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[🇧🇩] India's Water Terrorism Against Bangladesh
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Sharing of Ganges: Water What looms after 2026?​


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Farakka Barrage.

In 1976, a mass procession led by a nearly 80-year-old peasant leader, Maulana Bhasani, from Dhaka to the Indo-Bangladesh Border drew huge attention from national and international media. It demonstrated a profound sense of deprivation among the people of Bangladesh against the unilateral operation of the Farakka Barrage by India, which allegedly killed the Ganges River and unsettled the lives of millions of Bangladeshis living downstream of the Ganges.

The Farakka issue quickly became a perennial irritant in Indo-Bangladesh relations. An internationally renowned expert, R.R. Baxter, was hired to prepare a document assessing Bangladesh's claims. Based on this assessment, a White Paper was published, and the issue was raised by Bangladesh in the UN General Assembly in 1977. Consequently, a five-year temporary agreement was concluded; however, it soon faltered, followed by a weaker legal arrangement (MoU), which raised more controversy on both sides of the border.

I went to SOAS, University of London in 1994 with a Commonwealth Scholarship to pursue a PhD on the international legal aspects of this conflict. Based on a literature review, I found that there were examples of accommodating competing interests of the basin states of a shared river by observing the principles of international watercourse (or river) law. So, why had Bangladesh and India failed to do so, despite many years of protracted consultation and negotiations?

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The withdrawal of water by India during the dry season results in the almost dried-up riverbed at the Hardinge Bridge. The photo was taken by Humayun Kabir Topu on February 18, 2024.

I tried to find answers to this question. In the absence of any "global codification" by intergovernmental bodies, the search for international law centered on applicable "customary rules." The International Law Commission rapporteur assigned to codify those rules on the utilization of shared rivers into a global convention had already agreed in 1994 on the existence of such customary rules. However, there were other versions as well; a notable one was the 1970s proceedings of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, comprising, among others, India, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, which recorded its failure to agree on most of the drafts of customary rules placed for its consideration.

It therefore appeared doubtful whether the global customary rules of international watercourse law were "global" at all, or whether they, like some other branches of international law, were based almost entirely on European and American practice. For that reason, was their application in other areas, including in South Asia, still a debatable issue, and did this confusion have any impact on the resolution of the Ganges water dispute?

A closer look at the South Asian practice, however, reveals an encouraging picture. It shows that from an early period, most of the countries in this region recognized at least one applicable international law principle: the principle of equitable sharing or equitable utilization. Occasional references were also made to the principle of no harm, although it has implications that do not fully conform to the equitable principle.

For example, the equitable utilization principle provides for numerous factors of equity such as river condition, existing uses, dependent population, available alternatives, and the impact of the project, which can be used to assess whether the diversion by the Farakka Project was equitable or reasonable. However, this principle has not settled the hierarchy of those factors. Therefore, by selectively emphasizing those factors, arguments both for and against any planned measure such as the Farakka Project could be made.

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On May 16, 1976, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani led a massive long march from Rajshahi towards India’s Farakka Barrage, demanding the demolition of the barrage constructed by the Indian government to divert the flow of Ganges water within its territory.

But in accordance with the no harm principle, it would be very difficult to support such a project considering its harmful impact on the downstream areas.

Interestingly, the relation between these two substantive principles has not been fully resolved even in the global codification of international watercourse law in 1997. The 1997 Watercourse Convention simply suggests resolving disputes based on both these principles and through compliance with a set of procedural obligations such as information sharing, consultation, and negotiation, etc.

However, there have been two important developments in the last few decades which, among other things, aim to place more emphasis on ensuring protection from potential harmful impacts of any planned measures on a shared river, specifically emphasizing the no-harm principle. The first is the emergence of the concept of treating an international watercourse as an indivisible natural resource, thus requiring a basin-wide approach for the utilization, development, and management of an international watercourse. The second is the growing legal recognition of the right of the river as a living entity, and therefore giving due regard to the environmental implications of the utilization of a watercourse. These require a much broader, holistic, and rational approach to dealing with international watercourses and provide wider opportunities for addressing the long-standing conflicts on the utilization of international watercourses.

With added optimism based on these developments, I recently embarked on updating my PhD (awarded in 1999) thesis. As the principles of comprehensive data sharing, integrated water resource management, and protection of the ecology of the watercourse continue to solidify, their importance in the renegotiation of the latest Ganges treaty of 1996, set to expire in 2026, has grown significantly.

