[🇧🇩] Political Activities of Awami League after the fall of Hasina's Regime

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[🇧🇩] Political Activities of Awami League after the fall of Hasina's Regime
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G Bangladesh Defense

Awami League’s future rests on past reckoning
Seven major obstacles to comeback

Ahammad Foyez


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BURDENED by the legacy of the July mass uprising, a lack of introspection regarding past governance, a leadership crisis, ousted former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s presence on Indian soil, and a government ban on its activities — the Awami League’s political future currently faces a multidimensional crisis.

To discuss the AL’s potential return to Bangladeshi politics, one point must be clarified at the outset: it is impossible to make definitive predictions about any political party’s future. However, by analysing the party’s current state, the legacy of its past rule, its organisational capacity, and the prevailing political and legal realities, one can identify the obstacles lying ahead.

Following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government during the mass uprising of July–August 2024, the Awami League did not merely lose power; serious questions arose regarding its long-standing political authority, leadership structure and public acceptability. Compounding these issues are the ban on the party’s activities and impending legal proceedings concerning allegations of crimes against humanity.

An investigative report by the Office of the United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights, published on February 12, 2025, estimated that up to 1,400 people may have been killed between July 1 and August 15, 2024. The report detailed grave human rights violations involving the then-government, security and intelligence agencies, and violent elements affiliated with the AL.

Against this backdrop, there are at least seven major obstacles to the AL’s political comeback.

Loss of power and the departure of top leadership

THE circumstances under which the AL lost power mark a significant turning point in the party’s political history. Hasina’s departure from the country and the pressure exerted on the central leadership have forced the party to confront a new reality regarding its organisational structure and political strategy.

For a party that has long operated with state power at its core, reorganising itself within a new political landscape while out of power is no easy task. This is particularly challenging when nearly the entire central leadership has fled abroad, making it difficult to keep grassroots activists active, rebuild public engagement, and establish the credibility of new leadership. However, a political leader leaving the country or residing abroad does not permanently sideline their party from politics. History offers precedents of exiled or ousted leadership making a political comeback. Yet, the AL lacks the positive political agenda required for such a return, nor does it appear inclined to pursue that path. The question now arises: can the party adapt to the changing political reality without relying on its old organisational structure and leadership?

Limits of AL’s conspiracy narrative on the July uprising

INTERPRETING the July mass uprising is crucial to any discussion regarding the AL’s political future. If the party characterises the movement merely as a conspiracy or the result of foreign instigation, it risks overlooking the underlying political grievances, the lived experience of repression, and the demands for accountability that fuelled the protests.

Explaining the July movement solely through conspiracy theories is also inconsistent with the findings of the UN’s report. The report presents evidence of systematic and widespread violence used to suppress the protests and raises serious questions regarding the policy stance of the then-government.

Of course, allegations of political conspiracy or foreign influence within a movement can be examined based on concrete evidence. However, such allegations cannot be used to deny the domestic causes of the movement, the reality of public discontent, or the state’s use of force.

The deposed prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, was the one who directly ordered the indiscriminate killings. The fact that she authorised the use of lethal weapons against protesters has been proven by both domestic and international forensic analysis. Seeking a conspiracy theory instead of expressing remorse for these actions serves only one purpose: to mislead the public.

This is precisely where the AL faces a major challenge. If the party fails to view the events of July as a reflection of its own political failures, its opportunity to rectify past mistakes will be severely limited. A political comeback requires more than just attempting to discredit the movement; it necessitates addressing the fundamental question of why so many people rose up against the government.

Accountability for past repression and rights violations

OPPOSITION parties, human rights organisations, journalists and civil society have raised numerous allegations regarding the AL’s long tenure in power. These include enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, the harassment of political opponents, the curtailment of freedom of expression, and the dismantling of the electoral system.

The events of July and August have added a new dimension to these allegations. The UN’s 2025 report presents serious investigative findings regarding the repressive policies of the then-government and the role of security forces. It also highlights the involvement of violent elements associated with the Awami League.

As a political party, the AL faces questions it cannot evade: Will it engage in self-criticism regarding its past tenure? Will it cooperate with impartial investigations into the allegations? Will it take a stand on ensuring justice for victims? Or will it dismiss all accusations as mere political vendettas?

