[🇧🇩-Land] Indian army---A long term threat for Bangladesh army.

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https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/longform/361034/combatting-india%E2%80%99s-manufactured-fears

Combatting India’s manufactured fears
A strategic framework for Bangladesh

Anu AnwarAnu Anwar
Publish : 07 Oct 2024, 08:44 AMUpdate : 07 Oct 2024, 03:32 PM

The Indian defense minister's recent remarks about Bangladesh, hinting at potential use of force, have triggered a significant response within Bangladesh, including within its military establishment. In response, former Chief of Army General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan has urged the military to assess the possibility of putting forces on war footing under the French model of levee en masse -- which refers to a policy from the French Revolution that required all able-bodied men of certain ages to serve in the military to defend the nation.

This development underscores the urgent need to assess Bangladesh's strategic options, dissect India’s “manufactured fears,” and formulate a comprehensive defense strategy. In this article, I advocate for "Triple-A Deterrence (AAAD)” strategy -- which stands for Asymmetric, Adaptive, and Aligned Deterrence, where "asymmetric" represents a focus on quality over quantity, "aligned" emphasizes the internationalization of defense through multipolar partnerships, and "adaptive" highlights the nation’s ability to remain united and resilient to evolving security challenges.

Bangladesh’s strategic depth

While Bangladesh may seem small on the global map, it is a country of considerable strategic significance. With a population of 175 million, it is the eighth-largest nation globally and the third-largest Muslim-majority country, surpassing even Russia in population. Its geo-strategic location at the crossroads of the Bay of Bengal -- where Eurasian land powers meet Western Sea powers -- has been geo-politically significant for centuries. Historically, Bengal has been a critical region, from the prosperous Bengal Sultanate, to the Mughal Empire, to its role in providing a launching pad for 200-years of British colonial expansion across South Asia.

India’s strategic gains from Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 is profound. In the shorter term, the independence of Bangladesh eliminated India’s two-front threat posed by East and West Pakistan. However, while Bangladesh has gone the extra mile to maintain friendly relations with India, Delhi’s recent chauvinist nationalist policies under BJP alienated Bangladeshis as it is at odds with what defines Bangladesh’s national identity. Bangladesh hostility toward India could force India to redirect its military resources, which have since been concentrated against China and Pakistan, and it could undercut India’s horizontal expansion via “Look East and Act East policy” as well as engaging Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, and Iran on the West aimed at countering China’s vertical expansion in Indian Ocean via Belt and Road Initiative.

However, from the very inception of Bangladesh, India laid the groundwork to exert long-term influence. For the past five decades, it has employed a mix of covert and overt strategies -- ranging from economic incentives to political pressure -- to keep Bangladesh within its sphere of influence to project power eastward. Yet, a generational shift is underway. The new generation of Bangladeshis, born and raised in an independent country, is deeply committed to protecting their nation’s interests, marking a departure from the older generation’s historical ties to either India or Pakistan.

The mass uprising of August 5, when Gen Z-led protests ousted Sheikh Hasina's dictatorial regime after 15 years of rule, symbolizes a tectonic shift in the political landscape. The youth-led movement not only removed a perceived India pet regime seen as compromising national interests, but also may dismantle India’s carefully constructed “spider net” of influence within Bangladesh. The frustration and anxiety of ruling elites in India were visible in their media. Faced with these developments, India’s response has been to fall back on its familiar playbook of exerting control through what can be termed “manufactured fear.” The Indian defense minister’s statement fits squarely within this broader strategy.

While territorial size is important for conventional defense, “strategic depth” encompasses more than just physical space. Bangladesh's strategic depth lies in its access to the Bay of Bengal, its proximity to three nuclear powers -- China, India, and Pakistan -- each sharing borders with each other, which is unique globally, size of the population and their historic resilience, along with its position as a bridge between Southeast and South Asia. Additionally, Bangladesh's restrictive terrain imposes both operational and strategic limitations on invading forces. The dense vegetation and waterlogged landscape create further obstacles to maneuverability. In sum, Bangladesh has indeed the sufficient strategic depth required to defend itself against India.

India’s strategy of manufactured fear

India’s strategy to influence Bangladesh is rooted in a well-orchestrated campaign of manufactured fear, deployed through three primary tactics:

1. Psychological warfare: India has mastered the art of psychological warfare, leveraging its media and intellectual infrastructure to project power and instill a sense of vulnerability among its neighbours. For Bangladesh, this has manifested in regular border killings of Bangladeshi civilians by Border Security Force (BSF) that serve as reminders of India’s military dominance, undermining the morale of Bangladeshi Security Forces. Intermittently playing the “vulnerability of minority” card and putting Bangladesh in defensive mode. India’s control over shared river systems, where it has built dams unilaterally, has led to seasonal droughts and floods in Bangladesh, exacerbating the country’s vulnerabilities. Additionally, India’s deep penetration into Bangladesh’s cultural and media landscape subtly shapes public perception, aligning Bangladeshi thought patterns more closely with Indian values and diminishing the capacity for independent strategic thinking.

