[🇧🇩] Banking Industry in Bangladesh

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[🇧🇩] Banking Industry in Bangladesh
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G Bangladesh Defense

How Islamic are Islamic banks?


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Although around one-fourth of the country's banking activities are now considered Shariah-based, some quarters have already raised a few troubling questions. The main questions they ask is: to what extent do Islamic banks follow Shariah principles (Islamic law)? Several Islamic scholars have also expressed reservations about the current state of Islamic banking. Some believe most Islamic banks are not yet fully Shariah-compliant. A few even have harsher assessment; none of the Islamic banks is at all Islamic.

Currently, 10 full-fledged Islamic banks operate in the country, and 17 conventional banks have 53 Islamic bank branches. Another 23 conventional banks have 23 Islamic banking windows. Thus, among 63 scheduled banks, 50 have Islamic banking operations, either fully or partially. Bangladesh Bank statistics also showed that at the end of the last fiscal year (FY26), the Islamic banking sector accounted for 22.53 per cent of the total banking industry's deposits and 29.19 per cent of the industry's total advances or investments.

Besides Islamic banks, Islamic financing activities by Non-Bank Financial Companies (NBFCs) are rising modestly. Currently, 35 NBFCs operate, of which two are full-fledged Islamic. In addition, one conventional NBFC provides Islamic financial services through seven Islamic branches, while seven conventional NBFCs provide Islamic financial services through 69 Islamic windows. A bank or NBFC with an Islamic window provides limited Islamic financial services through a dedicated desk or counter at a branch. A bank or NBFC with an Islamic branch indicates that the dedicated branch provides Shariah-compliant services.

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the inter-governmental platform of the Muslim majority countries, defined the Islamic bank as "a financial institution whose status, rules and procedures expressly state its commitment to the principle of Islamic Shariah and to the banning of the receipt and payment of interest on any of its operations." The core guiding principles that govern Islamic banking are 'mutual risk and profit sharing' between parties, the 'assurance of fairness for all ', and that 'transactions are based on an underlying business activity or asset.' Because Islamic law strictly prohibits interest (riba), gambling (maisir), and speculative trading (gharar), the Islamic banking and financing framework does not allow any commercial activity linked to interest or gambling. Instead, it encourages activities that cultivate entrepreneurship, trade and commerce and bring social development or benefit.

Thus, the main challenge for an Islamic bank or financial company is to ensure that it has no exposure to interest-based activities, the core driver of conventional banking worldwide. Riba is the Arabic term for interest charged on loans and covers all interest, not just excessive interest (usury). Islamic law forbids a Muslim from paying and accepting interest at a predetermined rate. So, when conventional banks offer interest on deposits and charge interest on loans, it breaches Islamic Shariah. Islamic banks offer Shariah-compliant alternatives by providing profit-and-loss sharing tools.

Many Muslims in Bangladesh do not want to receive interest on their deposits. So, they prefer Islamic banks that offer no predetermined profit. In practice, Islamic banks set a provisional profit rate, subject to revision and adjustment at year-end. Some argue that the pre-determined profit is also interest in disguise, since there is no way to escape it. Why would depositors park their money if they get nothing in return? And without collecting deposits, how will an Islamic bank finance or invest in industries and commercial activities? Banking governance guide

Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks do not disburse loans or advances; instead, they finance business and trade through investment. This is because traditional banks charge and earn interest on loans or advances without being directly involved in commercial activities. For Islamic banks, this means becoming business partners or investors to earn profits and share them with the partners. To facilitate investment, Islamic banks and financial companies have developed and practised several modes. These are: partnership, ownership-sharing, sale-based, lease-based, and loan-based investments. Under partnership, one partner (the bank) invests in the business, and the other partner (the client) manages it. Finally, they both share the business profits in a predetermined ratio. In case of losses, the bank bears them alone. This kind of partnership is known as Mudarabah. Another type of partnership is Musharaka, where both the bank and the client contribute capital, and the client also provides entrepreneurial skills through labour and management. Profits are shared according to agreed ratios, and losses are borne in proportion to capital contributions. These two types of investments are considered more Shariah-compliant than others.

