[🇧🇩] Should we discard our foreign policy and formulate a new one.

[Saif]

Date of Event: Feb 26, 2025 Source : https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/bangladesh-must-discard-its-archaic-foreign-policy-3833226

Bangladesh must discard its archaic foreign policy

VISUAL: SIFAT AFRIN SHAMS

The mass uprising of July-August 2024 has not only shaken Bangladesh's internal political structure but also brought a monumental shift in its foreign policy and diplomatic approach. One significant outcome has been the government's newfound ability to distinguish between its true allies and adversaries in the international arena. This signifies a break from past submissive policies, marking a new era in Bangladesh's diplomacy—one that prioritises national dignity, self-respect, and equal status on the global stage.

For decades, Bangladesh followed the policy of "friendship to all, malice to none," a principle inherited from its early years of independence. However, the events of 2024 have exposed the weaknesses of this antiquated dogma. A sovereign nation cannot afford to extend equal friendship to all while ignoring the power dynamics and self-interest that define global politics. Instead, Bangladesh must embrace a pragmatic and strategic foreign policy that acknowledges global realities, while serving its own interests.

The government's recent stance reflects a break from dependency-based diplomacy. Despite knowing that India will not support its current leadership, the government has declared its intent to rely on the people rather than foreign powers. This newfound assertiveness signals a shift towards an independent and self-respecting approach, aligning foreign policy with the aspirations of its citizens rather than external pressures.

However, breaking free from a redundant foreign policy is not a new phenomenon; many nations have recalibrated their diplomatic strategies. China embraced economic openness in 1978, Turkey diversified alliances in the 2000s, and France asserted sovereignty in 1966. Yet, Bangladesh's previous regime long adhered to outdated policies, resisting necessary shifts in global engagement.

It prioritised select alliances over national interest and maintained a one-dimensional approach, compromising sovereignty and economic potential. This failure to modernise left Bangladesh diplomatically weak and economically dependent, hindering progress.

However, the previous regime's foreign policy was not merely about "friendship to all"—it extended "extra friendship" to certain countries, often at the cost of Bangladesh's sovereignty. A clear example of this was seen in transit and transshipment agreements with India. Economists and pro-government analysts promoted the idea that Bangladesh would achieve economic prosperity similar to Singapore through these arrangements. However, rather than benefiting from a win-win scenario, Bangladesh found itself trapped in one-sided agreements where its interests were repeatedly undermined. This realisation, fuelled by public sentiments in the wake of the mass uprising, has led to a re-evaluation of diplomatic engagements. Moving forward, Bangladesh must engage only with those who respect its sovereignty, and distance or insulate itself from those who exploit its resources under the guise of cooperation.

A nation's foreign policy should be a reflection of its people's aspirations. For Bangladesh, these aspirations are deeply rooted in the Liberation War of 1971, which was fundamentally a struggle for self-respect and human dignity. The uprising of 2024 has reignited these values, demanding that Bangladesh's diplomatic strategies uphold the same principles that guided its fight for independence.

First, human dignity must be a core principle in foreign relations. Bangladeshis are a major labour force across the globe, and their rights and dignity abroad must be a priority in diplomatic negotiations. Without a strong foreign policy that protects Bangladeshi citizens internationally, the nation will fail to assert itself as a dignified global player.

Also, the legal protection, fair wages, and humane treatment of the growing Bangladeshi diaspora seeking opportunities abroad must be ensured, making them an integral part of foreign agreements. If Bangladesh does not demand equal respect on the global stage, its citizens will continue to face discrimination and exploitation abroad.

This shift marks a significant departure from the submissive policies of previous administrations which often prioritised economic concessions over national pride. The government's new approach emphasises equal status, ensuring that Bangladesh is not treated as a subordinate in global negotiations.

Another key transformation in Bangladesh's foreign policy is the pursuit of equal dignity among nations. This principle dictates that Bangladesh, regardless of its economic or geopolitical stature, must be treated as an equal partner in international relations.

The United Nations Charter guarantees equal dignity to all nations, including Bangladesh, ensuring that no country, regardless of its size or economic power, is treated as inferior in international relations. Article 1(2) affirms the right of all peoples to self-determination and equal participation in global affairs, reinforcing that Bangladesh has the same standing as any other nation.

Similarly, Article 2(1) upholds the sovereign equality of all UN member states, meaning Bangladesh has the right to be treated as an equal partner in diplomacy, trade, and negotiations.

The UN Charter gives Bangladesh the legal and moral foundation to demand equal treatment, ensuring that it engages with the world on its own terms. This shift is not an act of defiance but a rightful alignment with international law, allowing Bangladesh to emerge as a respected and independent voice in global affairs.

