[🇧🇩] Monitoring Bangladesh's Economy

[🇧🇩] Monitoring Bangladesh's Economy
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G Bangladesh Defense

How new tax structure will squeeze the middle class

Atiqul Kabir Tuhin

Published :
Jun 18, 2026 00:24
Updated :
Jun 18, 2026 00:24

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The national budget for fiscal year 2026-27 reveals the scale of the country's fiscal dilemma. On the one hand, the government is offering tax relief to ease inflationary pressures and reduce the cost of doing business. On the other, it has set an ambitious revenue collection target of Tk 6.04 trillion for the National Board of Revenue (NBR), nearly Tk 1 trillion higher than the target for the outgoing fiscal year. Moreover, as revenue collection is running far below target, the NBR will need to increase collections by around 50 per cent over this year's actual receipts to meet its target for next fiscal, starting from July 1. Whether such a dramatic increase is realistically attainable remains open to question. However, the target itself creates pressure for more aggressive revenue mobilisation through stricter enforcement and policy adjustments. Given Bangladesh's persistently narrow tax base, which successive governments have failed to broaden meaningfully, it is feared that the burden could ultimately fall on the already compliant, taxed and inflation-hit segments of the population and businesses.

This policy paradox is evident in the new tax structure, where tax-free income threshold has been raised by Tk 25,000 from existing 3.5 lakh, which the authorities claim will provide some relief to taxpayers amid persistently high inflation. However, the lowest tax slab of five per cent has been abolished and replaced with a 10 per cent rate. As a result, many taxpayers will ultimately face a higher overall income tax burden despite the proposed increase in the tax-free income threshold.

Moreover, the new tax structure is likely to place a disproportionately heavier burden on lower- and middle-income earners than on higher-income taxpayers. An analysis by SMAC Advisory Services Ltd shows that an individual earning around Tk 74,000 per month would face a 49 per cent increase in tax liability under the proposed structure, whereas someone earning Tk 250,000 or more per month would see an increase of only about 10.5 per cent. At a time when ordinary households are already struggling with inflation and stagnant purchasing power, such disparities raise questions about the equity and fairness of the proposed tax measures.

The burden on taxpayers is further compounded by changes to investment-related tax incentives. Under the existing system, taxpayers can claim a rebate equal to 15 per cent of eligible investments, subject to a maximum investment limit of 20 per cent of taxable income or Tk 6.67 million, whichever is lower. The proposed Income Tax Act 2027 increases the eligible investment ceiling to 30 per cent of taxable income but reduces the rebate rate from 15 per cent to 10 per cent. It also lowers the maximum annual tax rebate from Tk 1 million to Tk 750,000. As a result, taxpayers will receive Tk 5,000 less in tax relief for every Tk 100,000 invested. Although the proposal allows a larger share of income to be invested in eligible instruments, the lower rebate rate will diminish the tax-saving benefit of such investments for many taxpayers. The changes are likely to affect salaried employees in particular and discourage savings.

The proposed budget worth Tk 9.38 trillion has been widely praised for prioritising healthcare, education and social protection. The challenge however lies in revenue collection. Many argued that revenue targets should have been set realistically, taking into account the economy's current weaknesses. Under these circumstances, greater emphasis should have been placed on reducing wasteful expenditure and improving the efficiency of public spending. Failure to meet overly ambitious targets could force the government to rely more heavily on bank borrowing, crowding out private-sector credit and slowing investment. In the worst case, persistent fiscal shortfalls could increase pressure for monetary financing of deficits, adding further fuel to inflation.

There are indeed scopes for significantly boosting revenue collection. Recent data show that Bangladesh's revenue collection has not kept pace with economic growth over the past decade, indicating substantial untapped potential. Experts have identified several structural weaknesses behind the country's poor revenue performance. These include corruption and inefficiency within the tax administration, the failure to identify and bring new taxpayers into the system, and the absence of a unified digital platform linking income tax, VAT and customs authorities. Comprehensive digital integration of tax administration could significantly reduce tax evasion, improve compliance and broaden the tax base without placing additional burdens on existing taxpayers.