The title of the thoroughly updated version of my PhD is "Sharing Ganges Water, Indo-Bangladesh Treaties, and International Law," and it was published (under my academic name Md. Nazrul Islam) in February 2023 by University Press Limited.


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Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin


This book has compared the experience of negotiation of the Ganges agreements to the contemporary development of international law to determine the extent to which the basin states of the Ganges were prepared to learn from the advances in international law. It has also attempted to understand whether the Ganges dispute reflected non-compliance or a narrow application of international law.

First, it assesses whether the information exchanged between India and Pakistan (predecessor of Bangladesh before the latter's liberation in 1971) during the early stage of the planning of the Farakka project was adequate to resolve the amount of water of the Ganges that constituted an equitable share for each country and the extent of the impact of the project. It should be mentioned that the irrigation and hydroelectric projects of the upper reaches of India and their impact on the availability of water to be shared between the Farakka project and Bangladesh at the downstream area were kept outside the purview of negotiations on the Ganges issue. What were its implications, and how did the international law developed at that time entertain this question?

Second, the later agreements, including the 1996 Ganges Treaty (between Bangladesh and India), were premised on this limited information sharing and made an allocation of the Ganges water at an extreme downstream point between the Farakka project and Bangladesh without provisions for exchanging information on the use of Ganges water in the vast upstream areas in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in India. It was claimed that these arrangements were based on equity, fairness, and no harm. The crucial question raised in my book is, can the arrangement of sharing the 'residual' flow of a river (water left over after the unlimited upstream diversion) be made equitable or fair? Or ensure no harm to the downstream country? What were the rules of international law on such issues?

Third, in the case of the Ganges, the issue appeared more complex, since the river actually originated further upstream in Nepal. Can Nepal, therefore, be ignored in any sharing arrangement of the Ganges at its downstream point? How would it impact the sharing arrangement then? How different could it have been with the participation of Nepal?

If we examine the experience of implementing the Ganges agreements from 1977 to the present, it provides answers to many of these questions. The fact is that the Ganges negotiation began and continued on a faulty legal premise. It focused solely on the competing demands and uses in the downstream Ganges without linking these with the upstream uses of the river. The resulting agreements were unique in many respects. They were short-term or fixed-term, primarily centered around the Farakka project, and focused solely on the economic use of the Ganges, neglecting key environmental issues.

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Cover of the book ‘Sharing Ganges Water’.

As a result, the agreements, including the long-term 1996 Treaty, have failed to fully achieve their goals of equity and no harm. The joint river commission assigned to monitor the implementation of the 1996 treaty meets irregularly, and the state parties have shown no interest in correcting its deficiencies. Regular complaints have been raised from both sides about the poor performance of the treaty.

Furthermore, negotiations on the sharing of other transboundary rivers (such as the Teesta) have not learned from the Ganges experience and have thus failed to produce any significant advancements. Most of these negotiations have followed the Ganges pattern, excluding other basin states, limiting data sharing and consultation to water availability at the tail end of the river, disregarding the need for maintenance of environmental flows, and failing to establish a powerful and autonomous river commission.

The 1996 Ganges treaty will expire in 2026. It also provided for conducting negotiations for sharing the water of other common rivers based on equity and no harm principles. Unless it is renewed, there will be no negotiated arrangement for Ganges water sharing or agreed basis for negotiations on other rivers in the post-2026 period.

A modified Ganges Treaty involving all of its basin states (Nepal, India, and Bangladesh) should be concluded before it expires in 2026. It is high time to learn the lessons of the past and thus reposition the course of future negotiations, taking due account of the recent developments in international law that inspire integrated basin-wide development of rivers.

Bangladesh and India (along with all the basin states of South Asia) should have a wider vision to understand that integrated, multilateral, and basin-wide water resource management would be a much better approach to accommodate the various needs of the basin states of any international river and to ensure its adequate protection. They need to understand that the equitable utilization or no-harm principles cannot be translated into reality without the equitable participation of all the basin states, comprehensive data sharing (including through participatory EIA) on all the actual and potential water uses, negotiated arrangements on that basis, continuous monitoring, and efficient conflict resolution mechanisms. In accomplishing these, they should respect and embrace the customary rules reflected in the 1997 Watercourse Convention and other relevant instruments. They should also consider the recent increasing focus on related environmental obligations, human rights aspects, and the need for an efficient institutional regime, as elaborated in the 1992 UNECE Watercourse Convention (global participation opened in 2015) and the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules, and as followed in some water-stressed regions in Asia and Africa such as the Mekong and Senegal basins.

