[🇧🇩] Chicken Neck/Siliguri Corridor

[Saif]

The video below talks about India's extra agility to militarize chicken's neck to protect it from Bangladesh and China. Bangladesh's military doctrine is defensive. Their Training and military equipment are fully compatible with defensive military doctrine. Bangladesh army cannot conduct military mission to occupy lands beyond its border. Nonetheless, India has chosen the path of confrontation with Bangladesh to remedy its strategic weakness in North East. The video is in Bengali.

 

[Saif]

Retired Brigadier General of Indian army SK. Chatterji says that the recent military deployment by the Indian army in Siliguri Corridor is for defensive purposes only. The Indian army has no plan to occupy Bangladeshi land to widen Siliguri Corridor. The video is in Bengali.

 

[Krishna with Flute]

Retired Brigadier General of Indian army SK. Chatterji says that the recent military deployment by the Indian army in Siliguri Corridor is for defensive purposes only. The Indian army has no plan to occupy Bangladeshi land to widen Siliguri Corridor. The video is in Bengali.

But plan can be changed any time.

 

[Saif]

But plan can be changed any time.

True. But we should look for peace not war.

 

[Krishna with Flute]

True. But we should look for peace not war.

That also changes with time. The only country looking with consistent policy of peace is India.

 

[Saif]

That also changes with time. The only country looking with consistent policy of peace is India.

You mean all other neighbors of India look for cutting the peace into pieces.

 

[Saif]

Why Chicken’s Neck is a perennial security challenge

NEW DELHI: The narrow Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck,” is once again at the centre of regional strategic attention — this time trig

www.newindianexpress.com

Why Chicken’s Neck is a perennial security challenge
After Yunus highlighted the fragility of Northeast India during his recent trip to China, India curbed exports to Bangladesh, signaling the costs of challenging its regional autonomy.

Bangladesh's Chief Advisor Yunus , Chinese President Xi discuss bilateral issues Photo | ANI

Jayanth Jacob

NEW DELHI: The narrow Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the “Chicken’s Neck,” is once again at the centre of regional strategic attention — this time triggered by remarks from Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus during his recent China visit. Yunus referred to India’s Northeast as “landlocked,” implying its dependence on transit routes through Bangladesh. The comments have sparked swift diplomatic and economic responses from New Delhi, revealing the corridor’s deep-rooted strategic importance.

What is the Siliguri Corridor?

The Siliguri Corridor is a narrow stretch of land in West Bengal that connects India’s mainland to its northeastern states — Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya, collectively known as the Seven Sisters. This land bridge, just about 22 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, lies between Nepal to the north and Bangladesh to the south.

Its geographical fragility and criticality have earned it the nickname “Chicken’s Neck” in strategic and military circles. Any disruption in this corridor — be it from military conflict, natural disaster, or internal unrest — would sever India’s northeastern states from the rest of the country.

Why it is back in the news

The recent tension emerged after Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s interim chief advisor, made pointed references to India’s “landlocked” Northeast in Beijing. Though subtle, the comment implied India’s dependence on Bangladeshi territory for transit to its own territory — a point India is deeply sensitive about.

In response, New Delhi promptly restricted certain Bangladeshi exports through its entry points, exempting the land-locked Nepal and Bhutan and accelerated work on alternative connectivity projects that bypass Bangladesh. Mainly among these is the long-talked about Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project, which aims to connect Kolkata to Mizoram via Myanmar, reducing dependence on Bangladeshi transit routes.

This reaction is not just about infrastructure. It’s geopolitical signaling — a warning to Dhaka that undermining India’s strategic autonomy in the region comes with consequences, economic and political.

Shifting power dynamics post-Hasina

India’s concerns have intensified since the departure of Sheikh Hasina from power in August 2024. The Hasina regime maintained friendly, understanding and warm ties with New Delhi, but the interim administration led by Yunus has taken a markedly different tone. Anti-India rhetoric has gained mainstream space in Bangladesh’s political discourse, along with the politically-motivated attacks against Hindu minorities, that Dhaka denies.

