[🇧🇩] The U.S.A.---A Strategic Partner of Bangladesh

Saif · Mar 14, 2024

‘Vendetta against Yunus will impact US-BD partnership’

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‘Vendetta against Yunus will impact US-BD partnership’

15 Mar 2024, 12:00 am0

Staff Reporter :

US Senator Dick Durbin, a prominent figure in the US Senate, expressed concerns about the potential negative impact on the United States-Bangladesh partnership due to the ongoing vendetta against Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus. Senator Durbin took to his official Twitter handle after a discussion with Bangladesh Ambassador to the US, Mohammad Imran, to share his views.

“The US values its relationship with Bangladesh, and I appreciate its help to Rohingya refugees. But a failure to end the vendetta against Muhammad Yunus will negatively impact that partnership,” he stated in his tweet.

During the meeting, Senator Durbin directly addressed the government of Bangladesh, urging them to cease the harassment targeting the Nobel Laureate. “In my meeting with Ambassador Imran, I called for an end to the harassment of Prof. Yunus,” he emphasised.

Earlier in January twelve US Senators including Dick Durbin in a letter urged Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to halt a continuous harassment of Dr Yunus.

In the letter, they expressed concern about the misuse of law and judicial system against critics of the government in Bangladesh. The letter was published on Senator Dick Durbin’s website.

Earlier, just after the 12th National Parliamentary Election in Bangladesh, ‘even though several million people participated peacefully, the election and the pre-election process were marred by violence and intimidation from opposition parties,’ said the four American senators, one of whom was Dick Durbin.

The trial of Dr Yunus has been highly critical by the west including the United Nations.

The UN has directly said that they have been closely monitoring the case of Dr Yunus, a dear friend of the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the United States has also been talking about the Yunus issue and urged the government not to harass the economist.

Even on March 11, US State Department Spokesperson Mathew Miller said that the US government has expressed concerns surrounding the cases against Dr Yunus.

“The U.S. Government’s concerns surrounding the cases against Muhammad Yunus, including that they could represent a potential misuse of Bangladesh’s laws to harass and intimidate Dr Yunus,” he said.

Even on several occasions the United Nations said that the UN is closely following the case of Dr Yunus, who is a dear friend of the UN throughout his career.

Saif · Mar 15, 2024

What’s next for US policy in Bangladesh?

South Asia Institute Director Michael Kugelman offers his insights

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What’s next for US policy in Bangladesh?

South Asia Institute Director Michael Kugelman offers his insights

VISUAL: TEENI AND TUNI

When the US State Department declared, on January 8, that Bangladesh's elections the day before "were not free or fair," it was indirectly acknowledging a major policy setback.

For many months, the Biden administration used Bangladesh as a test case for its values-based foreign policy. It advocated tirelessly for greater respect for human rights, for democratic principles, and especially for free and fair elections. It deployed various tactics—relentless public messaging, meetings with political party leaders, written appeals for different political parties to work out differences, and sanctions and visa restrictions.

It's unclear why the administration chose to pursue its democracy agenda so robustly in Bangladesh (and it should be noted that this agenda was also pursued, albeit less emphatically, during the Trump administration). One reason may have been a strong expectation of success: unlike some other countries where the US has sought to promote democracy, Bangladesh does have a legacy of democratic institutions and achievements—meaning it shouldn't be as heavy a lift to advocate for something with a precedent. US officials have also been heartened by the reductions in RAB abuses since Washington sanctioned it in 2021.

But the State Department's assessment concedes its policy fell short. So why, despite all its efforts, was the election—in Washington's own view—marred by violence, crackdowns on the opposition, and irregularities?

Some would point to the limits of US leverage in foreign policy. Others would argue that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will never respond to pressure from a country against whom she has long harboured grudges, or that she wouldn't want to create the conditions for a possible BNP return to power, because of the retributive policies against her and other AL leaders that would surely follow. Still others would contend the US didn't go far enough, that it didn't sufficiently raise the costs for Dhaka—such as by imposing trade sanctions, which would have hit Bangladesh hard given its current economic struggles and deep dependence on the US as an export market.

The question now is what next for US policy? Will Washington deploy harsher tactics that it believes may better incentivise Bangladesh's government and broader political class to slam the brakes on a slide toward authoritarianism? Or will the US dial it down, and take a softer approach to democracy promotion? Alternately, will it jettison its values-based approach altogether and replace it with an interests-based lens? Or will it try for a middle ground that balances both approaches?

Washington's next moves will be shaped by two key considerations: Its assessment of the degree to which the AL hindered free and fair elections, and its future goals for its relationship with Bangladesh.