Other options include Ijara (lease financing), hire purchase, and Qard-e-Hasan (interest-free lending). In leasing or hire purchase, an Islamic bank purchases a specific asset and lets the client use it in exchange for rent for a set period. Once the rent is paid off, the client acquires the asset.

Finally, Bai-Salam is one of the most famous modes of Islamic financing, and Bai-Muajjal is another. The first is a contract in which the buyer pays in advance for goods to be delivered later. The latter is a credit sale. There is also Bai-Murabaha, a cost-plus sale in which the seller discloses the cost of a product and sells it to the buyer by adding an agreed profit margin.

In Bangladesh, Bai-Murabaha and Bai-Muajjal are two of the most commonly used investment modes of Islamic banks. Because the return on these two investment types is fixed or predetermined, Shariah compliance appears questionable. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of the country's total Islamic bank investment is concentrated in Bai-Murabaha and Bai-Muajjal, or sale-based modes of investment. Bangladesh Bank, in a policy note titled 'An Analysis of Mode-wise Investment of Islamic Banks in Bangladesh', released last month, highlighted the issue. It argued that excessive concentration in sale-based investment modes by Islamic banks may replicate key features of conventional banking. The policy note also pointed out that the overwhelming dominance of sale-based modes reflects a lack of emphasis on profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) modes. Currently, partnership-based PLS accounts for less than 1 per cent of Islamic banks' total investments in the country. This is alarming for the future of the Islamic banking system, as PLS is considered more Shariah-compliant than other investment modes. PLS is based on a risk-sharing partnership in commercial activities and places more responsibility on banks as co-investors. In other words, banks must assess risk more cautiously before investing in a trade. This ultimately reduces overall investment risk, although it may also limit opportunities to invest more.

Moreover, Islamic banks must rigorously ensure the ethical aspects of any commercial activity to comply with Islamic law. If a proposed venture appears harmful to society or the environment, an Islamic bank may not invest in it. For instance, a brickfield pollutes the air, degrades soil, and sometimes causes deforestation. So, an Islamic bank should not invest in a brickfield project.

Nevertheless, the central bank's policy note sends a timely message to rigorously examine the overall status of Islamic banking in the country. Over the decades, many irregularities and unethical practices have occurred in the country's Islamic banking sector. Cronies of the Hasina regime systematically distorted the country's Islamic financing, making it highly questionable and unreliable. So, it is time to move ahead and correct the course of the Islamic banking sector.​
 

BB hands govt Tk 600b annual bill for banking-sector recovery


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Bangladesh Bank has sought Tk 600 billion annually from the government over the next five to eight years for recovery of the banking industry that witnessed a massive looting, said the central bank chief.

"Last week, we forwarded a draft proposal to the government on how to fix the banking sector. And, in the proposal we have sought Tk 600 billion annually over the next five to eight years to recover the banking sector that suffered massive money plundering," BB Governor Md Mostaqur Rahman told a meet on Saturday.

He made the remarks while replying to a question at a question-answer session with students. He attended the function as the chief guest at a function arranged to launch Bangla QR transactions at the United International University (UIU) by ONE Bank PLC in Dhaka.

"When we started working at the central bank, we saw that one -third of the total money in the banking sector had already been stolen. This is the main problem in the sector," he continued.

The governor said they need the money from the national budget and it is people's money. "Now the taxpayers' money will be given to the depositors."

He admitted that the country's revenue collection is about Tk 4.5 trillion and taking away Tk 600 billion from there yearly, surely, is a pressure.

"Until this June, you saw people gather before banks as they failed to withdraw their deposit," he said while replying to a student as to when the situation will improve.

He added they have eased the process so that depositors now can withdraw their money, particularly at some Islamic banks.