As a vulnerable downstream region to nearly 54 rivers, Bangladesh, in particular, should take the lead by becoming a party to Watercourse Conventions. It should also demand the application of existing international environmental agreements like the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity and the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, which contain corresponding provisions on the use of international watercourses. Bangladesh could thus influence other co-basin countries to realize that watercourses are precious natural resources that need to be utilized, developed, and managed through an efficient and comprehensive arrangement covering all the uses and involving all the stakeholder States. This realization is crucial for the long-term benefit of the region and the sustainability of the dependent ecosystems.

Dr Asif Nazrul is Professor and Chairman, Department of Law, University of Dhaka.​
 
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From hydro-coercion to water justice
Why the Ganges Treaty and shared rivers demand a new imagination

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The transboundary journey of the Ganges, flowing from the Himalayan foothills through Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal before entering Bangladesh.

"There once was a river here." Across the Bengal Delta, this lament has become a hauntingly common refrain, signalling a transformation that is as much political as it is environmental. For Bangladesh, water is far more than a resource; it is the vital pulse of our ecological resilience and the primary determinant of our human vulnerability. Yet, in the high-stakes geopolitical landscape of South Asia, our rivers are increasingly being reconfigured from lifelines into instruments of hydro-coercion. As we stand at a historic junction, marked by the aftermath of the July 2024 revolution and the looming 2026 expiration of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, it is time to address the big picture of our water security. We must move beyond a legacy of downstream capitulation towards a future of water justice grounded in the recognition of our rivers as ecological commons.


The July 2024 uprising in Bangladesh did more than just overthrow a regime; it fundamentally altered the political foundations that had, for sixteen years, enabled India's hydro-coercive practices. Under the previous India-backed administration, Bangladesh often adopted a subservient posture in which domestic political legitimacy was essentially traded for Indian diplomatic patronage. This political accommodation created a dangerous feedback loop where our leadership avoided confronting treaty violations or upstream unilateralism in order to preserve broader bilateral ties. The revolution represented a conceivable rupture in this pattern of downstream capitulation. The popular uprising was fuelled by a deep-seated resentment against what many perceived as imperial control over domestic sovereignty, with water often serving as the primary tool of that control. Today, there is a burgeoning demand from the youth movement and civil society to decolonise our water governance and to challenge the colonial logics that have long normalised the advantage of upstream riparians at the expense of our survival.


To navigate this new era, we must understand what I have described as hydro-coercion, a strategic evolution of hydro-hegemony. While hydro-hegemony describes a general state of dominance in which a riparian state uses power to secure water objectives, hydro-coercion is the active weaponisation of water control for immediate and long-term political objectives. It functions as a mechanism of escalating spatial and geopolitical domination, where the upstream state exerts direct or indirect pressure on downstream states to force compliance. In the India–Bangladesh context, this power is deployed through three distinct but overlapping strategies that amount to a form of political colonisation.

The first of these is material hydro-coercion, which involves the physical control of water resources through large-scale infrastructure to reconfigure deltaic hydro-social territories. The Farakka Barrage is the most potent and enduring symbol of this material dominance. Commissioned in 1975 without meaningful consultation or consent from Bangladesh, the barrage unilaterally diverts dry-season flows. This infrastructure is not merely a technical solution for navigability but an enduring instrument of control that embeds hydro-insecurity into our national consciousness. By physically altering the flow of the Ganges, India uses its geographical advantage to impose a reality of scarcity upon the downstream delta, effectively redrawing the social and ecological map of the region to suit its own interests.

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The Farakka Barrage in West Bengal stands as the primary site of upstream water control on the Ganges.

The second dimension is institutional hydro-coercion, which operates through procedural manipulation, bargaining power, and what can be described as institutional stalling. The prolonged stalemate over the Teesta River is a clear instance of this strategy. Although an agreement was nearly finalised in 2011, it has been blocked for over a decade by the state government of West Bengal. This subnational veto allows the Indian federal government to avoid accountability for diplomatic failure while implicitly using the unresolved issue as leverage. This manufactured scarcity is a deliberate strategic delay in which non-decision and silence are weaponised as forms of structural power. By keeping Bangladesh in a state of perpetual negotiation and vulnerability, India maintains an advantageous position that pressures our nation into broader strategic alignment.