If the party fails to undertake credible self-criticism and accountability measures concerning its past rule, rebuilding public trust will become even more difficult. Restoring confidence through mere political rhetoric is challenging without tangible evidence of a shift away from the political conduct that sparked these allegations.

A tendency for retribution in political rhetoric

THREATS of retribution or violence against those who participated in the July movement remain evident in the political statements made by AL leaders and activists. This poses a significant obstacle to the party’s efforts to regain political acceptability.

Rhetoric aimed at annihilating political opponents narrows the scope for compromise and democratic coexistence. A crucial lesson from the events of July is that attempting to suppress a movement through state-sanctioned force cannot ensure long-term political legitimacy.

Despite the extensive use of force by security forces prior to the fall of the Hasina administration, the government could not remain in power. The lesson here for the Awami League is that a crisis of public support cannot be resolved through the exercise of political might, threats, or the language of revenge. At the same time, the party’s opponents must also bear in mind that political crimes should be addressed through the legal process, not through retaliatory violence or unlawful persecution.

Leadership centred on Hasina, the succession crisis

HASINA’S long-standing leadership has had a profound impact on the AL’s political structure. Her position is inextricably linked to the party’s leadership, organisational decisions, and political identity. Consequently, how the party’s leadership will function in her absence is a fundamental question.

Who will succeed the 79-year-old party leader, how acceptable that new leadership will be, and how the relationship between the central leadership and the grassroots organisation will be maintained — the answers to these questions could shape the party’s future organisational viability.

In this context, analysing the institutional framework of leadership is more important than speculating about age or personal futures. If a political party becomes overly dependent on a single individual, internal competition and differences of opinion tend to escalate during leadership transitions. The AL faces a significant risk in this regard.

Hasina’s presence in Delhi and Bangladesh-India relations

HASINA’S presence in India has become a crucial factor concerning both the AL’s political future and the broader relationship between Bangladesh and India. In a report published on October 3, 2026, Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh Dinesh Trivedi stated that legal processes regarding Hasina’s return to Bangladesh were underway, though he did not specify a timeframe for her return.

This statement indicates that the question of Hasina’s return is part of ongoing diplomatic and legal discussions. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that India might be using her as a bargaining chip in its relations with Bangladesh or detaining her for specific political objectives.

Relations between India and Bangladesh should not revolve around a single political leader. Yet, during the AL’s long tenure, India demonstrated a profound lack of diplomatic maturity. They failed to grasp that, in the future, they might need to engage with entities other than the Awami League. India is now paying the price for having ‘put all its eggs in one basket’ regarding Bangladesh. Given the multitude of shared issues — such as trade, energy, border management, water sharing, and regional security — it is only natural that Sheikh Hasina’s status will influence the bilateral relationship.

However, this presents a political challenge for the AL. If the party’s future becomes overly dependent on leadership based abroad — rather than on rebuilding public support and political acceptability within the country — questions could arise regarding its political autonomy.

Ultimately, the primary factors determining the AL’s position in Bangladeshi politics will be the people of Bangladesh, the country’s political institutions, and the prevailing legal realities.

Ban on the AL’s activities and the judicial process

ONE of the most significant realities currently shaping the analysis of the AL’s future is the government-imposed ban on the party’s activities.

On May 12, 2025, the activities of the Awami League — along with its associate, fraternal, and affiliated organisations — were banned by the government. According to the notification, the ban is to remain in effect until the conclusion of the judicial proceedings against the party’s leaders and activists at the International Crimes Tribunal. This ban encompasses a prohibition on holding meetings, rallies, and processions, as well as conducting party activities through various channels, including online platforms.

On June 24, 2026 prime minister’s information and broadcasting adviser Zahed Ur Rahman stated that the AL’s political future would depend on the outcome of the trials concerning crimes against humanity and that the question of banning the party permanently would be determined by the courts.

Two distinct aspects need to be considered here. First, the current ban on the party’s activities directly limits the scope of its political operations. Second, the question of permanently banning the party and determining the criminal liability of specific individuals or leaders is tied to the judicial process.

Consequently, the AL’s political future hinges not merely on public support or leadership; it is also bound by legal hurdles, the progress of judicial proceedings, and future legal rulings. How these obstacles are overcome will depend not only on the party’s own political stance but also on decisions made by the courts and state institutions.