2. Discursive warfare: India’s discursive dominance revolves around three key narratives: its overwhelming size relative to Bangladesh, its geographic encirclement of Bangladesh, and India’s nuclear superiority.

Indian analysts often portray South Asia as a region of “India and smaller countries,” a narrative that is both factually incorrect and dismissive of the seven other South Asian states. If such framing were accepted globally, we would also hear narratives like “China and smaller countries in Northeast Asia” or “Brazil and smaller countries in South America.” Yet, no one describes these sub-regions with the same reductive terminology.

Furthermore, let alone global, India frequently portrays Bangladesh as "too small" to be an actor in regional issues. While geographically India is 22 times larger in size and eight times more populous than Bangladesh, China is 25 times larger in size and 11 times bigger than Japan in population. Yet, Japan is never described as “too small” in geo-political discourse. History shows that power dynamics are not solely determined by size -- after all, Japan was never invaded by China but the opposite happened.

Another narrative is that Bangladesh is encircled by India on three sides, with the Bay of Bengal on the other, leaving it no choice but to pay deference to India. This interpretation fails to recognize that if Bangladesh is India-locked then India should realize that its Northeastern seven states are also “Bangladesh-locked.” The "seven sisters" region of India, which makes up 8% of the country’s territory, is connected to the mainland only via the narrow Siliguri Corridor, which lies between Bangladesh and Nepal. From a military perspective, this corridor is a strategic vulnerability. More so, Doklum and Naku La incidents near this place in 2017 and 2021 with China should substantiate fragility. Furthermore, while India emphasizes its geographic advantage, it avoids mentioning that Bangladesh is less than 100 miles from China’s border, just beyond the Siliguri Corridor. If China is hungry to expand vertically into the Indian Ocean through economic corridors, this has significance. India also overlooks the fact that the populations in its northeastern states often feel alienated from Delhi and share more cultural and linguistic ties with Bangladesh than with India’s heartland. In sum, Bangladesh, if it plays its cards right, can leverage its geographical and cultural positions to expose India’s vulnerabilities.

Finally, India leverages its nuclear status to present Bangladesh as militarily vulnerable. However, history shows that nuclear weapons are seldom used in warfare, with the last and only instance occurring 78 years ago in Japan. The close proximity of India and Bangladesh also complicates the use of nuclear weapons, as any detonation would result in radiation fallout affecting both countries. Furthermore, the use of nuclear weapons would drastically alter the regional balance of power, a development that superior nuclear power China or Pakistan would oppose. Even if Bangladesh cannot count on direct support from China or Pakistan, if nukes come into play in an event of conflict, these countries would likely interfere to protect their own strategic interests. Thus, India’s nuclear advantage is not as absolute as it might appear.

3. Divide and rule tactics: India’s most effective strategy has been to foster internal divisions within Bangladesh, whether along political, religious, or ideological lines. These divisions prevent Bangladesh from presenting a united front and allow India to exert influence regardless of which political party is in power.

To be continued......................​

 

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What can India actually do against Bangladesh?

In practical terms, India’s capacity for overt military action against Bangladesh is highly constrained and counterproductive-- it would be a bigger bite than India can chew. If India had that capacity, it would not have withdrawn its forces after the 1971 Independence War of Bangladesh, nor would it likely refrain from using force unlike it did in cases like the Maldives or Sri Lanka. India’s military resources are already stretched thin by threats from China and Pakistan, making a prolonged conflict with Bangladesh unlikely.

It maintains about 40 divisions, yet it would need to commit at least 30 divisions to effectively attack Bangladesh, assuming a minimum force ratio of 3:1 for successful offensive operations. However, Bangladesh, with a population of 175 million, one-third of whom are youth, can rapidly mobilize its population for military service, tapping into a pool of 56 million people of standard military age. While India has a larger population, it also faces larger and more numerous adversaries. Bangladesh, in contrast, can focus its military entirely on India, as it faces no other threats.

Moreover, Bangladesh’s 4,000km border complicates any Indian military strategy. Bangladesh could unleash millions of fighters potentially crossing into Indian territory, creating widespread mayhem against Indian forces. Rather than a strategic advantage, India’s geographic encirclement of Bangladesh becomes a vulnerability in this context.