Therefore, Bangladesh must reject policies that position it as a dependent state. Just as countries like Belarus, Chile, Mexico, and Pakistan assert their sovereignty, Bangladesh must demand the same level of respect. This shift in policy requires a strong leadership stance, one that refuses to bow to international coercion and instead negotiates from a position of strength. For that, sustainable diplomatic strategy is needed which will ensure that Bangladesh remains resilient against external pressures while steadily strengthening its global influence.

Historically, Bangladesh has been positioned as a "soft state," easily manipulated by regional and global powers. The uprising of 2024 has fuelled a new confidence, pushing the nation to adopt a bargaining stance rather than a submissive one. By shifting from reactive diplomacy to proactive engagement, Bangladesh can strengthen its democracy and economic standing without compromising its values.

The July-August uprising has redefined Bangladesh's approach to governance and diplomacy. The movement has not only exposed internal injustices but also highlighted the flaws of Bangladesh's submissive foreign policy. As the country moves forward, the following principles must guide its diplomatic path: i) self-respect over subordination; ii) human dignity beyond borders; iii) equal status among nations; iv) sovereignty above external influence; and v) a sustainable, assertive approach to foreign policy.

The era of passive foreign policy is over—a new Bangladesh is emerging, and it refuses to be dictated by external forces and instead asserts itself as an equal and sovereign player on the global stage.

Alauddin Mohammad is the secretary of international relations and diplomacy at the Jatiya Nagorik Committee.​

 

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What should Bangladesh’s foreign policy be in the changing world order?

Cool-headed rationality standing with feet on the bedrock of pragmatic realism.

images.thedailystar.net

What should Bangladesh’s foreign policy be in the changing world order?

Bangladesh is like a walnut, caught in the jaws of two nutcrackers in today’s world. PHOTO: COLLECTED

These days, I witness a lot of societal fulminations on the directions and goals of our foreign policy. Having been an active practitioner for almost four decades and a continuing interested observer for well over a decade, I am not a little disturbed at some of the things I hear. Perhaps I hear incorrectly, but what I worry about more is that the external actors with whom we maintain interstate relations may also be hearing, and misinterpreting, as incorrectly as I.

A few years ago, I wrote in The Daily Star, "A fundamental dictum in foreign policy formulation and analysis is unquestionably this: each country, as a sovereign, independent nation-state, contextualises its every move or action within the overall rubric of preservation and advancement of its own national interest. Therefore, each party, in any bilateral relationship, must acknowledge and be fully conscious of these mutual constraints, and also respect 'where' the other party is coming 'from.' It takes two to tango, as they say, and if each dancer in performing this very difficult and complex choreography is not in tune, innately, with the partner, a misstep or miscue would end in serious accident or injury to one or both."

Writing in the annual Journal of the Bangladesh Foreign Service Academy last year, I asserted that our foreign policy configuration must be "buttressed by a hard-nosed pragmatism and understanding that while one may choose one's friends, one cannot choose one's neighbourhood; and that while friendship may exist between peoples and persons (which even then are vulnerable to change), 'friendship' between states is primarily driven by the national demands of each state, rendering such friendship very protean in nature." In this context, friendship between states may best be described as being the state of relatively happy equilibrium between two or more states that have managed to arrive at a mutually acceptable alignment or coexistence of their national interests that serves everyone in perceptibly equitable measure.

When formulating the parameters of foreign relations with other states, whether far or near, there are several essential factors that need to be considered.

First, geography matters. It encompasses geolocation, geomorphology, and geopolitics.

Second, size matters. It alludes to the physical size in terms of land (and water) areas in possession. It also, importantly, alludes to the size of population, combined military capacities, economy including GDP and GDP per capita, and the state of technological advancement.

Third, perception matters. This not only encompasses how the governments of interacting states perceive each other, but also how the domestic population of each state views its governments or governments of other states, near or far from it.

All of the above are variables with their own subsets. They comprise a complex mix that can be volatile and subject to spontaneous combustion by the slightest spark. We can address these either with viscerally charged, emotionally soaked jingoism, or cool-headed rationality standing with feet on the bedrock of pragmatic realism.

The world we know has witnessed two World Wars in the last century. Each ended with global political geography being changed, ending the status quo ante. Former empires crumbled; new states were formed while some were broken apart. Ironically, the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I generated the drivers for World War II. The Wilsonian idealism that eluded the closure of World War I was brought out of the woodworks after World War II, putting in place institutions and building blocks of what was touted by the Allied victors as the "New World Order." The basic unit comprising this new order was the state, which was to be looked upon by all others as being equal in the "comity of nations," their borders hard, impermeable and inviolable, their sovereignty supreme, not brooking any interference in their internal affairs.

