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Is Bangladesh–India relationship still stuck in 1971?
Five and a half decades later, Bangladesh–India relations now stand before a difficult reality. After the 2024 mass uprising, Bangladesh has changed significantly; a new force has emerged at the centre of power. Two paths lie ahead—either deny this change and remain rooted in the past, or...
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Is Bangladesh–India relationship still stuck in 1971?
For Bangladesh and India, 1971 is not just a history of friendship or cooperation — it is much more than that. But no relationship can remain the same forever. Half a century has passed; realities have changed, generations have changed, and so have interests. Hasan Ferdous has written in two parts about Bangladesh–India relations. Today, the first part has been published.
Five and a half decades later, Bangladesh–India relations now stand before a difficult reality. After the 2024 mass uprising, Bangladesh has changed significantly; a new force has emerged at the centre of power.
Two paths lie ahead—either deny this change and remain rooted in the past, or accept the altered reality and seek a new direction. Which path will we choose?
One thing is clear. At this moment, the main crisis for both countries is former prime minister Sheikh Hasina; both nations are entangled over her. Although the court completed its judicial responsibility by sentencing her to death, the implementation of this verdict has now become a thorn in the throat of the Yunus government.
Many people, especially those who directly took part in the mass uprising, demand that Hasina be immediately brought back to the country and the verdict carried out. Yet even a fool understands that this is impossible without India’s consent. Still, various flimsy arguments are being offered to claim that she will eventually be brought back, even if it requires going to an international court. But this crisis is not about just one individual; it is the inevitable outcome of long-standing structural flaws in the relationship between the two countries.
On the other hand, by granting political asylum to Sheikh Hasina, India now finds itself unable either to swallow her or to spit her out. Sending her back would mean execution, and India would not push a loyal ally into such a fate. For the ruling BJP, that could trigger a major internal political disaster.
Conversely, it is clear that the relationship between the two countries will not return to normal unless Hasina is returned. The diplomatic vacuum created after the fall of the Hasina government has opened a space that Pakistan is trying to slip into. On the other side of the door stands China. None of this is favourable to India’s national interests.
Structural imbalance
Most commentators agree on one point: the current distance between the two countries is the result of the India-dependent politics and diplomacy built during Hasina’s 15 years in power. Instead of relying on the people of Bangladesh, India relied on Hasina. And what happens when all the eggs are placed in one basket is exactly what happened—when Hasina fell, India lost both its ‘eggs’ and the ‘basket.’
Indian writer Vinod Khosla has described this as the ‘structural asymmetry’ in the relationship between the two neighbouring states. Instead of treating Bangladesh as a sovereign neighbour and partner, India viewed it as a client state. The more submissive it appeared, the more value it held for Indian policymakers.
Hasina herself was aware of this. That is why she often remarked, ‘I have given India so much that they cannot even imagine anything else.’ A foreign minister of the Hasina government once even said, ‘For its own interests, India must keep Hasina in power.’
Even though India sees itself as the ‘elder brother,’ it has not always acted like one—a fact many Indians have acknowledged. The long-standing dispute over river water shares between the two countries is one example of this.
Even though unequal, this relationship had an internal logic. In all master–client or patron–vassal relationships, the central logic is that despite the inequality, both sides protect each other’s strategic interests. When necessary, the master will hold an umbrella over the vassal’s head; in return, the vassal will unquestioningly follow whatever instructions come from above.
The problem is that, in the long run, such unequal relationships inevitably generate resentment within the weaker or client state. People begin to think that their rulers are getting away with massive abuses of power under the protection of the ‘master’ state. This resentment is directed both at the authoritarian domestic rulers and equally at the foreign patrons.
With this in mind, the well-known Indian strategic thinker Raja Mohan has written that whenever a small neighbouring country and its people—whether Bangladesh or any other—feel that their sovereignty is being bent under the pressure of a larger neighbour, negative reactions become inevitable. In Raja Mohan’s words, this is a ‘nationalistic backlash.’ In Bangladesh, it manifested as anger, suspicion, and deep distrust regarding India’s intentions.
