India obtained ports from Iran. Then India handed over Iranian naval intelligence to Israel... India has never known what "shame" means.
[🇧🇩] Indo-Bangla Relation: India's Regional Ambition, Geopolitical Reality, and Strategic Options For Bangladesh
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Indians are not only shameless, they are liars also.
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India has almost wiped out extreme poverty: International Monetary Fund
In India, the number of people living in extreme poverty -- defined by the World Bank as living on US$1.9 or less in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms -- was 0.8% of the population in the pre-pandemic year 2019, stated the IMF paper, published on April 5, 2022.
Updated on: Apr 07, 2022 5:40 PM ISTByZia Haq
New Delhi: India has almost eradicated extreme poverty and brought down consumption inequality to its lowest levels in 40 years through state-provided food handouts, according to a new working paper published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
India has almost wiped out extreme poverty, says IMF (REUTERS)
The IMF working paper -- authored by economists Surjit Bhalla, Arvind Virmani and Karan Bhasin -- said that the proportion of people living in extreme poverty, at less than 1%, remained steady even during the pandemic on the back of “in-kind” subsidies, especially food rations.
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The study comes at a time when several recent global reports have pointed to the widening gap between the rich and poor in Asia’s third-largest economy, while studies on the economic shocks of the Covid-19 pandemic vary in their conclusions.
In India, the number of people living in extreme poverty -- defined by the World Bank as living on US$1.9 or less in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms -- was 0.8% of the population in the pre-pandemic year 2019, stated the IMF paper, published on April 5, 2022.
Food rations were “instrumental” in ensuring that extreme poverty did not increase and “remained at that low level” in the pandemic year 2020, the study found. PPP is a metric that equalises the buying power of different currencies to make comparisons easy.
“Our results also demonstrate the social safety net provided by the expansion of India’s food subsidy program absorbed a major part of the pandemic shock,” the authors stated. Such back-to-back low poverty rates suggest India has eliminated extreme poverty, they concluded.
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Also read: Pakistan in turmoil, IMF's $6 billion bailout programme on hold
What sets their study apart, according to the authors, is the effect of subsidy adjustments on poverty. The results are “striking”, they said in the working paper. Food handouts curbed poverty by acting like “cash transfers”.
IMF states that its working papers describe research in progress, and are published to elicit comments.
Real (inflation-adjusted) inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, which stands at 0.294, is now very close to its lowest level 0.284 observed in 1993-94, the paper stated. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality.
“The food subsidy is 5kg per person. In terms of a household, that would be about 25 kg a month. Now if you convert that into prices, that would come to about ₹750. This is not an insignificant amount for really poor households,” said Pronab Sen, former chief statistician of India.
“But I cannot imagine ₹750 changing the inequality part of it. Absolute poverty in terms of hunger…yes, but inequality is a different ballgame. ₹750 is just not enough to move the needle on inequality,” Sen added.
Also read: Why IMF praised PM Modi’s food security scheme during pandemic
Most previous studies and measures of poverty and inequality did not account for the role of food handouts, the paper’s authors noted. “These (new) estimates include, for the first time, the effect of in-kind food subsides on poverty and inequality,” the paper stated.
During the first Covid-19 lockdown in 2020, the Modi government launched the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Ann Yojana (PMGKAY), a programme to distribute a fixed quantity of free foodgrain (5kg per head) to the poor beyond their usual entitlement of 25kg a month of subsidised grains.
Over 800 million beneficiaries under the National Food Security Act are covered by the programme. Last week, the government said it would extend the PMGKAY till September 2022.
A National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper in December last year, too, showed that inequality surprisingly reduced during the pandemic, mainly because incomes of the rich from the services sector had plunged, while farm-sector output was resilient. However, this paper found a spike in extreme poverty during the pandemic.
When India’s economy saw its worst-ever recession of -6.6% in 2020-21, the farm sector grew 3.3%, according to revised official estimates.
The World Inequality Report, released in December last year, said India emerged as the most unequal country with the top 1% of the population holding more than one-fifth of the total national income in 2021.
The richest Indians more than doubled their wealth during the Covid-19 crisis, according to the global Oxfam Davos Report of 2022.
Yet another study by the International food Policy Research Institute scholar Yanyan Liu in 2019 found that the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme, acting as a conditional cash transfer, had increased welfare and reduced inequality.
Bhalla, one of the authors of the IMF paper, said, “Given that extreme poverty has been eradicated, India should move from $1.9 PPP poverty line to $3.2 poverty line”. This essentially means setting the poverty line high and is significant because it raises the income threshold for determining those below poverty line, and such a move would allow more people to qualify for subsidies.
“Bhalla’s method of using National Accounts Statistics numbers to estimate poverty is not new and he had declared poverty to have become insignificant in India 20 years ago,” said Jawaharlal Nehru University economist Himanshu.
Most economists do not agree with his method, Himanshu said, adding: “That is why we need another round of consumer expenditure survey to ascertain exact trends in poverty and inequality in India.”
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Why should Bangladesh be concerned about the elections in Assam and West Bengal?