The superpowers that emerged set up the new international financial institutions and rules through putting in place the Bretton Woods system. They set up global institutions like the United Nations and its General Assembly and numerous organs like the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or much later the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Human Rights Commission, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and so on.

While the UN was set up with the loftily stated ideal of preventing any repetition of the scourge of war, a goal that was to be ensured by the UN Security Council, the most powerful entities of this so-called New World Order have been the instigators or supporters of most wars or conflicts after 1945. While the most powerful are supposed to safeguard a rules-based world order, the last decade has shown that the principles of inviolability of borders, state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the state are flouted, egregiously, by the most powerful of states.

We appear to be already in the early throes of a World War III, with principles of state "sovereignty" and state borders being "inviolable" being rendered figments of the imagination. The mighty can impose their wills on anyone they please, and change borders and lives of settled peoples at their will. The UN, the ICJ, The ICC, and the WTO have all proven to be made of clay. Political geography in former Eastern Europe and Middle East are already being reconfigured from their hitherto accepted positions since 1945. The only overriding principle of inter-state relations today appears to be increasingly the axiom "Might is right." All prior agreements, supposedly inviolable, can be revoked at will. All smaller, less powerful states, anywhere or everywhere, have never been more vulnerable and fragile than they are today.

In such a situation, what should Bangladesh do in what is obviously a far more hostile world today than what existed at the time of its birth, almost five and a half decades ago?

At a recent gathering at the Foreign Service Academy, our foreign affairs adviser asserted that Bangladesh seeks friendship with all countries and does not want to take side with any one country or power against any other. He was absolutely right.

Bangladesh must look at the map of Asia and its own geomorphological location in that. It is almost entirely surrounded by India, which controls all rivers as upper riparian. It is "spitting distance" away from China, the Asian giant aspiring to superpower status and already the second largest economy in the world. By virtue of its propulsion of being at the epicentre of our oceanic planet, with the Bay of Bengal where it is centrally located bridging the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean, Bangladesh finds itself in the strategic crosshairs of competing (or contesting) global powers, located near or far. Its socioeconomic vulnerabilities and the aspirations of its largely youthful population, demanding better lives and opportunities for themselves, necessitate that we must stay out of geopolitical conflicts that will derail our development efforts. Internal internecine factional strife will be self-defeating, even self-destructing.

We must endeavour to develop friendly, mutually beneficial cooperation with all nations, whether they be our immediate neighbours or near neighbours, whether to our east in Southeast and East Asia, or to our west in South, Southwest and Central Asia, without exception.

We must at the same time strive to have peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with all powers, in Asia, Africa, Europe or Americas, regardless of whether those powers behave with each other in terms of friendship or animosity. Ours must be a policy not of isolation with anyone, nor seeking confrontation with anyone, but living in peace with all and promoting peace among all.

Since the earliest times, at least from Fourth Century CE, our location in the Bay of Bengal propelled us to become the richest region, or Mughal suba (province), Colonial British India's presidency. That enabled all the countries of the Bay of Bengal region to comprise a living, thriving, prosperous integrated economic region that invited global covet and respect. World War II fragmented that hitherto regional integration, just as it fragmented our own subcontinent.

We must now collaboratively strive to work with our Bay of Bengal neighbours to ensure that our Bay, from which we derive our identity and historical legacy, remains a zone of peace, neutrality, prosperity and friendship, serving once again as it did in the earlier times as the highway for peaceful interlocution between states and peoples, inclusively, whether in the Eastern or Western Hemisphere. We should strive to be a catalyst for fashioning a fraternity for the Bay of Bengal Economic Cooperation.

Bangladesh is like a walnut, caught in the jaws of two nutcrackers in today's world. One nutcracker is regional, comprising the competing jaws that are India and China. The other nutcracker is global, its jaws comprising the US-led Indo-Pacific narrative facing off the China-led BRI. We must be with both, without being against either. The shell of the walnut gains its strength and firmness from within, and so must we, through developing internal resilience.

Within South Asia, we must champion better relations and cooperation with all countries, from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, even if some of them have indifferent or even hostile relations with each other. Their fights should not be our fights, but our peace and friendship must also be theirs to emulate. Our policy must strive to tread the razor-edge path of "strategic autonomy"that walks with "active neutrality."