A similar conclusion has been reached by India’s former National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon. He believes that not only Bangladesh, but almost every small neighbour in South Asia has a structurally unequal relationship with India.
The reason is that, instead of building relationships with neighbouring countries on the basis of equality, India has personalised these relationships. A country is defined by its people and its state institutions.
It is possible to have a rapport with a favoured leader of a neighboring country, but if that relationship is prioritised over engagement with the country’s people and institutions, the foundation of the entire relationship becomes unstable. In Menon’s words: ‘When you prioritise an individual over a country’s (democratic) institutions, the outcome is unlikely to be positive—this is almost certain.’
Nostalgia for 1971
This unequal relationship between India and Bangladesh has a structural and psycho-cultural dimension, as well as a historical background. Speaking with Indian diplomats and intellectuals in New York, it became evident that regarding Bangladesh, they tend to assume that India is the ‘elder brother’ and Bangladesh the ‘younger brother.’
Behind this attitude lies a hidden reason: nostalgia for 1971. Almost all of them view Bangladesh’s victory in the Liberation War simultaneously as their own triumph and as a gift for the younger brother.
It is worth recalling that a few years ago, Major General CP Singh wrote with some self-congratulation, ‘It is not just that we made Bangladesh independent in 14 days; we also split Pakistan into two pieces.'
After last year’s mass uprising in Bangladesh, many figures within India’s ruling establishment have reminded that the core of the relationship between the two countries is 1971. In a message sent this year on 26 March to Professor Yunus, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reminded him, ‘The spirit of 1971 still serves as the guiding light of our bilateral relationship.’
Modi did not explicitly say, ‘For this, Bangladeshis should be grateful,’ but Indian media have repeatedly reminded their audience of this. In their eyes, Hasina, the daughter of Bangabandhu, and her government are the bearers of that 1971 spirit. It is through this ‘lens of self-satisfaction and gratitude’ that they view things, which is why Indians cannot conceive that the ‘old enemy’ Pakistan and another adversary from 1971, China, might gain influence in Bangladesh.
If the India–Bangladesh relationship is to be elevated to a realistic, balanced, and mutually respectful level, India must move away from its past ‘mindset.’ Bangladesh should be recognised not as a ‘client state’ but as a sovereign neighbour. A major reason for India’s numerous disputes in South Asia is its hesitation to fully accept its neighbours as sovereign equals.
Instead of considering the political context of Bangladesh’s domestic power shift, Indian commentators and policymakers have found a convenient target to blame—the head of the caretaker government, Professor Yunus.
One such figure is the military commentator Ashish Singh. On 15 December last year, on the occasion of Victory Day, he wrote an article in the Sunday Guardian titled ‘India’s Regional Leadership and Bangladesh’s Ingratitude.’ Without any pretense, he wrote: ‘It was we who brought independence to Bangladesh. Instead of expressing gratitude, the youth of Bangladesh are questioning India’s role and criticising it as “hegemonic.”’
Ashish Singh further wrote: ‘Bangladesh, which once benefited from India’s valour, is now objecting to that very valour. They are now expressing concerns over issues like trade deficits.’
Another Indian analyst, Colonel Abhay Balakrishnan Pattabardhan, in Organizer magazine, expressed his frustration more directly, writing that those now supporting Bangladesh’s interim government show no gratitude towards India. Yet, without India’s vast financial and military support, independence could never have been achieved. Such ingratitude is completely unexpected.
In other words, Hasina’s fall does not merely signify the fall of India’s closest ally; it also represents the fall of the 1971 spirit. Their ‘nostalgia’ for 1971 is hardly surprising—they lost over three thousand military personnel in that Liberation War. What is surprising, however, is that Indians largely view the struggle for Bangladesh’s independence as a ‘transactional’ or quid-pro-quo relationship: ‘We suffered great losses in your war; now it is your turn to repay us.’