Minorities in Assam and West Bengal border share cultural and historical ties with Bangladesh. So the elections there are a matter of concern for Dhaka
en.prothomalo.com
Why should Bangladesh be concerned about the elections in Assam and West Bengal?
Assam and West Bengal are Indian states in the border with Bangladesh. Altaf Parvez writes about why Bangladesh is concerned with the election results in these two states.
Altaf Parvez Contributor image
Altaf Parvez
Flags of various political parties are now being sold on the streets of Kolkata ahead of the legislative assembly elections. ANI
However, although this remains politically appealing as a campaign issue, the old-style “infiltrator” narrative has lost novelty. As a result, India’s ruling establishment has adopted new strategies in these states. In effect, both strategies are extensions of the long-standing theory of illegal infiltration, and they carry broad risks for Bangladesh.
What has happened in Assam to reduce the political strength of Muslims.
Assam and West Bengal are among the Indian states where Muslims constitute a significant portion of the population. In Assam, they make up about 34 per cent, and in West Bengal around 27-28 percent. Although they lag behind the majority in political and economic power in every respect, during legislative assembly elections in both states, these minorities are viewed as a ‘vote bank.’
The ruling power has this time worked with the goal of further reducing Muslim representation in the legislative assembly.
Accordingly, it has altered the delimitation of constituencies in such a way that the number of Muslim-majority seats has dropped to 20.
The Assam legislative assembly has 126 seats. Muslims were the majority in 35 of those constituencies. Although they support various political parties, in these 35 seats, and in several others, this minority group has played an important role in determining electoral outcomes. By portraying these Muslims as ‘infiltrators’ and turning fear of Bangladesh into a political tool, the BJP has long been in power in Assam. In 2011, the party had only 5 seats in the state; now it has 60.
In many Muslim-majority constituencies, certain areas have been merged with surrounding Hindu-majority constituencies. At the same time, some Hindu-majority areas have been added to those Muslim-majority seats.
Not only have the Muslim-majority constituencies been geographically restructured, but constituencies where Hindu and Muslim votes were nearly equal have also been redrawn in this way. The aim has been to reduce the Muslim vote bank in these seats and ensure the victory of BJP or any party’s Hindu candidates.
Where this was not possible, many Muslim-majority areas have been consolidated into a single constituency instead of multiple ones.
In some cases, Muslim-majority seats have been reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. On the other hand, in regions like Karbi Anglong and the Bodo autonomous areas, the number of legislative assembly seats has been increased while reducing seats in Muslim-majority regions.
Despite this progress, the ruling power has this time worked with the goal of further reducing Muslim representation in the legislative assembly. Accordingly, it has altered the delimitation of constituencies in such a way that the number of Muslim-majority seats has dropped to 20.
These structural, multi-dimensional changes and measures resemble a kind of modern, subtle form of discrimination and have not been implemented solely to target minorities. They have also been aimed at weakening the Congress, leftist parties, and Muslim-based parties at the national level. Until now, minorities largely voted for these parties, and these parties often nominated Muslim candidates in constituencies with significant Muslim voter presence.
Now the situation has reached a point where opposition parties, due to the reconfiguration of constituencies, are compelled to nominate fewer Muslim candidates. Such (legal!) reforms of the electoral system to influence outcomes are rare in the modern world.
The BJP seeks to politically weaken Muslims at two levels, within the legislative assembly and within political parties.
If this current ‘experiment’ in Assam proves successful, similar constituency reconfigurations may be carried out in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and elsewhere, potentially making the national parliament (Lok Sabha) and various state assemblies increasingly devoid of minorities. A similar exercise was also conducted in Jammu and Kashmir after its statehood was revoked.
Since Muslim minorities are already economically disadvantaged, becoming politically marginalised would likely begin to erode their social foundations. They may then seek to leave behind a life resembling displacement and move toward places where they can find human dignity. Because Assam and West Bengal border Bangladesh, and because minorities in these regions share cultural and historical ties with this side, the issue is a matter of concern for Dhaka.
Although the results in Assam have not yet been announced, many locals think that this time the state assembly may see the lowest number of Muslim representatives in its history, possibly around 20-22. In the past, however, Muslim representation in the state’s legislative body used to be around 30.
Similar concerns are being observed in West Bengal as well. However, in this state, the Election Commission appears to be pursuing a different and innovative initiative that could help fulfill the BJP’s ambitions.
At least 4 million voters are unable to reach polling stations
West Bengal has 294 legislative assembly seats. Although the Trinamool Congress has maintained dominance in the state for the past 15 years, the BJP’s rise in terms of vote share and seats has been remarkably rapid. In 2011, the party had no seats and only 4 percent of the vote. In the next election, its vote share rose to 10 percent and it won 3 seats. By 2021, its seats increased to 77 and its vote share reached 38 percent. This progress has taken place in just one and a half decades.
In the last election, the vote difference between the Trinamool Congress and the BJP was only 10 percentage points (38 per cent to 48 per cent). Therefore, if Trinamool’s vote share can be reduced by just 5 per cent, the BJP could achieve the rest of its target. How could that be possible?