The third pillar is ideational hydro-coercion, which utilises water nationalism and diplomatic signalling to shape narratives of sovereignty and development. Water is imbued with powerful nationalistic meanings, transforming it from a natural resource into a symbol of national identity that justifies unilateral extraction. India frames its upstream schemes as essential to its national progress, often characterising downstream claims as impediments to its sovereign prerogatives. This ideational control extends to overt diplomatic pressure; for example, recent reports indicate that Indian politicians have suggested the 1996 Ganges Treaty could be reconsidered if Bangladesh's foreign policy diverges from Indian interests. Such statements explicitly link vital water access to foreign policy compliance, using water as a tool of deterrence to prevent Bangladesh from pursuing strategic autonomy or closer ties with other regional powers.

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Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin

The consequences of these coercive practices are not abstract theories but lived realities of pervasive precarity for millions of Bangladeshis. The diversion of the Ganges has led to severe salinity intrusion in our coastal regions, devastating agricultural lands and compromising potable water sources. This ecological degradation directly threatens the Sundarbans, which is the world's largest mangrove forest and our primary defence against climate-induced cyclones. In the north, the lack of predictable flow from the Teesta has led to the collapse of traditional livelihoods in fishing and agriculture. These disruptions drive internal migration and displacement, as rural communities are forced to abandon their ancestral lands for the precarious life of urban slums. This displacement is a form of structural violence, where hegemonic control over water fuels the redrafting of the social fabric of our nation.


This structural inequality is reaching a breaking point due to the threat multiplier of climate change. We are entering an era of unprecedented hydro-variability, where Himalayan glaciers are projected to decline by up to 40 percent by 2100. For Bangladesh, this means a future of catastrophic monsoon floods followed by acute dry-season scarcity. Our existing agreements, particularly the 1996 Ganges Treaty, are tragically ill-equipped for this volatility. The treaty treats water as a divisible commodity to be quantified and allocated based on historical data rather than as a shared, interconnected ecological system. It lacks flexible mechanisms for climate adaptation, enforceable environmental flow regimes, or joint data-sharing platforms. As the treaty approaches its 2026 expiration, we must realise that a static agreement is no longer a tool of cooperation; in a climate-stressed world, it becomes another mechanism of control.

It is a mistake to view water justice as a zero-sum game, because from a strategic perspective, hydro-coercion is self-defeating for India. A water-stressed, ecologically fragile Bangladesh is a source of regional instability. The cascading effects of environmental degradation, including mass migration, state fragility, and economic shocks, do not respect national borders. Furthermore, the regional power dynamic is shifting, as China's aggressive dam-building on the upper Brahmaputra creates a cascading hierarchy in which India itself is vulnerable to upstream control. If India continues to adopt a coercive posture towards its downstream neighbour, it weakens its own moral and legal standing when challenging Chinese unilateralism. True regional stability requires cooperative precedents rather than coercive ones.

Beyond the immediate concerns of water flow, the health of the India–Bangladesh relationship is foundational to broader regional prosperity across the energy, trade, and transportation sectors. Bangladesh provides critical transit and transhipment facilities that connect India's northeastern states to its mainland, while India is a major source of the electricity and consumer goods that fuel our economy. These sectors are deeply interdependent, yet this interdependence is poisoned by the mistrust generated by hydro-coercion. When water is used as a diplomatic lever, it creates a climate of uncertainty that hinders long-term investment in regional connectivity and energy grids. For instance, the vision of a seamless South Asian power pool, where hydroelectricity from Nepal and Bhutan flows through India to Bangladesh, cannot be realised if the participating nations remain locked in hydro-political disputes. Stable, neighbourly relations are not a luxury but a prerequisite for the economic integration that could lift millions out of poverty across the entire basin.

The path forward requires a fundamental structural transformation in how we govern our transboundary waters. We must move beyond narrow, secretive bilateral negotiations towards comprehensive basin-wide governance. This means involving all riparian states, including Nepal, Bhutan, India, and China, in holistic planning for our shared river systems. Bangladesh's June 2025 entry into the UNECE Water Convention is a critical first step in this strategic pivot, anchoring our claims in international legal norms of equitable and reasonable utilisation. This multilateral shift provides a normative basis to challenge unilateral actions and assert our downstream rights in a way that bilateralism never could.

Transformative governance also necessitates the establishment of enforceable ecological safeguards. Future treaties must recognise the intrinsic value of water and include legally binding minimum environmental flow regimes to protect the health of our rivers and the biodiversity of the delta. Alongside these safeguards, we must demand drastic data transparency. The current information asymmetry is a tool of coercion, and we must insist on the mandatory, real-time sharing of hydrological and climate data. This is foundational for building trust, creating early warning systems, and ensuring collaborative management in an era of climate uncertainty. Most importantly, we must shift the discourse from water as a diplomatic concession to water as a fundamental human right. Access to water for basic needs, livelihoods, and ecological sustenance must be non-negotiable.