It is impossible to make a definitive prediction regarding the AL’s political comeback. However, the obstacles facing the party cannot be underestimated. Acknowledging the causes and significance of the July mass uprising, addressing serious allegations regarding past governance, cooperating with impartial investigations and judicial processes concerning human rights violations, determining future leadership, and rebuilding public trust within the country — these issues are directly linked to the party’s political future.

The question of the AL’s political comeback is not limited merely to how well-organised the party remains; it is also a test of its past liabilities, its current legal standing, and the nature of the politics it intends to pursue in the future.

For now, the most critical challenge facing the party is not simply returning to active politics but rather gaining the capacity to re-establish a lawful and credible political role within Bangladesh’s transformed political landscape.

Ahammad Foyez is managing editor at New Age.​
 

Can the Awami League return through violence?

Ahammad Foyez

12 November, 2026, 00:00

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A bus goes up in flames at Bajitpur in Kishoreganj on November 10 as arsonists set fire to it amid heightened security measures in the wake of crude bomb explosions and arson incidents across the country. | New Age.

FOLLOWING its ouster in the July uprising, the greatest political challenge facing the Awami League has been to restore public trust. Given its long history of authoritarian politics and responsibility for the loss of unarmed lives during the uprising, the party was presented with a difficult path — one requiring self-reflection and political reform. However, by choosing instead to engage in violence, bombings, arson attacks and the creation of an atmosphere of fear, the party has further narrowed its prospects for returning to mainstream politics.

Recent incidents, including the torching of vehicles, detonation of crude bombs (cocktails), attacks on police and acts of sabotage against various facilities have brought this issue to the fore. Reports of violence across 16 districts on November 10 underscore the gravity of the situation; one bus driver has even lost his life. According to media accounts, targets have included government institutions, educational establishments, banks, airports and critical infrastructure such as the Padma Bridge. If these actions are intended as a prelude to the return of leaders who fled during the mass uprising, it is clear that the Awami League remains trapped in a cycle of misguided politics. Such events will only invite further catastrophe for the party’s political future.

For the Awami League, the question is no longer merely about returning to power or resuming political activities; the more fundamental issue is whether the party can ever earn the public’s trust and function as a legitimate, mainstream political party.

Violence is not the path to a political comeback

STATEMENTS and reports suggesting that Sheikh Hasina will return to the country in December have sparked a renewed surge of political activity among Awami League supporters. However, the political aspiration to return is not the same as creating a political environment conducive to such a return. In fact, attempts to exert political pressure through violence and acts of sabotage may only make the path to a comeback even more difficult.

If a political party wishes to regain public support, it must engage with the people, acknowledge its past mistakes and compete fairly against its political opponents. A party cannot achieve long-term political legitimacy by resorting to tactics such as bombings, setting vehicles on fire or endangering the lives of ordinary citizens.

The memory of the loss of life among unarmed people during the 2024 mass uprising continues to leave deep scars on the public consciousness. If, instead of healing these wounds, there are fresh allegations of violence, public anger will only intensify. There is a significant risk that the existing negative perception of the Awami League will become even more deeply entrenched.

Increased legal and organisational risks for party people

IF THE path of violence continues, Awami League leaders and activists could face several types of risks.

First, operations and arrests by law enforcement agencies against its party members in Bangladesh may intensify. In addition to those already facing cases, new incidents of violence could lead to further investigations and charges. Consequently, a significant number of the party’s grassroots-level members could become entangled in long-term legal complications.

Second, securing bail for those already in custody may become increasingly difficult. New allegations and evidence of violence could negatively impact bail hearings in court — though it should be noted that bail decisions remain entirely within the court’s discretion, and each case is evaluated on its own judicial merits.

Third, affluent and influential party members remaining in the country may face growing concerns regarding their personal safety and potential legal actions. Reports suggest that some have already begun leaving the country, aiming to protect their business interests and avoid the prospect of arrest. While some Awami League members were previously able to maintain a local presence through political compromises, the current situation has effectively closed off such opportunities.

Sustaining political violence requires both organisational capacity and financial resources. Therefore, if a link is established between acts of sabotage or violence and their funding, those providing the financial backing could also find themselves under investigation.

Should law enforcement agencies succeed in identifying the sources of funding, organisational channels and the individuals issuing orders behind the violence, the party’s organisational and financial networks will come under significant pressure. The repercussions would not be limited to grassroots members; political patrons and potential financiers could also face serious legal risks.

A return to the politics of confrontation with students?