To find the answer to that question, the SIR (Special Intensive Review) has been introduced in this border state of Bangladesh. SIR stands for “Special Intensive Review.” In Bengali, it roughly means a “special voter list updating exercise.”
Updating voter lists is a normal practice in all countries where elections are held. Typically, its aim is to remove deceased voters, people who have moved away from the area, or those who are registered more than once.
This was also carried out in West Bengal in 2002. The problem this time lies in the word “special.” Because of this “special” nature, a concept called “logical discrepancy” has been added during the updating process. Its implication is that anyone whose name or details show any kind of “discrepancy” will be removed. In addition, various documents must be submitted as proof of citizenship.
As a result of this “special” updating exercise, 9.1 million people have been excluded from the voter list in West Bengal this time. A large portion of those removed are Muslims and members of the Matua community. Both groups appear to be indirect victims of what Home Minister Amit Shah earlier referred to as “infiltrators.”
Investigations by journalists in West Bengal suggest that among the said 9.1 million, at least 4 million voters were removed due to minor errors or discrepancies in their records. According to commentators, they have become victims of a legally valid but manipulative updating process. About 65 per cent of these 4 million are said to be Muslim voters, while nearly 30 percent are Matua voters.
The BJP was aware that a major foundation of Mamata Banerjee’s “vote magic” lies in Muslim voters. Among lower-income Muslims, inconsistencies in documentation are quite common. For example, someone named “MD Hanif” might appear elsewhere as “Md. Hanif.” A woman named “Hanufa Begum” after marriage might also be recorded as “Hanufa Bibi.” Such variations between “Begum” and “Bibi” have reportedly been caught by "Artificial Intelligence"! In this way, Muslim vote banks in Trinamool strongholds have been excluded.
Some have questioned whether the exclusion of Matua voters, alongside Muslims, might also harm the BJP. It is true that a large section of the Matua community supports the BJP, but Trinamool also has a voter base among them. In an effort to corner Muslim voters, a large number of Matua voters were also excluded. As a corrective measure, the BJP is assuring that they will soon be granted citizenship. No such assurance, or possibility, exists in the case of Muslims.
The Matua community is being told quite explicitly: “Your vote will be lost once, we will fix it next time; but Muslims will be excluded permanently, think about which is better.” The BJP is having Matua leader Shantanu Thakur say things like this. Shantanu has also said, “If we have to go without voting for a year to remove 5 million Rohingyas, that would still be worth it.”
In this way, the entire election has been pushed into a deep abyss of extreme ethnic and religious polarisation.
If the Trinamool Congress loses power in West Bengal, it will be a historic cause for celebration for the BJP-RSS family. In the last election, Trinamool won 45 seats by narrow margins; SIR may facilitate BJP’s advance in those constituencies. Events are unfolding quite openly.
Under the SIR’s “logical discrepancy” process, the district that lost the highest number of voting rights was Murshidabad, while the area least affected was Alipurduar, a BJP stronghold. Overall, this polarisation across the state has been shaped through the SIR process.
Why Assam and West Bengal are of special importance to the BJP
Given the current state of India’s national politics and the Lok Sabha, even if the BJP were to lose the legislative assembly elections in West Bengal or Assam, it would not create any serious problem for it. Moreover, the next national election is still at least three years away. However, West Bengal and Assam are important to the BJP because they are border states adjoining Bangladesh.
Hindutva ideologues believe that the political power of Muslims in these two states constitutes a “security threat.” Forcibly removing them would create widespread uproar. But the social marginalisation and economic hardship resulting from a lack of political and civic rights would gradually push these people into a situation where displacement becomes their only option. A similar situation could also arise for the Matua community.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi once campaigned even in Orakandi of Gopalganj in an effort to attract Matua votes. This time, however, under the SIR process, hundreds of thousands of Matua people across Nadia and the North and South 24 Parganas are losing their citizenship status, making the BJP’s past promises appear like deception to them. The loss of civic rights leads to deprivation in many areas such as health and education, stripping people of broader social rights. What happened in Assam through the National Register of Citizens (NRC) could effectively happen in West Bengal through SIR.
In the NRC process in 2019, 1.9 million people were excluded, the majority of whom were Bengali-speaking. In the 2026 SIR process in West Bengal, the 4 million people losing voting rights are also almost entirely Bengali-speaking. In this way, the ruling establishment in India has, at least on paper, created 5.9 million “infiltrators” on both sides of the Bangladesh border.
Whatever the result, the reaction will be similar
After the NRC in Assam, BJP’s power became more consolidated. This time, constituency reorganisation may strengthen it further. Detailed results will be known on May 4. The outcome of the intense electoral battle in West Bengal will also be clear then.
If the Trinamool Congress loses power in West Bengal, it will be a historic cause for celebration for the BJP-RSS family. In the last election, Trinamool won 45 seats by narrow margins; SIR may facilitate BJP’s advance in those constituencies. Events are unfolding quite openly.
In Nandigram, the constituency of BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari, 95 per cent of those excluded under SIR were found to be Muslim.
