saying that killing the 86-year-old cleric who has ruled Iran since 1989 would ‘end the conflict’ between the two countries.

Trump wrote on Tuesday that the United States knew Khamenei’s location but would not kill him ‘for now’.

Israel launched strikes on Iran last Friday in what it said was an 11th-hour move to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

It has since hit hundreds of targets, including military commanders, top nuclear scientists and military and nuclear facilities.

- ‘Regime change’ -

The movements of the supreme leader, who has not left the Iran since he took over in 1989, are subject to the tightest security and secrecy.

Netanyahu has not said publicly that Israel is trying to topple him, only that regime change could be a result of its military action.

Iranians ‘understand that the regime is much weaker than they thought -- they realise it, and that could lead to results,’ he told a press conference on Monday.

French President Emmanuel Macron has said that any attempt at forcing change through military action would result in ‘chaos’, while both China and Russia demanded that Israel cease fire.

Iran denies seeking to develop a nuclear weapon and reports citing US intelligence officials this week have cast doubt on Israeli claims that it has accelerated efforts to produce one.

Iran has been enriching uranium to 60 percent -- far above the 3.67-percent limit set in a 2015 nuclear deal, which Trump abandoned, but still short of the 90-per cent threshold needed for a nuclear warhead.

Israel has maintained ambiguity on its own nuclear arsenal, but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute says it has 90 nuclear warheads.​

 

[Saif]

Are we looking at a new era of nuclear proliferation?

To imagine the future, one must be prepared to accept a probable scenario where the number of nuclear-capable states grows.

www.thedailystar.net

Are we looking at a new era of nuclear proliferation?

A satellite image shows the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran after Israeli airstrike in this handout image dated June 15, 2025. PHOTO: REUTERS

The latest escalation between Iran and Israel—flaring beyond their traditional shadow war into a more overt theatre of strategic confrontation—has not only brought into sharp relief the frailty of the Middle East's security architectures but also injected a renewed sense of plausibility to a future marred by nuclear proliferation. This is not merely a regional rivalry now shaped by drones, proxies, and ballistic threats; it is a deeper existential tremor through the global non-proliferation regime, particularly as it intersects with an evolving global stance on nuclear energy, evidenced recently by the World Bank lifting its ban on financing nuclear power projects. While such economic realignments suggest a revivalist sentiment towards nuclear energy for development purposes, the geostrategic ripple, if one observes closely, seems to be redirecting states towards the more ominous potential of military nuclearisation.

The gravitational pull of this crisis has clearly intensified since Iran's nuclear posture has taken a turn towards ambiguity, arguably as a form of strategic signal following repeated Israeli threats to pre-emptively neutralise Iran's nuclear infrastructure. While Tehran maintains that its ambitions remain within peaceful bounds—a position reiterated in its official adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—its progressive accumulation of enriched uranium, combined with the installation of advanced centrifuges, has rendered the so-called breakout time increasingly irrelevant. As argued by Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, proliferation is not always about intention but about the temptation born of security anxiety. What we are witnessing in the Middle East is a classic case of the security model driving nuclear aspiration—precisely the kind of condition under which the NPT begins to erode not legally, but normatively.

Israel's long-standing policy of nuclear opacity, or amimut, compounded by its non-signatory status in the treaty, makes it a paradoxical actor within the non-proliferation discourse. Avner Cohen, in The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb, exposes the internal logic of deterrence that has shaped Israeli policy since Dimona, a desert city where Israel has a nuclear installation, became functional. But the normalisation of such opacity—protected often by Western double standards—has already created conditions under which regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, may feel increasingly justified in pursuing latent or overt nuclear capabilities. Indeed, as Jacques Hymans demonstrates in Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, national identity and state capacity often shape the likelihood of nuclear pursuit, but when perceived threats cross a certain threshold, even states with lower bureaucratic coherence become willing to absorb the risks.

