Combatting India’s manufactured fears
A strategic framework for Bangladesh
Anu AnwarAnu Anwar
Publish : 07 Oct 2024, 08:44 AMUpdate : 07 Oct 2024, 03:32 PM
The Indian defense minister's recent remarks about Bangladesh, hinting at potential use of force, have triggered a significant response within Bangladesh, including within its military establishment. In response, former Chief of Army General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan has urged the military to assess the possibility of putting forces on war footing under the French model of levee en masse -- which refers to a policy from the French Revolution that required all able-bodied men of certain ages to serve in the military to defend the nation.
This development underscores the urgent need to assess Bangladesh's strategic options, dissect India’s “manufactured fears,” and formulate a comprehensive defense strategy. In this article, I advocate for "Triple-A Deterrence (AAAD)” strategy -- which stands for Asymmetric, Adaptive, and Aligned Deterrence, where "asymmetric" represents a focus on quality over quantity, "aligned" emphasizes the internationalization of defense through multipolar partnerships, and "adaptive" highlights the nation’s ability to remain united and resilient to evolving security challenges.
Bangladesh’s strategic depth
While Bangladesh may seem small on the global map, it is a country of considerable strategic significance. With a population of 175 million, it is the eighth-largest nation globally and the third-largest Muslim-majority country, surpassing even Russia in population. Its geo-strategic location at the crossroads of the Bay of Bengal -- where Eurasian land powers meet Western Sea powers -- has been geo-politically significant for centuries. Historically, Bengal has been a critical region, from the prosperous Bengal Sultanate, to the Mughal Empire, to its role in providing a launching pad for 200-years of British colonial expansion across South Asia.
India’s strategic gains from Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 is profound. In the shorter term, the independence of Bangladesh eliminated India’s two-front threat posed by East and West Pakistan. However, while Bangladesh has gone the extra mile to maintain friendly relations with India, Delhi’s recent chauvinist nationalist policies under BJP alienated Bangladeshis as it is at odds with what defines Bangladesh’s national identity. Bangladesh hostility toward India could force India to redirect its military resources, which have since been concentrated against China and Pakistan, and it could undercut India’s horizontal expansion via “Look East and Act East policy” as well as engaging Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, and Iran on the West aimed at countering China’s vertical expansion in Indian Ocean via Belt and Road Initiative.
However, from the very inception of Bangladesh, India laid the groundwork to exert long-term influence. For the past five decades, it has employed a mix of covert and overt strategies -- ranging from economic incentives to political pressure -- to keep Bangladesh within its sphere of influence to project power eastward. Yet, a generational shift is underway. The new generation of Bangladeshis, born and raised in an independent country, is deeply committed to protecting their nation’s interests, marking a departure from the older generation’s historical ties to either India or Pakistan.
The mass uprising of August 5, when Gen Z-led protests ousted Sheikh Hasina's dictatorial regime after 15 years of rule, symbolizes a tectonic shift in the political landscape. The youth-led movement not only removed a perceived India pet regime seen as compromising national interests, but also may dismantle India’s carefully constructed “spider net” of influence within Bangladesh. The frustration and anxiety of ruling elites in India were visible in their media. Faced with these developments, India’s response has been to fall back on its familiar playbook of exerting control through what can be termed “manufactured fear.” The Indian defense minister’s statement fits squarely within this broader strategy.
While territorial size is important for conventional defense, “strategic depth” encompasses more than just physical space. Bangladesh's strategic depth lies in its access to the Bay of Bengal, its proximity to three nuclear powers -- China, India, and Pakistan -- each sharing borders with each other, which is unique globally, size of the population and their historic resilience, along with its position as a bridge between Southeast and South Asia. Additionally, Bangladesh's restrictive terrain imposes both operational and strategic limitations on invading forces. The dense vegetation and waterlogged landscape create further obstacles to maneuverability. In sum, Bangladesh has indeed the sufficient strategic depth required to defend itself against India.