However, regardless of the outcome of the 23 and 29 April elections, whether the BJP wins or loses, and whether figures like Rupa Ganguly, Lovely Maitra, or Nusrat Jahan ultimately celebrate victory, the developments that have already taken place are sending a clear message to Bangladesh.
* Altaf Parvez is political analyst and researcher
Assam and West Bengal are Indian states in the border with Bangladesh. Altaf Parvez writes about why Bangladesh is concerned with the election results in these two states.
Altaf Parvez Contributor image
Altaf Parvez
Flags of various political parties are now being sold on the streets of Kolkata ahead of the legislative assembly elections. ANI
However, although this remains politically appealing as a campaign issue, the old-style “infiltrator” narrative has lost novelty. As a result, India’s ruling establishment has adopted new strategies in these states. In effect, both strategies are extensions of the long-standing theory of illegal infiltration, and they carry broad risks for Bangladesh.
What has happened in Assam to reduce the political strength of Muslims.
Assam and West Bengal are among the Indian states where Muslims constitute a significant portion of the population. In Assam, they make up about 34 per cent, and in West Bengal around 27-28 percent. Although they lag behind the majority in political and economic power in every respect, during legislative assembly elections in both states, these minorities are viewed as a ‘vote bank.’
The ruling power has this time worked with the goal of further reducing Muslim representation in the legislative assembly.
Accordingly, it has altered the delimitation of constituencies in such a way that the number of Muslim-majority seats has dropped to 20.
The Assam legislative assembly has 126 seats. Muslims were the majority in 35 of those constituencies. Although they support various political parties, in these 35 seats, and in several others, this minority group has played an important role in determining electoral outcomes. By portraying these Muslims as ‘infiltrators’ and turning fear of Bangladesh into a political tool, the BJP has long been in power in Assam. In 2011, the party had only 5 seats in the state; now it has 60.
In many Muslim-majority constituencies, certain areas have been merged with surrounding Hindu-majority constituencies. At the same time, some Hindu-majority areas have been added to those Muslim-majority seats.
Not only have the Muslim-majority constituencies been geographically restructured, but constituencies where Hindu and Muslim votes were nearly equal have also been redrawn in this way. The aim has been to reduce the Muslim vote bank in these seats and ensure the victory of BJP or any party’s Hindu candidates.
Where this was not possible, many Muslim-majority areas have been consolidated into a single constituency instead of multiple ones.
In some cases, Muslim-majority seats have been reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. On the other hand, in regions like Karbi Anglong and the Bodo autonomous areas, the number of legislative assembly seats has been increased while reducing seats in Muslim-majority regions.
Despite this progress, the ruling power has this time worked with the goal of further reducing Muslim representation in the legislative assembly. Accordingly, it has altered the delimitation of constituencies in such a way that the number of Muslim-majority seats has dropped to 20.
These structural, multi-dimensional changes and measures resemble a kind of modern, subtle form of discrimination and have not been implemented solely to target minorities. They have also been aimed at weakening the Congress, leftist parties, and Muslim-based parties at the national level. Until now, minorities largely voted for these parties, and these parties often nominated Muslim candidates in constituencies with significant Muslim voter presence.
Now the situation has reached a point where opposition parties, due to the reconfiguration of constituencies, are compelled to nominate fewer Muslim candidates. Such (legal!) reforms of the electoral system to influence outcomes are rare in the modern world.
The BJP seeks to politically weaken Muslims at two levels, within the legislative assembly and within political parties.
If this current ‘experiment’ in Assam proves successful, similar constituency reconfigurations may be carried out in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and elsewhere, potentially making the national parliament (Lok Sabha) and various state assemblies increasingly devoid of minorities. A similar exercise was also conducted in Jammu and Kashmir after its statehood was revoked.
Since Muslim minorities are already economically disadvantaged, becoming politically marginalised would likely begin to erode their social foundations. They may then seek to leave behind a life resembling displacement and move toward places where they can find human dignity. Because Assam and West Bengal border Bangladesh, and because minorities in these regions share cultural and historical ties with this side, the issue is a matter of concern for Dhaka.
Although the results in Assam have not yet been announced, many locals think that this time the state assembly may see the lowest number of Muslim representatives in its history, possibly around 20-22. In the past, however, Muslim representation in the state’s legislative body used to be around 30.
Similar concerns are being observed in West Bengal as well. However, in this state, the Election Commission appears to be pursuing a different and innovative initiative that could help fulfill the BJP’s ambitions.
At least 4 million voters are unable to reach polling stations
West Bengal has 294 legislative assembly seats. Although the Trinamool Congress has maintained dominance in the state for the past 15 years, the BJP’s rise in terms of vote share and seats has been remarkably rapid. In 2011, the party had no seats and only 4 percent of the vote. In the next election, its vote share rose to 10 percent and it won 3 seats. By 2021, its seats increased to 77 and its vote share reached 38 percent. This progress has taken place in just one and a half decades.
