Bangladesh Defense
Saif
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Date of Event:
Jan 26, 2026
After 2026 election, Dhaka must set out clear India, China, and US policies
By Asif Bin Ali
VISUAL: STAR
Bangladesh often seems to treat foreign policy as subject to seasonal political moods. If one government is branded “India-friendly,” another “China-leaning,” then a third is cast as “Washington’s favourite.” In reality, Dhaka engages all three powers every day—on trade, loans, borders, security, climate, migration, the Bay of Bengal, etc. But it does so without a clearly stated hierarchy of interests and without a stable policy framework that survives elections and domestic political manoeuvring. This is a major weakness of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Moreover, political actors often use foreign policy as a weapon in partisan storytelling for a domestic audience. So India becomes a symbol, not a relationship. China becomes a chequebook, not a strategy. The United States becomes either a saviour or a conspirator, depending on who is speaking and who is under pressure.
After the 2026 election, the future elected government should do something basic but long overdue: set out three clear country policies—towards India, China, and the US—and ensure they enjoy broad political consensus and commitment so that they do not change regardless of the change in power. These policies should not be about ideological alignments or public relations exercises; they should instead serve as enduring principles that signal to the bureaucracy and the public what Bangladesh wants, what it will not trade away, and what it will prioritise when interests collide.
Why do clear country policies matter? Small and mid-sized states survive by being predictable abroad and disciplined at home. Geography already imposes certain permanent facts. India surrounds Bangladesh on three sides and shapes its river system, border economy, and security environment. China is the largest source of global manufacturing power and a major provider of capital for infrastructure. The US and the Western market system remain central to Bangladesh’s exports, finance, and technology ecosystem. You can dislike these facts, but you cannot vote them out.
Yet relationships with these countries were often viewed as if they were personal friendships between leaders, short-term transactions, or exercises in emergency diplomacy, rather than as long-term statecraft anchored in clearly articulated national interests and institutional continuity. This approach produces negative outcomes, frequently converting routine bargaining into narratives of national prestige. A water-sharing negotiation, a port decision, a visa issue, or a defence procurement discussion becomes a test of patriotism. Such framing undermines, rather than strengthens, a strategic foreign policy approach.
Over the decades, Bangladesh has produced some important diplomatic achievements. The 1996 Ganges water treaty, for instance, showed how tough geography can still be negotiated. The maritime boundary settlements with Myanmar and India expanded our legal certainty in the Bay of Bengal and strengthened Bangladesh’s blue-economy claims. The 2015 land boundary settlement with India improved the lives of people in the enclaves. These are not Awami League or BNP moments; they are Bangladesh’s achievements. But when they are treated as partisan trophies, the country weakens its future negotiating position.
One of the most persistent myths in Dhaka is that closeness to one power requires hostility to another. If you are “with” India, you must be “against” China. If you work with China, you must be suspicious of America. This may sound like common sense, and the geopolitics around them may also seem to suggest it, but it is really a lazy shortcut often favoured by Bangladesh’s political and civil classes. They confuse alignment with engagement. Bangladesh already practises issue-based engagement. It relies on the US and EU markets for export earnings. It relies on Gulf states for labour markets and remittances. China and other Asian partners provide large-scale financing and industrial inputs, while neighbouring India is critical for border security and stability, transit geography, and river politics. This is not a choice between lovers or adversaries. It is a portfolio. The missing piece is strategy.
What should an India policy look like? India is not just another bilateral partner; it is an integral part of the neighbourhood structure. In most areas, India has more leverage. It is a nuclear power and an aspiring global power. But that does not mean Bangladesh cannot negotiate or exercise sovereign autonomy. A serious India policy, therefore, begins by accepting this reality and managing it with steady discipline rather than chest-thumping. It should remain anchored in the files that never go away. Water sharing requires year-round negotiation capacity and technical preparation, not seasonal outrage. To save lives on the border and ensure security, both countries must work in a manner bound by law and accountability; otherwise, the issue turns toxic at home. The relationship is also lived through people-to-people ties—visas, culture, and media narratives. If these spaces are left to suspicion and scandal, policy may always be hostage to anger. Above all, the baseline must be clear: reciprocal respect for sovereignty and a firm commitment to non-intervention in each other’s domestic politics. Ultimately, an India policy should separate real bargaining from performative nationalism.