The upcoming expiration of the Ganges Treaty in 2026 is our most significant strategic inflection point. We cannot afford to passively await upstream goodwill while our rivers dwindle. We must use this moment to demand an epistemic rupture, which is a break from the colonial-era logic of extraction and control. The rivers of the Bengal Delta are an ecological commons and a shared heritage that demands collective stewardship rather than competitive exploitation. By centring the voices of downstream communities and grounding our governance in ecological justice and the principles of the ecological commons, we can turn our shared rivers into sources of regional strength.

For a deltaic nation like Bangladesh, achieving water justice is not merely a goal of foreign policy; it is the absolute prerequisite for our survival. Sustainable water governance cannot rest upon the political subordination of downstream populations. If we are to ensure a stable and prosperous South Asia, we must move towards a future where shared rivers foster genuine cooperation and resilience rather than remaining potent symbols of power imbalance and perennial conflict. Only by radically changing our approach to water and embracing the principles of joint basin stewardship can we hope to preserve the lifeblood of our delta for generations to come. An equitable water future is the only path towards the regional peace and human security that our people so urgently deserve.

Farhana Sultana, PhD, is Professor of Geography and the Environment at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, USA. Her research focuses on the intersections of water governance, climate justice, and international development, with particular attention to South Asia.​
 
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Yes, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has pledged to build a Padma Barrage and a second Padma Bridge, viewing these projects as crucial for the livelihoods of millions in the southern region, with leaders emphasizing strong political will and public demand for implementation, contrasting with previous stances on the first Padma Bridge.

Key Points from BNP Statements:
  • Commitment: BNP leaders, including Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, have repeatedly stated their commitment to building the barrage and second bridge, linking it to national development and security.
  • Necessity: They argue these projects are vital to combat adverse effects from the Farakka Barrage and ensure water flow for the region, protecting agriculture and livelihoods for nearly 80 million people.
  • Contrast with Past: While the party previously questioned the first Padma Bridge's feasibility, they now champion these projects, citing a need for a democratic process and national consensus to implement large infrastructure.
  • Public Demand: BNP emphasizes that a united public demand is necessary to compel any future government to undertake these significant infrastructure projects.
  • Inclusion in Manifesto: Economists and political figures suggest these demands should be part of national election agendas, with BNP leaders calling for medium-term plans to include them in budgets.
In essence, the BNP is positioning the Padma Barrage and a second bridge as key development goals, promising implementation if elected, and calling for strong public support to make these projects a reality.
 
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Padma Barrage likely to get govt approval today
Staff Correspondent 25 January, 2026, 00:20

A meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council in a meeting today is likely to review a proposal on the construction of the long-awaited Padma Barrage Project.

Bangladesh has long been attempting to construct the proposed barrage at Pangsha in Rajbari for improved management of the water it receives from India.Bangladesh travel guides

If approved, the project will be completed in June 2033.

The discussion on the project began after India had erected the controversial Farakka barrage on the transboundary river in West Bengal in 1975, and disrupted the flow of water.

But the feasibility study of the proposed Padma Barrage was completed in 2013.

The Awami League regime, which was ousted in August 2024 amid a mass uprising, had decided not to implement the project.

The interim government has revived the project with an estimated cost of Tk 50,443.64 crore, with the first part at 34,608 crore with its own fund, officials said.

The interim government will prefer foreign funds at suitable terms for the second part of the project that aims at countering Farakka impacts, reducing salinity and restoring rivers.

The project will also provide irrigation, hydropower, navigation, and ecosystem protection.

The ECNEC meeting to be presided over by chief adviser Muhammad Yunus will also review two dozen more project proposals.

The projects include the proposed 1,000-bed Bangladesh-China Friendship Hospital in Nilphamari, a district in the country’s northern region.

The cost of the hospital has been estimated at Tk 2,293 crore, with China agreeing to provide around Tk 2,220 crore as a grant.

The rest of the fund, or Tk 72.9 crore, would be provided by the Bangladesh government.

Planning commission officials who reviewed the project proposals said that the hospital was expected to provide advanced medical services not only to the district’s residents but also to nearly 1.76 crore people across the northern region, as well as patients from neighbouring countries.

China has expressed willingness to help construct two more hospitals in Bangladesh to promote its Health Silk Road, a rapidly expanding component of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative.​
 
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