In the last election, the vote difference between the Trinamool Congress and the BJP was only 10 percentage points (38 per cent to 48 per cent). Therefore, if Trinamool’s vote share can be reduced by just 5 per cent, the BJP could achieve the rest of its target. How could that be possible?
To find the answer to that question, the SIR (Special Intensive Review) has been introduced in this border state of Bangladesh. SIR stands for “Special Intensive Review.” In Bengali, it roughly means a “special voter list updating exercise.”
Updating voter lists is a normal practice in all countries where elections are held. Typically, its aim is to remove deceased voters, people who have moved away from the area, or those who are registered more than once.
This was also carried out in West Bengal in 2002. The problem this time lies in the word “special.” Because of this “special” nature, a concept called “logical discrepancy” has been added during the updating process. Its implication is that anyone whose name or details show any kind of “discrepancy” will be removed. In addition, various documents must be submitted as proof of citizenship.
As a result of this “special” updating exercise, 9.1 million people have been excluded from the voter list in West Bengal this time. A large portion of those removed are Muslims and members of the Matua community. Both groups appear to be indirect victims of what Home Minister Amit Shah earlier referred to as “infiltrators.”
Investigations by journalists in West Bengal suggest that among the said 9.1 million, at least 4 million voters were removed due to minor errors or discrepancies in their records. According to commentators, they have become victims of a legally valid but manipulative updating process. About 65 per cent of these 4 million are said to be Muslim voters, while nearly 30 percent are Matua voters.
The BJP was aware that a major foundation of Mamata Banerjee’s “vote magic” lies in Muslim voters. Among lower-income Muslims, inconsistencies in documentation are quite common. For example, someone named “MD Hanif” might appear elsewhere as “Md. Hanif.” A woman named “Hanufa Begum” after marriage might also be recorded as “Hanufa Bibi.” Such variations between “Begum” and “Bibi” have reportedly been caught by "Artificial Intelligence"! In this way, Muslim vote banks in Trinamool strongholds have been excluded.
Some have questioned whether the exclusion of Matua voters, alongside Muslims, might also harm the BJP. It is true that a large section of the Matua community supports the BJP, but Trinamool also has a voter base among them. In an effort to corner Muslim voters, a large number of Matua voters were also excluded. As a corrective measure, the BJP is assuring that they will soon be granted citizenship. No such assurance, or possibility, exists in the case of Muslims.
The Matua community is being told quite explicitly: “Your vote will be lost once, we will fix it next time; but Muslims will be excluded permanently, think about which is better.” The BJP is having Matua leader Shantanu Thakur say things like this. Shantanu has also said, “If we have to go without voting for a year to remove 5 million Rohingyas, that would still be worth it.”
In this way, the entire election has been pushed into a deep abyss of extreme ethnic and religious polarisation.
If the Trinamool Congress loses power in West Bengal, it will be a historic cause for celebration for the BJP-RSS family. In the last election, Trinamool won 45 seats by narrow margins; SIR may facilitate BJP’s advance in those constituencies. Events are unfolding quite openly.
Under the SIR’s “logical discrepancy” process, the district that lost the highest number of voting rights was Murshidabad, while the area least affected was Alipurduar, a BJP stronghold. Overall, this polarisation across the state has been shaped through the SIR process.
Why Assam and West Bengal are of special importance to the BJP
Given the current state of India’s national politics and the Lok Sabha, even if the BJP were to lose the legislative assembly elections in West Bengal or Assam, it would not create any serious problem for it. Moreover, the next national election is still at least three years away. However, West Bengal and Assam are important to the BJP because they are border states adjoining Bangladesh.
Hindutva ideologues believe that the political power of Muslims in these two states constitutes a “security threat.” Forcibly removing them would create widespread uproar. But the social marginalisation and economic hardship resulting from a lack of political and civic rights would gradually push these people into a situation where displacement becomes their only option. A similar situation could also arise for the Matua community.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi once campaigned even in Orakandi of Gopalganj in an effort to attract Matua votes. This time, however, under the SIR process, hundreds of thousands of Matua people across Nadia and the North and South 24 Parganas are losing their citizenship status, making the BJP’s past promises appear like deception to them. The loss of civic rights leads to deprivation in many areas such as health and education, stripping people of broader social rights. What happened in Assam through the National Register of Citizens (NRC) could effectively happen in West Bengal through SIR.
In the NRC process in 2019, 1.9 million people were excluded, the majority of whom were Bengali-speaking. In the 2026 SIR process in West Bengal, the 4 million people losing voting rights are also almost entirely Bengali-speaking. In this way, the ruling establishment in India has, at least on paper, created 5.9 million “infiltrators” on both sides of the Bangladesh border.
Whatever the result, the reaction will be similar
After the NRC in Assam, BJP’s power became more consolidated. This time, constituency reorganisation may strengthen it further. Detailed results will be known on May 4. The outcome of the intense electoral battle in West Bengal will also be clear then.
If the Trinamool Congress loses power in West Bengal, it will be a historic cause for celebration for the BJP-RSS family. In the last election, Trinamool won 45 seats by narrow margins; SIR may facilitate BJP’s advance in those constituencies. Events are unfolding quite openly.
In Nandigram, the constituency of BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari, 95 per cent of those excluded under SIR were found to be Muslim.
However, regardless of the outcome of the 23 and 29 April elections, whether the BJP wins or loses, and whether figures like Rupa Ganguly, Lovely Maitra, or Nusrat Jahan ultimately celebrate victory, the developments that have already taken place are sending a clear message to Bangladesh.
* Altaf Parvez is political analyst and researcher
Saif
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West Bengal poll politics tests the limits of Dhaka-Delhi reset process
That three-word formulation has become the defining doctrine of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the run-up to West Bengal’s two-phase assembly elections scheduled for April 23 and 29.
West Bengal poll politics tests the limits of Dhaka-Delhi reset process
Shakeel Anwar
FILE VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL
“Detect, delete, deport.”
That three-word formulation has become the defining doctrine of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the run-up to West Bengal’s two-phase assembly elections scheduled for April 23 and 29. The party has placed illegal migration at the centre of its political and security narrative, more sharply than in previous campaigns, so Bangladesh has naturally emerged as a reference point. That has implications far beyond state politics, especially at a time when Dhaka and New Delhi are trying to rebuild ties after a sharp downturn following the fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024.
For years, BJP has used the issue of so-called “illegal infiltration” from Bangladesh as a political tool in Assam, where demographic anxieties have long shaped electoral behaviour. The Assam assembly election is now over, but the narrative has not receded—it has shifted, recalibrated, and intensified in West Bengal. Terms like “infiltrators,” “outsiders,” and “illegal entrants” are dominating campaign speeches, frequently without naming Bangladesh directly. But the subtext is widely understood.
The strategy is deliberate. Bengal’s politico-cultural landscape demands a more calibrated tone than Assam. Direct references to Bangladeshis—especially Bengali-speaking Muslims—carry electoral risks. But the core message remains intact: migration is a threat to identity, resources, and security. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing a rally in Purba Bardhaman district on April 11, delivered one of the sharpest statements yet: “The infiltrators should start packing their bags; it is time to leave. Those who have helped the infiltrators will not be spared.”
The phrasing is striking not just for its directness, but also for its implied consequences. Across the campaign, BJP leaders have moved beyond general warnings. They are setting implicit deadlines for “infiltrators” to leave, linking migration to voter fraud and welfare leakage, and framing it as a national security issue.
In West Bengal politics, as an Atlantic Council columnist has noted, Bangladesh functions “less as a foreign policy concern than a domestic political proxy through which citizenship, demography, and belonging are contested. For the BJP, references to Bangladesh collapse cross-border history into a narrative of undocumented migration and demographic threat.” In effect, Bangladesh is no longer just a neighbour but a symbol within India’s domestic political contests.
This transformation simplifies a rather complex, historically rooted migration issue into a binary political narrative: insiders versus outsiders. The political utility of the narrative is clear. By linking migration to jobs, welfare, and security, BJP taps into local anxieties while aligning them with a broader national ideology. The result is a message that resonates across constituencies. Even administrative measures are framed within this lens. The revision of electoral rolls through the controversial Special Intensive Revision (SIR), which saw millions of names removed in West Bengal, has been projected by some as a clean-up of “illegal Bangladeshis.”
At the same time, any report of communal tension in Bangladesh is quickly amplified in West Bengal’s political discourse. BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari, seen as a potential chief ministerial face if the party wins, has repeatedly sought to link developments in Bangladesh to security and demographic anxieties in Bengal. In campaigns, he has expressed deep concern over Bangladesh’s February 2026 election results, specifically regarding the performance of Jamaat-e-Islami in constituencies along the Indo-Bangladesh frontier.
All of this is unfolding at a sensitive moment in bilateral relations since the 2024 political transition in Bangladesh. The new government under Tarique Rahman has signalled a pragmatic approach, emphasising mutual respect and reciprocity under a “Bangladesh First” policy. New Delhi, too, has indicated a willingness to engage. But the contrast between diplomatic engagement and campaign rhetoric is stark. While officials on both sides speak of cooperation, political messaging in Bengal continues to cast Bangladesh in a negative light.
For the BNP government, this is both embarrassing and politically uncomfortable. Built historically on an anti-India sentiment, the party chief has consciously repositioned it towards a more centrist and moderate stance. Notably, its election campaign avoided overt anti-India rhetoric. Since assuming office, Tarique Rahman has moved quickly to signal a reset in ties with New Delhi. Yet what he sees across the border is the public demeaning of Bangladesh by the very leaders he is keen to engage and rebuild ties with.
The Bengal campaign, in effect, is acting as a rhetorical drag on diplomacy. Some observers have already flagged this tension. Writing in Deccan Herald after a recent visit to Delhi by Bangladesh’s foreign minister, Smita Sharma suggested that India should tone down its rhetoric. “India would do well to ease up medical visas and resume cricketing ties with the neighbour once the unfortunate shrill rhetoric over Rohingya Muslims and Bangladeshi infiltrators by the BJP campaigners in Assam and West Bengal calms down,” she wrote.