Dhaka’s growing closeness with Beijing is viewed with alarm in Indian policy circles. Two recent developments have particularly heightened Indian anxieties: Dhaka’s plans to move the $1 billion Teesta River project from India to China; and reviving the Lalmonirhat airbase in northern Bangladesh with Chinese assistance.

Both projects lie close to India’s border and have major implications for Indian security — especially regarding surveillance and the possibility of foreign military use.

Why Lalmonirhat matters

The Lalmonirhat airfield, originally built in 1931 by the British and used in World War II, has been largely dormant since Bangladesh’s independence. The current revival plan, reportedly supported by China, could turn it into a logistics or surveillance hub. While it presently hosts a Bangladesh Air Force maintenance unit, Indian agencies are concerned that it could be upgraded for full-scale military operations or dual-use missions that will be against New Delhi’s strategic interests.

A functional Lalmonirhat airbase would lie perilously close to the Siliguri Corridor. India will need to see if Bangladesh will allow other countries like China and Pakistan to use it. Bangladesh has the right to develop airfields for their security reasons, but that should not be used against India is India’s position.

Historical, geopolitical context

The strategic relevance of the Siliguri Corridor is not new. Its current geography is a result of complex historical shifts — from the Anglo-Gorkha war, the Duar war, and treaties such as Sugauli and Punakha, to the creation of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) and the redrawing of borders by colonial powers. These artificial boundaries cut through long-standing social, cultural and economic ties in the region.

Today, the corridor serves as the only land route connecting the Indian mainland to its northeastern states. It is also a transit point to Nepal, Bhutan and even Bangladesh, making it an artery not just for national integration, but for regional diplomacy.

The town of Siliguri, at the heart of the corridor, is a crucial transport hub, handling road, rail, and air traffic. This logistical importance has made it a magnet for both legal and illegal cross-border activity — from trade and migration to drug trafficking and human smuggling.

Security challenges

The corridor’s narrow geography makes it exceptionally vulnerable. At its narrowest between Phansidewa (near the Bangladesh border) and Panitanki (on the Indo-Nepal border), it is susceptible to both military incursions and internal disturbances. The proximity to the Chumbi Valley tri-junction — where India, Bhutan, and China meet — adds another layer of complexity.

Chinese infrastructure build-up in the Chumbi Valley has triggered border standoffs, including the 2017 Doklam crisis. Analysts warn that any hostile movement from the north — combined with instability or pressure from the south (Bangladesh) — could potentially choke the corridor, cutting off northeast India.

The corridor is also seen as a choke point in any future military conflict involving China. If China were to ally more directly with Bangladesh or secure access to bases like Lalmonirhat, it would give Beijing new leverage in a region.

China’s expanding footprint

Under Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s military and economic ties with China have deepened further. Beijing remains Dhaka’s largest arms supplier — delivering fighter jets, artillery and naval vessels. It is also a major infrastructure partner, involved in building roads, railways, bridges and airports across Bangladesh. The two countries frequently conduct joint military exercises, and Chinese companies have gained influence over strategic infrastructure, raising alarms in Indian strategic circles. China’s growing role in Bangladesh has transformed the Siliguri Corridor from a logistical asset into a geostrategic vulnerability.

India’s response

Faced with this encirclement risk, India is fast-tracking alternate connectivity projects. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project will connect Mizoram to Kolkata via Sittwe Port and Paletwa in Myanmar. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway aims to link Manipur with Southeast Asia, reducing India’s dependence on Bangladesh for regional connectivity. Domestically, India is investing in robust rail and highway infrastructure through the corridor, ensuring redundant and rapid deployment of military and civilian assets. By expanding its network of access points, New Delhi hopes to mitigate the strategic risks posed by both geography and geopolitics.