"It was outright looting in the banking sector. The plundering group looted taxpayers', public money from the banks," he said, urging society and young generation to be vigilant so that none can loot people's money in the future.

Vice-chancellor of UIU Prof Md. Abul Kashem Mia emphasized implementing and incorporating the advanced technological system in the financial sector so that corruption and irregularities can broadly be controlled.

He said introducing Bangla QR will make UIU a first cashless campus, enabling tuition fees, other fees, retail transactions on the campus charge-and hassle -free.

Managing Director of ONE Bank Muhit Rahman said that their transactions volume has significantly increased in recent times through Bangla QR Code, signaling a fast popularity of it among the users.

He announced they won't charge for using their service through Bangla QR usually being charged outside the campus.

Because of the rapid change in the financial and banking system, there will be a major shift in the transactions with security challenges, he continued.

Emphasizing the cashless transaction, the central bank boss also said that they have to spend an additional Tk 200 billion on paper-cash transactions, including its transportation, making, delivery to booths and banks, which will be half if the Bangla QR sees success.​
 

Making public pay for bank looting


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Bangladesh Bank (BB) governor Md Mostaqur Rahman has said that the country's banking sector would require Tk600 billion annually from the national budget over the next five to eight years to recover from the damage caused to the banking system through looting. Speaking at a Bangla QR promotion event on Saturday, the governor said that a third of the money lent by banks had been stolen before he took office. The story of how the banks were plundered under the previous political regime is by now an old one. What is new, and more disturbing, is the proposition that the government will have to pick up the bill for the crime committed by plunderers of the banks. And who would pay? Obviously, the taxpayers, who had no part in the crime.

To put the proposed bailout in perspective, Tk 600 billion a year over five to eight years would amount to between Tk3.0 trillion and Tk4.8 trillion. That is no small change for an economy struggling to fund education, healthcare, agriculture and social protection. The government cannot create money without consequences. It will either have to raise taxes, borrow more or divert resources from other urgent needs. Borrowing, too, means repayment with interest. So, the ordinary people stand to be penalised twice: first when political cronies in business stole their deposits through the banking channel and again when their taxes would be used to replace the stolen money. Is this what is meant by rescuing the banking sector?

Notably, as of the end of June last, the banks' Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) stood at Tk6.06 trillion, or 32.78 per cent of outstanding loans, according to central bank data. In other words, about one-third of the money lent by the banks is not performing. More revealingly, just 10 of the country's 61 banks account for over 72 per cent of the entire NPL amount. Together, they held Tk4.39 trillion in classified loans. Clearly, the banking sector's distress is not evenly spread. It is concentrated in institutions where lending to influential borrowers, often through proxies, wrecked banking discipline. One wonders how such transactions could continue for years without the knowledge, or at least the acquiescence, of those responsible for supervising the banks.

The traditional role of a bank is to collect savings from depositors and lend the funds to productive enterprises against reasonable assurance of repayment. The bank earns from lending at interest. But the arrangement collapses once lending ceases to be a commercial decision and becomes a privilege extended to persons enjoying political protection. During the fallen autocratic regime, the nexus of big businessmen, bank directors, compliant officials and their political patrons turned a large section of the banks into instruments of private enrichment. Banks were left with doubtful claims, while depositors were left with promises some institutions cannot honour. That is the structural damage the BB governor is talking about.

Now the question is, what has happened to those who caused the damage? To be fair, there have been investigations, court cases and orders for freezing assets. The Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU), for instance, disclosed in July that assets valued at around Tk760 billion, at home and abroad, had been frozen in eleven money-laundering cases. Sammilito Islami Bank, formed through merging five troubled banks, has also reportedly filed around ten thousand cases for recovery of classified loans. These are developments of consequence. But freezing an asset or filing a case is not the same as recovering the money and returning it to the banking system. How much has been recovered? How many of the principal perpetrators have been convicted, their assets realised to repay depositors?