Furthermore, any military escalation would likely prompt reactions from regional and global powers, particularly the US, China, and the wider Muslim world as a change in the regional power balance would threaten their interests. However, India can indeed cause significant damage to Bangladesh should an all-out war break out but Bangladesh’s strength rests in its ability to incur relative damage on India across the board over the longer term. Though, India is likely to get an initial upper hand in a direct confrontation but unlikely to sustain relative gain is protracted guerilla warfare that has been the doctrine of Bangladesh’s armed forces in an event of invasion. Recognizing these constraints, India has refrained from overt conflict and instead relies on psychological warfare and gray-zone tactics, leveraging covert influence to extract concessions from Bangladesh without direct military engagement.

National defense through unity

Bangladesh faces the challenge of establishing a credible deterrent against a larger, nuclear-armed neighbour like India. Given this asymmetry, it must explore strategic alternatives that do not rely on traditional power projection. Three primary options emerge for Bangladesh: Nuclear deterrence; a robust conventional force; or a multifaceted strategy incorporating military quality, international partnerships, and national unity.

The first option, pursuing nuclear weapons, offers a proven deterrent. However, as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and considering global geo-political realities, Bangladesh cannot develop a nuclear arsenal or seek an extended nuclear deterrent from another power without facing significant political and economic repercussions. This constraint makes the nuclear option neither feasible nor practical.

The second possibility is building a conventional military force capable of inflicting significant damage, similar to North Korea's strategy against US-South Korea before acquiring nuclear weapons. This would involve developing advanced precision-strike capabilities, and missile systems such as short and medium-range hypersonic missiles, to create a credible threat. However, this approach is not viable for Bangladesh due to the massive financial resources and technological expertise required. Additionally, obtaining such advanced weapons would likely encounter serious geopolitical obstacles, including sourcing them from international suppliers may warrant regional destabilization.

Given these limitations, Bangladesh’s most viable path is adopting the aforementioned AAAD strategy: A multifaceted approach combining asymmetric military development, internationalizing defense policy, and fostering national unity, which would entail:

1. Asymmetric deterrence (prioritizing quality over quantity): Bangladesh cannot match India’s military size; therefore, it should focus on developing a qualitative edge. This entails building an agile, technologically advanced, and professional armed force. Implementing meritocracy within military ranks is essential to counteract recent declines in operational capabilities caused by political interference.

Qualitative enhancement can provide a powerful deterrent. For instance, during India’s 2019 Balakot airstrike, Pakistan demonstrated how technological sophistication, and tactical prowess could outweigh numerical superiority. Despite possessing around 600 fighter aircraft compared to Pakistan’s 350, India was forced to halt its air campaign after a Pakistani US-made F-16 downed an Indian Soviet-made MiG-21 in a dogfight. This incident underscores that quantity does not guarantee success; rather, advanced capabilities and skilled personnel can shift the strategic balance.

Bangladesh can also learn from Singapore’s defense strategy, which emphasizes meritocracy, high-tech capabilities, and qualitative superiority to create a credible deterrent against much larger neighbours. Given India's limited ability to achieve strategic objectives through conventional warfare, it often resorts to gray-zone tactics, such as covert operations and economic pressure, to exert influence. To counter this, Bangladesh should adopt a two-pronged strategy: Deterrence by denial and "escalate to de-escalate."

“Deterrence by denial” necessitates that Bangladesh fortify its defense and posture its forces in a manner that imposes unacceptable costs on India in the event of an invasion. A critical part of this deterrence strategy, however, is assurance. Bangladesh must unequivocally communicate that its objective is strictly defensive -- not offensive. On the other hand, ”escalate to de-escalate” involves countering Indian gray-zone tactics with a readiness to escalate conflicts into conventional military confrontations. This strategy signals that Bangladesh is prepared to defend its sovereignty, which in turn would dissuade India from pursuing sub-conventional maneuvers that might provoke a larger confrontation. Ultimately, the aim is to deter, not provoke.

2. Aligned deterrence (internationalizing defense policy): South Asia’s geo-political landscape ensures that any conflict in the region has far-reaching implications. While Bangladesh is smaller than India, interstate warfare would have more than a purely bilateral matter -- as evident during Bangladesh’s War for Independence in 1971. The international community and regional actors would likely oppose India’s attempts to alter the status quo. Thus, Bangladesh must internationalize its defense policy, positioning itself as a key player in regional stability.

