What can India actually do against Bangladesh?
In practical terms, India’s capacity for overt military action against Bangladesh is highly constrained and counterproductive-- it would be a bigger bite than India can chew. If India had that capacity, it would not have withdrawn its forces after the 1971 Independence War of Bangladesh, nor would it likely refrain from using force unlike it did in cases like the Maldives or Sri Lanka. India’s military resources are already stretched thin by threats from China and Pakistan, making a prolonged conflict with Bangladesh unlikely.
It maintains about 40 divisions, yet it would need to commit at least 30 divisions to effectively attack Bangladesh, assuming a minimum force ratio of 3:1 for successful offensive operations. However, Bangladesh, with a population of 175 million, one-third of whom are youth, can rapidly mobilize its population for military service, tapping into a pool of 56 million people of standard military age. While India has a larger population, it also faces larger and more numerous adversaries. Bangladesh, in contrast, can focus its military entirely on India, as it faces no other threats.
Moreover, Bangladesh’s 4,000km border complicates any Indian military strategy. Bangladesh could unleash millions of fighters potentially crossing into Indian territory, creating widespread mayhem against Indian forces. Rather than a strategic advantage, India’s geographic encirclement of Bangladesh becomes a vulnerability in this context.
Furthermore, any military escalation would likely prompt reactions from regional and global powers, particularly the US, China, and the wider Muslim world as a change in the regional power balance would threaten their interests. However, India can indeed cause significant damage to Bangladesh should an all-out war break out but Bangladesh’s strength rests in its ability to incur relative damage on India across the board over the longer term. Though, India is likely to get an initial upper hand in a direct confrontation but unlikely to sustain relative gain is protracted guerilla warfare that has been the doctrine of Bangladesh’s armed forces in an event of invasion. Recognizing these constraints, India has refrained from overt conflict and instead relies on psychological warfare and gray-zone tactics, leveraging covert influence to extract concessions from Bangladesh without direct military engagement.
National defense through unity
Bangladesh faces the challenge of establishing a credible deterrent against a larger, nuclear-armed neighbour like India. Given this asymmetry, it must explore strategic alternatives that do not rely on traditional power projection. Three primary options emerge for Bangladesh: Nuclear deterrence; a robust conventional force; or a multifaceted strategy incorporating military quality, international partnerships, and national unity.
The first option, pursuing nuclear weapons, offers a proven deterrent. However, as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and considering global geo-political realities, Bangladesh cannot develop a nuclear arsenal or seek an extended nuclear deterrent from another power without facing significant political and economic repercussions. This constraint makes the nuclear option neither feasible nor practical.
The second possibility is building a conventional military force capable of inflicting significant damage, similar to North Korea's strategy against US-South Korea before acquiring nuclear weapons. This would involve developing advanced precision-strike capabilities, and missile systems such as short and medium-range hypersonic missiles, to create a credible threat. However, this approach is not viable for Bangladesh due to the massive financial resources and technological expertise required. Additionally, obtaining such advanced weapons would likely encounter serious geopolitical obstacles, including sourcing them from international suppliers may warrant regional destabilization.
Given these limitations, Bangladesh’s most viable path is adopting the aforementioned AAAD strategy: A multifaceted approach combining asymmetric military development, internationalizing defense policy, and fostering national unity, which would entail:
1. Asymmetric deterrence (prioritizing quality over quantity): Bangladesh cannot match India’s military size; therefore, it should focus on developing a qualitative edge. This entails building an agile, technologically advanced, and professional armed force. Implementing meritocracy within military ranks is essential to counteract recent declines in operational capabilities caused by political interference.
Qualitative enhancement can provide a powerful deterrent. For instance, during India’s 2019 Balakot airstrike, Pakistan demonstrated how technological sophistication, and tactical prowess could outweigh numerical superiority. Despite possessing around 600 fighter aircraft compared to Pakistan’s 350, India was forced to halt its air campaign after a Pakistani US-made F-16 downed an Indian Soviet-made MiG-21 in a dogfight. This incident underscores that quantity does not guarantee success; rather, advanced capabilities and skilled personnel can shift the strategic balance.
Bangladesh can also learn from Singapore’s defense strategy, which emphasizes meritocracy, high-tech capabilities, and qualitative superiority to create a credible deterrent against much larger neighbours. Given India's limited ability to achieve strategic objectives through conventional warfare, it often resorts to gray-zone tactics, such as covert operations and economic pressure, to exert influence. To counter this, Bangladesh should adopt a two-pronged strategy: Deterrence by denial and "escalate to de-escalate."