The World Bank's decision to reintroduce nuclear energy into its financing portfolio, albeit under the rubric of green transitions, comes at a time when the line between civilian and military nuclear programmes has grown thinner than ever. In Nuclear Energy: What Everyone Needs to Know, Charles D Ferguson underscores how the dual-use nature of nuclear technology remains the Achilles heel of non-proliferation efforts, particularly in politically volatile regions. The shift in global energy paradigms, driven by climate obligations and the search for low carbon alternatives, inadvertently contributes to a proliferation-permissive environment. While the intention may be to catalyse sustainable development, the outcome, especially in strategically insecure regions, may be the opposite: an acceleration towards weaponisation disguised as energy transition.

One must not underestimate the ideological and existential dimensions at play. In Nuclear Iran: Birth of an Atomic State, David Patrikarakos articulates how Iran's nuclear project is deeply embedded within its revolutionary narrative—a means not just of deterrence, but of ideological fortification in the face of perceived Western hostility and Israeli aggression. This framework, where nuclear capability becomes a symbol of sovereignty and resistance, undermines the normative power of the NPT and emboldens other regional actors to similarly frame nuclear pursuits as righteous or defensive.

The erosion of normative compliance is even more troubling when one considers the declining influence of multilateral institutions. Mohamed ElBaradei, in The Age of Deception, recounts the struggles of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain impartial credibility, often caught between technical mandates and political pressures. In the current Iran-Israel escalation, the IAEA finds itself unable to contain the narrative spiral; its inspections are challenged, its neutrality questioned, and its authority diluted. Such developments don't merely affect Iran; they delegitimise the architecture built over decades to constrain nuclear ambition globally.

Equally critical is the emergent geopolitics of nuclear patronage. In Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War, Angela Stent reminds us that nuclear diplomacy is often subservient to grand strategy. When the West no longer appears neutral in adjudicating proliferation threats, it creates incentives for other power blocs to encourage, or at least tolerate, proliferation under their spheres of influence as counterweights.

This tectonic shift is mirrored in the Nuclear Tipping Point, a documentary by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, where it is argued that once regional balances are sufficiently disrupted, the psychological and strategic thresholds for proliferation fall precipitously. The Israel-Iran conflict, layered with religious, territorial, and ideological grievances, appears to have arrived precisely at that inflection. The rising tide of normalisation agreements, while ostensibly peace-building, also brings into sharper contrast the isolation of Iran and the consolidation of anti-Iran blocs, thereby reinforcing Tehran's perception of encirclement and its consequent reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Furthermore, within the broader global reordering, there is now less incentive for emerging powers to be morally constrained by treaties designed in a post-World War II liberal order. As John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics so decisively argues, the international system rewards those who maximise their relative power, even if it means undermining norms. The return of realist imperatives in global politics, from Eastern Europe to the Indo-Pacific, renders disarmament diplomacy not only hollow but also dangerous, as it falsely assumes that regimes guided by survival will disarm for abstract ideals.

To imagine the future, one must be prepared to accept a probable scenario where the number of nuclear-capable states grows—not linearly but exponentially. In Arsenals of Folly, Richard Rhodes warns that the mere existence of nuclear weapons creates systemic instability, not because of their use, but because of the crises they perpetually generate. With the legitimisation of nuclear financing for peaceful purposes by the World Bank, and with the NPT facing both ideological and enforcement paralysis, the global community may be on the cusp of a second nuclear age—more decentralised, more volatile, and more dangerous.

The Iran-Israel crisis has not only undermined regional security; it has sent tremors through the global nuclear order. The future likely holds more nuclearisation, justified either as deterrence or energy transition, and normalised under an increasingly bifurcated world order. If the non-proliferation regime is to survive, it must confront both the double standards embedded in its enforcement and the shifting global narrative that now sees nuclear capability not as taboo, but as insurance.

Syed Raiyan Amir is senior research associate at the KRF Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs (CBGA).​

 

[Saif]

Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war?

So, as the pressure mounts on Iran, has it been left to fight alone? Or does it have allies that could come to its aid?

www.thedailystar.net

Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war?

Rocket trails are seen in the sky above the Israeli coastal city of Netanya amid a fresh barrage of Iranian missile attacks on June 19, 2025. AFP

As Israel continues its attacks on Iran, US President Donald Trump and other global leaders are hardening their stance against the Islamic Republic.

While considering a US attack on Iran's nuclear sites, Trump has threatened Iran's supreme leader, claiming to know his location and calling him "an easy target". He has demanded "unconditional surrender" from Iran.