The Chicken’s Neck is not just a cartographic curiosity; it is a strategic fulcrum for India’s northeastern policy, its neighbourhood diplomacy, and its military doctrine. What makes it so vital is not just its role as a connector — but its potential as a vulnerability. Any disruption here — intentional or accidental — could have outsized consequences for India’s unity and security.

With rising regional tensions, Dhaka’s growing tilt towards Beijing, and heightened Chinese military activity near the border, the Siliguri Corridor’s strategic significance is once again at the forefront of Indian policymaking. What happens in this narrow strip of land will continue to influence the future of India’s engagement with both its Northeast and its neighbours.

Corridor factoids

The Siliguri Corridor has around 80 small towns and villages lying within the areas of Kishanganj district of Bihar, Darjeeling district, northern parts of Uttar Dinajpur district as well as the districts of Jalpaiguri, Alipurduar and Cooch Behar in West Bengal

Siliguri town is the transit point for road, air and rail traffic to Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal along with the northeastern states of India. Its location on the foothills of the Himalayas makes it strategically important. Its role as the main trading and commercial centre of north Bengal adds to its economic significance

At its narrowest, the strip is just 21-22 km wide linking the mainland to the northeastern states

It is flanked by three countries - Nepal to its west, Bhutan to north and Bangladesh to the south

Major road and rail infrastructure towards the northeast passes through it

India’s 2017 Doklam standoff — at the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and Tibet Autonomous Region — over infrastructure construction by China was also in the context of the Siliguri Corridor becoming vulnerable

Bhutan-China border talks will have its shadow on the corridor, as China is claiming 89 sq km in Chumbi Valley, close to the Siliguri Corridor

Indian steps to secure it

The Army on May 8-9 conducted the ‘Teesta Prahar’ integrated field exercise at the Teesta Field Firing Range in North Bengal, near Siliguri Corridor

In January 2023, battle preparedness practice of the security forces using latest weapons and equipment in a networked, integrated environment, involving all arms and services of the Army, the Indian Air Force and CAPFs was done

In 2023, a decision was taken to deploy border guarding forces - BSF, ITBP, SSB - at the corridor during peacetime

There is increase in deployment on the Chinese side since May 2020 leading to precautionary deployment by the Indian forces in the region.​

 

[Saif]

Yunus chokes the chicken's neck in Beijing

Ever since August 5, 2024—when Sheikh Hasina was overthrown by a turbulent coup in the streets, with the Bangladesh Army looking on—it has been evident from the

www.newindianexpress.com

Yunus chokes the chicken's neck in Beijing
The Bangladesh chief advisor’s mention of the strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor in China justifiably worries India. Muhammad Yunus seems to be playing Pakistan's hand against India.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)

Ever since August 5, 2024—when Sheikh Hasina was overthrown by a turbulent coup in the streets, with the Bangladesh Army looking on—it has been evident from the flow of events that Pakistan’s hand was behind it. Since then, I have not been alone in often saying that Pakistan never left Dhaka—not in 1971, not ever. It remained embedded in Bangladesh in different ways, cultivating its interests among radicals, various political parties, the army and even intellectuals.

Till Hasina ruled, there was no question of a Pakistani upper hand. In August 2024, the situation was created with the connivance of external elements, with Muhammad Yunus, a supposed liberal, leading the pack to bring about the meltdown. Perhaps Hasina erred in her dictatorial ways; perhaps she should have had her finger on the pulse of the nation. That is important, but currently insignificant.

Since that event, Yunus, who parachuted back from the US to his homeland to be chief advisor to the interim government, has never been in favour of India in any of his utterances. Prior to the illegal change of government, Yunus’s oft-expressed views never really targeted India. He spoke in favour of regional cooperation and connectivity between Bangladesh and India, seeing it as a mutual benefit for both. He often emphasised the importance of trade, economic ties, and collaboratively resolving regional issues. Now Yunus has made it a point to be unpleasant towards India in the post-August 5 configuration. He has also found time to pass remarks against his bête noire on India’s linkages with his country’s original ‘first family’.

