Saif
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Winning the sea, but losing the energy race
Bangladesh is facing its worst gas shortage in a decade, with households, factories and power plants all struggling with inadequate supply. Domestic output has fallen to around 1,620 million cubic feet a day from a peak of nearly 2,800 million, leaving the country short by roughly 1,300 to 1,500 mi
Winning the sea, but losing the energy race
Bangladesh is facing its worst gas shortage in a decade, with households, factories and power plants all struggling with inadequate supply. Domestic output has fallen to around 1,620 million cubic feet a day from a peak of nearly 2,800 million, leaving the country short by roughly 1,300 to 1,500 million cubic feet every single day. Imported liquefied natural gas has helped cover some of that gap, but rising prices and the ongoing war in the Middle East have made it much more expensive and harder to secure. Each time the gas shortage reaches this level of severity, offshore exploration in the Bay of Bengal naturally becomes subject of renewed public discussion. The catch is that this idea relies on a resource potential that is still largely unproven, since nobody knows for certain if the sea actually holds enough gas to make extraction worth the cost. On top of that, even if a promising discovery is made, developing an offshore field and getting that gas into the national system would still take years.
The irony is that the physical space to conduct this exploration is already secured and waiting. The country won a massive maritime zone of over 118,000 square kilometres after settling boundary disputes with India and Myanmar more than a decade ago. It has been 12 years since that historic legal victory, yet successive governments have treated the exploration of this vast underwater territory as a secondary concern. Instead of launching serious drilling campaigns, leaders have allowed the area to remain largely untouched while neighbouring nations actively extract energy resources from their adjacent waters. Myanmar, sharing the exact same maritime neighbourhood, has continued extracting gas from fields close to the boundary line throughout this period, drawing on geology that very likely extends into waters now legally belonging to Bangladesh. Meanwhile that same geological formation yields nothing on this side of the line.
The state gas corporation Petrobangla carries a large share of the blame for how little that maritime advantage has been used. Political appointees have occupied the top positions of the organisation for years instead of true professionals, which severely weakened the expertise and technical continuity needed to negotiate confidently with foreign companies. Bapex, the exploration arm that should have been pushing the process forward, has also struggled to turn its technical recommendations into a consistent exploration programme.
This lack of strategic continuity became particularly costly when ConocoPhillips identified a deep-water prospect that state experts estimated could contain around five trillion cubic feet of gas. Such a massive discovery would have been a complete game changer for the national energy grid. However, the extreme depth and distance made the extraction process incredibly expensive. The American company requested a revised pricing formula to make the project financially viable, suggesting a slight increase in the gas price. The government responded with a flat refusal and rigidly stuck to the old pricing structure rather than negotiating towards a middle ground. ConocoPhillips eventually walked away. Looking back, this decision stands as a massive failure of foresight. The issue was not simply whether the higher price sought by the company was acceptable. It was whether a way could have been found to keep negotiations alive over a resource that, developed on time, could have reduced import dependence and spared the country the present cry of shortage.
The instinct for rigid decision-making also showed up in the bidding rounds that followed. The offshore bidding round in 2024 ended in complete failure despite initial interest from several major international players including ExxonMobil. Eventually, the process had to be cancelled. A government committee later identified unfavourable pricing terms among the reasons for the poor response.
The current administration is now attempting to restart the effort with a new tender for 26 offshore blocks, split between 15 deep sea and 11 shallow water areas. Learning from that earlier embarrassment, the government has adjusted the production sharing contract terms to offer better financial incentives. Turkish Petroleum and China National Offshore Oil Corporation have already purchased tender documents, while several other firms have collected information packages. Buying paperwork and submitting a firm bid by the end of November remain two very different steps yet the early signs of interest offer a small measure of hope.
While adjusting the terms to attract foreign companies makes logical sense, the state must ensure the fundamental purpose of domestic exploration is not compromised in the process. If the actual cost of extracting gas from the deep sea ends up matching or exceeding the price of imported liquefied natural gas, the citizens will still end up paying high prices. The production sharing contracts therefore need to strike a balance between giving investors enough incentive and ensuring that Bangladesh receives a reasonable return. This necessary caution does not mean offshore exploration should be abandoned. On the contrary, finding new domestic sources of gas is one of the few realistic ways to reduce dependence on volatile international markets over the longer term. The real trouble is the timeline. Even if the current bidding process is a complete success, Petrobangla estimates that it could take roughly eight years to bring the gas to the national grid. Such a long delay creates a massive disconnect between immediate survival and long-term planning. The country is essentially looking for a distant lifeboat while the current ship has started taking on water.
At the same time, the existing engines of domestic energy are actively failing. This reveals severe operational inefficiencies within the national oil and gas corporation and its dedicated exploration arm. Notably, these two organisations are rarely seen as serious exploration companies, despite being the country's own institutions for exactly that purpose. The same underperformance runs through the education system where universities across the country produce graduates from relevant engineering and geology departments every year, yet their academic knowledge rarely translates into homegrown exploration initiatives. The complete absence of independent drilling campaigns led by the state shows that the educational pipeline is not feeding into practical execution. Offshore exploration may offer a significant new source of gas in the future, but building stronger domestic capacity is necessary to reduce the dependence that has brought the country to its present predicament.