For now, however, there is little indication that BJP is willing to soften its tone in the middle of a crucial election. The rhetoric may well subside once the dust settles following the West Bengal elections, but it is likely to leave a scar. In Bangladesh, memories remain sharp—particularly of Amit Shah’s 2018 remark describing illegal Bangladeshi migrants as “termites.” That phrase continues to resonate, reinforcing perceptions of hostility and making the task of rebuilding trust between the two countries more difficult.
Rhetoric matters in international relations, especially between neighbours with deep historical and cultural ties. India’s strong reaction to remarks by Prof Muhammad Yunus, who described India’s northeast as “landlocked” and Bangladesh as the “only guardian of the ocean,” illustrates how sensitive such language can be. From Dhaka’s perspective, the continued portrayal of Bangladeshis as “infiltrators” and sources of instability is equally sensitive. Ironically, India expects rhetorical restraint from Bangladesh on issues related to its security, but its own political discourse often overlooks Bangladesh’s concerns.
For the BNP government, this presents a delicate challenge. Although Tarique Rahman secured a strong electoral mandate, his government operates under domestic pressure. The Jamaat-NCP opposition coalition continues to mobilise anti-India sentiment, ensuring that any engagement with New Delhi is closely scrutinised. In this context, even routine diplomatic gestures may acquire political significance. If Dhaka appears overly accommodating while Indian leaders publicly link Bangladesh to infiltration and security threats, it risks triggering domestic backlash, a pattern evident during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. Yet a confrontational approach would equally undermine the broader objective of stabilising bilateral ties. The space for manoeuvre is limited.
A significant segment of Bangladesh’s population, especially Gen Z youth who led the 2024 uprising, still view India with deep suspicion. The grievance is rooted, among other factors, in inflammatory rhetoric from sections of Indian media and political circles. This dynamic was evident during the interim government period, when Indian narratives about minority issues in Bangladesh triggered strong reactions in Dhaka. In West Bengal, the amplification of such issues for electoral gain further narrows the space for diplomacy.
At the heart of this strategy lies the politics of perception. Migration is a complex issue shaped by geography, economics, and history. But in electoral politics, it is often reduced to a simple narrative: outsiders taking what belongs to insiders. Research shows that perceived demographic threat, rather than empirical evidence, plays a decisive role in shaping voter behaviour. In this sense, the “Bangladeshi infiltrator” functions less as a measurable category and more as a political symbol.
The Bengal and Assam elections have turned Bangladesh into a central, if implicit, theme in India’s domestic politics. For BJP, the strategy is seen as electorally effective. For bilateral relations, the effects could be ruinous. Whether these contrasting scenarios—engagement in diplomatic corridors, confrontation on campaign trails—can be reconciled will determine the trajectory of Bangladesh-India relations in the months ahead.
Shakeel Anwar is a former journalist at the BBC.
Shakeel Anwar
FILE VISUAL: ANWAR SOHEL
“Detect, delete, deport.”
That three-word formulation has become the defining doctrine of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the run-up to West Bengal’s two-phase assembly elections scheduled for April 23 and 29. The party has placed illegal migration at the centre of its political and security narrative, more sharply than in previous campaigns, so Bangladesh has naturally emerged as a reference point. That has implications far beyond state politics, especially at a time when Dhaka and New Delhi are trying to rebuild ties after a sharp downturn following the fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024.
For years, BJP has used the issue of so-called “illegal infiltration” from Bangladesh as a political tool in Assam, where demographic anxieties have long shaped electoral behaviour. The Assam assembly election is now over, but the narrative has not receded—it has shifted, recalibrated, and intensified in West Bengal. Terms like “infiltrators,” “outsiders,” and “illegal entrants” are dominating campaign speeches, frequently without naming Bangladesh directly. But the subtext is widely understood.
The strategy is deliberate. Bengal’s politico-cultural landscape demands a more calibrated tone than Assam. Direct references to Bangladeshis—especially Bengali-speaking Muslims—carry electoral risks. But the core message remains intact: migration is a threat to identity, resources, and security. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing a rally in Purba Bardhaman district on April 11, delivered one of the sharpest statements yet: “The infiltrators should start packing their bags; it is time to leave. Those who have helped the infiltrators will not be spared.”
The phrasing is striking not just for its directness, but also for its implied consequences. Across the campaign, BJP leaders have moved beyond general warnings. They are setting implicit deadlines for “infiltrators” to leave, linking migration to voter fraud and welfare leakage, and framing it as a national security issue.
In West Bengal politics, as an Atlantic Council columnist has noted, Bangladesh functions “less as a foreign policy concern than a domestic political proxy through which citizenship, demography, and belonging are contested. For the BJP, references to Bangladesh collapse cross-border history into a narrative of undocumented migration and demographic threat.” In effect, Bangladesh is no longer just a neighbour but a symbol within India’s domestic political contests.