It’s in this context that Yunus’s recent statement in China has drawn intense flak in India. The exact statement, as quoted in the media, was, “India’s northeast is completely landlocked, and its access to the ocean is completely controlled by Bangladesh. The Siliguri Corridor is the only route that connects the northeast with the rest of India, and this connection passes through Bangladesh.” During such a high-level meeting in China, Yunus urged Beijing to establish an economic foothold in Bangladesh by leveraging the latter’s strategic position as the “only guardian of the ocean” for the “landlocked” northeastern region.

The provocation through this statement perhaps surpasses that generated by Hasina’s overthrow. To many, this may be construed as a direct slur towards India’s sovereignty and national security. The interpretations can be many, but one thing is obvious—the fact that Yunus has chosen to use words and occasions that promote confusion and obfuscation.

Do I find anything wrong in the physical description of India’s northeast given by Yunus? None whatsoever. But I find everything wrong with the context in which Yunus offered this description and its follow-up connotation, as per his perception. This cannot be treated as a standalone statement.

Obviously, Yunus and the Chinese officials, initially led by President Xi Jinping, had discussions that underscore a concerted effort to deepen the strategic partnership between Bangladesh and China, focusing on economic development, regional stability and collaborative infrastructure projects. Yunus knows that the Chinese have a deep interest in the Bay of Bengal and do not get optimum choices.

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor forms a part of the Belt and Road Initiative. It connects China’s Yunnan province to Myanmar and provides China with access to the Indian Ocean via Bay of Bengal. Several projects enhance the China-Myanmar-Thailand connection without being formally a part of the BRI. Yet, there is no link to or through it to Bangladesh. The Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-China corridor is a geopolitical disaster, leaving Bangladesh with no land link to the Chinese mainland. It appears obvious that Yunus, in his naiveté, was trying to draw the attention of the Chinese to the feasibility of a strategic Bangladesh-China linkage to offset India’s domination of the Bay of Bengal. However, in a ridiculous choice of words and objectives, he touched upon India’s sensitivity—the Siliguri Corridor.

The Siliguri Corridor, often called the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, is a narrow stretch of land in the state of West Bengal that connects mainland India to its northeastern states. It is a region of immense strategic importance due to its geographic, economic and security implications. It is bordered by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, and is very close to the Chinese border at Tibet. This makes it vulnerable to external threats, particularly from China, which claims parts of Arunachal Pradesh.

The corridor is near Doklam, where India and China had a 72-day-long military standoff in 2017. Any conflict in this region could cut off India’s northeast. The corridor is home to important railway lines, highways and oil pipelines that sustain the economy of the northeast and of India too. Thus, was Yunus’s deliberately-crafted statement a reminder to China and others of India’s vulnerability, and the force multiplication effect that Bangladesh’s border configuration could have for Sino-Bangladesh strategic advantage? This is how nations often project the worth of their geostrategic characteristics.

It is apparent that Bangladesh is not alone. It is abetted and advised by the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which is obviously licking its lips at the potential of an Indian strategic disadvantage being exploited. In the past six months, the ISI has gone to quite an extent to make known its interest. Visits by senior ISI officials with specific forays to areas of strategic significance were a way of conveying interest. It now seems to have gone beyond, with translation of the same into words uttered by none other than Bangladesh’s chief advisor.

Yunus is warming up to Pakistan because he probably perceives that the Pakistanis would be his best bet in the fight for survival, which may come faster than anyone thinks. The radical elements are already proliferating, but Yunus knows that his survival depends on the creation of an anti-minority sentiment and a pathetically skewed sense of Bangla nationalism—all of which will militate against India.

India’s response has indeed been mature all through the developments of the last few months. Let us hope the meeting of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Yunus at the BIMSTEC summit brings a much-needed turn to the flow of Indo-Bangladesh relations.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)

Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir​