[🇧🇩] India's Water Terrorism Against Bangladesh

[Saif]

We are here on Bangladesh's request regarding Teesta, nothing else: Yao Wen

The Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka, Yao Wen, stated that in response to Dhaka's request, China has come forward with the large-scale Teesta project, which is directly linked to the lives and livelihoods in the northern region. Beyond this, China has no other concerns. This comment was made by...

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We are here on Bangladesh's request regarding Teesta, nothing else: Yao Wen

Diplomatic Correspondent
Dhaka
Published: 02 Jul 2026, 19: 08

At the Chinese Embassy in Baridhara, the Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen answered journalists' questions during a press briefing. Photo: Prothom Alo

The Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka, Yao Wen, stated that in response to Dhaka's request, China has come forward with the large-scale Teesta project, which is directly linked to the lives and livelihoods in the northern region. Beyond this, China has no other concerns.

This comment was made by Ambassador Yao Wen in response to journalists' questions during a briefing at the Chinese Embassy in Baridhara, the capital, on Thursday morning.

The Chinese Embassy organized this briefing regarding the recent visit of Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Tarique Rahman, to China.

Yao Wen began by speaking on Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit to China.

He then answered various questions from the journalists. Highlighting the Teesta project as one of the most important topics of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit, the Chinese Ambassador stated that the livelihoods of people around the river are linked to the project. At Bangladesh's request, China will provide maximum assistance for this project.

When attention was drawn to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with a Chinese company regarding the Teesta project, the Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen said, "The previous Memorandum of Understanding was between a Chinese company and a Bangladeshi government entity. But we are talking about cooperation at a governmental level in this project. Chinese companies can conduct their surveys. We will conduct surveys with the best scientists. If the project is to move forward, surveys are necessary. The Chinese government will work with the Bangladesh government to advance these surveys. We are committed in this regard. "

A journalist asked, regarding the Teesta, experts say India has some concerns about this, and again some say there are concerns about whether it will be effective if India does not release water from upstream.

In response, the Ambassador said, "You are talking about other elements. This is not our concern. China has come forward according to Bangladesh's expectations. "

When asked about the tri-nation economic corridor involving Bangladesh and Myanmar, Yao Wen said, "This is not a new initiative. We proposed BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) 15 years ago. Although there has been some progress, it has not moved forward as China wanted. Since Bangladesh wants regional connectivity, China also wants more regional connectivity. I believe Myanmar also wants such (connectivity) cooperation."

The Chinese Ambassador further stated, "We are open-minded about other countries. If they are ready, we are prepared to include them. It depends on their decision. But China is now determined to move forward with an economic corridor involving Bangladesh and Myanmar. "

When asked about the challenges of establishing a corridor by land due to Myanmar's instability, Yao Wen said, "Initially, we can consider connectivity through ports and sea routes. "​

 

[Saif]

Padma (Ganges) barrage and 14 problems: Why a new study is necessary

In 2012, a comprehensive 563-page feasibility report was submitted, covering hydrology, morphology, environment, economy, social impact, and engineering design. However, the report was for the Padma of 2012, with the climate of 2012. Now, it's 2026, and the report is 14 years old. Over these 14...

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Padma (Ganges) barrage and 14 problems: Why a new study is necessary

Subail Bin Alam

Representative image

In 2012, a comprehensive 563-page feasibility report was submitted, covering hydrology, morphology, environment, economy, social impact, and engineering design. However, the report was for the Padma of 2012, with the climate of 2012. Now, it's 2026, and the report is 14 years old. Over these 14 years, the river, climate, diplomacy, and technology have all changed. Yet, a project worth Tk 500 billion has been approved based on this outdated survey.

Problem 1: The fundamental water calculations are questionable
The report's dry season flow calculations rest on two assumptions: firstly, that the Ganges Treaty of 1996 will remain in effect, and secondly, that the flow patterns from 1997 to 2010 will continue in the future. Both assumptions have now fallen apart.

The Ganges Treaty's term will expire in December of 2026, with no indication of a new agreement. Before the Farakka Barrage, the average dry season flow at Pangsha was 2,031 cubic meters per second. Post-treaty, it dropped to 576 cubic meters, and in some years, even lower.

Without the treaty, it is likely to decrease further. Moreover, India's upstream water withdrawal is increasing every decade. The report contains no flow data from the 16 years post-2010.

Problem 2: No lessons learned from Farakka regarding silt
The report claims that if a barrage is constructed at Pangsha, the riverbed will rise only by 3.28 feet over 60 years. Farakka's real-life experience shows that the riverbed there rose by nearly 20 feet in just 52 years. Such a significant discrepancy in a similar river with similar structures implies a fundamental flaw in the modeling approach.