What should a China policy look like? China is no longer just about roads and bridges for Dhaka. As China increasingly shapes industrial policy, technology standards, defence choices, and strategic infrastructure, a clear China policy has become essential. The first rule should be productivity over ribbon-cutting. Bangladesh should prioritise fewer vanity projects and more reliable energy, efficient ports, rail freight, functioning industrial zones, and skills linked to real jobs. It should also incorporate risk management into Chinese-funded projects, with greater financial transparency, proper procurement where possible, and clear, plain-language debt assessments. When terms are hidden, suspicion grows, and that suspicion becomes a domestic weapon weakening Bangladesh’s bargaining power with Beijing and others. Moreover, Bangladesh’s China policy should treat technology as a security issue, not just a price issue. This will help reduce dependence in sensitive areas that foreign powers can turn into leverage. And China should not be treated only as a lender; Dhaka should negotiate for market access, manufacturing relocation, and joint ventures.
What should a US policy look like? Bangladesh needs a clear US policy because Washington affects its economy even when it does not mention Bangladesh. Trade rules, labour standards, brand compliance, technology ecosystems, financial regulations, and sanctions policies can influence Bangladesh’s economy overnight. A serious US policy must begin with the understanding that the export economy depends on reputation. It is about protecting Bangladeshi workers and keeping Bangladeshi factories and products inside the global supply chains.
A serious US policy also requires an engagement strategy that extends beyond a single embassy channel. The US system is fragmented. Congress matters. State-level business networks matter. Brands matter. Diaspora voices matter. If Bangladesh engages Washington only during crises, it will always negotiate from a defensive position. On security and regional strategy, Bangladesh should maintain a calm posture. As the Bay of Bengal becomes more contested, Dhaka should cooperate on maritime domain awareness, disaster response, and counter-trafficking, but avoid getting pulled into military postures that turn it into a frontline.
How should the next government do this? Policy needs structure. The next government should publish a foreign-policy white paper within its first year, to be updated annually, with separate chapters on India, China, and the US. It should be written in plain language and debated in parliament. When policy becomes a public document, it becomes harder to hijack for vested interest groups. Institutional coordination must also be rebuilt. Several ministries—commerce, energy, shipping, home affairs, defence, expatriate welfare and overseas employment, and environment—conduct foreign policy by accident. Bangladesh, therefore, needs a strong inter-ministerial mechanism to set priorities, resolve contradictions, and track implementation.
Finally, our foreign policy should no longer be treated as a partisan identity or instrument, but as a shared national framework grounded in consensus, continuity, and clear interests. It should strengthen our negotiating hand regardless of who holds office.
Asif Bin Ali is an Atlanta-based geopolitical analyst and a doctoral fellow at Georgia State University.
By Asif Bin Ali
VISUAL: STAR
Bangladesh often seems to treat foreign policy as subject to seasonal political moods. If one government is branded “India-friendly,” another “China-leaning,” then a third is cast as “Washington’s favourite.” In reality, Dhaka engages all three powers every day—on trade, loans, borders, security, climate, migration, the Bay of Bengal, etc. But it does so without a clearly stated hierarchy of interests and without a stable policy framework that survives elections and domestic political manoeuvring. This is a major weakness of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Moreover, political actors often use foreign policy as a weapon in partisan storytelling for a domestic audience. So India becomes a symbol, not a relationship. China becomes a chequebook, not a strategy. The United States becomes either a saviour or a conspirator, depending on who is speaking and who is under pressure.
After the 2026 election, the future elected government should do something basic but long overdue: set out three clear country policies—towards India, China, and the US—and ensure they enjoy broad political consensus and commitment so that they do not change regardless of the change in power. These policies should not be about ideological alignments or public relations exercises; they should instead serve as enduring principles that signal to the bureaucracy and the public what Bangladesh wants, what it will not trade away, and what it will prioritise when interests collide.
Why do clear country policies matter? Small and mid-sized states survive by being predictable abroad and disciplined at home. Geography already imposes certain permanent facts. India surrounds Bangladesh on three sides and shapes its river system, border economy, and security environment. China is the largest source of global manufacturing power and a major provider of capital for infrastructure. The US and the Western market system remain central to Bangladesh’s exports, finance, and technology ecosystem. You can dislike these facts, but you cannot vote them out.
Yet relationships with these countries were often viewed as if they were personal friendships between leaders, short-term transactions, or exercises in emergency diplomacy, rather than as long-term statecraft anchored in clearly articulated national interests and institutional continuity. This approach produces negative outcomes, frequently converting routine bargaining into narratives of national prestige. A water-sharing negotiation, a port decision, a visa issue, or a defence procurement discussion becomes a test of patriotism. Such framing undermines, rather than strengthens, a strategic foreign policy approach.