In other words, even though Bangladesh has moved beyond 1971 and reached 2025, India’s thinking on its relationship with this neighbour is still stuck in 1971. For the new generation that led the mass uprising, Hasina is not a symbol of the Liberation War; rather, she represents a gross violation of the values of that struggle.
According to the Indian ‘playbook,’ Hasina consolidated the two core ideals of the Liberation War—secularism and opposition to fundamentalism. This explains India’s interest and affection toward her. Several Indian strategists have alleged, ‘Under Yunus, Bangladesh has become a stronghold of fundamentalists, and Pakistan has infiltrated with the direct support of this government.’
In this mindset, emotion outweighs reason, and at the heart of that emotion is the long-standing tendency to view Bangladesh as a ‘client.’ Indian writer Sandwip Ray has noted: ‘We assumed that Bangladesh loves us because of 1971, yet that nostalgia faded long ago.’
Not a client state
If the India–Bangladesh relationship is to be elevated to a realistic, balanced, and mutually respectful level, India must move away from its past ‘mindset.’ Bangladesh should be recognised not as a ‘client state’ but as a sovereign neighbour. A major reason for India’s numerous disputes in South Asia is its hesitation to fully accept its neighbours as sovereign equals.
This is not only our view; some Indian experts have begun to express the same. Professor Happymon Jacob of Jawaharlal Nehru University has written that India’s problem is its desire to control its smaller neighbours—but this desire for control is merely an illusion.
Even though India sees itself as the ‘elder brother,’ it has not always acted like one—a fact many Indians have acknowledged. The long-standing dispute over river water shares between the two countries is one example of this.
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Roy has acknowledged that Bangladesh is dissatisfied over not receiving its share of the Teesta River. In her words, this is not just about a river; it also reflects India’s sincerity toward its neighbour.
The same applies to the unequal trade relationship. Well-known security expert Sushant Singh, with a touch of irony, has remarked that India calls itself Bangladesh’s ‘best friend,’ yet repeatedly imposes non-tariff barriers on their exports. He reminded that ‘friendship is not merely an emotional statement; it is a policy decision.’
*Hasan Ferdous is a journalist
For Bangladesh and India, 1971 is not just a history of friendship or cooperation — it is much more than that. But no relationship can remain the same forever. Half a century has passed; realities have changed, generations have changed, and so have interests. Hasan Ferdous has written in two parts about Bangladesh–India relations. Today, the first part has been published.
Five and a half decades later, Bangladesh–India relations now stand before a difficult reality. After the 2024 mass uprising, Bangladesh has changed significantly; a new force has emerged at the centre of power.
Two paths lie ahead—either deny this change and remain rooted in the past, or accept the altered reality and seek a new direction. Which path will we choose?
One thing is clear. At this moment, the main crisis for both countries is former prime minister Sheikh Hasina; both nations are entangled over her. Although the court completed its judicial responsibility by sentencing her to death, the implementation of this verdict has now become a thorn in the throat of the Yunus government.
Many people, especially those who directly took part in the mass uprising, demand that Hasina be immediately brought back to the country and the verdict carried out. Yet even a fool understands that this is impossible without India’s consent. Still, various flimsy arguments are being offered to claim that she will eventually be brought back, even if it requires going to an international court. But this crisis is not about just one individual; it is the inevitable outcome of long-standing structural flaws in the relationship between the two countries.
On the other hand, by granting political asylum to Sheikh Hasina, India now finds itself unable either to swallow her or to spit her out. Sending her back would mean execution, and India would not push a loyal ally into such a fate. For the ruling BJP, that could trigger a major internal political disaster.
Conversely, it is clear that the relationship between the two countries will not return to normal unless Hasina is returned. The diplomatic vacuum created after the fall of the Hasina government has opened a space that Pakistan is trying to slip into. On the other side of the door stands China. None of this is favourable to India’s national interests.