The finance minister's budget speech outlined several measures aimed at expanding the tax net and automating revenue collection, which is welcome. However, the minister mentioned nothing about the much-anticipated reform of the National Board of Revenue (NBR), particularly the move initiated by the interim government to separate tax policy formulation from revenue collection and enforcement. Critics have long argued that the NBR's dual role as both policymaker and enforcer creates an inherent conflict of interest, which serves as a potent source of irregularities and corruption that plague the revenue administration.

The question, therefore, is not whether tax revenue should increase, but how it should be raised. Will the government boost revenue by curbing tax evasion among wealthy individuals and businesses that are often politically difficult to tax, or will it continue to squeeze those already within the tax net and easiest to tax? Will higher revenue come from broadening the tax base or from greater reliance on indirect taxes, which disproportionately affect lower- and middle-income households? A wider and more equitable tax base, along with an efficient and corruption-free revenue department, could strengthen fiscal stability while reducing distortions in the economy.

That said, the budget contains several measures aimed at easing inflation. Source taxes on nearly 60 agricultural and essential commodities, including rice, wheat, flour, edible oil, sugar, fish, meat, onions and ginger, have been reduced. Existing rates of five per cent, two per cent and one per cent will be lowered to just 0.5 per cent. If these reductions are reflected in retail prices, they could help moderate inflation and provide some relief to consumers. However, the benefits will materialise only if strict market monitoring ensures that lower tax costs are passed on to consumers rather than absorbed as additional profit by intermediaries.​
 

Amid rising debt pressures, a case for sukuk to ease the burden

Mezbah Uddin Ahmed

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VISUAL: ANWAR SOHE

The government’s proposed Tk 9.38 lakh crore budget for FY2026-27 is the largest in Bangladesh’s history. The budget frames economic democratisation, deregulation, and the empowerment of the people as priorities on Bangladesh’s path to becoming a trillion-dollar economy. Funding it, however, will rely heavily on debt. To this end, the government plans to borrow Tk 2.43 lakh crore during the fiscal year, of which Tk 1.16 lakh crore will be from foreign sources. The remainder will be raised domestically, with Tk 1.12 lakh crore from the banking system and Tk 15,000 crore from national savings certificates. Economists warn that heavy reliance on domestic borrowing could crowd out private sector credit. Interest payments alone will reach Tk 1.05 lakh crore on domestic loans and Tk 22,500 crore on foreign loans.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the IMF-World Bank debt sustainability assessment both classify Bangladesh as being at moderate risk of external and overall debt distress. Both warn that rising domestic debt-servicing costs are already eroding fiscal space, and that any major shock (climatic, geopolitical, or otherwise) could turn a still-manageable debt burden into an unmanageable one.

The months-long closure of the Strait of Hormuz is the latest example of this warning. Still, such shocks do not change what the state owes its lenders; its debt-servicing obligations remain the same. Risk-free fixed payments are precisely what make sovereign debt cheaper, but they also place the entire burden of adjustment on the state. When a shock erodes the economy’s capacity to pay while its obligations hold firm, the fiscal cushion thins and the government loses room to manoeuvre. The present is a good time for Bangladesh to rethink how it borrows.

One option would be to tie the government’s payment obligations to its capacity to meet them. This is the idea behind state-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs): securities whose repayments adjust in line with a measurable indicator of the state’s ability to pay. Encouragingly, Bangladesh has already laid the groundwork for such instruments.

Since 2020, the government has been issuing investment sukuk, all of which have been oversubscribed, the most recent by 12.30 times, despite offering lower returns than comparable conventional treasury instruments. This indicates that a sizeable Shariah-sensitive investor base already exists in the market. With Shariah-compliant options still scarce, depositors unsettled by uncertainty in parts of the Islamic banking sector, and Islamic pension schemes under development at the National Pension Authority likely to require such options once launched, demand for sovereign sukuk is set to deepen in the coming years.

