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[🇧🇩] Reforms carried out by the interim/future Govts.

[🇧🇩] Reforms carried out by the interim/future Govts.
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G Bangladesh Defense

Choosing reform, remembering July, securing the Republic

Serajul I Bhuiyan
Published :
Jan 20, 2026 22:52
Updated :
Jan 20, 2026 22:52

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On February 12, Bangladesh faces a question of profound historical importance one that goes beyond the usual trappings of election politics and into the very moral foundations of the republic itself. The people will not only elect their representatives; they will also be called upon to respond to a more profound question of constitutional moment: whether the moral power of the July 36 Revolution will be given expression in irreversible democratic guarantees, or whether, once again, the door will be left ajar for authoritarianism to slip back into the state quietly, legally, and incrementally.

Far from a symbolic gesture or an elitist construct, this referendum is the essence of a people who took a stand against fear, impunity, and exclusion and a people who paid a high price of blood and pain for their sovereignty over their political future. At its roots, this referendum is a statement of a radical principle: sovereignty lies with citizens, not with untrammeled power. February 12 is more than an election day; February 12 is a constitutional moment of reckoning.

Why the referendum counts: The lesson from history remains grim. The reason for the failure of revolutions has nothing to do with the loss of courage, but the structure of power remains. This has also been the case in Bangladesh, where people power has compelled political transitions, but the structure has remained the same. This has led to the same cycle: elections have been held, parliaments established, and constitutions referred to, yet power has continued to be consolidated.

The referendum specifically addresses this weakness. The referendum aims to translate the moral power of July into a set of constitutional guarantees to will into being. “Yes” voters express the conviction that democracy must be crafted, not simply willed. They recognise the tough lesson of the past fifty years: Elections alone cannot secure freedom if the agencies of observation are flexible, the police force is politicized, and accountability is discretionary.

In fact, the referendum serves as a democratic firewall by incorporating safeguards into the constitutional order. The referendum establishes an institutional memory within a political culture which is often characterized by amnesia to prevent past failures from simply being repackaged as future stability.

From sacrifice to statecraft: The July 36 Revolution was not a moment of blind fury. It was a collective gesture of outrage at a system that had closed all the democratic channels, made votes meaningless, squashed all opposition, and made impunity the norm. The sacrifices of the July 36 Revolution deserve more than just memorials.

However, the best memorial remains an affirmative vote. It will ensure that July is not just an interruption in the series of elite settlements but the start of a new political era. The referendum turns mourning into governance by codifying safeguards against the misuse of power and the trampling of civil liberties. To squander this opportunity is to turn a turning point in history into a tragedy, another installment in the book of lost opportunities. The “Yes” vote means that Bangladesh will choose change over the known comforts of stagnation, and democracy over the convenience of control.

The reform vision: The reform agenda to be adopted in the referendum is based on a set of principles that have long been a hallmark of Dr Yunus’s philosophy: democracy fails when power is wielded by institutions not guided by principle. Based on the experiences of a country like Bangladesh, the reform agenda emphasizes the need for independence, transparency, and accountability as non-negotiable democratic principles.

This is neither a personality project nor an act of partisanship. This is state-building through institutional transformation building institutions strong enough to outlast any leader or political party. This is to ensure that future administrations, regardless of their political stripe, operate within a framework they cannot easily manipulate.

A ‘Yes’ vote, then, is an investment in democracy with depth. It is an investment in an ethical vision of governance, one in which prioritization is done as follows: prioritize restraint over domination, prioritize law over loyalty, and prioritise citizenship over convenience.

The price of ‘NO’: ‘No’ will not just postpone change; it will also break the bridge between the sacrifices of July and the republic’s constitutional future. It will preserve the same flaws that made repression, manipulation, and the abuse of power. It will mean that the lessons of the past have not been learned.

Such a course of events would embolden those accustomed to living amid ambiguity and the weakness of institutions. Without the safeguards of the Constitution, the politicised administration and the compliant oversight agencies would once again be the order of the day. Regression rarely comes in the form of tanks; it often marches under the guise of legal technicalities and the fatigue of the citizenry.

In this situation, July might be remembered not as a time of change but as an interlude.

Core principles at stake: Essentially, the referendum is meant to address the structural imbalances that have undermined democratic rule in Bangladesh over the years. Chief amongst these is the need to depoliticise the state. It is inconceivable that a democratic republic can be sustained when the civil service, the law-and-order machinery, and regulatory institutions become appendages of political power. The referendum is meant to place such institutions back on track as non-partisan protectors of the public weal.

Another important aspect is promoting accountability. Without the investigation and punishment of corruption, abuse of power, and election manipulation, democracy becomes but a mere illusion because of fear and intimidation. This is because the reform is intended to give power to truly independent institutions to carry out their mandates without fear of intimidation and reprisal, and in so doing, the referendum holds that nobody is above the law.

Another important plank of the reform platform is the safeguarding of civil liberties. The freedom of speech, of assembly, and of dissent cannot be mere rhetorical ideals to be brought to life only during election times. The proposed referendum is intended to guarantee these ideals as permanent, enforceable guarantees, so that citizens, the press, and the opposition are assured they can act without fear of consequences during times of political stability and turmoil.

Finally, the referendum corrects the perpetual imbalance of power that has resulted from excessive executive power. By promoting the separation of powers and checks and balances among the three branches of government, it ensures that power does not become centralized in any one institution or office. This is crucial in ensuring that the government remains accountable and transparent to the citizens.

Together, these principles constitute a democratic architecture. They are meant to prevent the concentration of power, limit the potential for authoritarian drift, and ground Bangladesh’s democracy in the rule of law rather than the benevolence of those temporarily at the helm.

Preventing the re-emergence of authoritarian: Authoritarianism returns not by coercion but by persuasion — by a reasoned argument that order is more important than liberty, that efficiency is more important than accountability. This is a cycle that Bangladesh knows all too well. The referendum is intended to put a stop to that cycle by making illiberal changes more expensive in politics.

A ‘Yes’ vote is an expression of a collective voice, saying, “We will not accept governance through fear, silence, and violence, in the name of order.” It is preventive, not reactive. It eliminates the conditions that made July inevitable.

The moral choice: Countries, like people, also have their moments when they face the alternatives of remembering and forgetting. It is demanding to remember, and it calls for reform, accountability, and self-control. Forgetting, on the other hand, is easier and more dangerous.

February 12 is the moment when Bangladesh is faced with a choice. Voting ‘Yes’ is an act of collective memory, an act that remembers suffering, remembers failure, and remembers the need for change. Voting ‘No’ or opting out is an act of forgetting, and forgetting is an act that repeats.

Why reform is resisted: The opposition in the referendum is quite revealing. On the domestic front, the existing networks associated with the old regime, including some associated with the banned Awami League, will have every reason to oppose any reform that seeks to end the culture of impunity and patronage. Unchanged constitutions are hard to turn back; the absence of change leaves space for a return.

But beyond these international players, there may also be regional players who are uncomfortable with this new reality. A more confident and rule-bound Bangladesh would not be as vulnerable to pressure and backchannel politics. For these players, it is not a matter of ideology; it is a matter of interest.

The strategic cost of rejection: ‘No’ would have larger implications than the domestic politics of the country. ‘No’ would mean a lack of confidence in the country’s ability to consolidate the democratic advances achieved in the face of crisis. But, more importantly, ‘No’ would mean the failure of the moral challenge of the month of July, where the people stood up not only for a change of government but for a change of the style of governance. Unless the change is made to the constitution, the forces of fear and concentration may regroup, reorganize, and come back, this time under the cloak of legality.

Why ‘Yes’ is the firewall regression: A ‘Yes’ vote locks out the possibility of regression. It turns a revolutionary document into a constitutional one, making it much more difficult for authoritarianism, either domestic or foreign backed, to exploit procedural weaknesses. It says that the future of Bangladesh will be decided by its own people, not some hidden agendas that feed on the weakness of its institutions.

In this regard, the referendum is about irreversibility. The referendum ensures that the month of July cannot be quietly reversed, and the republic can oppose any kind of regression or meddling, whether internal or external.

The referendum is not a distraction in electoral politics, but rather its basis. Without structural change, elections risk being procedurally correct but substantively empty. Through change, they are restored to their former status as tools of true self-government.

By saying ‘Yes’ on February 12, the people of Bangladesh can mark the end of a journey that began in July, bringing the people’s struggle from the streets to the constitution, from protest to policy, from sacrifice to safeguard. It is a statement that says Bangladesh will not give away its future in exchange for a temporary calm labeled as stability.

Dr Serajul I Bhuiyan is a professor and former chair of journalism and mass communications at Savannah State University, Savannah, Georgia, USA.​
 

Restructuring for administrative efficiency

FE
Published :
Jan 22, 2026 23:18
Updated :
Jan 22, 2026 23:18

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In a significant move aimed at streamlining administrative efficiency, the interim government has recently unveiled a set of restructuring decisions involving steps towards enhancing transparency, efficiency and accountability across key state institutions. Presided over by the Chief Adviser, the meeting of the National Implementation Committee on Administrative Reorganisation (NICAR) approved a total of 11 administrative measures as part of a broader reform agenda of the interim government.

Among the most consequential decisions was the bifurcation of the tax wing of the National Board of Revenue (NBR), dividing it into two separate entities: the Revenue Policy Division and the Revenue Management Division. Officials have stated that the two new divisions are expected to begin operations in February with preparatory work for the split nearing completion. The proposal, however, had not been without controversy. When it was first announced earlier, it triggered considerable unrest, including pen-down strikes by sections of NBR staff and officials. Now, with the NICAR's formal approval, the restructuring appears to be finally settled. While the decision may be welcomed as an administrative milestone, its success will ultimately depend on outcomes rather than intentions. The objective should not be confined merely to reducing workload or redistributing responsibilities, but to ensuring qualitative improvements in efficiency, professionalism and service delivery. Equally important is safeguarding the interests of taxpayers, for whom the tax authority must function as a facilitative mechanism rather than an added source of complexity or hardship.

Another important issue discussed at the NICAR meeting was the future structure of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP). Deliberations reportedly explored whether the DMP could be divided into multiple units-possibly along north-south lines or through other administrative configurations. Although no final decision has been reached, officials suggest that the idea remains under active consideration. Here again, the stated aim is to improve professional efficiency. Yet, experience suggests that structural fragmentation does not automatically translate into better service delivery. The earlier bifurcation of the Dhaka Municipal Corporation into two separate entities serves as a cautionary example, where the intended gains in efficiency largely remained unrealised. Beyond bifurcation, the restructuring initiative also includes mergers of certain administrative bodies. The NICAR approved the merger of the Public Security Division and the Security Services Division under the Ministry of Home Affairs, as well as the consolidation of the Health Services Division with the Health Education and Family Welfare Division under the Ministry of Health. These moves appear to signal an effort to reduce overlap and improve coordination between and among ministries.

Taken together, the scale and scope of the NICAR decisions underscore the interim government's attempt to reshape key institutions-not only to improve day-to-day governance, but also to signal a departure from entrenched administrative practices. Yet, as experience repeatedly reminds us, reform is judged not by its rhetoric or structural ambition, but by its tangible impact. In the end, it is not the intention behind these decisions, but their outcomes, that will determine whether the promise of reform is truly fulfilled.​
 

Bureaucracy obstructs effective ACC reforms
Sadiqur Rahman 24 January, 2026, 01:10

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Iftekharuzzaman | File photo

Transparency International Bangladesh executive director Iftekharuzzaman, regarding reforms in the Anti-Corruption Commission, said that the interim government had failed to remove obstacles to effective ACC reforms and had neglected the immediately implementable reforms due to the bureaucracy.

According to his observation, Bangladesh has emerged from 16 years of entrenched kleptocracy in which corruption, abuse of power, and non-accountability became core features of governance.


He said that the July 2024 uprising reflected public rejection of this system and raised hopes for a transparent, accountable state.

However, he said that those hopes had largely been shattered, as, he observed, immediately after the Awami League regime’s ouster, new vested interests moved in to occupy political and administrative spaces, grabbed land, engaged in extortion, filed false cases, and captured institutions with politically motivated appointments and promotions.

The interim government, he further said, has failed to resist these trends and neglected reform commissions’ meaningful recommendations on implementable reforms, including those on strengthening the Anti-Corruption Commission.

According to him, the interim government has taken some symbolic steps but major proposals such as setting up an independent ‘selection and review committee’ for the ACC have been dropped, mainly due to resistance from the bureaucracy.

Iftekharuzzaman described the bureaucracy as the biggest obstacle to effective reforms in the ACC. Raising concerns, he said that none of the 15 ACC-related short-term implementable reforms, also listed in the July National Charter, had been implemented.

Proposals to reduce bureaucratic control, establish independent investigation mechanisms in the ACC, and adopting the Common Reporting Standard to curb money laundering have also been ignored.

He also said that the hope for making the ACC a constitutional body seemed to be fading as one of the major political parties opposed this recommendation.​
 

What happens when reform is managed, not delivered
26 January 2026, 00:38 AM

By Tasneem Tayeb

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FILE VISUAL: SALMAN SAKIB SHAHRYAR

At first glance, the interim administration appears to be doing what transitional governments are expected to do. The ground has been steadied. An election date has been announced and is nearing. Charters and ordinances have been drafted. The language of restoration circulates freely, carrying the reassurance that the rupture of July is being responsibly managed.

However, beneath this surface calm, something feels unresolved. Not because politics is loud—if anything, it has grown quieter compared to past election cycles—but the space in which politics is meant to unfold feels narrower than the promise of reform would suggest.

Power does not always govern through force or repression. Often, it governs through mundane procedure—timelines, expert bodies, administrative sequencing, the framing of choices as technical necessities rather than political decisions. And this is experienced not as coercion but as delay, deferral, and the gradual closing of options: through notices, legal ambiguity, and the repeated assurance that reform will follow. The talk of reforms becomes a way of managing uncertainty.

Following the 2024 uprising, reform was presented as both a moral obligation and a political promise. The near-dozen reform commissions and their recommendations, the consensus-building exercises, and finally the adoption of a national charter all pointed towards a reimagining of the state and its power structure. The language was ambitious, suggesting not merely a transition between governments but also a recalibration of how power would be exercised and contested.

But ambition alone does not transform institutions. What matters is where reform is placed in the political timeline and how it is sequenced, controlled, and insulated from political contestation. In Bangladesh’s case, many of the major reform measures proposed have been procedurally deferred, their fate and likely impact all but suspended in a future that may or may not arrive.

Since August 2024, the interim government has announced reforms across nearly every major institution of the state. Constitutional amendments were promised through the July National Charter. Electoral, judicial, anti-corruption, police, and public administration reforms were placed under review. Yet few of the reforms have crossed the threshold from proposal to enactment. The constitutional changes remain tied to future decisions, while many of the police and anti-corruption reforms remain at nascent stages. Meanwhile, electoral reform has focused largely on administration rather than political inclusion.

This pattern has a measurable outcome: reform largely as architecture, not action.