Structural imbalance
Most commentators agree on one point: the current distance between the two countries is the result of the India-dependent politics and diplomacy built during Hasina’s 15 years in power. Instead of relying on the people of Bangladesh, India relied on Hasina. And what happens when all the eggs are placed in one basket is exactly what happened—when Hasina fell, India lost both its ‘eggs’ and the ‘basket.’
Indian writer Vinod Khosla has described this as the ‘structural asymmetry’ in the relationship between the two neighbouring states. Instead of treating Bangladesh as a sovereign neighbour and partner, India viewed it as a client state. The more submissive it appeared, the more value it held for Indian policymakers.
Hasina herself was aware of this. That is why she often remarked, ‘I have given India so much that they cannot even imagine anything else.’ A foreign minister of the Hasina government once even said, ‘For its own interests, India must keep Hasina in power.’
Even though India sees itself as the ‘elder brother,’ it has not always acted like one—a fact many Indians have acknowledged. The long-standing dispute over river water shares between the two countries is one example of this.
Even though unequal, this relationship had an internal logic. In all master–client or patron–vassal relationships, the central logic is that despite the inequality, both sides protect each other’s strategic interests. When necessary, the master will hold an umbrella over the vassal’s head; in return, the vassal will unquestioningly follow whatever instructions come from above.
The problem is that, in the long run, such unequal relationships inevitably generate resentment within the weaker or client state. People begin to think that their rulers are getting away with massive abuses of power under the protection of the ‘master’ state. This resentment is directed both at the authoritarian domestic rulers and equally at the foreign patrons.
With this in mind, the well-known Indian strategic thinker Raja Mohan has written that whenever a small neighbouring country and its people—whether Bangladesh or any other—feel that their sovereignty is being bent under the pressure of a larger neighbour, negative reactions become inevitable. In Raja Mohan’s words, this is a ‘nationalistic backlash.’ In Bangladesh, it manifested as anger, suspicion, and deep distrust regarding India’s intentions.
A similar conclusion has been reached by India’s former National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon. He believes that not only Bangladesh, but almost every small neighbour in South Asia has a structurally unequal relationship with India.
The reason is that, instead of building relationships with neighbouring countries on the basis of equality, India has personalised these relationships. A country is defined by its people and its state institutions.
It is possible to have a rapport with a favoured leader of a neighboring country, but if that relationship is prioritised over engagement with the country’s people and institutions, the foundation of the entire relationship becomes unstable. In Menon’s words: ‘When you prioritise an individual over a country’s (democratic) institutions, the outcome is unlikely to be positive—this is almost certain.’
Nostalgia for 1971
This unequal relationship between India and Bangladesh has a structural and psycho-cultural dimension, as well as a historical background. Speaking with Indian diplomats and intellectuals in New York, it became evident that regarding Bangladesh, they tend to assume that India is the ‘elder brother’ and Bangladesh the ‘younger brother.’
Behind this attitude lies a hidden reason: nostalgia for 1971. Almost all of them view Bangladesh’s victory in the Liberation War simultaneously as their own triumph and as a gift for the younger brother.
It is worth recalling that a few years ago, Major General CP Singh wrote with some self-congratulation, ‘It is not just that we made Bangladesh independent in 14 days; we also split Pakistan into two pieces.'
After last year’s mass uprising in Bangladesh, many figures within India’s ruling establishment have reminded that the core of the relationship between the two countries is 1971. In a message sent this year on 26 March to Professor Yunus, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reminded him, ‘The spirit of 1971 still serves as the guiding light of our bilateral relationship.’
Modi did not explicitly say, ‘For this, Bangladeshis should be grateful,’ but Indian media have repeatedly reminded their audience of this. In their eyes, Hasina, the daughter of Bangabandhu, and her government are the bearers of that 1971 spirit. It is through this ‘lens of self-satisfaction and gratitude’ that they view things, which is why Indians cannot conceive that the ‘old enemy’ Pakistan and another adversary from 1971, China, might gain influence in Bangladesh.