Bangladesh is facing its worst gas shortage in a decade, with households, factories and power plants all struggling with inadequate supply. Domestic output has fallen to around 1,620 million cubic feet a day from a peak of nearly 2,800 million, leaving the country short by roughly 1,300 to 1,500 million cubic feet every single day. Imported liquefied natural gas has helped cover some of that gap, but rising prices and the ongoing war in the Middle East have made it much more expensive and harder to secure. Each time the gas shortage reaches this level of severity, offshore exploration in the Bay of Bengal naturally becomes subject of renewed public discussion. The catch is that this idea relies on a resource potential that is still largely unproven, since nobody knows for certain if the sea actually holds enough gas to make extraction worth the cost. On top of that, even if a promising discovery is made, developing an offshore field and getting that gas into the national system would still take years.
The irony is that the physical space to conduct this exploration is already secured and waiting. The country won a massive maritime zone of over 118,000 square kilometres after settling boundary disputes with India and Myanmar more than a decade ago. It has been 12 years since that historic legal victory, yet successive governments have treated the exploration of this vast underwater territory as a secondary concern. Instead of launching serious drilling campaigns, leaders have allowed the area to remain largely untouched while neighbouring nations actively extract energy resources from their adjacent waters. Myanmar, sharing the exact same maritime neighbourhood, has continued extracting gas from fields close to the boundary line throughout this period, drawing on geology that very likely extends into waters now legally belonging to Bangladesh. Meanwhile that same geological formation yields nothing on this side of the line.
The state gas corporation Petrobangla carries a large share of the blame for how little that maritime advantage has been used. Political appointees have occupied the top positions of the organisation for years instead of true professionals, which severely weakened the expertise and technical continuity needed to negotiate confidently with foreign companies. Bapex, the exploration arm that should have been pushing the process forward, has also struggled to turn its technical recommendations into a consistent exploration programme.
This lack of strategic continuity became particularly costly when ConocoPhillips identified a deep-water prospect that state experts estimated could contain around five trillion cubic feet of gas. Such a massive discovery would have been a complete game changer for the national energy grid. However, the extreme depth and distance made the extraction process incredibly expensive. The American company requested a revised pricing formula to make the project financially viable, suggesting a slight increase in the gas price. The government responded with a flat refusal and rigidly stuck to the old pricing structure rather than negotiating towards a middle ground. ConocoPhillips eventually walked away. Looking back, this decision stands as a massive failure of foresight. The issue was not simply whether the higher price sought by the company was acceptable. It was whether a way could have been found to keep negotiations alive over a resource that, developed on time, could have reduced import dependence and spared the country the present cry of shortage.
The instinct for rigid decision-making also showed up in the bidding rounds that followed. The offshore bidding round in 2024 ended in complete failure despite initial interest from several major international players including ExxonMobil. Eventually, the process had to be cancelled. A government committee later identified unfavourable pricing terms among the reasons for the poor response.
The current administration is now attempting to restart the effort with a new tender for 26 offshore blocks, split between 15 deep sea and 11 shallow water areas. Learning from that earlier embarrassment, the government has adjusted the production sharing contract terms to offer better financial incentives. Turkish Petroleum and China National Offshore Oil Corporation have already purchased tender documents, while several other firms have collected information packages. Buying paperwork and submitting a firm bid by the end of November remain two very different steps yet the early signs of interest offer a small measure of hope.
While adjusting the terms to attract foreign companies makes logical sense, the state must ensure the fundamental purpose of domestic exploration is not compromised in the process. If the actual cost of extracting gas from the deep sea ends up matching or exceeding the price of imported liquefied natural gas, the citizens will still end up paying high prices. The production sharing contracts therefore need to strike a balance between giving investors enough incentive and ensuring that Bangladesh receives a reasonable return. This necessary caution does not mean offshore exploration should be abandoned. On the contrary, finding new domestic sources of gas is one of the few realistic ways to reduce dependence on volatile international markets over the longer term. The real trouble is the timeline. Even if the current bidding process is a complete success, Petrobangla estimates that it could take roughly eight years to bring the gas to the national grid. Such a long delay creates a massive disconnect between immediate survival and long-term planning. The country is essentially looking for a distant lifeboat while the current ship has started taking on water.
At the same time, the existing engines of domestic energy are actively failing. This reveals severe operational inefficiencies within the national oil and gas corporation and its dedicated exploration arm. Notably, these two organisations are rarely seen as serious exploration companies, despite being the country's own institutions for exactly that purpose. The same underperformance runs through the education system where universities across the country produce graduates from relevant engineering and geology departments every year, yet their academic knowledge rarely translates into homegrown exploration initiatives. The complete absence of independent drilling campaigns led by the state shows that the educational pipeline is not feeding into practical execution. Offshore exploration may offer a significant new source of gas in the future, but building stronger domestic capacity is necessary to reduce the dependence that has brought the country to its present predicament.