In fact, Iftekharuzzaman, executive director of Transparency International Bangladesh, remarked not long ago that the interim government effectively “surrendered” to bureaucratic power, with many reform targets largely missed. His critique was not that reform ideas were not substantive, but that resistance within the administrative machinery was never meaningfully confronted while pursuing them. Powerful interests embedded in the bureaucracy diluted or excluded key provisions, including those aimed at strengthening the Anti-Corruption Commission. Despite early expectations, proposals to meaningfully reinforce ACC’s independence, particularly its appointment and oversight mechanisms, have yet to materialise. Reform, when it arrived, lost its momentum; authority continued to circulate through familiar, entrenched channels.

This pattern—reform on paper, power elsewhere—is not incidental. It mirrors a familiar failure in change management: systems are redesigned on paper, processes are updated, but the underlying power structures and practices that sustain the old order are left undisturbed.

Nowhere is this perhaps more visible than in the design of the election itself. The interim government has delivered many of the administrative components expected of it. Timelines are in place. Preparations are underway. From a logistical standpoint, order prevails. Campaigning remains cautious, alliances tentative, and political speech unusually restrained for a moment meant to invite contestation.

But elections are not merely administrative events. They are reconstitutive moments, occasions when political space is reopened, legitimacy renegotiated, and participation meaningfully expanded. It is here that the reform promise has thinned most visibly. Take, for instance, the nomination of women candidates contesting in the election—a mere four percent.

In the reform project, legitimacy was meant to be restored by opening up political space; instead, procedures have closed off participation, constrained whose voices matter, and regulated how political competition is allowed. Simply prosecuting the past regime’s political actors or barring them from returning to politics, on its own, does not amount to political reform.

By treating the election as a procedural exercise rather than a reconstitutive moment, the interim government has narrowed reform precisely when political possibility was meant to expand. The result is an election that may function smoothly but yet struggle to carry the burden of expectations placed upon it.

Other areas of reform reveal similar tensions between promise and practice. As the Human Rights Watch noted in late July 2025, while some of the most visible abuses associated with the previous regime have eased, systemic reforms to protect civil liberties and human rights remain incomplete. Arbitrary detention, politically motivated prosecutions, and threats to journalists and vulnerable groups have persisted.

Economist Debapriya Bhattacharya has made a similar point recently, but from another angle, arguing that reforms remain superficial when they rely on institutional blueprints without strengthening the social forces that sustain democratic norms. His observation matters because it exposes a deeper contradiction at the heart of our reform project. Reform was expected to be inclusive, to draw legitimacy from public participation. Instead, it has largely remained insulated: managed at a distance from the society it claims to renew. In this disconnect, the purpose of reform risks defeating itself.

For many citizens, the question is no longer whether reform will be completed, but whether it will ever touch daily political life at all. If reform is to mean more than reassurance, the logic must shift.

Electoral credibility must be treated as a matter of political architecture, not merely administrative efficiency. Transitional moments require mechanisms that widen participation, protect contestation, and prevent dissent from being neutralised as a technical inconvenience. Reform cannot be deferred to post-election promises alone. Within their limited window of authority, interim governments must establish irreversible guardrails—on administrative neutrality, prosecutorial restraint, freedom of expression, and bureaucratic accountability—that shape the way forward.

Resistance to reform must also be confronted. Bureaucratic inertia does not dissolve on its own, and reform fails mostly when power is allowed to hide behind complexity. Institutional change must be socially anchored. Minority representation must be mandated when reforms are being planned. None of this requires dramatic confrontation. But it does require a willingness to treat reform not as a sequence to be managed, but as a political space to be protected.

True, the interim government has restored a degree of calm. The harder task now is to ensure that calm does not harden into closure.

Power does not always close doors outright. Sometimes it keeps people waiting at the threshold, through the routine of procedures, reviews, and assurances. The measure of reform will not be found in the calm of election day, but in whether politics is eventually allowed to cross that threshold, long after the moment of transition has passed.