Consider in this connection the recovery performance of six state-owned banks. A report published last April showed that their top twenty defaulters owed Tk926.27 billion, while the banks had recovered only Tk562 billion. What does such a dismal figure say about the effectiveness of the recovery drives? Borrowers fleeing abroad do not make their domestic properties disappear. So, before asking the public to pay trillions of taka, the government must explain its efforts to realise those assets. Otherwise, the message going out to the next generation of bank-looters would be simple: take the money, leave the bank in ruins and let the taxpayers settle the account.

Of course, one cannot allow troubled banks simply to collapse, since innocent depositors would suffer and the crisis could spread. The government has already injected Tk200 billion into Sammilito Islami Bank, while the BB has provided substantial liquidity assistance to other distressed lenders. But providing temporary liquidity to honour legitimate withdrawals is one thing and committing public funds for years to cover losses without recovering stolen assets is quite another. Nor can merging hollowed-out banks make stolen money reappear. Consolidating five sick institutions under one name may simplify their management, but does not, by itself, cure their financial sickness.

Interestingly, the Bangladesh Bank's own monetary policy statement earlier referred to a proposed Distressed Asset Management Act intended to allow banks to dispose of bad assets without relying on taxpayers' funds. There is also the Bank Resolution Act, 2026, and the prospect of reforming the Money Loan Courts so that defaulted loans can be recovered faster. The proposal should first be tested against that alternative, rather than being accepted as the only possible course. Why then should a long-term budgetary bailout become the first, rather than the last, resort? Shareholders and those directors and executives responsible for the losses must face the consequences before public funds are committed. The authorities should distinguish between wilful defaulters and genuine entrepreneurs who have failed because of market shocks. For the latter, restructuring may be justified; for the former, repeated rescheduling only prolongs the fraud.

What is needed immediately is a time-bound and publicly verifiable programme for recovering the large defaulted loans, confiscating assets lawfully, pursuing offenders through international cooperation and ensuring accountability of complicit bank officials and regulators. Any unavoidable fiscal assistance should be conditional, transparent and primarily directed at protecting small depositors, not preserving the wealth of failed owners. Most importantly, the government must disclose how much is being recovered against how much it proposes to spend. Unless the cost of plundering banks is made to fall first on those who plundered them, the exercise of banking reform will become another way of transferring the losses of the powerful to the powerless. This cannot be called justice, let alone reform.​
 

Fixing our banking sector

If setting strict deadlines is what is needed to cleanse our balance sheets and end the culture of loan default, then so be it


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Reports that the International Monetary Fund will likely press for strict, time-bound deadlines to fix weak banks and reduce the astronomical non-performing loans (NPLs) we have racked up should serve as a wake-up call for our leaders.

Despite dreams of self-sufficiency, the reality we must contend with is that, at present, our economic delegations are preparing to negotiate a fresh financial package with international lenders.

To that end, it is also abundantly clear that if we are to continue to receive the financial assistance our economy needs, Bangladesh can no longer afford half-measures in reforming what can safely be referred to as its crippled banking sector.

Decades of political patronage, reckless default cultures, and opaque loan write-offs have brought our financial architecture to the brink. As such, we simply no longer have the option to treat bank reform as an optional administrative exercise.

The rot in our financial system is neither hidden nor new. For years, massive amounts of liquidity have been siphoned off through fraud, insider lending, and willful defaults, leaving state-owned and private commercial banks saddled with staggering piles of debt.

It goes without saying that a banking sector choking on defaulted loans cannot be of help to the economy, thereby stunting our growth and deepening the broader fiscal crisis.

While no nation likes external pressure, we would do well to not view it as an infringement on sovereignty, but rather as a catalyst for accountability.

Financial stability is the backbone of national security and economic survival, and it is a shame that Bangladesh has not experienced it for some time now, if ever.