The investment sukuk issued has so far financed clearly identified socioeconomic projects—such as safe water supply, schools, rural roads, and bridges—rather than merely covering general budget gaps. Each issuance carries its own prospectus, setting out the purpose of issuance, the use of proceeds, and the expected impact of the underlying projects. In some cases, the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of those projects is assessed to confirm that their economic benefits exceed their funding costs.

Yet, for all their merits, these remain fixed-rate structures that closely track comparable conventional treasury bonds. Neither is the actual performance of the underlying projects measured, nor do payments to investors vary with it. The government’s obligation stays the same regardless of how the projects actually perform. For investors, this means a safe investment. But from a debt-management perspective, they are no more than conventional debt, offering no relief from the rigidity of debt servicing.

This is where an alternative sukuk design becomes an opportunity. Short-term, trade-based sukuk, for instance, could finance recurring commodity purchases by the government and its agencies, tying issuances to the genuine trading activities of the state. Long-term, performance-linked sukuk could fund profitable state enterprises or their viable segments, with returns tagged to actual performance. Sukuk could likewise be issued against revenue-generating public assets such as tolled bridges, power plants, ports, and transport networks. Impact-linked sukuk could support public welfare projects that generate no revenue, with payments tied to verified outcomes such as improvements in air quality, traffic, education, healthcare, and employment generation. Waqf resources could complement this welfare financing, while zakat funds could support eligible beneficiaries in the social sector. Together, these structures would bind government spending more closely to performance-oriented economic activity.

If a growing share of government financing were channelled through sukuk whose payouts track the actual performance of the underlying assets, or clearly defined indicators of the state’s capacity to pay, the government’s debt-servicing burden would adjust accordingly. If scaled sufficiently, this could provide greater fiscal flexibility at the sovereign level. These structures would also be more than financing tools and, done properly, they would serve as accountability mechanisms. Since payouts would depend on performance, investors can gain a direct stake in how each project is run and would press for fuller disclosure—a form of scrutiny rarely associated with conventional debt. Done well, sukuk could quietly strengthen the country’s broader governance.

Of course, such structures would not be easy to introduce. Given limited trust in the performance of government agencies, investors may initially demand a government guarantee or a premium for bearing performance risk, while the agencies themselves may resist stronger monitoring and disclosure. Because of the performance link, every element of the structure would need careful design. The supporting infrastructure would also be essential: tax neutrality, streamlined issuance, strong oversight, an active trustee, Shariah-compliant segregation of income, honest and verifiable impact reporting, and effective coordination among the central bank, the finance ministry, and project-implementing agencies.

Issuances could begin with structures closest to the familiar fixed-rate profile while still carrying a performance-linked element, then move towards fuller performance-based forms as investors grow comfortable. To build confidence early on, a government guarantee may be offered—but not in a blanket form that severs the link between performance and payout. Instead, it should be transitional, paired with full disclosure, and withdrawn as the market matures. Over time, this approach could diversify the government’s financing mix, reduce its reliance on entirely fixed obligations, and embed stronger accountability in public projects.

Conventional borrowing, or a plain debt-based sukuk, is easy to issue. But it also locks in the rigidity already burdening debt management. Genuinely performance-linked sukuk may be harder to launch, but that difficulty is the price of fiscal flexibility and gives everyone involved a built-in reason to care about how an underlying project (or the economy itself) performs.

The shift need not be abrupt. We could begin with small-scale projects and early-stage structures that stay close to today’s fixed-rate profile, while carrying some performance-accountability elements, and then scale up and shift towards fuller performance linkage as the market matures. Debt management reimagined in this way has the potential to become not merely a means of covering the deficit but also a lever for a stronger, more transparent economy.

Mezbah Uddin Ahmed is research fellow at ISRA Institute of INCEIF University in Malaysia.​
 

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