Tasneem Tayeb is a columnist for The Daily Star.​
 

'People will pull you down if reforms abandoned'

Finance adviser warns next govt

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Salehuddin Ahmed warns next government on reforms

The next elected government must continue the ongoing reform agenda in the country’s interest, or risk facing public backlash, Finance Adviser Salehuddin Ahmed warned yesterday.

"We, as the interim government, tried to prioritise some reform initiatives. But many things cannot be completed within a short time – they require more time," he said at an event organised by the Policy Research Institute (PRI) of Bangladesh in Dhaka on the reform agenda for the next government.

Warning the next government of potential consequences if reforms are abandoned, the adviser said, "Unless you do this for the country, for the good of the country, people will come back to the streets and pull you down again. You will not be able to get away with deception the way you did before."

"Whatever we started, these are not one-offs. They must continue. You can certainly do more, but you have to choose and prioritise," he also said.

Ahmed urged political leaders not to dismiss reforms simply because they are associated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank.

"Not all of their prescriptions are bad. Some of them deserve serious attention," he said.

The government undertook reforms based on "the felt needs of the country" and what was "absolutely necessary," Ahmed said, rather than personal preference.

He said the interim government had to address multiple pressing issues, including high inflation, the current account deficit, and the energy crisis. The government also encountered problematic contracts.

“We were shocked to see some contracts – independent contracts, such as those of Adani and Rampal. Astonishing! We were told the High Court would review these contracts,” he said.

“They were extremely distorted, and we tried to revise them. We couldn't. It was too complicated,” he added.

Warning of a recurring pattern in Bangladesh's political system, Adviser Ahmed said, "When one government does something, the next one labels it as bad and starts building something else. But development is cumulative. If someone has done something good, build on it."

"Our suggestion is: please consolidate some of the things we have done and move forward faster. You cannot go as slowly as before," he said.

He also highlighted the lack of coordination across government as a major obstacle.

“It is extremely difficult to implement anything because of lack of coordination and resistance to reform,” he said, recalling his tenure.

“I tell you, we tried. We had no personal agenda, no political agenda. We tried. And definitely Bangladesh is not in bad shape,” said the adviser.

Also speaking at the event, KAS Murshid, former director general of Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, said they have been asking for reforms for a very long time.

“If you look at our economic history, significant reforms mostly happened only when the IMF was involved. Rarely have we independently decided that reforms were important and then implemented them.”

He attributed this to political-economic constraints, saying most governments cannot handle the backlash. “Only under external pressure do we say: we have to carry these reforms through. But we need to move beyond this mindset.”

He also pointed to a key gap in government operations.

“We have all these ministries, economists, and private-sector actors producing hundreds of recommendations. Who processes them? Does the government care? Yes, it does, but there is no mechanism to address them systematically,” he said.

He suggested that ministries, such as agriculture, should have dedicated teams to review, discuss, and channel these recommendations to the ministers.

“Does that happen? I don’t think so. These missing links in the chain are crucial gaps in implementation,” he added.

Meanwhile, delivering the keynote speech at the event, Ashikur Rahman, principal economist at PRI, said the incoming government, expected to take office within a week, should pursue bold fiscal and financial reforms.

He identified some key priorities for the next government, including establishing an effective Asset Management Company (AMC) to tackle non-performing loans, strengthening the banking sector resolution framework, clarifying the role of the Financial Institutions Division (FID), reforming the Bank Company Act to ensure good governance, and guaranteeing central bank’s independence with accountability to parliament.

On taxation, he called for a clear separation of policy and administration, the elimination of discretionary measures, and a move toward a fairer system, targeting a 50:50 split between direct and indirect taxes by 2030.

He also recommended shifting from trade-based to income and property taxes, broadening the tax base, and adopting a single commercial VAT rate.

Among others, Fahmida Khatun, executive director of the Centre for Policy Dialogue, Clinton Pobke, deputy high commissioner of Australia, spoke at the programme chaired by Zaidi Sattar, chairman of PRI.​