ONE of the most concerning aspects of the recent violence is the reports of attacks targeting educational institutions and university campuses. During the July uprising, students stood at the forefront of the movement against the Awami League government — a movement that ultimately paved the way for the government’s downfall.

If investigations into recent bombings or acts of violence — directed at students, campuses or educational institutions — reveal the involvement of individuals linked to the Awami League, the implications would be politically profound. It would clearly demonstrate that, rather than engaging in democratic political competition, the party has chosen a path of confrontation against the very student body that drove its ouster from power.

Recent crude bomb blasts at various universities across the country, including the University of Dhaka, Jahangirnagar University, Jagannath University, North South University, and Southeast University, suggest that the Awami League harbours deep-seated resentment towards students.

The apparent satisfaction the Awami League derives from attacking those who led the July uprising makes it clear that the party views the entire ‘Gen Z’ generation as its adversary.

The future of any political party is, in part, defined by how it treats its opponents. The allegations that the party has resorted to physical attacks — rather than engaging its opponents through political means — raise even more serious questions about its democratic credentials.

The AL’s public image faces further crisis

FOR the Awami League, the greatest danger may not be immediate arrests, legal cases or organisational weakness; rather, it is how the party is being perceived by the public.

The memories of the loss of life and the brutal crackdowns during the 2024 mass uprising have severely damaged the party’s image. New allegations involving bombings, arson attack and the endangerment of ordinary citizens will only intensify these painful recollections.

At one time, the Awami League’s political identity was intertwined with the Liberation War and the nation-building process following Bangladesh’s independence. However, recent political experiences and allegations of violence have created a stark contradiction between that historical identity and the party’s current conduct.

If the party continues to engage in acts of terror, the public will increasingly view the Awami League as a violent political force. This will pose a major obstacle to any long-term political rehabilitation.

What must be done to return to conventional politics?

THERE is no easy path for the Awami League to make a political comeback. First, the party must abandon the path of violence and sabotage. Second, it must acknowledge political responsibility for the killings, crackdowns and human rights violations that occurred during the 2024 mass uprising and its tenure of power. Third, it must allow for impartial investigations and trials for those involved in these crimes, regardless of their political affiliation.

A return to conventional politics cannot be achieved merely by issuing a few statements or mobilising party activists on the streets. The top leadership, including Sheikh Hasina, must clarify whether they intend to evade accountability for past political errors and crimes or whether they are prepared to face the consequences.

Most importantly, the party must seek forgiveness from the people. Apologising is not merely a political tactic; it signifies an acknowledgement of past wrongs, a commitment to the victims and a guarantee that such events will not be repeated.

The Awami League has a long history in Bangladeshi politics. Yet, its historical legacy cannot grant it immunity for its present actions. A party’s past duration in power, its historical role during the Liberation War, or its previous contributions to governance cannot serve as a shield against accountability for current crimes.

If the Awami League believes it can re-establish itself as a political force by inciting violence and fear, it is making a grave political miscalculation. Such violence is the antithesis of the self-reflection, genuine remorse and democratic conduct required for a political comeback after losing power.

Ultimately, the Awami League faces two paths: it can continue a politics of violence and vengeance — thereby deepening its own political isolation — or it can acknowledge its past transgressions, seek forgiveness, face the legal process and attempt to return to democratic politics.

It is impossible for the Awami League to return to mainstream politics while evading justice, failing to apologise to the public and persisting in a politics of violence.

Ahammad Foyez is managing editor at New Age.​
 

AL violence plunges Gopalganj into total anarchy

Staff Correspondent . Dhaka


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Activists of activity-banned Awami League and its front organisations march carrying sticks, bamboo poles and oars in Gopalganj town on Sunday. | New Age photo

Gopalganj came to a standstill on Sunday, with road communications and public movement disrupted amid arson attacks, vandalism and demonstrations by leaders and activists of the activity-banned Awami League and its associate organisations, with similar incidents reported in several other districts.

The attacks targeted offices of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, educational institutions and government offices, including the Local Government Engineering Department office in Barguna, as well as Grameen Bank offices in Netrokona and Sylhet.

Attacks, arson reported in several other districts

- Six BGB platoons deployed


- Police vehicle torched, officer stabbed

- BNP offices, govt buildings attacked

- July Memorial, Grameen Bank branches torched

- Attacks reported in three districts


On Sunday afternoon, hundreds of Awami League leaders, activists and supporters staged demonstrations in broad daylight in Gopalganj, calling for public support for the party’s planned countrywide lockdown on November 19.