Tariq Karim, a former ambassador of Bangladesh, is currently president of the Bay of Bengal Institute of the Cosmos Foundation, and adviser to the Centre for Bay of Bengal Studies at Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB).​

 

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Bangladesh’s foreign policy mistakes

New Age, a Dhaka-based leading English language daily newspaper, is a major source of news of Bangladesh and international affairs

www.newagebd.net

Bangladesh’s foreign policy mistakes
Md Himel Rahman 02 March, 2025, 00:00

JOHN Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States, used to say, ‘domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us.’ This statement signifies the importance of foreign policy of a nation. Indeed, the possession of foreign policy autonomy is a cardinal attribute of sovereignty – the most important element of a state. However, while every state strives to attain its national interests through its foreign policy, a number of factors, including miscalculations, inefficiency, lack of clear objectives and passivity, can lead states into making mistakes in foreign policy.

Mistakes in foreign policy often harm the national interests of states, resulting in political-diplomatic crises, economic-financial losses, or military-strategic reversals. In some cases, foreign policy mistakes can prove deadly for states. For instance, the decision of Napoleon to invade Spain and Russia ruined the French empire; the decision of Kaiser Wilhelm II to concurrently wage wars on Russia and France ultimately destroyed the Second Reich; the decision of the National Socialists to invade the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wrecked the Third Reich; and the decision of the Soviet Politburo to engage in a Cold War against both the Western World and China ultimately shattered the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Since its emergence as an independent state in 1971, Bangladesh has so far succeeded in avoiding foreign policy mistakes of this magnitude. Still, several significant mistakes in Bangladesh’s foreign policy can be identified. These mistakes can be divided along two lines — theoretical and practical case-based.

Theoretical mistakes

FIRST, since the independence of Bangladesh, the theoretical foundation of its foreign policy is primarily based on Article 25 of the constitution and the two maxims ‘friendship to all, malice towards none’ and ‘non-alignment.’ In reality, Bangladesh lacks any long-term foreign policy and instead, its foreign policy is conducted on day-to-day basis. Thus, Bangladesh has so far failed to develop a long-term, well-articulated and coherent foreign policy.

Second, apart from the concise Indo-Pacific outlook, Bangladesh has not yet managed to produce any strategy paper related to its foreign and security policy. Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific outlook is not as comprehensive and focused as the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and it does not have a foreign policy concept, national security strategy, military doctrine, or naval doctrine.

Third, the political actors in Bangladesh have so far failed to reach a national consensus over foreign policy, because their views of what constitutes Bangladesh’s ‘true’ interests differ widely. Consequently, the change of government in Bangladesh often results in substantial changes in its foreign policy, resulting in an incoherent and short-sighted foreign policy.

Finally, there is a strong tendency to prioritise regime interests over national interests among Bangladeshi policymakers. Accordingly, governments in Bangladesh sometimes pursue foreign policies to further their narrower party-political objectives at the expense of wider national interests.

Hence, the absence of a well-defined foreign policy, the failure to develop national strategy papers related to foreign policy, the lack of a national consensus and the prioritisation of regime interests over national interests have been major mistakes of Bangladesh’s foreign policy.

Case-based mistakes

SINCE its independence, Bangladesh has made several mistakes in making foreign policy decisions on specific issues, and accordingly, it had to face severe consequences.

The decision to export jute and jute products to Cuba in 1974 proved to be a major political disaster for the country. Since Cuba was a communist state closely aligned with the USSR and was subject to a US economic blockade, the US retaliated by suspending food aid to Bangladesh. This, coupled with a devastating flood, contributed to a deadly famine in Bangladesh in 1974, which killed more than a million people. Ultimately, Bangladesh had to abandon its trade with Cuba to facilitate the resumption of US food aid. However, the famine played a significant role in fostering dissatisfaction among the people against the government and is considered to be a major contributing factor in the fall of the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s administration in August 1975.

Then comes the failure to repatriate stranded Pakistanis to Pakistan. During the late 1970s and 1980s, and again in the early 2000s, Bangladesh shared relatively cordial ties with Pakistan, yet Dhaka failed to exert significant political-diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to repatriate the stranded Pakistanis. Consequently, the stranded Pakistanis, often unintegrated into the mainstream society and involved in criminal activities.

Bangladesh’s inability to capitalise on the Afghan war (1979–1989) proved to be a missed opportunity. During the Afghan war, Pakistan acted as a frontline state for the US and received billions of dollars and massive shipments of advanced weaponry in return. During the 1980s, Bangladesh strongly opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and generally pursued a pro-US foreign policy. Initially, the US had accorded $80 million to Bangladesh in the context of the Afghan war, but the Ershad administration failed to capitalise on the crisis by gaining more economic and military aid from the western powers.