The Ganges carries approximately 450 million tonnes of silt annually at Pangsha. The report mentions 18 undersluices, but these sluices' total width is only one-eighth of the entire barrage length. These could quickly become blocked in a silt-rich river and, being submerged, would be difficult to clean. When to open the sluices, how much to open them, and what strategies to employ in different seasons are not covered in the report.

The silt-related mathematical modeling in the report was based on 2008 data. Significant changes in the Padma's channel, silt characteristics, and quantity have occurred between 2008 and 2026. Using an outdated model in this changed context ensures incorrect results.

Problem 3: The location issue has been closed
The Pangsha point was selected in 2012 based on the river morphology at the time. In 2017, the design was canceled due to design flaws and concerns about siltation, waterlogging, and bank erosion upstream. Nine years later, the same Pangsha point has been reapproved, but the technical solutions for the 2017 issues have not been made clear to the public.

The biggest issue is that Pangsha as the only option has never been validated through a multi-criteria analysis. Selecting any location without a comparative evaluation of multiple points based on hydraulic efficiency, silt load, land acquisition level, navigation, cost, and climate resilience is like betting billions of taka on assumptions. The Padma's course has changed significantly since 2012, with new shoals, eroded banks, and a shifted main channel. Without a new survey, it's uncertain if Pangsha is still the best point.

Farakka barrage File photo

Problem 4: The concerns of downstream people are ignored

Downstream from Pangsha to Goalanda, there is another 20 to 23 kilometers of river. If water is held back at Pangsha, the flow in this section will decrease. With Farakka blocking upstream and Pangsha blocking downstream, the river in between is drying up. The report lacks any analysis of how this "double Farakka" situation will affect the Arial Khan, Kumar, and Gorai regions.

Since 1988, there have been practically no natural flow in the Gorai during the dry season. This has doubled salinity in the Khulna region and increased the peak salinity at Bardia Point eightfold. The project's objective is to reduce salinity, but without understanding the impact on downstream flow, it might have the opposite effect. This risk assessment is missing from the report.

Problem 5: No modern assessment of biodiversity
The report mentions two fish passes (passages for fish migration), but provides no further details. Farakka also had a fish pass, yet upstream hilsa production decreased by 92 per cent due to Farakka. Simply stating the number of fish passes does not fulfill responsibility. There is no analysis of the design type, effectiveness for different species, or how they will be managed and monitored.

Bangladesh's hilsa production has already decreased by over 71,000 tonnes in two years. The Ganges-Padma basin is a habitat for the endangered Gangetic dolphin. Gorai is the main freshwater source for the Sundarbans.

If the barrage obstructs the river's connection with floodplains during floods, it will destroy the habitat and breeding grounds of thousands of wetland-dependent species. Increased salinity in the Sundarbans will occur if downstream flow decreases during the dry season. There is no quantitative modeling of these environmental impacts in the 2012 report. Approving the project without such assessments according to 2026 international environmental standards is questionable.

Riverbank erosion along the Padma River is swallowing up farmland in Daulatpur Upazila.Photo: Prothom Alo

Problem 6: Climate change impact is not accounted for

The report's entire hydrological analysis is based on historical data from 1965 to 2008. The rate of Himalayan glacier melt, monsoon patterns, and dry season flow characteristics were considerably different at that time.

The latest IPCC report indicates that by 2050, maximum monsoon flows in the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin will increase by 15-20 per cent.

The 100-year flood calculations in the report haven't been checked against this new reality to see if they are understated. Although there is a brief chapter on climate change, it is not reflected in the main design. Without projections of flow till 2050 and 2100, there's no way to determine how climate-resilient the barrage will be.

Problem 7: Structural safety requires reassessment

The report states that the barrage's foundation and structural design were based on a geological survey conducted in 2012. However, the riverbed of the Padma is highly dynamic, with its soil composition changing annually due to sediment deposition and erosion.

Without a new geological survey, the safety of the foundation cannot be assured. Moreover, the report does not reassess the probable maximum flood, seismic risk, or structural reliability in line with the latest standards of the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD). A failure of the barrage would put the lives of millions of people downstream at risk.

Problem 8: Future navigation left unexamined

The report mentions the construction of a navigation lock. However, it provides no detailed modelling of how the barrage would affect the depth of the navigation channel, water levels, or vessel movement upstream and downstream of Pangsha.

Inland waterborne trade in southwestern Bangladesh depends heavily on this river. Without assessing the barrage's impact on navigation, it is not possible to determine the appropriate size and design of the navigation lock.

Problem 9: No operational guidelines

Once constructed, a barrage will last 50 to 100 years. How it's operated will determine whether the project is beneficial or harmful. Modes for silt management at the start of the monsoon, storage post-monsoon, environmental flow in winter, emergency in extreme drought, and overflow during excess floods need to be defined. Who will make decisions, on what basis, and how the gates will function in these five different scenarios are not described in the report. Without operational guidelines, a barrage is like having a tool without the instructions for use.

Problem 10: Economic analysis only considers benefits, not risks

The report includes calculations of agricultural, irrigation, hydropower, and navigation benefits. However, there is no account of the long-term dredging costs upstream due to siltation, flood compensation, erosion damage, and environmental cost. Comprehensive investment evaluations include both benefits and risks. An evaluation showing only benefits is not an analysis but a promotion. The project's cost was originally estimated at Tk 314.14 billion in 2012. It has now exceeded Tk 500 billion. When basic costs increase by 60 per cent, benefits must be recalculated. This hasn't been done.

Problem 11: Resettlement plan is 13 years outdated

The report contains a land acquisition and resettlement plan. But the Padma's course and the habitation near its banks have significantly changed since 2012. Land that was submerged according to the old survey now has newly formed settlements, while some settlements have been lost to river erosion. Implementing a resettlement plan based on a 13-year-old survey will inevitably lead to land disputes and social conflict.

Problem 12: Funding source remains unclear

It’s still unclear if this Tk 500 billion project will be financed internally, through foreign loans, or via public-private partnerships. A memorandum of understanding was signed with China in 2013, but it hasn't been implemented. Without finalising the funding source, it's impossible to calculate loan terms, interest rates, and long-term financial burdens.

Approving construction with uncertain funding creates financial risk even before the project starts.

Problem 13: No analysis of diplomatic risks

This is the most significant omission in the 2012 report. The report assumes water will come and agreements will stand. However, constructing the Ganges Barrage could weaken or strengthen Bangladesh's position in negotiating a new Ganges treaty with India, but there's no analysis of this. There's also no mention that ratifying the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention is essential for any water-dispute-related negotiations.

Problem 14: This is a barrage project, not a basin plan

This is perhaps the most fundamental issue, talked about the least. The 2012 report is primarily an engineering feasibility study on how to build a structure. But the Padma's problems won't be solved by building a barrage alone. The water crisis, silt crisis, salinity crisis, biodiversity crisis are all interconnected and linked to the entire Ganges-Padma basin.

Unless the entire basin's water, silt, environment, navigation, and climate adaptation are inclusively planned around the barrage, the barrage may be constructed, but the underlying problems it aims to solve will persist.

Bangladesh's Delta Plan 2100 includes basin management, but there's no connection between that plan and this project. Approval was granted without assessing whether the construction of a standalone barrage would support or complicate the broader plan.

The 2012 report might have been adequate for its time, but in each of the fourteen fundamental problems, new information, realities, and questions have emerged by 2026. Technology has also changed significantly. Starting construction worth Tk 500 billion without addressing these fourteen questions or incorporating modern technology is a massive gamble on uncertainty.

70 million people in the southwest region are waiting for water. While their wait may be long, the project should genuinely benefit them. Bangladesh cannot afford another repeat of Farakka through rush construction based on old grounds.

#Subail Bin Alam is an engineer, founding member of the Centre for Science Tech and Policy Diplomacy, and Bangladesh Research Analysis and Information Network.​

 

[Saif]

Legal future of Bangladesh after the UNECE Water Treaty accession

On 20 June 2025, Bangladesh acceded to the 1992 UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Water Convention).

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Legal future of Bangladesh after the UNECE Water Treaty accession

Md. Fariduzzaman

On 20 June 2025, Bangladesh acceded to the 1992 UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Water Convention). It is pertinent to delve into the legal and diplomatic implications of the Convention for Bangladesh across internal and international fora. Notably, India and Bangladesh have experienced strained diplomatic relations over transboundary watercourse issues since Bangladesh gained independence in 1971. Discussions of possible inclusion of Chinese monetary cooperation in the Teesta water basin management further complicated the relationship between the two nations. Geographically, Bangladesh is crucial for both the Asian giants. Recent tensions in geopolitics surrounding the expiry of the Ganges Treaty in December 2026 also have profound implications in this regard.

Interestingly, in 2018, it seemed that the agreement, which was drafted in 2011 between India and Bangladesh upon the Teesta tributaries, would very soon be entered into. Unfortunately, it did not materialise arguably with claims of the then Chief Minister of West Bengal that the people in West Bengal would face dire scarcity of drinking water and water crisis in irrigation, plantation, hydroelectricity, and fishing, had the water been shared.

Bangladesh may now experience the achievements and pitfalls alongside other countries enlisted in the Water Convention. The ratio of the side-effects would intrinsically transcend the loopholes present in the bilateral underpinnings surrounding the Ganges Treaty. In my opinion, multilateralism is now a new paradigm in water diplomacy in South Asia.
Clearly, Bangladesh and India do not have identical policies in terms of water sharing and basin management concerning the largest rivers flowing through the two countries, let alone the smaller ones. On the contrary, both countries have also cooperated with each other across many axes, e.g., economy, trade, culture, and politics since 1971. Both parties, as members of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), have also already exhibited liberal diplomatic intelligence in getting boundaries delimited in the Bay of Bengal. Indeed, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) judiciously delineated the maritime boundary between India and Bangladesh in its 2014 arbitral award. Thus, both the states had utilised rights and privileges under principles of international law.

The same mutual diplomatic bargain between Bangladesh and Myanmar also witnessed an end through maritime delimitation. After prolonged argumentation before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the ITLOS delivered judgement in favour of Bangladesh in 2012 and the country’s dispute with Myanmar over the St. Martin’s Island came to an end. The jurisprudential interpretation of decisions by the PCA and ITLOS strengthens the legal argument for equitable water sharing in South Asia, specifically with respect to Bangladesh, India and Myanmar.

Maritime delimitation was basically compromised to facilitate trade through sea routes and enjoyment of the natural resources under the ocean. On the other hand, mutual placement of bilateral diplomacy over transboundary rivers encircles many more overlapping issues concerning international environmental law, environmental science and geography. The Ganges, the Teesta and the Brahmaputra are indeed crucial ingredients in keeping alive water disputes between the two South Asian deltaic nations.

It is entirely possible to continue diplomatic negotiation among states on issues of trade, culture, economy, geopolitics, and even transboundary waters and oceanic delimitations. But it is in no way fair to sustain a patently unequal bargaining status quo with climate-induced aggressions compounded by the disturbances in watercourse through diversion, barrages and dams, etc. Here, nature is the only authoritarian and sovereign entity to shape the geographical peripheries of the countries.

After the possible expiry of the bilateral water treaty over the Ganges with India in December 2026, the provisions of the UNECE Water Convention would enhance multilateral bargaining over watercourses. Then international laws on watercourses may steadily guide both India and Bangladesh in the utilisation of transboundary watercourses. There are intersecting national interests of both the nations which are protected by international institutions framed under international law. India might plan to implement unilateral use of the water of the Ganges, entirely ignoring Bangladesh’s need. Now Bangladesh may have recourse to the UN agencies against such pursuit.

Bangladesh may now experience the achievements and pitfalls alongside other countries enlisted in the Water Convention. The ratio of the side-effects would intrinsically transcend the loopholes present in the bilateral underpinnings surrounding the Ganges Treaty. In my opinion, multilateralism is now a new paradigm in water diplomacy in South Asia, because otherwise, the states invariably lead a ‘country and people first’ policy. Notably, even after the formation of the democratically elected government in Bangladesh in February 2026, serious and effective discussions on the Ganges water treaty are yet to reach a considerable stage of complacency.

Bangladesh’s accession to the 1992 UNECE Water Convention should never be evaluated as a blow to the longstanding relations, diplomatic and otherwise, between Bangladesh and India. Rather, such a move needs to be viewed as an extension of Bangladesh’s search for broader international partnership in watercourse administration, jointly ventured hydropower research, and exchange of technical and scientific developments in river tributaries. Egocentrism of states in international relations and laws is never conducive because nations are encircled with uncontrollable and hegemonic uncertainties internally, regionally, and also internationally in one way or the other. To mitigate the rather uncomfortable shifts in foreign policies, Bangladesh should address the facilitation of joining the 1992 club by sharing the technicalities driven by partners in Europe and other continents in watercourse management. As such, both countries should look forward to adopting water ethics for ensuring human rights of the people of both countries along with upholding the norms of the legal provisions of international environmental laws for an equitable world.

The writer is a river-rights enthusiast and Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangladesh Judicial Service.​

 

[Saif]

Why India and Bangladesh need a new approach to transboundary rivers

As climate pressures mount, India and Bangladesh must rethink transboundary river governance to safeguard water, ecosystems, and shared futures.