The administration will examine the extent of AL-perpetrated irregularities and election-related violence. How it evaluates the BNP boycott will also be critical. Will Washington put more weight on the boycott itself (which would emphasise the BNP's stubborn refusal to participate in an election not overseen by a neutral government), or on the broader factors that drove the boycott (especially the non-level playing field generated by the AL's relentless crackdowns on the BNP)? If more weight is given to the latter, there are higher chances of muscular US policy responses. The State Department has laid out additional signposts, calling on Dhaka "to credibly investigate reports of violence and hold perpetrators accountable. We also urge all political parties to reject violence." Washington will be watching on these fronts, too.

However, even if the administration renders the harshest possible judgement on AL complicity in an unfree and unfair election, that doesn't guarantee harsh US responses. And this gets to the matter of Washington's objectives for the broader US-Bangladesh relationship.

Amid all the attention on bilateral tensions over democracy and elections, it's easy to forget that US-Bangladesh relations have actually strengthened considerably in recent years. The US is the top destination for Bangladesh exports, and the biggest source of FDI in Bangladesh. In 2020, the two sides announced a new vision for boosting economic cooperation in areas ranging from tech collaborations and air travel to blue economy initiatives and energy security.

Commercial cooperation has been further energised by the launching of the US-Bangladesh Business Council, part of the US Chamber of Commerce, in 2021.

Additionally, over the last decade or so, US officials have started to invest in Bangladesh with more strategic significance. The origins of this shift may lie in the scholarship of influential American foreign policy analysts, most prominent among them Robert Kaplan, which highlights the importance of the Indian Ocean Region for US interests. In recent years, going back to the Trump era, Bangladesh has been emphasised in multiple Indo-Pacific strategy documents published by the Pentagon and State Department, with emphasis on potential for cooperation on counterterrorism, counter piracy, counternarcotics, and maritime issues.

Intensifying great power competition has made Bangladesh's strategic significance come into even sharper relief in Washington. Consider China's deepening influence in the Indian Ocean Region: Its military base in Djibouti, its ships' presence from the Bay of Bengal to the Andaman Sea, and of course its deepening ties with Dhaka and backing for Bangladesh's first submarine base. Meanwhile, witness Russia's intensifying engagement with Dhaka. Unsurprisingly, US officials now call Bangladesh a strategic partner.

Consequently, US-Bangladesh relations have been busy in recent years: High-level diplomatic engagements, military exercises, business leader delegation visits, and extensive US humanitarian assistance—from support for Rohingya refugees to pandemic assistance. Washington is the top supplier of humanitarian aid for the Rohingya crisis, and it has provided more COVID-19 vaccines to Bangladesh than to any other country.

Given this expanding partnership, Washington will want to avoid leaning too heavily on the tensions-prone values-based aspect of bilateral ties—because that risks damaging the relationship. It will likely look to balance the values- and interests-based dimensions of its relations with Dhaka.

But that will be a delicate balance.

Washington needs diplomatic space with Dhaka to try to push back against Chinese and Russian influence in Bangladesh. But that space shrinks if Bangladesh is pushed into a corner with tough trade sanctions. Previous punitive US tactics—visa restrictions, RAB sanctions, suspensions of GSP benefits—weren't as harmful to bilateral ties because those measures weren't as damaging for Bangladesh on the whole.

On the other hand, Bangladesh's democratic backsliding constrains efforts to expand cooperation. Dhaka's crackdowns on Internet freedom may deter prospective US tech investors. Bangladesh's poor labour rights record precludes the International Development Finance Corporation—Washington's main investment arm in the Indo-Pacific—from sponsoring infrastructure projects. And if Bangladesh's security forces ramp up abuses, America's Leahy law—which bans US assistance to foreign militaries implicated in serious human rights violations—could kick in, jeopardising deeper military cooperation.

In the coming weeks, expect a reoriented US focus away from elections and more toward promoting rights and democracy in Bangladesh more broadly—though more visa restrictions are possible for those that hindered free and fair polls. Meanwhile, the administration, impelled by commercial and strategic interests, will continue to push for deeper partnership.

Bangladesh will remain a test case for Washington's values-based foreign policy. But so long as it keeps bumping up against the relationship's strategic imperatives, the experiment could grow increasingly untenable in a world order where realpolitik so often prevails.

Michael Kugelman is director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.

Saif · Mar 15, 2024

The Great Game will continue

The absence of democratic behaviour is no longer hidden under the carpet.

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The Great Game will continue

The pressing questions after the January 7 election are how the result and the electoral process will be considered by the international community and what impact it will have, if any, on the relationship with Bangladesh's external partners, especially the West. These questions have become important because of the series of events leading up to polling day and the low voter turnout.