If setting strict deadlines is what is needed to cleanse our balance sheets and end the culture of loan default, then so be it. We must do what we can to restore public trust and build a modern, transparent banking system.​
 

Illusion of independence: Why Bangladesh Bank needs market instruments, not just legal autonomy

Without a functional secondary government securities market, flexible exchange rate discovery, and automated resolution tools, Bangladesh Bank defaulted to administrative fiat—paralyzing monetary transmission and institutionalising supervisory forbearance.

Sajed ul Islam


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Bangladesh Bank emblem Collected

Whenever systemic distress in Bangladesh’s banking sector surfaces, "central bank independence" is invoked as the sovereign remedy. Strip the Ministry of Finance of its informal veto, insulate Bangladesh Bank from executive directives and institutional discipline—we are told—will return.

Yet this diagnosis confuses legal autonomy with operational capacity.

Central bank independence is not merely a statutory shield inscribed in an amended Bangladesh Bank Order; it is an institutional technology. When a monetary authority lacks market-clearing transmission tools and non-discretionary supervisory mechanisms, even an ostensibly autonomous regulator is forced to govern by administrative decree. In finance, administrative discretion is the primary currency of cronyism.

To understand why autonomy has repeatedly unraveled, we must first ask: independence from whom?

Conventional macroeconomic theory fixates on fiscal dominance—preventing elected governments from printing money to finance deficit spending ahead of elections. In Bangladesh, however, the far deadlier capture has been commercial. Over recent decades, concentrated conglomerates colonised commercial bank boards and captured the regulatory perimeter.

Ordinary depositors are widely dispersed, unorganised, and possess zero lobbying power. Chronic delinquent borrowers, by contrast, are concentrated, highly capitalised, and politically entrenched. A central bank’s essential mandate is to act as the fiduciary guardian of public savings against the insatiable appetites of concentrated capital. When that independence fails, depositors bear the quiet tax of negative real yields, currency misalignments, and systemic bailouts.

Why was Bangladesh Bank structurally unable to defend this perimeter? Because it suffered from an acute dual instrument deficit across both monetary policy transmission and banking supervision.

True autonomy will arrive not when a governor is granted absolute personal discretion, but when the central bank is equipped with the market instruments to govern impersonally, and bound by statutory rules to let the consequences fall where they may.

The monetary impasse: Governing without markets

In a functioning architecture, a central bank steers the macroeconomy impersonally. It adjusts its policy rate, which transmits through an active interbank market, anchors a competitive yield curve across liquid secondary government debt, and prices commercial credit and deposits.

The foreign exchange market clears based on external supply and demand. In Bangladesh, these mechanisms were systematically suppressed:

• Absence of a Secondary Debt Market: Government securities remained a captive, buy-and-hold space dominated by statutory reserve requirements rather than active trading. Primary Treasury auctions were routinely subjected to yield caps and direct devolvement onto Bangladesh Bank's balance sheet, destroying yield-curve discovery and rendering Open Market Operations (OMO) toothless.

• Managed Exchange Rate Distortions: Rather than allowing market-clearing price discovery, the central bank maintained an artificially defended exchange rate. When external balances deteriorated, authorities resorted to fragmented administrative rates, moral suasion on Authorized Dealer banks, and import-letter-of-credit rationing. This depleted foreign exchange reserves, fueled wide curb-market premiums, and delayed macro adjustments.

• Administrative Rate Ceilings: To suppress borrowing costs by fiat, the central bank enforced rigid 9% lending and 6% deposit caps. This severed the link between monetary policy rates and commercial bank pricing, penalised savers with negative real returns, and subsidized corporate leverage while inflation accelerated.

The supervisory collapse: Discretion over rules

This reliance on administrative fiat in monetary policy mirrored an identical failure in bank supervision. In mature jurisdictions, supervisors rely on automated Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) frameworks and statutory resolution tools. When capital or asset quality deteriorates past statutory thresholds, mandatory sanctions trigger by law: dividends are halted, balance-sheet expansion is frozen, and non-viable management is removed without political negotiation.