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Why India and Bangladesh need a new approach to transboundary rivers
1 August 2026, 16:27 PM

Dr Md Sarwar Hossain , Alamgir Kabir , and Sheikh Rokonuzzaman

South Asia is the region most vulnerable to climate change, according to the Sixth Assessment Report (2022) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Yet this vulnerability is being compounded by a rapidly growing population, poverty, poor governance, water scarcity, and transboundary water conflicts.

After South America, South Asia is home to one of the world's largest river systems, which has shaped civilisations for millennia. These rivers not only sustain the region's culture, economy and environment, but their natural flows are also fundamental to climate resilience and ecological stability. There is no doubt that climate change is placing growing pressure on these rivers by raising temperatures, accelerating the retreat of Himalayan glaciers, and intensifying monsoon rainfall. Equally important, however, are increasing conflicts over transboundary rivers and the persistent failure to view rivers as interconnected social-ecological systems. Together, these human and climatic pressures are amplifying the adverse impacts of climate change across the region.

In broad terms, social-ecological systems describe the dynamic interactions between human societies and natural ecosystems, and the deeply interconnected relationships that determine their resilience to environmental and social shocks such as climate change and pandemics. From this perspective, a river is shaped not only by climate, hydrology, land and geography, but also by governance, institutions, economic and cultural activities, and the complex interactions among them, all of which underpin people's livelihoods. While this article does not seek to provide an exhaustive roadmap for resolving transboundary water conflicts, it highlights several key reasons why rivers must be understood through a social-ecological systems lens if we are to address the climate crisis effectively.

First, the impacts of the Farakka Barrage and the Ganges Treaty between India and Bangladesh deserve renewed attention, as they remain both significant and politically sensitive issues with profound implications for people-to-people relations between the two countries.

The Ganges Treaty is due to expire in December 2026. Signed in 1996 for a period of 30 years on the principle of equal sharing, the Treaty is conditional upon a minimum flow threshold rather than guaranteeing water flows at all times. The consequences of reduced flows caused by the Farakka Barrage are now clearly evident across the social-ecological systems of nearly half of Bangladesh. According to our recent research, the Ganges during the dry season, together with three other major rivers among Bangladesh's ten principal rivers, has already crossed the safe operating space. The impacts extend from water scarcity to the degradation of aquatic ecosystems and fish habitats, declining agricultural productivity, the deterioration of mangrove ecosystems, and increasing salinity.

Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin


Once a mighty river with powerful flows, parts of the Ganges have now become so depleted that they can sometimes be crossed on foot. Known as the Padma in Bangladesh, the river was once among the country's richest fishing grounds and a major source of affordable nutrition. Although Bangladesh's fisheries sector has undergone a remarkable transformation through closed-pond aquaculture, supported by increasing production inputs, natural fish production from rivers is in steep decline as a consequence of the Farakka Barrage.

The repercussions are not confined to Bangladesh. The decline of hilsa—a fish deeply embedded in the cultural identity of millions of people in West Bengal and central to festivals such as Jamai Sasthi and Durga Puja—has also had significant consequences for India.

Though climate change has negatively affected the flow of the Ganges, we must also recognise that nearly 1,000 dams have been built across the Ganges River basin in India, significantly altering, restricting, and diverting the river's natural flow. Therefore, both future climate change projections and the diversion of upstream water through dams must be explicitly taken into account during negotiations for the renewal of the Ganges Water Treaty.

Second, the transboundary nature of rivers means that local risks inevitably extend across borders. The growing threat of water scarcity in the lower reaches of the Ganges in Bangladesh is amplifying the impacts of climate change by altering surface heating and cooling patterns. The geophysical characteristics of the vast Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) river basin require sufficient upstream river flows to push back increasing salinity and sea-level rise from the Bay of Bengal. Without adequate upstream flows, one of the world's largest mangrove forests could be severely disrupted and, in the long term, irreversibly damaged, affecting not only the regional climate balance but also the Sundarbans in the Indian part of the delta.

Importantly, the Ganges in India and several major rivers in China are among the most polluted in the world, largely because of poorly managed industrial waste, untreated urban sewage, and agricultural runoff. These pollutants are carried downstream by river flows. But what happens when those flows are severely reduced by dams or by the absence of effective transboundary water-sharing agreements? Reduced flows diminish rivers' natural capacity to transport pollutants, threatening the health of downstream ecosystems, estuaries and coastal waters.