If the India–Bangladesh relationship is to be elevated to a realistic, balanced, and mutually respectful level, India must move away from its past ‘mindset.’ Bangladesh should be recognised not as a ‘client state’ but as a sovereign neighbour. A major reason for India’s numerous disputes in South Asia is its hesitation to fully accept its neighbours as sovereign equals.
Instead of considering the political context of Bangladesh’s domestic power shift, Indian commentators and policymakers have found a convenient target to blame—the head of the caretaker government, Professor Yunus.
One such figure is the military commentator Ashish Singh. On 15 December last year, on the occasion of Victory Day, he wrote an article in the Sunday Guardian titled ‘India’s Regional Leadership and Bangladesh’s Ingratitude.’ Without any pretense, he wrote: ‘It was we who brought independence to Bangladesh. Instead of expressing gratitude, the youth of Bangladesh are questioning India’s role and criticising it as “hegemonic.”’
Ashish Singh further wrote: ‘Bangladesh, which once benefited from India’s valour, is now objecting to that very valour. They are now expressing concerns over issues like trade deficits.’
Another Indian analyst, Colonel Abhay Balakrishnan Pattabardhan, in Organizer magazine, expressed his frustration more directly, writing that those now supporting Bangladesh’s interim government show no gratitude towards India. Yet, without India’s vast financial and military support, independence could never have been achieved. Such ingratitude is completely unexpected.
In other words, Hasina’s fall does not merely signify the fall of India’s closest ally; it also represents the fall of the 1971 spirit. Their ‘nostalgia’ for 1971 is hardly surprising—they lost over three thousand military personnel in that Liberation War. What is surprising, however, is that Indians largely view the struggle for Bangladesh’s independence as a ‘transactional’ or quid-pro-quo relationship: ‘We suffered great losses in your war; now it is your turn to repay us.’
In other words, even though Bangladesh has moved beyond 1971 and reached 2025, India’s thinking on its relationship with this neighbour is still stuck in 1971. For the new generation that led the mass uprising, Hasina is not a symbol of the Liberation War; rather, she represents a gross violation of the values of that struggle.
According to the Indian ‘playbook,’ Hasina consolidated the two core ideals of the Liberation War—secularism and opposition to fundamentalism. This explains India’s interest and affection toward her. Several Indian strategists have alleged, ‘Under Yunus, Bangladesh has become a stronghold of fundamentalists, and Pakistan has infiltrated with the direct support of this government.’
In this mindset, emotion outweighs reason, and at the heart of that emotion is the long-standing tendency to view Bangladesh as a ‘client.’ Indian writer Sandwip Ray has noted: ‘We assumed that Bangladesh loves us because of 1971, yet that nostalgia faded long ago.’
Not a client state
If the India–Bangladesh relationship is to be elevated to a realistic, balanced, and mutually respectful level, India must move away from its past ‘mindset.’ Bangladesh should be recognised not as a ‘client state’ but as a sovereign neighbour. A major reason for India’s numerous disputes in South Asia is its hesitation to fully accept its neighbours as sovereign equals.
This is not only our view; some Indian experts have begun to express the same. Professor Happymon Jacob of Jawaharlal Nehru University has written that India’s problem is its desire to control its smaller neighbours—but this desire for control is merely an illusion.
Even though India sees itself as the ‘elder brother,’ it has not always acted like one—a fact many Indians have acknowledged. The long-standing dispute over river water shares between the two countries is one example of this.
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Roy has acknowledged that Bangladesh is dissatisfied over not receiving its share of the Teesta River. In her words, this is not just about a river; it also reflects India’s sincerity toward its neighbour.
The same applies to the unequal trade relationship. Well-known security expert Sushant Singh, with a touch of irony, has remarked that India calls itself Bangladesh’s ‘best friend,’ yet repeatedly imposes non-tariff barriers on their exports. He reminded that ‘friendship is not merely an emotional statement; it is a policy decision.’
*Hasan Ferdous is a journalist