By actively engaging with regional powers and international partners, Bangladesh can create a strategic environment where any Indian aggression is perceived as contrary to regional and global powers’ interests. Building strategic partnerships through diplomatic channels not only enhances Bangladesh's defense capabilities but also discourages India from pursuing military adventurism. By framing its security policy within a broader international context, Bangladesh could strengthen its position and deter unilateral action by its larger neighbour.

3. Adaptive deterrence (national unity as a strategic tool): National unity should be the cornerstone of Bangladesh’s deterrence strategy. With a population of approximately 175 million, cohesive internal strength acts as a significant force multiplier. Historically, internal divisions in Bangladesh have been exploited by external actors, especially through India’s gray-zone tactics. Therefore, uniting the populace around a common national cause is vital for defense.

To counter India’s efforts to create internal instability, Bangladesh must leverage its intellectual and media resources, as well as a capable intelligence community, to expose clandestine activities. Highlighting such operations disrupts immediate threats and signals long-term vigilance, thereby serving as a deterrent. Bangladesh should also foster a scholarly community specializing in security studies to build a solid theoretical foundation for its defense policies. This scholarly engagement can produce counter-narratives that debunk India’s influence and educate the public on Bangladesh’s relative strength, reducing unwarranted fear and empowering citizens to support national security confidently.

The military can play a pivotal role in this endeavour, promoting national solidarity and projecting strength. While this task extends beyond the traditional military traditional mandate, it is critical for bolstering the country’s deterrence posture as they must realize it is harder for Bangladesh to compete with India only by military means. A unified Bangladesh presents a formidable front to any external threat, potentially rivaling even nuclear capabilities as a deterrent force.

India is likely to continue employing strategies aimed at internal destabilization. Therefore, national cohesion is paramount for Bangladesh's survival and sovereignty. As Singapore’s leaders have observed: "The world is like a pond, and countries are like fish where big fish must eat small fish for their own survival. For small fish to survive, they must become poisonous to deter predators." Bangladesh must adopt this in its strategic culture, nurturing internal unity and building a superior qualitative military force to counter external threats effectively. In effect, it becomes a poison mushroom that, if swallowed, could kill the host.

While achieving direct military parity with India is neither feasible nor necessary, Bangladesh can establish credible deterrence through a strategy that prioritizes qualitative military enhancements, internationalizes its defense policy, and fortifies national unity. This AAAD approach not only strengthens Bangladesh’s defense posture but also serves as a robust deterrent against potential aggression, ensuring its sovereignty and regional stability.

For constructive Bangladesh-India relations, both nations need to embrace a “live and let live” approach, acknowledging the changing realities on the ground. If India fails to recognize Bangladesh's transformation and persists with a heavy-handed strategy, the consequences could prove detrimental not only for Bangladesh but for India as well. In essence, Bangladesh has no reason to live in fear or insecurity, nor should India entertain overambitious strategy. The path to development for both countries lies in fostering mutual security and respect.

The author would like to express gratitude to several anonymous experts who provided valuable feedback on the initial draft.

Anu Anwar serves as a non-resident associate at Harvard University and is a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.​

 

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We are in regular touch with Dhaka: Indian army chief

General Dwivedi dismisses concerns over Bangladesh’s ties with Pakistan and China

www.thedailystar.net

We are in regular touch with Dhaka: Indian army chief

General Dwivedi dismisses concerns over Bangladesh’s ties with Pakistan and China

By Star Online Report

Photo: Collected

Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has dismissed Bangladesh emerging as a “third front” after Pakistan and China, saying the Indian military leadership has been in talks with the top brass in Dhaka and there is no such indication as of now.


General Dwivedi said this in response to questions at the annual press conference in New Delhi today, clarifying that the Indian army is constantly monitoring the situation in Bangladesh, reports the United News of India (UNI).


“First of all, it is important to understand what kind of government is in Bangladesh. If it is an interim government, we have to see whether the steps they are taking are for four to five years or only for four to five months,” he said.

“One has to think about whether we need a response immediately or not. Secondly, the channels of the three services are fully open. I am in regular touch with the Army Chief there [Bangladesh],” Dwivedi told journalists.


“Similarly, we are in touch through other mediums as well. We had sent a delegation there, which met all the concerned people. Similarly, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff have also held talks,” he said.

The Indian army chief said that the aim is to ensure that there is no misunderstanding or lack of communication.

“I want to assure you that whatever steps are being taken by the three services in today's situation, they are not against India in any way,” he said.


Referring to the growing closeness of the Bangladesh army with the Pakistani and Chinese armies, he noted capability building is a continuous process.

“India is doing it and so are other countries,” the Indian army chief said.​