India’s withdrawal of water during the dry season leaves the riverbed near Hardinge Bridge almost dry. File Photo: Humayun Kabir Topu

The cascading consequences of human intervention through dams on transboundary rivers are therefore felt not only beyond India's borders but also within India's own social-ecological system. According to Indian experts, flood risks in Bihar have increased significantly because of the progressive accumulation of silt upstream of the Farakka Barrage between Patna and Bhagalpur. By slowing the river, the barrage traps sediment, reduces the channel's carrying capacity, and over time creates a self-reinforcing cycle of more frequent and severe flooding. These feedback loops destabilise the river system, increasing flood risks through channel changes and altered water depths, even as further engineering interventions are introduced to mitigate those very risks.

Third, strengthening leadership in addressing climate change and transboundary water conflicts is imperative for a better and more sustainable future for the 3 billion people living across the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) river basin.

The Ganges Water Treaty, which expires in December 2026, is essential not only for rebuilding people-to-people relations between India and Bangladesh but also for addressing climate change and other transboundary river issues, including those affecting the Brahmaputra River basin. China is constructing what has been described as the world's largest dam—the "mother of all dams"—which could not only reduce river flows but also increase flood risks in both India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh and India have both announced plans to build major infrastructure projects to respond to developments on the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, respectively.

However, increasing political instability, rivalry, and countermeasures often place additional stress on social-ecological systems and may ultimately lead to social collapse in the long term. Ultimately, these pressures will increase food and water insecurity and drive migration across the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) river basin, where more than 3 billion people live in India, China and Bangladesh.

Real-time, data-driven monitoring, greater data transparency, and science-based diplomacy supported by artificial intelligence can help restore trust in resolving transboundary water conflicts and prevent severe damage to livelihoods caused by flash floods. A tax-based approach to water sharing could also be considered, whereby countries that use more water pay more, with the revenue shared among the countries within the river basin.

The solution to transboundary water challenges is neither simple nor straightforward. It requires sustained cooperation among riparian countries to ensure fair and equitable water-sharing treaties, ecological restoration, and technological innovations that maintain healthy river flows. Political leaders must urgently place human wellbeing, water security, and climate resilience at the centre of their policy agendas, ensuring that these commitments endure despite changes in governments or political regimes. The safe operating space framework for rivers could provide a robust scientific basis for monitoring and maintaining river systems within ecologically safe limits. Applying this framework across the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin would help track the impacts of climate change, guide evidence-based policymaking, and support a more sustainable future for both India and Bangladesh.

Dr Md Sarwar Hossain is Associate Professor and Director of the Postgraduate Programme, School of Social & Environmental Sustainability, University of Glasgow. He is also Editor-in-Chief of the journal Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change.

Alamgir Kabir is Assistant Professor in the Department of Environmental Science at Bangladesh University of Professionals.​

 

[Saif]

Pilot project for Teesta master plan to begin soon: State Minister Azad

State Minister for Water Resources Farhad Hossain Azad today (Saturday) said that the technical committee has been working on the implementation of the Teesta Master Plan and its consultations are also being held with the experts from different countries. “A pilot project under the mas

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Pilot project for Teesta master plan to begin soon: State Minister Azad
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State Minister for Water Resources Farhad Hossain Azad today spoke to the journalists at Chilmari river port area. Photo : BSS

State Minister for Water Resources Farhad Hossain Azad today (Saturday) said that the technical committee has been working on the implementation of the Teesta Master Plan and its consultations are also being held with the experts from different countries.

“A pilot project under the master plan will be launched within a short time,” he made the remarks while talking to the journalists at Chilmari river port area, BSS reports.

Earlier, the state minister visited several river erosion-hit areas at Chilmari, Ulipur, Roumari and Rajibpur upazilas of the district.

Responding to questions about the Teesta project, Azad said, “The Teesta is a major project. It is not possible to implement such a large project in a single day. Our government is only five months old. Give us some time. We will begin work on the Teesta Master Plan as a pilot project within a short time.”

Regarding the overall river erosion situation in Kurigram, the state minister said he had personally inspected the erosion-hit areas across the district including the Chilmari river port.

He said two projects have already been undertaken to construct permanent embankments and prevent river erosion in the district. The government is reviewing the progress of the projects and taking steps to ensure their speedy implementation.

Assuring that there would be no political discrimination in measures to prevent river erosion, Azad said the government stands beside people affected by erosion.

“The government has taken necessary measures so that the people do not lose their homes, markets, mosques, temples or educational institutions to river erosion,” he said.

He further said, “Following the prime minister’s instructions, we are conducting field-level visits together with local members of parliament and relevant officials to determine how quickly the projects can be implemented.”