Meanwhile, countries such as Germany, Canada, the UK and Australia have toughened their rhetoric, demanding Iran fully abandon its nuclear program.

So, as the pressure mounts on Iran, has it been left to fight alone? Or does it have allies that could come to its aid?

Has Iran's 'axis of resistance' fully collapsed?

Iran has long relied on a network of allied paramilitary groups across the Middle East as part of its deterrence strategy. This approach has largely shielded it from direct military strikes by the US or Israel, despite constant threats and pressure.

This so-called "axis of resistance" includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, the Houthi militants in Yemen, as well as Hamas in Gaza, which has long been under Iran's influence to varying degrees. Iran also supported Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria before it was toppled last year.

These groups have served both as a regional buffer and as a means for Iran to project power without direct engagement.

However, over the past two years, Israel has dealt significant blows to the network.

Hezbollah — once Iran's most powerful non-state ally — has been effectively neutralised after months of attacks by Israel. Its weapons stocks were systematically targeted and destroyed across Lebanon. And the group suffered a major psychological and strategic loss with the assassination of its most influential leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

In Syria, Iranian-backed militias have been largely expelled following the fall of Assad's regime, stripping Iran of another key foothold in the region.

That said, Iran maintains strong influence in Iraq and Yemen.

The PMF in Iraq, with an estimated 200,000 fighters, remains formidable. The Houthis have similarly sized contingent of fighters in Yemen.

Should the situation escalate into an existential threat to Iran — as the region's only Shiite-led state — religious solidarity could drive these groups to become actively involved. This would rapidly expand the war across the region.

The PMF, for instance, could launch attacks on the 2,500 US troops stationed in Iraq. Indeed, the head of Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the PMF's more hardline factions, promised to do so:

If America dares to intervene in the war, we will directly target its interests and military bases spread across the region without hesitation.

Iran itself could also target US bases in the Persian Gulf countries with ballistic missiles, as well as close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil supply flows.

Will Iran's regional and global allies step in?

Several regional powers maintain close ties with Iran. The most notable among them is Pakistan — the only Islamic country with a nuclear arsenal.

For weeks, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has tried to align Iran more closely with Pakistan in countering Israel's actions in Gaza.

In a sign of Pakistan's importance in the Israel-Iran war, Trump has met with the country's army chief in Washington as he weighs a possible strike on its neighbour.

Pakistan's leaders have also made their allegiances very clear. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has offered Iran's president "unwavering solidarity" in the "face of Israel's unprovoked aggression". And Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently said in an interview Israel will "think many times before taking on Pakistan".

These statements signal a firm stance without explicitly committing to intervention.

Yet, Pakistan has also been working to de-escalate tensions. It has urged other Muslim-majority nations and its strategic partner, China, to intervene diplomatically before the violence spirals into a broader regional war.

In recent years, Iran has also made diplomatic overtures to former regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to improve relations.

These shifts have helped rally broader regional support for Iran. Nearly two dozen Muslim-majority countries — including some that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel — have jointly condemned Israel's actions and urged de-escalation.

It's unlikely, though, that regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey would support Iran materially, given their strong alliances with the US.

Iran's key global allies, Russia and China, have also condemned Israel's strikes. They have previously shielded Tehran from punitive resolutions at the UN Security Council.

However, neither power appears willing — at least for now — to escalate the confrontation by providing direct military support to Iran or engaging in a standoff with Israel and the US.

Theoretically, this could change if the conflict widens and Washington openly pursues a regime change strategy in Tehran. Both nations have major geopolitical and security interests in Iran's stability. This is due to Iran's long-standing "Look East" policy and the impact its instability could have on the region and the global economy.

However, at the current stage, many analysts believe both are unlikely to get involved directly.

Moscow stayed on the sidelines when Assad's regime collapsed in Syria, one of Russia's closest allies in the region. Not only is it focused on its war in Ukraine, Russia also wouldn't want to endanger improving ties with the Trump administration.

China has offered Iran strong rhetorical support, but history suggests it has little interest in getting directly involved in Middle Eastern conflicts.

Ali Mamouri is a Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University​

 

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