This transformation simplifies a rather complex, historically rooted migration issue into a binary political narrative: insiders versus outsiders. The political utility of the narrative is clear. By linking migration to jobs, welfare, and security, BJP taps into local anxieties while aligning them with a broader national ideology. The result is a message that resonates across constituencies. Even administrative measures are framed within this lens. The revision of electoral rolls through the controversial Special Intensive Revision (SIR), which saw millions of names removed in West Bengal, has been projected by some as a clean-up of “illegal Bangladeshis.”
At the same time, any report of communal tension in Bangladesh is quickly amplified in West Bengal’s political discourse. BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari, seen as a potential chief ministerial face if the party wins, has repeatedly sought to link developments in Bangladesh to security and demographic anxieties in Bengal. In campaigns, he has expressed deep concern over Bangladesh’s February 2026 election results, specifically regarding the performance of Jamaat-e-Islami in constituencies along the Indo-Bangladesh frontier.
All of this is unfolding at a sensitive moment in bilateral relations since the 2024 political transition in Bangladesh. The new government under Tarique Rahman has signalled a pragmatic approach, emphasising mutual respect and reciprocity under a “Bangladesh First” policy. New Delhi, too, has indicated a willingness to engage. But the contrast between diplomatic engagement and campaign rhetoric is stark. While officials on both sides speak of cooperation, political messaging in Bengal continues to cast Bangladesh in a negative light.
For the BNP government, this is both embarrassing and politically uncomfortable. Built historically on an anti-India sentiment, the party chief has consciously repositioned it towards a more centrist and moderate stance. Notably, its election campaign avoided overt anti-India rhetoric. Since assuming office, Tarique Rahman has moved quickly to signal a reset in ties with New Delhi. Yet what he sees across the border is the public demeaning of Bangladesh by the very leaders he is keen to engage and rebuild ties with.
The Bengal campaign, in effect, is acting as a rhetorical drag on diplomacy. Some observers have already flagged this tension. Writing in Deccan Herald after a recent visit to Delhi by Bangladesh’s foreign minister, Smita Sharma suggested that India should tone down its rhetoric. “India would do well to ease up medical visas and resume cricketing ties with the neighbour once the unfortunate shrill rhetoric over Rohingya Muslims and Bangladeshi infiltrators by the BJP campaigners in Assam and West Bengal calms down,” she wrote.
For now, however, there is little indication that BJP is willing to soften its tone in the middle of a crucial election. The rhetoric may well subside once the dust settles following the West Bengal elections, but it is likely to leave a scar. In Bangladesh, memories remain sharp—particularly of Amit Shah’s 2018 remark describing illegal Bangladeshi migrants as “termites.” That phrase continues to resonate, reinforcing perceptions of hostility and making the task of rebuilding trust between the two countries more difficult.
Rhetoric matters in international relations, especially between neighbours with deep historical and cultural ties. India’s strong reaction to remarks by Prof Muhammad Yunus, who described India’s northeast as “landlocked” and Bangladesh as the “only guardian of the ocean,” illustrates how sensitive such language can be. From Dhaka’s perspective, the continued portrayal of Bangladeshis as “infiltrators” and sources of instability is equally sensitive. Ironically, India expects rhetorical restraint from Bangladesh on issues related to its security, but its own political discourse often overlooks Bangladesh’s concerns.
For the BNP government, this presents a delicate challenge. Although Tarique Rahman secured a strong electoral mandate, his government operates under domestic pressure. The Jamaat-NCP opposition coalition continues to mobilise anti-India sentiment, ensuring that any engagement with New Delhi is closely scrutinised. In this context, even routine diplomatic gestures may acquire political significance. If Dhaka appears overly accommodating while Indian leaders publicly link Bangladesh to infiltration and security threats, it risks triggering domestic backlash, a pattern evident during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. Yet a confrontational approach would equally undermine the broader objective of stabilising bilateral ties. The space for manoeuvre is limited.
A significant segment of Bangladesh’s population, especially Gen Z youth who led the 2024 uprising, still view India with deep suspicion. The grievance is rooted, among other factors, in inflammatory rhetoric from sections of Indian media and political circles. This dynamic was evident during the interim government period, when Indian narratives about minority issues in Bangladesh triggered strong reactions in Dhaka. In West Bengal, the amplification of such issues for electoral gain further narrows the space for diplomacy.
At the heart of this strategy lies the politics of perception. Migration is a complex issue shaped by geography, economics, and history. But in electoral politics, it is often reduced to a simple narrative: outsiders taking what belongs to insiders. Research shows that perceived demographic threat, rather than empirical evidence, plays a decisive role in shaping voter behaviour. In this sense, the “Bangladeshi infiltrator” functions less as a measurable category and more as a political symbol.
The Bengal and Assam elections have turned Bangladesh into a central, if implicit, theme in India’s domestic politics. For BJP, the strategy is seen as electorally effective. For bilateral relations, the effects could be ruinous. Whether these contrasting scenarios—engagement in diplomatic corridors, confrontation on campaign trails—can be reconciled will determine the trajectory of Bangladesh-India relations in the months ahead.
Shakeel Anwar is a former journalist at the BBC.