The minister said emergency work is currently underway in around 100 erosion-prone areas of Kurigram. He added that instructions would be issued to take prompt measures wherever further intervention is required.

After his programme here, the state minister said he would travel to Gaibandha to inspect two ongoing projects funded by the World Bank.

Among others, lawmakers from Kurigram-4 constituency Mostafizur Rahman, Kurigram-3 constituency Barrister Mahbub Salehi, reserved seat women lawmaker Suraiya Jerin Roni, Bangladesh Water Development Board Director General Md Ruhul Amin, Kurigram Deputy Commissioner Annapurna Debnath and Kurigram Water Development Board Executive Engineer Rakibul Hasan, accompanied the state minister.

Excepting those officials, Kurigram district BNP convener Mostafizur Rahman, its member secretary Sohel Hossain Kaikobad, senior joint convener Shafiqul Islam Babu, joint convener Prof. Habibur Rahman Hasib, Convener of Chilmari upazila BNP freedom fighter Abdul Bari, its member secretary Assistant Prof. Abu Hanifa and joint convener Assistant Prof. Fazlul Haque, were also present at that time.​

 

[Saif]

Can the new political reality break the Teesta River deadlock?

For nearly four decades, Bangladesh and India have remained at loggerheads over the management of shared water resources. By controlling the upstream reaches of 54 transboundary rivers that originate in India and flow into Bangladesh, New Delhi enjoys a significant strategic advantage in...

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Can the new political reality break the Teesta River deadlock?
Farzana Afroz & Tania Khatun

Thousands of demonstrators step into the Teesta River water near the Teesta Rail Bridge in Lalmonirhat to protest against the “water aggression” of India against Bangladesh on 18 February 2025. Prothom Alo

For nearly four decades, Bangladesh and India have remained at loggerheads over the management of shared water resources. By controlling the upstream reaches of 54 transboundary rivers that originate in India and flow into Bangladesh, New Delhi enjoys a significant strategic advantage in regulating the flow of these rivers.

India enjoys greater leverage in negotiations over the Teesta and Ganges rivers due to its upstream position. It has increasingly used its control over shared water resources as a strategic instrument. A substantial portion of the Teesta's water is currently utilized within India. Moreover, more than 20 large dams and hydroelectric power projects have been constructed along the river, the vast majority of which are located in Indian territory. Approximately two-thirds of the Teesta River lies within India, while the remaining one-third flows through Bangladesh.

However, tensions over the Teesta River have intensified in recent years. China's proposal to invest in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project has added a new geopolitical dimension to the dispute. For Bangladesh, accepting Chinese investment presents a strategic dilemma, as India views China's expanding presence in South Asia with considerable suspicion. Consequently, Dhaka must carefully balance its development needs with its foreign policy priorities. At the same time, many analysts argue that Bangladesh should avoid excessive dependence on any single external power and instead pursue a foreign policy that safeguards its national interests while maintaining constructive relations with both India and China.

The Teesta River dispute extends far beyond water sharing. It has significant implications for Bangladesh–India relations, regional cooperation, food security, agricultural productivity, and the livelihoods of millions who depend on the river.

Teesta originates in the Eastern Himalayas and flows through the Indian state of Sikkim and West Bengal before entering Bangladesh’s Rangpur Division, ultimately draining into the Bay of Bengal. The river is approximately 414 km long in total, of which about 151 km flows through Sikkim, around 283 km through West Bengal, and roughly 121 km through Bangladesh.

India has been unilaterally withdrawing water from the Teesta since 2011. The West Bengal government even took the initiative to dig two more canals upstream in 2023 to divert water, disregarding international norms regarding shared rivers.

The India–Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was established in 1972, following initial discussions in the 1950s and 1960s.

A provisional understanding reached in 1983 reportedly allocated 39 per cent of Teesta waters to India and 36 per cent to Bangladesh, while 25 per cent remained unallocated. Bangladesh, however, has at times sought up to 50 per cent of the flow. The arrangement was never fully implemented.

According to the West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu, set an important precedent for water-sharing cooperation In 1996 The Ganges Water Treaty. However, the Teesta issue remained unresolved. Between 1997 and 2005, several joint technical committees failed to reach a consensus, particularly regarding dry-season water availability.

A draft agreement proposed in 2011 suggested allocating 42.5 per cent of Teesta waters to India and 37.5 per cent to Bangladesh. However, it was not finalized, reportedly due to objections from the West Bengal state government, which cited concerns over state-level water security. As a result, negotiations have since remained stalled.