Crucially, an effective PCA regime relies on timely, honest provisioning. In Bangladesh, banks systematically fail to make adequate or timely provisions, aided by external auditors who rubber-stamp cosmetic balance sheets. Because Bangladesh Bank lacks automated supervisory tools to detect and penalise balance-sheet misrepresentation in real time, profound information asymmetry is created. Depositors and investors are kept in the dark, believing distressed institutions are well-capitalised until capital deficits become catastrophic.

Deprived of objective, automated tools, the central bank substituted supervision with administrative circulars:

• Instead of enforcing non-discretionary provisioning and Basel III deductions, it issued ad-hoc circulars that repeatedly relaxed loan classification criteria to conceal bad debt.

• Instead of forcing credit recognition, it permitted repeat defaulters to regularize massive bad debts through nominal 2% down payments and multi-year rescheduling windows.

• When distressed assets choked interbank liquidity, the central bank quietly deployed emergency liquidity lifelines to keep zombie lenders alive.

The result of this supervisory vacuum is the catastrophe of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). Today, bad loans represent a massive share of the banking sector's balance sheet, with total distressed assets exceeding Tk 600,000 crore and several captured institutions completely decapitalised.

The pathology of discretion

The lesson across both mandates is identical: administrative measures are never a systemic substitute for market instruments.

A market-determined Treasury yield, a floating exchange rate, or an automated PCA trigger is impersonal—blind to borrower identity, bank ownership, or political clout. An administrative decree, by contrast, requires an official’s signature.

The moment monetary transmission and supervisory enforcement hinge on a signature—whether granting an LC quota, fixing a rate cap, or approving an ad-hoc loan-rescheduling circular—that signature becomes a prize to be lobbied for, pressured, or bought. Administrative discretion did not resolve market frictions; it created a lucrative marketplace for regulatory forbearance, the evergreening of bad debt, and policy capture.

Housing both mandates under one roof without statutory separation worsened this: central bank liquidity was repeatedly deployed to prop up failing banks under its supervisory watch, compromising price stability to conceal supervisory failure.

Restoring functional autonomy

If Bangladesh Bank is to escape this trap, reform must focus on operational instruments rather than legal platitudes:

1. Build Secondary Sovereign Debt Markets: End Treasury bill devolvement onto the central bank. Establish genuine auction discovery and secondary liquidity so the policy repo rate transmits across an authentic yield curve.

2. Transition to Market-Clearing Exchange Rates: Eliminate administrative rationing in foreign exchange pricing, letting an authentic market rate clear external balances and protect reserves.

3. Statutory PCA with Automated Provisioning Triggers: Enact legally binding Prompt Corrective Action legislation where asset impairment and provisioning shortfalls trigger mandatory restrictions automatically. Integrate automated supervisory audit systems to penalise misrepresentation by banks and their external auditors, eliminating information asymmetry.

4. End the Bureaucratic Duopoly: Dismantle the Financial Institutions Division’s administrative oversight over state banks, establishing a single supervisory standard for all deposit-taking institutions.

5. Establish a Modern Resolution Architecture: Equip the central bank with statutory resolution powers to haircut wholesale creditors, wind down insolvent lenders, and transfer viable deposits to bridge institutions without judicial delays.

Central bank independence cannot survive as an abstract legal virtue. As long as Bangladesh Bank lacks secondary debt markets, flexible pricing channels, and automated resolution tools, it will remain hooked on administrative discretion—and wherever discretion reigns, capture will follow.

True autonomy will arrive not when a governor is granted absolute personal discretion, but when the central bank is equipped with the market instruments to govern impersonally, and bound by statutory rules to let the consequences fall where they may.

*Sajed ul Islam is a senior banking executive and financial markets specialist with three decades of global institutional experience across treasury, capital markets, and corporate governance.​
 

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