India’s strategy of manufactured fear
India’s strategy to influence Bangladesh is rooted in a well-orchestrated campaign of manufactured fear, deployed through three primary tactics:
1. Psychological warfare: India has mastered the art of psychological warfare, leveraging its media and intellectual infrastructure to project power and instill a sense of vulnerability among its neighbours. For Bangladesh, this has manifested in regular border killings of Bangladeshi civilians by Border Security Force (BSF) that serve as reminders of India’s military dominance, undermining the morale of Bangladeshi Security Forces. Intermittently playing the “vulnerability of minority” card and putting Bangladesh in defensive mode. India’s control over shared river systems, where it has built dams unilaterally, has led to seasonal droughts and floods in Bangladesh, exacerbating the country’s vulnerabilities. Additionally, India’s deep penetration into Bangladesh’s cultural and media landscape subtly shapes public perception, aligning Bangladeshi thought patterns more closely with Indian values and diminishing the capacity for independent strategic thinking.
2. Discursive warfare: India’s discursive dominance revolves around three key narratives: its overwhelming size relative to Bangladesh, its geographic encirclement of Bangladesh, and India’s nuclear superiority.
Indian analysts often portray South Asia as a region of “India and smaller countries,” a narrative that is both factually incorrect and dismissive of the seven other South Asian states. If such framing were accepted globally, we would also hear narratives like “China and smaller countries in Northeast Asia” or “Brazil and smaller countries in South America.” Yet, no one describes these sub-regions with the same reductive terminology.
Furthermore, let alone global, India frequently portrays Bangladesh as "too small" to be an actor in regional issues. While geographically India is 22 times larger in size and eight times more populous than Bangladesh, China is 25 times larger in size and 11 times bigger than Japan in population. Yet, Japan is never described as “too small” in geo-political discourse. History shows that power dynamics are not solely determined by size -- after all, Japan was never invaded by China but the opposite happened.
Another narrative is that Bangladesh is encircled by India on three sides, with the Bay of Bengal on the other, leaving it no choice but to pay deference to India. This interpretation fails to recognize that if Bangladesh is India-locked then India should realize that its Northeastern seven states are also “Bangladesh-locked.” The "seven sisters" region of India, which makes up 8% of the country’s territory, is connected to the mainland only via the narrow Siliguri Corridor, which lies between Bangladesh and Nepal. From a military perspective, this corridor is a strategic vulnerability. More so, Doklum and Naku La incidents near this place in 2017 and 2021 with China should substantiate fragility. Furthermore, while India emphasizes its geographic advantage, it avoids mentioning that Bangladesh is less than 100 miles from China’s border, just beyond the Siliguri Corridor. If China is hungry to expand vertically into the Indian Ocean through economic corridors, this has significance. India also overlooks the fact that the populations in its northeastern states often feel alienated from Delhi and share more cultural and linguistic ties with Bangladesh than with India’s heartland. In sum, Bangladesh, if it plays its cards right, can leverage its geographical and cultural positions to expose India’s vulnerabilities.
Finally, India leverages its nuclear status to present Bangladesh as militarily vulnerable. However, history shows that nuclear weapons are seldom used in warfare, with the last and only instance occurring 78 years ago in Japan. The close proximity of India and Bangladesh also complicates the use of nuclear weapons, as any detonation would result in radiation fallout affecting both countries. Furthermore, the use of nuclear weapons would drastically alter the regional balance of power, a development that superior nuclear power China or Pakistan would oppose. Even if Bangladesh cannot count on direct support from China or Pakistan, if nukes come into play in an event of conflict, these countries would likely interfere to protect their own strategic interests. Thus, India’s nuclear advantage is not as absolute as it might appear.
3. Divide and rule tactics: India’s most effective strategy has been to foster internal divisions within Bangladesh, whether along political, religious, or ideological lines. These divisions prevent Bangladesh from presenting a united front and allow India to exert influence regardless of which political party is in power.
To be continued......................
Bangladesh Defense