India has been unilaterally withdrawing water from the Teesta since 2011. The West Bengal government even took the initiative to dig two more canals upstream in 2023 to divert water, disregarding international norms regarding shared rivers.

According to The Government of West Bengal, particularly Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, has at various times expressed reservations regarding the Teesta Water Sharing Agreement. She has argued that the water flow in the Teesta basin has declined significantly due to climate change, including glacial retreat and changing rainfall patterns. According to this position, releasing additional water to Bangladesh during the dry season could adversely affect irrigation in northern West Bengal and impact local farmers.

The state government has also pointed out that agricultural expansion in Bangladesh following the commissioning of the Teesta Barrage in 1998 has increased water demand downstream, which, in its view, complicates additional water allocation.

Furthermore, West Bengal has ongoing irrigation and hydropower development plans in the Teesta basin, including projects intended to generate approximately 67.6 megawatts of electricity and provide irrigation coverage for about 922,000 hectares of land. Officials argue that any significant increase in downstream allocation could affect these planned developments and water availability within the state.

In recent years, Bangladesh has expressed concern over reduced dry-season flows, while discussions on upstream water use and diversion projects in India have continued at the subnational level. The issue remains sensitive and unresolved within the broader framework of bilateral river water cooperation.

The Teesta River is a crucial transboundary river for Bangladesh, as it is closely linked to agriculture, food security, and rural livelihoods. Its importance is particularly significant, with estimates suggesting that it contributes to the irrigation of around 14 per cent of the country’s arable land, while the livelihoods of approximately 7.3 per cent of the population are directly or indirectly dependent on it.

According to Bangladesh’s position, a substantial portion of Teesta waters is utilized upstream in India, and during the dry season the flow entering Bangladesh is significantly reduced. As a result, Bangladesh has consistently sought a fair and equitable share of the river’s dry-season flow, often cited as around 50 per cent, particularly between December and May when water levels decline sharply.

Due to India's excessive water withdrawal, about 100,000 hectares of land in the Rangpur region is not suitable for winter crop cultivation, which has a major impact on agricultural production.

Millions of people across five northern districts—Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, Kurigram, and Gaibandha—depend on the Teesta River for irrigation, fishing, and seasonal employment. 750,000 hectares of land in Bangladesh depend on Teesta water for irrigation. Approximately 70 per cent of the population depends on agriculture, and the region contributes about 14 per cent of the country’s cultivable land. The Teesta Barrage Project in Bangladesh requires at least 4,500 cusecs of water during the dry season to effectively serve the region. However, recent reports suggest that the actual flow has dropped to around 400 cusecs.

In 1997, the Teesta River carried around 6,500 cusecs of water, which declined to approximately 1,348 cusecs by 2006, and further dropped to between 700 and 300 cusecs in the following decade. The Gazoldoba Barrage in West Bengal is reported to regulate and divert a significant portion of the river’s flow before it enters Bangladesh.

This deficit is not confined to official records. Water insecurity is visible in dried-up canals, empty fishing nets, and the fragile finances of char-area households, many of whom take loans against crops that may never be harvested.

The area faces severe seasonal extremes. During the monsoon, around 750,000 hectares of land are affected by flooding, while in the dry season (December to May), river flows can decline to as low as 300 cusecs. This seasonal scarcity contributes to reduced soil moisture, drying of croplands, and a reported annual decline in groundwater levels of about two feet in some areas.

These conditions exacerbate socio-economic vulnerability. According to World Bank estimates, around 40 per cent of households in the region live below the poverty line. Studies also suggest that improved irrigation could increase agricultural productivity by up to 25 per cent. In addition, the development of irrigation, transport, and industrial infrastructure linked to the basin could potentially generate employment opportunities for tens of thousands of people.

According to The Indian Constitution has given the power to enter into all kinds of communication and agreements with foreign countries to the Union Ministry of External Affairs. As a result, the central government can sign the agreement without the states. But it has political risks. And that is why neither the BJP nor the previous Congress government signed the Teesta Agreement.

Following the West Bengal elections in May 2026, a new state government took office after the change in leadership. With the transition, political constraints surrounding the Teesta water-sharing negotiations are widely seen as having shifted. However, analysts note that institutional and technical challenges in reaching a comprehensive agreement remain largely unchanged.

In this context, some observers argue that the removal of political obstacles should not be mistaken for an immediate restoration of normal river flows. While diplomatic space may have expanded, the physical reality of the Teesta has not significantly changed. A procedural breakthrough, they suggest, does not automatically translate into increased water availability downstream.

* Farzana Afroz is Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University

* Tania Khatun is a student of Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University​