“Deterrence by denial” necessitates that Bangladesh fortify its defense and posture its forces in a manner that imposes unacceptable costs on India in the event of an invasion. A critical part of this deterrence strategy, however, is assurance. Bangladesh must unequivocally communicate that its objective is strictly defensive -- not offensive. On the other hand, ”escalate to de-escalate” involves countering Indian gray-zone tactics with a readiness to escalate conflicts into conventional military confrontations. This strategy signals that Bangladesh is prepared to defend its sovereignty, which in turn would dissuade India from pursuing sub-conventional maneuvers that might provoke a larger confrontation. Ultimately, the aim is to deter, not provoke.
2. Aligned deterrence (internationalizing defense policy): South Asia’s geo-political landscape ensures that any conflict in the region has far-reaching implications. While Bangladesh is smaller than India, interstate warfare would have more than a purely bilateral matter -- as evident during Bangladesh’s War for Independence in 1971. The international community and regional actors would likely oppose India’s attempts to alter the status quo. Thus, Bangladesh must internationalize its defense policy, positioning itself as a key player in regional stability.
By actively engaging with regional powers and international partners, Bangladesh can create a strategic environment where any Indian aggression is perceived as contrary to regional and global powers’ interests. Building strategic partnerships through diplomatic channels not only enhances Bangladesh's defense capabilities but also discourages India from pursuing military adventurism. By framing its security policy within a broader international context, Bangladesh could strengthen its position and deter unilateral action by its larger neighbour.
3. Adaptive deterrence (national unity as a strategic tool): National unity should be the cornerstone of Bangladesh’s deterrence strategy. With a population of approximately 175 million, cohesive internal strength acts as a significant force multiplier. Historically, internal divisions in Bangladesh have been exploited by external actors, especially through India’s gray-zone tactics. Therefore, uniting the populace around a common national cause is vital for defense.
To counter India’s efforts to create internal instability, Bangladesh must leverage its intellectual and media resources, as well as a capable intelligence community, to expose clandestine activities. Highlighting such operations disrupts immediate threats and signals long-term vigilance, thereby serving as a deterrent. Bangladesh should also foster a scholarly community specializing in security studies to build a solid theoretical foundation for its defense policies. This scholarly engagement can produce counter-narratives that debunk India’s influence and educate the public on Bangladesh’s relative strength, reducing unwarranted fear and empowering citizens to support national security confidently.
The military can play a pivotal role in this endeavour, promoting national solidarity and projecting strength. While this task extends beyond the traditional military traditional mandate, it is critical for bolstering the country’s deterrence posture as they must realize it is harder for Bangladesh to compete with India only by military means. A unified Bangladesh presents a formidable front to any external threat, potentially rivaling even nuclear capabilities as a deterrent force.
India is likely to continue employing strategies aimed at internal destabilization. Therefore, national cohesion is paramount for Bangladesh's survival and sovereignty. As Singapore’s leaders have observed: "The world is like a pond, and countries are like fish where big fish must eat small fish for their own survival. For small fish to survive, they must become poisonous to deter predators." Bangladesh must adopt this in its strategic culture, nurturing internal unity and building a superior qualitative military force to counter external threats effectively. In effect, it becomes a poison mushroom that, if swallowed, could kill the host.
While achieving direct military parity with India is neither feasible nor necessary, Bangladesh can establish credible deterrence through a strategy that prioritizes qualitative military enhancements, internationalizes its defense policy, and fortifies national unity. This AAAD approach not only strengthens Bangladesh’s defense posture but also serves as a robust deterrent against potential aggression, ensuring its sovereignty and regional stability.
For constructive Bangladesh-India relations, both nations need to embrace a “live and let live” approach, acknowledging the changing realities on the ground. If India fails to recognize Bangladesh's transformation and persists with a heavy-handed strategy, the consequences could prove detrimental not only for Bangladesh but for India as well. In essence, Bangladesh has no reason to live in fear or insecurity, nor should India entertain overambitious strategy. The path to development for both countries lies in fostering mutual security and respect.
The author would like to express gratitude to several anonymous experts who provided valuable feedback on the initial draft.
Anu Anwar serves as a non-resident associate at Harvard University and is a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Bangladesh Defense