Over the decades, Bangladesh has produced some important diplomatic achievements. The 1996 Ganges water treaty, for instance, showed how tough geography can still be negotiated. The maritime boundary settlements with Myanmar and India expanded our legal certainty in the Bay of Bengal and strengthened Bangladesh’s blue-economy claims. The 2015 land boundary settlement with India improved the lives of people in the enclaves. These are not Awami League or BNP moments; they are Bangladesh’s achievements. But when they are treated as partisan trophies, the country weakens its future negotiating position.
One of the most persistent myths in Dhaka is that closeness to one power requires hostility to another. If you are “with” India, you must be “against” China. If you work with China, you must be suspicious of America. This may sound like common sense, and the geopolitics around them may also seem to suggest it, but it is really a lazy shortcut often favoured by Bangladesh’s political and civil classes. They confuse alignment with engagement. Bangladesh already practises issue-based engagement. It relies on the US and EU markets for export earnings. It relies on Gulf states for labour markets and remittances. China and other Asian partners provide large-scale financing and industrial inputs, while neighbouring India is critical for border security and stability, transit geography, and river politics. This is not a choice between lovers or adversaries. It is a portfolio. The missing piece is strategy.
What should an India policy look like? India is not just another bilateral partner; it is an integral part of the neighbourhood structure. In most areas, India has more leverage. It is a nuclear power and an aspiring global power. But that does not mean Bangladesh cannot negotiate or exercise sovereign autonomy. A serious India policy, therefore, begins by accepting this reality and managing it with steady discipline rather than chest-thumping. It should remain anchored in the files that never go away. Water sharing requires year-round negotiation capacity and technical preparation, not seasonal outrage. To save lives on the border and ensure security, both countries must work in a manner bound by law and accountability; otherwise, the issue turns toxic at home. The relationship is also lived through people-to-people ties—visas, culture, and media narratives. If these spaces are left to suspicion and scandal, policy may always be hostage to anger. Above all, the baseline must be clear: reciprocal respect for sovereignty and a firm commitment to non-intervention in each other’s domestic politics. Ultimately, an India policy should separate real bargaining from performative nationalism.
What should a China policy look like? China is no longer just about roads and bridges for Dhaka. As China increasingly shapes industrial policy, technology standards, defence choices, and strategic infrastructure, a clear China policy has become essential. The first rule should be productivity over ribbon-cutting. Bangladesh should prioritise fewer vanity projects and more reliable energy, efficient ports, rail freight, functioning industrial zones, and skills linked to real jobs. It should also incorporate risk management into Chinese-funded projects, with greater financial transparency, proper procurement where possible, and clear, plain-language debt assessments. When terms are hidden, suspicion grows, and that suspicion becomes a domestic weapon weakening Bangladesh’s bargaining power with Beijing and others. Moreover, Bangladesh’s China policy should treat technology as a security issue, not just a price issue. This will help reduce dependence in sensitive areas that foreign powers can turn into leverage. And China should not be treated only as a lender; Dhaka should negotiate for market access, manufacturing relocation, and joint ventures.
What should a US policy look like? Bangladesh needs a clear US policy because Washington affects its economy even when it does not mention Bangladesh. Trade rules, labour standards, brand compliance, technology ecosystems, financial regulations, and sanctions policies can influence Bangladesh’s economy overnight. A serious US policy must begin with the understanding that the export economy depends on reputation. It is about protecting Bangladeshi workers and keeping Bangladeshi factories and products inside the global supply chains.
A serious US policy also requires an engagement strategy that extends beyond a single embassy channel. The US system is fragmented. Congress matters. State-level business networks matter. Brands matter. Diaspora voices matter. If Bangladesh engages Washington only during crises, it will always negotiate from a defensive position. On security and regional strategy, Bangladesh should maintain a calm posture. As the Bay of Bengal becomes more contested, Dhaka should cooperate on maritime domain awareness, disaster response, and counter-trafficking, but avoid getting pulled into military postures that turn it into a frontline.
How should the next government do this? Policy needs structure. The next government should publish a foreign-policy white paper within its first year, to be updated annually, with separate chapters on India, China, and the US. It should be written in plain language and debated in parliament. When policy becomes a public document, it becomes harder to hijack for vested interest groups. Institutional coordination must also be rebuilt. Several ministries—commerce, energy, shipping, home affairs, defence, expatriate welfare and overseas employment, and environment—conduct foreign policy by accident. Bangladesh, therefore, needs a strong inter-ministerial mechanism to set priorities, resolve contradictions, and track implementation.
Finally, our foreign policy should no longer be treated as a partisan identity or instrument, but as a shared national framework grounded in consensus, continuity, and clear interests. It should strengthen our negotiating hand regardless of who holds office.
Asif Bin Ali is an Atlanta-based geopolitical analyst and a doctoral fellow at Georgia State University.