Furthermore, during this period, the government chose to turn a blind eye to the movement of volunteers from Bangladesh to Afghanistan. Later, these Afghan war veterans, known as the Mujahids, created violent extremist groups, such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh, which emerged as a serious national security threat to Bangladesh.

Failure to formulate a well-defined and long-term policy towards Myanmar in general and the Rakhine state/Arakan in particular has been a major foreign policy mistake. Bangladesh faced repeated influxes of Rohingya refugees from Arakan, including in 1978, 1991–1997 and 2017–2018, but has not developed a sustainable strategy to deal with the Rohingya crisis. Also, owing to the historical ties between Bengal and Arakan, Bangladesh had an opportunity to develop some sort of ‘special relationship’ with the Arakanese, including both the Rakhines and the Rohingyas, but no concrete step has ever been undertaken by Dhaka in this direction.

Policy towards India, irrespective of the government in power in Dhaka, has not always succeeded in protecting the state’s national interests. In dealing with India, the governments led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jatiya Party have traditionally chosen balancing, while the governments led by the Bangladesh Awami League have usually opted for bandwagoning. Neither approach has achieved substantial success, as demonstrated by the regular killings of Bangladeshi civilians by the Indian Border Security Force, the persistent Indian refusal to share the waters of trans-boundary rivers, the continued Indian occupation of the South Talpatti Island and the Muhurir Char, the ongoing dispute about the continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal, and the growing anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric inside India. Meanwhile, Bangladesh has made substantial unilateral concessions to India, including the crackdown on northeastern Indian insurgents inside its territory and the provision of transit and transshipment facilities, but has received nothing of note in return. The failure to develop a robust foreign policy vis-à-vis India and to utilise all instruments at its disposal, including international legal measures, has been a major mistake for Dhaka.

For the most part, Bangladesh’s policy vis-à-vis the Russian-Ukrainian war has been a correct one. However, Dhaka missed an important opportunity. Following the outbreak of the Russian–Ukrainian war, a number of states, including China, India, Brazil, Turkey and Pakistan, purchased large amount of crude oil from Russia at cheap prices, taking advantage of the western sanctions on Russia. Through this, they not only ensured their energy security but also earned hard currency by re-exporting some of the imported Russian crude oil to western states. However, Bangladesh failed to utilise the opportunity owing to the fear of western reactions and the reported inability of Bangladeshi oil refineries to refine Russian crude oil.

Taking into account the existing conditions in South Asia and the near-inoperativeness of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the region is unlikely to witness regional integration in the foreseeable future. Since Bangladesh is located at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, Dhaka has an option to pursue a ‘look east’ policy with the view to closer integration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. By doing so, Bangladesh can attempt to reduce its overdependence on India. However, Bangladesh has not accorded priority to its partnership with the ASEAN, and consequently, no notable progress has been made in this regard.

Bangladesh has been one of the foremost contributors of personnel to the United Nations peace operations in Africa. Yet, Bangladesh’s political, economic and security ties with sub-Saharan African states remain minimal and Dhaka has so far undertaken few initiatives to expand its diplomatic, economic and security footprints on the Sub-Saharan Africa. As the successes of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs in South Sudan indicate, Africa presents large-scale opportunities for the country. Dhaka has made a mistake in not identifying and utilizing these opportunities properly.

Finally, Bangladesh’s reactive policy towards its neighbourhood has been a serious weakness in its foreign policy. Bangladesh has two neighbours — India and Myanmar and the wider neighbourhood includes Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and China. However, Bangladesh often lacks in-depth knowledge about its neighbours. In particular, Bangladesh lacks sufficient knowledge about the conditions in West Bengal, Northeast India, Rakhine state and Chin state, which share borders with Bangladesh. Consequently, Bangladesh is often confronted with foreign policy shocks from its immediate neighbourhood. For instance, the Arakan Army has been operating in the immediate vicinity of Bangladesh for more than a decade. Yet when the Arakan Army’s conquest of Maungdaw resulted in a new influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh, it came as a shock to many Bangladeshis.

Since its independence, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has been based on weak theoretical foundations and its failure to articulate robust and interest-driven foreign policy in dealing with the great powers as well as neighbouring states, coupled with its propensity to miss or ignore new opportunities, have harmed the country’s national interests to a considerable degree. Accordingly, Bangladesh should formulate well-articulated, comprehensive and pragmatic foreign policy documents, stop conflating regime interests with national interests and be more calculative, proactive and interest-driven in implementing its foreign policy decisions.

Md Himel Rahman is a Dhaka-based freelance analyst on international and strategic affairs.​