In response to the unrest, the government replaced the deputy commissioner and superintendent of police in Gopalganj, while the district administration deployed six platoons of Border Guard Bangladesh personnel to maintain law and order.

Awami League activists were seen carrying locally made weapons, including machetes and other sharp-edged weapons, as well as oars, sticks and bamboo poles during demonstrations that rocked the south-central district in phases from Saturday night to Sunday evening, New Age correspondent in Faridpur reported.

Agitated activists reopened the party’s Gopalganj district office and took control of it. They also set fire to the July Memorial in the city’s launch terminal area.

A police vehicle was also reportedly torched.

Police Headquarters Assistant Inspector General of Police for Media and Public Relations Kamarum Munira said the police were closely monitoring the overall situation in Gopalganj and had deployed additional forces.

‘We are examining whether there was any lapse or negligence on the part of the police in performing their duties. Necessary legal action will be taken over the incidents,’ Kamarum Munira told New Age.

On Saturday night, two offices belonging to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its youth wing, Jatiyatabadi Juba Dal, were vandalised and set on fire in Tungipara upazila.

Tungipara police station Sub-Inspector Moslem Ali, who filed a case over the torching of a police vehicle on November 10, was stabbed during a demonstration by Awami League activists in Tungipara on Sunday afternoon, police officials confirmed.

A series of attacks were allegedly carried out by activists of the activity-banned Awami League and its associate organisations at Nilfa Bazar and Barni Bazar in Tungipara between 8:30pm and 9:00pm on Saturday.

New Age contacted several Gopalganj police officials, including the superintendent of police, for comment, but they could not be reached by phone.

The protesters removed the nameplate of Gopalganj Government College and put up a banner renaming it Government Bangabandhu College.

The college was renamed Gopalganj Government College after the ouster of the Awami League government on August 5, 2024, following a student-led mass uprising.

At one point, demonstrators also vandalised the nameplate of Hadi Chattar at Gopalganj Science and Technology University.

The protesters also broke through a police barricade and brought out a procession in the presence of police personnel.

This was the second major demonstration by the Awami League since July 16, 2025, when at least four people were killed and scores injured in a series of clashes between law enforcement personnel and Awami League activists in Gopalganj town during a rally organised by the National Citizen Party.

On that day, the Bangladesh Army evacuated NCP leaders from Gopalganj in armoured personnel carriers.

New Age Staff Correspondent in Sylhet reported that important documents and a jeep of the Sylhet regional office of Grameen Bank were damaged in an arson attack at about 3:30am on Sunday.

Mohammad Abul Hossain, regional manager of Grameen Bank in Sylhet, confirmed the incident, saying that unidentified individuals set fire to the office using plastic packets containing flammable substances.

‘The fire was set first on the northern side of the building and later on the eastern side. The attackers also set fire to the regional manager’s vehicle parked in the garage,’ he said.

Khitish Kumar Das, team leader of the Fire Service and Civil Defense, said that the firefighters’ team rushed to the spot immediately after receiving information about the fire but found that the bank employees and local residents had already brought it under control.

Shah Poran police station Officer-in-Charge Ferdous Ahmed said that a general diary was recorded and they already launched an investigation.

In the early hours of Sunday, miscreants allegedly set fire to the accounts section of the Local Government Engineering Department office inside the Amtali Upazila Parishad Complex in Barguna district, New Age correspondent in Barishal reported.

Amtali police station Officer-in-Charge Md Yakub Hossain said police collected evidence and an investigation was underway to identify the perpetrators.

Unidentified people allegedly set fire to a branch office of Grameen Bank in Chhallisha Union under Netrakona Sadar upazila after pouring petrol around the premises, New Age correspondent in Mymensingh reported.

A 25-second video of the incident went viral on social media on Saturday afternoon, which took place at about 11:30pm on Friday.

Netrokona Sadar Model Police Station Officer-in-Charge Abul Khayer said that he was aware of the incident.

‘No written complaint was filed in this connection,’ he said, adding that necessary legal action would be taken following an investigation once a written complaint was submitted.

In Manikganj, police arrested a BCL leader and a Sramik League leader in Harirampur upazila, New Age correspondent reported, quoting Harirampur police Officer-in-Charge JOM Taufiq Azam.​
 

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