The series of events since October 28 sent out the message that the ruling party had planned the election to ensure a victory. The absence of democratic behaviour is no longer hidden under the carpet. The persecution of leaders and activists of the opposition parties, especially the BNP, drew international attention and criticism. It was matched with other kinds of intrigue and machinations, such as fielding "dummy" candidates and using state apparatuses to ensure victory of the preferred candidates.

It was highlighted before the polling day that the goal of the incumbent Awami League was to draw a large number of voters to the polling stations. The party hoped that its supporters and supporters of the "independent" candidates would make up more than 50 percent of the voters. But January 7 showed how voters shied away from the polling booths. Then came events casting serious doubts about the turnout data. The Election Commission (EC) said around midday that the turnout was 18.5 percent, and around 3pm it was around 26 percent. But an hour later, as the polls closed, the official estimate was claimed to be 40 percent. That, too, was announced in a bizarre way. Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Kazi Habibul Awal, in a press briefing, said the turnout was about 28 percent, only to retract at the prodding of his colleagues and offered a new, higher number. However these numbers are presented in the future, their veracity will continue to dog the EC. Considering that the election was essentially uncontested, there was never any doubt about the victory of Sheikh Hasina and the AL, but the entire process has added further questions to her victory and the strength of her mandate.

As for the reactions of the international community, there was the predictable part—those who had already supported the incumbent have already sent congratulatory messages. These are India, China and Russia, along with a few other nations. The "unknown unknown" part of the equation was the reactions of Western nations. These countries insisted on a free, fair and inclusive election, but have remained remarkably silent since October 28. The US reaction, expectedly, stated that the January 7 election was not free or fair. In a similar fashion, the UK said that the standards of credible and fair competitions were not consistently met during the 12th parliamentary election. The West will continue to consider not only the stray incidents of ballot stuffing and violence on January 7, but also how the entire process unfolded contrary to its efforts.

The US faces a dilemma: whether to reassess its relationship with Bangladesh and act robustly, or sidestep for a foreseeable picture. A robust action will demonstrate that it is returning to its divergence with India. Will Western countries go about a business-as-usual engagement with the "new" government? Notwithstanding the political aspect of it—an abandonment of its policy of democracy and human rights promotion—there is an institutional aspect to it too. For a long time, there have been security-related cooperation between the two countries, but leading to the election, evidently some of these institutions' integrity have been eroded as these have been blatantly used as political tools. If the US and the West adopt direct or indirect measures, there will be serious adverse impacts on Bangladesh's economy.

The predictable reactions of the trio—India, China and Russia—do not mean that the relationship between Bangladesh and these countries will continue as before. A contest between these nations, especially between China and India, will intensify to expand their sphere of influence. That will not be a matter of the distant future, but within a short period of time. Due to the ongoing economic crisis, Bangladesh will need to rely more on external support. This will bring Bangladesh and China closer, but how much closeness is acceptable for India is the question for the coming days. As such, whether the Western countries "act" or not, the country will continue to be the theatre of the Great Game.

Ali Riaz is distinguished professor of political science at Illinois State University in the US.

Saif · Mar 16, 2024

Bangladesh a truly important strategic partner

US Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Afreen Akhter, has said the US sees Bangladesh as a "truly important strategic partner" and looks forward to working over the next 50 years for a stronger relationship.

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Bangladesh a truly important strategic partner

Says US Deputy Assistant Secretary Afreen Akhter

US Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Afreen Akhter, has said the US sees Bangladesh as a "truly important strategic partner" and looks forward to working over the next 50 years for a stronger relationship.

She said in the last 50 years Bangladesh-US relations have seen incredible progress between the peoples, economies and governments.

The people-to-people ties between the two countries are very deep, she said.

Praising Bangladesh's progress in different sectors, Akhter said Bangladesh's economy has expanded from largely agriculture society to economic powerhouse over the just few decades.

This is a story to really be proud of that Bangladesh has lifted millions of people out of poverty and the country will achieve the middle-income status within generations, which is truly remarkable, she said while speaking at a Victory Day function in Washington.

Beyond the economic cooperation, Afreen mentioned the close partnership between the two countries in providing Covid-19 vaccines and addressing climate change issue. She thanked the Bangladesh government for hosting some 1.1 million Rohingya from Myanmar.

The Bangladesh Embassy in Washington DC celebrated the 52nd Victory Day of Bangladesh, remembering the valiant freedom fighters who fought and made the supreme sacrifice for the cause of long-aspired independence.

To commemorate the day, the embassy arranged a daylong programme.

The day's first part of the programme began with the hoisting of the national flag ceremonially on the chancery premises in the morning by Bangladesh Ambassador to the US Muhammad Imran.

Officials and employees of the embassy were present at that time.

Later, the ambassador along with officials and employees of the embassy placed a wreath at the bust of Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Bangabandhu Corner of the embassy.